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Notes
See Michale Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1996), pp. 453–466.
See Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Simon Keller, “Virtue Ethics is Self-Effacing,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85/2 (2007), pp. 221–231.
Glen Pettigrove, “Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” Journal of Ethics 15(2011), p. 197.
In speaking of eudaimonistic theories, I am referring to a family of (ancient) theories in which flourishing is basic. Each of these theories hold that virtue is (at least) necessary for flourishing. As Annas aptly puts it “Aristotle says that being virtuous is necessary; the Stoics, that it is necessary and sufficient; and the Epicureans that flourishing is being in a state of pleasure.” I will be advocating a version that is roughly Aristotelian; flourishing is constituted by virtuous activity. See Julia Annas. “Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism,” in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 213.
I will follow Stocker and Keller in using the term ‘reasons’ to refer to justifying reasons. Meanwhile, I will use the the term ‘motive’ to refer to so-called motivating reasons. Thus, something counts as a reason if it explains or justifies why the action should be performed. Something counts as a motive if it is a consideration that moves the agent. See Keller, op.cit., p. 222.
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 23–24.
See Stocker, op.cit., pp. 453–466.
My aim in this paper is not to establish premise 1. My aim is to establish premise 2 as it relates to eudaimonistic versions.
Hurka discusses other versions of virtue ethics as well, but his strongest argument (and primary focus) is against so-called flourishing-based accounts, with their considerations of personal flourishing. Such accounts are self-effacing, he claims, because they are unattractively egoistic. Meanwhile, Keller claims that “what the virtuous person would do” leads directly into self-effacement (SE1), because it must be read de dicto. The virtue ethicist cannot avail herself of a de re reading.
Annas, op.cit., p. 212.
Pettigrove, op.cit., p. 196.
Hurka, op.cit., p. 246.
Solomon makes roughly the same distinction I have made; Swanton distinguishes between foreground and background motivations; and something similar is implicit in Aristotle as well. See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 128–129; David Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” in Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIII (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame University Press, 1988), pp. 228–441; Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 29. Also, for a discussion of how this gives rise to the self-centeredness objection, see Christopher Toner, “The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics,” Philosophy 81 (2006), pp. 595–617. I will discuss this further in §7.
Pettigrove labels this form of justification “justification for a particular audience” noting that a reason may be effective for certain audiences, and not for others (depending upon antecedent cares, beliefs, and commitments). See Pettigrove, op.cit., p. 197.
If we take (CF) as a criterion of right action, eudaimonistic versions might fall into self-effacement (SE2). Thinking about which action contributes to personal flourishing might lead us to the wrong kind of action altogether. But this depends upon how we view the relation between virtue and flourishing. Annas argues that thoughts about flourishing will include thoughts about virtue, since virtue constitutes (a large part of) flourishing. This is one way to respond to the challenge of (SE2). For my own part, I am reluctant to allow (CF) to serve as a general justification for particular actions.
In my view, eudaimonistic virtue ethics is starting with something we already care deeply about, and proceeding in steps to teach us how to appreciate the intrinsic value of other things, other people, and other causes. Although personal flourishing is an intrinsic good, it is not the only intrinsically good thing.
See Hursthouse, op.cit., p. 28.
Stocker, op.cit., p. 460.
Keller claims (VP) must be read de dicto; one cannot defend virtue ethics by availing oneself of a de re reading of.
For a useful discussion of this distinction as it applies to virtue ethics, see Liezl Van Zyl, “Virtue Ethics and Right Action,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 172–196.
This assumes, of course, that we have some idea what a virtuous person characteristically does—he does what is generous, courageous, temperate, compassionate, just, etc.
For a similar account of what, according to an ethical theory, justifies an action, see Pettigrove, op.cit., p. 197. I disagree with his claim about the inadequacy of the eudaimonistic approach, but Pettigrove offers the best explanation of self-effacement, and he provides an extremely useful template for solving the problem.
This role has been underappreciated in recent discussions of self-effacement. Martinez refers to (VP) as a mere general schemata for types of virtue ethical theories—a schemata that requires further expression. Martinez overlooks the developmental importance of (VP), and the guidance it offers to beginners. Similarly for Keller [2007]. I agree with both authors that virtue ethics must offer something more in terms of action-guidance than just (VP). But it is necessary to acknowledge the developmental importance of (VP) for the person learning virtue. See Joel Martinez, “Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/2 (2011), p. 283.
I do not wish to give a detailed account here of what the development of the virtues requires. I will be assuming that thoughts about virtuous agents, and what virtuous agents do, are especially important. But I do not mean to exclude other important factors. Surely, there are many factors that contribute to the development of virtue (and of skill for that matter): a certain upbringing, a careful study of particular situations, a comprehensive exploration of the various virtues and other principles, close interactions with people who are more advanced in virtue, mentorship, etc.
The same can be said for thinking about the individual virtues and what they require. The virtue of friendship is a clear instance in which explicit thoughts (of what friendship requires) do sometimes detract from the value of an action. Bernard Williams points out, however, that thinking about justice during the performance of an act might not detract from the action’s value. See Bernard Williams, “Acting as the Virtuous Person Acts” in Aristotle and Moral Realism, ed. Robert Heinman (New York: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 13–33.
Annas, op.cit., p. 213.
See Hursthouse, op.cit., p. 300.
This criterion is mentioned by both Hursthouse, and by Pettigrove. It is worth noting here, as Pettigrove does, that the term correctly is used in this criterion in the sense of accurately. In order to make room for his target-centered criterion of good action, Pettigrove turns this into a necessary (not sufficient) condition.
The temperate person is characteristically motivated by those X reasons associated with temperance (e.g. “I’ve already had plenty” or “I can’t afford that right now”), the generous person is motivated by those X reasons associated with generosity (e.g. “She needs it more than I do” or “It would really help her get back on her feet”) and so on. See Williams, op.cit., pp. 18–23.
Pettigrove, op.cit., pp. 202–203.
Williams, op.cit., p. 21.
John McDowell, “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” Ethics, 4: 107 (1988), pp. 47–48.
McDowell, ibid., p. 48.
With one alteration to (PW): In order to allow for his target-centered criterion, Pettigrove provides a practical wisdom criterion that is a necessary but not sufficient condition of rightness. See Pettigrove, op.cit., p. 202.
See Pettigrove, ibid., p. 200.
Suppose an agent is deliberating about whether or not to accept a new job, for example, a job that is intriguing because it pays better than the agent’s current one. But now suppose that the nature of this new occupation is far more emotionally destructive (e.g. telemarketing, prison-guard, etc.), and that the agent’s current work pays well enough—she isn’t in critical need of a higher wage. For such an agent, the X reason may involve considerations of personal flourishing. The practically wise agent will be motivated by a (temperance-related) consideration like “I make enough money as it is” or “the new job is not conducive to my flourishing.” It may seem strange that a temperance-related consideration would involve flourishing. But as Williams observes “The real problem is that there is no X such that courageous or self-controlled people choose their acts for X reasons. Rather, for various other V-related X reasons, they choose acts for those reasons in the face of fear or desire.” The consideration would be temperance-related because she acts on this consideration in the face of temptation of a higher wage.
Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 76.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.4.
This interpretation of Aristotle’s proairoumenos kai proairoumenos di’ auto comes from Bernard Williams. I take this interpretation of Aristotle to be roughly correct, although the interpretive issue isn’t my present concern. My present concern is to put forward a plausible eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, which also avoids the problems associated with self-effacement.
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Harper and Row, 2008), p. 53.
See Hurka, op.cit., p. 246.
Toner, op.cit., p. 596.
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Clark, J.C. Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics and Self-Effacement. J Value Inquiry 50, 507–524 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-015-9533-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-015-9533-6