Abstract
Selinger and Engstrom, A moratorium on cyborgs: Computation, cognition and commerce, 2008 (this issue) urge upon us a moratorium on ‘cyborg discourse’. But the argument underestimates the richness and complexity of our ongoing communal explorations. It leans on a somewhat outdated version of the machine metaphor (exemplified perhaps by a frozen 1970’s Cyborg). The modern cyborg, informed by an evolving computational model of mind, can play a positive role in the critical discussions that Selinger and Engstrom seek.
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Clark, A. The frozen cyborg: A reply to Selinger and Engström. Phenom Cogn Sci 7, 343–346 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9105-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9105-3