Abstract
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of requests for“mercy killings” by patients and their relatives. Under certain conditions,the patient may prefer death to a life devoid of quality. In contrast to thosewho uphold this “quality of life” approach, those who hold the “sanctity oflife” approach claim that life has intrinsic value and must be preservedregardless of its quality. This essay describes these two approaches,examines their flaws, and offers a “golden path” between the two extremepositions.We discuss the halachic and the secular views, arguing for a balancebetween the sanctity of life and the quality of life. We argue that, indeed,such a balance exists in practice, and that life is important, but it is not sacred. Life can be evaluated, but quality of life is not the solecriterion.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
Senior Lecturer, Department of Communication and Faculty of Law, University of Haifa; Director, The Medical Ethics Think-tank, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (1995–1998); Visiting Professor and the Fulbright-Yitzhak Rabin scholar for this year, UCLA School of Law (1999–2000).
Graduate of the Hebrew University Law Faculty, Jerusalem; LLMstudent, University of Toronto Law Faculty.
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Post Coma Unawareness (PCU) is the state commonly referred to in the literature as Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). The moral rationale for our objection to the term PVS and preference for the term PCU is explained in Cohen-Almagor R. Autonomy, Life as an intrinsic value and death with dignity, Science and Engineering Ethics 1995; 1(3): 261–272. See also Cohen-Almagor R. Some observations on post-coma unawareness patients and on other forms of unconscious patients: Policy proposals, Medicine and Law 1997; 16(3): 451–471.
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This responsibility has been recognized and repeated in the U.S. court decisions. See for example Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz Mass 370 N.E. 2d. 417 (1977), at 426; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985). For general discussion see Bopp J. Jr. Is assiated suicide constitutionally protected?, Issues in Law and Medicine 1987; 3(2): 113–140, at 132–133; Kadish SH. Letting patients die: Legal and moral reflections, California Law Rev. 1992; 80: 857–888, at 863.
Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants: v.
Ibid., p. 120; Kuhse H. The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: 211–213.
Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants, chap. 5.
Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Bably Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants: 99.
Ibid., p. 107.
Ibid., p. 108. CAN LIFE BE EVALUATED? 137
Ibid., pp. 110–111. The same method is exhibited in their discussion in pp. 131–136.
Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants: 123.
Ibid., p. 160. See also Kuhse H. The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: 218.
Kuhse H. The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: 204–218; Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants: 160–161.
Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants: 122–123. Singer explains that infants lack rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness. Therefore killing them cannot be equated with killing normal human beings. Instead, the principles that govern the wrongness of killing non-human animals that are sentient, but not rational or self-conscious, apply to them. Singer P. Practical Ethics: 182–183.
Singer P. Practical Ethics: 118. See also Specter, M., The dangerous philosopher. New Yorker (6 September 1999): 46–55.
For further discussion see Cohen-Almagor R. Autonomy, Life as an intrinsic value and death with dignity, op. cit.; Cohen-Almagor R. Reflections on the intriguing issue of the right to die in dignity. Israel Law Review 1995; 29(4): 677–701.
Opening Procedure (Tel Aviv) 1141/90 Eyal v. Dr.Wilenski and Others, 1991: (3)187, p. 199, b.
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Cohen-Almagor, R., Shmueli, M. Can Life Be Evaluated? The Jewish Halachic Approach vs. The Quality of Life Approach in Medical Ethics: A Critical View. Theor Med Bioeth 21, 117–137 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009971004523
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009971004523