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Finking Frankfurt

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Abstract

Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, 0200, ACT, Australia

    Daniel Cohen

  2. School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, 3800, Victoria, Australia

    Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield

Authors
  1. Daniel Cohen
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  2. Toby Handfield
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Correspondence to Daniel Cohen.

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Cohen, D., Handfield, T. Finking Frankfurt. Philos Stud 135, 363–374 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5732-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5732-5

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