Abstract
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Nathan Ballantyne and Ian Evans make essentially the same point in "Sosa's Dreams" Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cohen, S. Knowledge as aptness. Philos Stud 144, 121–125 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9376-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9376-8