Abstract
This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.
Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
A shorter version of this paper, entitled ‘Knowledge and Context’, was presented as a symposium at the 1986 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association and appeared in the Journal of Philosophy 83 (October 1986) 574-83. Because of space limitations, much of the material in sections 1 and 2 of this longer version was compressed into footnotes. Section 3 and many of the footnotes were deleted entirely and the argument of section 5 was presented in a condensed form. I am grateful to Frederick Schmitt and the editors of Synthese for the opportunity to present the paper in its original form.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cohen, S. Knowledge, context, and social standards. Synthese 73, 3–26 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485440
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485440