Abstract
In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument doesn’t depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action, it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However, as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn’t open to the agent not to perform it.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Donald Davidson (1980) Essays on Actions and Events Clarendon Press Oxford
Frankfurt Harry, (1969): ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, The Journal of Philosophy 66, 829–839, reprinted in Watson (ed.), Free Will, 167–176.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2002) Deontic Morality and Control Cambridge University Press Cambridge
Kane Robert, (1999): ‘Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism’, The Journal of Philosophy 96, 217–240, reprinted in Watson (ed.), Free Will, 299–321.
Strawson Galen, (1994): ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75, 5–24, reprinted in Watson (ed.), Free Will, 212–228.
Strawson Peter, (1962): ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy 48, 1–25, reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, 72–93.
Watson Gary (ed.) (2003): Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed.
Wiggins David. ‘Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism’, in Watson (ed.), Free Will, p. 114.
Susan Wolf (1980) ArticleTitle‘Asymmetrical Freedom’ The Journal of Philosophy. 77 151–166
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cohen, D. Openness, Accidentality and Responsibility. Philos Stud 127, 581–597 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7793-2
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7793-2