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Confirmation Theory and Indispensability

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Abstract

In this paper I examine Quine's indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by 'indispensable'. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine's argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy School of Humanieiss, University of Tasmania, USA

    Mark Colyvan

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  1. Mark Colyvan
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Colyvan, M. Confirmation Theory and Indispensability. Philosophical Studies 96, 1–19 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004248218844

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