Abstract
This Introduction to the special issue on “Skepticism and Justification” provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.
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Coliva, A., Moruzzi, S. & Volpe, G. Introduction. Synthese 189, 221–234 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0174-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0174-z