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On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity

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Abstract

Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the ‘input problem’: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a ‘really real’ input problem (i.e., an empirical one). It will be suggested that this problem is real enough, but it does not selectively strike down massive modularity – it is a problem for everyone.

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  1. School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, NR4 7TJ

    J. Collins

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Collins, J. On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity. Mind Mach 15, 1–22 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-004-1346-5

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