Abstract
Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It is shown that sensory loss can have effects on the focussing of motor command and that for some a sense of agency can return despite paralysis.
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Notes
All references are from ‘Still Lives’ The MIT Press, 2004, unless otherwise stated.
By natural embodiment I am distinguishing between an effortless background awareness of the body and a more attentional process which may follow neurological impairment.
LARSI; lumbar anterior root stimulation implant.
One person with tetraplegia actually wrote that his live was better after the injury than before, (Cole, 2004).
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Acknowledgement
My thoughts in this area were initially stimulated by an invitation to lecture at the ASSC8 meeting in Antwerp in 2004. My thanks to Professor Patrick Haggard for organising the session.
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Cole, J. The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience. Phenom Cogn Sci 6, 309–325 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9051-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9051-5