Abstract
Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.
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Comesaña, J. Could there be exactly two things?. Synthese 162, 31–35 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9170-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9170-0