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Unsafe Knowledge

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Abstract

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.

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References

  • Juan Comesaña (2002) ArticleTitle“The Diagonal and the Demon” Philosophical Studies 110 249–266 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1020656411534

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 5113 Helen C. White Hall, Madison, WI, 53706, U.S.A

    Juan Comesaña

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  1. Juan Comesaña
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Correspondence to Juan Comesaña.

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Comesaña, J. Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146, 395–404 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7

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