Journal of the History of Philosophy

Arnauld's Alleged Representationalism* MONTE COOK Is ARNAULDA REPRESENTATIONALIST. 9 The heated dispute early in this century testifies to the question's ditficulty. On one side, John Laird and Morris Ginsberg champion Arnauld for seeing the vulnerability of representationalism and replacing it with something better: On the other side, A. O. Lovejoy and Ralph Withington Church set out to dispel the illusion that Amauld is anything but a representationalist ,z (The acrimonious exchange between Laird and Lovejoy is reminiscent of the Arnauld-Malebranche exchange.) Since I believe that Laird, Ginsberg, Lovejoy, and Church are in fundamental agreement, I will not discuss whether Arnauld is or is not a representationalist. I will instead argue that the dispute is spurious, that different uses of the word "representationalism" and a difference in emphasis conceal this fundamental agreement. More important, however, I will argue that both sides of the dispute misinterpret, in the same way, Amauld's theory of perception . In general, these interpreters, like Malebranche before them, fail to appreciate fully the extent to which Arnauld's theory of ideas differs from Malebranche's theory of ideas. Consequently, I will first sketch the basic differences between these two theories. In doing so, I will present and textually support my interpretation of Arnauld's theory of perception. I will then critically examine the arguments that Ginsberg, Lovejoy, and Church give for their contrary interpretation. In doing * I wish to thank Professor Phillip Cummins for his helpful criticisms and suggestions regarding an earlier version of this paper. 1 John Laird, A Study in Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), pp. 1-14, and "The 'Legend' of Arnauld's Realism," Mind, XXXIII (1924), pp. 176-179; Morris Ginsberg, introduction to his translation of Malebranche's Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 39-42. Earlier in the century the view that Arnanld rejected representationalism was suggested by Norman Kemp Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1902; reprinted New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 115-117, and by G. Dawes Hicks, "Sense Presentation and Thought," Proceedings o/ the Aristotelian Society, VI (1905-1906), 275-276. Kemp Smith declares, however, "as Arnauld himself accepts the Cartesian dualism in all its absoluteness, his denial of this fundamental tenet of the Cartesian system comes to no fruitful result" (p. 116). 2 A. O. Lovejoy, " 'Representative Ideas' In Malebranche and Arnauld," Mind, XXXII (1923), 449-461, and "Reply to Professor Laird," Mind, XXXIII (1924), 180-181; Ralph Withington Church, A Study in the Philosophy o[ Malebranche (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1931), pp. 154-163. See also Thomas Reid, "Of the Sentiments of Anthony Arnauld," in The Works o/ Thomas Reid, Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations by Sir William Hamilton, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863), I, 295-298; and Harry M. Bracken, "Antoine Arnauld," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards, ed., 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1967), I, 165-167. [53] 54 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY this, I will show that the dispute whether Arnauld is a representationalist is largely verbal and defend my interpretation of Arnauld's theory of perception. I. Commentators on Amauld's theory of perception are often misled because they accept Malebranche's statement of the controversy between Amauld and himself over the nature of ideas. As Malebranche describes it in Rdsponse au Livre Des Vraies et Des Fausses lddes, the situation is that "Mr Amaud pr&end que les modalitez de l'ame sont essentiellement repr6sentatives des objets differens de l'ame: & je sofitiens que ces modalitez ne sont que des sentimeus, qui ne repr6sentent h l'ame rien de different d'elle-mSme.''a Malebranche's statement of the disagreement between Amauld and himself is misleading and, more important, inaccurate. The statement is misleading because Amauld admits that some modifications of the soul, namely sensations (what Malebranche calls "sentiments"), are non-representative. The statement of the disagreement is inaccurate because, although they do disagree on whether modifications of the soul can be essentially representative (on whether ideas are modifications of the soul), they also disagree on whether ideas are objects of perception or acts of perception. (Malebranche completely overlooks the possibility of identifying ideas with acts of perception throughout the...