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Non-Bayesian Decision Theory. Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action, Martin Peterson. Theory and Decision Library, Springer, 2008. ix + 170 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 January 2011

Mikaël Cozic*
Affiliation:
Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne and Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (ENS Ulm, Paris 1 and CNRS)

Abstract

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Type
Book Review
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

REFERENCES

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Peterson, M. 2004. From outcomes to acts: a non-standard axiomatization of the expected utility principle. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33: 361378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Savage, L. J. 1954/1972. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley. [Second edition (1972) New York: Dover Publications.]Google Scholar