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Can God Know That He Is God?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Richard E. Creel
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Ithaca College

Extract

While reflecting one day on the enormous difficulties that men have in knowing that there is a God, a completely unexpected and unfamiliar question drifted into my purview – perhaps as a kind of ultimate expression of my philosophical frustration. ‘Indeed’, the question asked, ‘can even God know that he is God?’ At first I thought this query merely amusing. ‘Wouldn't it be funny if God cannot know that he is God! But of course he can.’ So my mind wandered on to other things. The question did not leave me alone, though. It insisted that I take it seriously, and the more I did, the more legitimate, complex, and significant it came to seem - and still does.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

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References

page 195 note 1 Aquinas, St Thomas, Knowledge in God in Summa Theologiae, vol. 4 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 13.Google Scholar

page 196 note 1 Ibid. p. 13.

page 196 note 2 Maimonides, Moses, The Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), p. 281.Google Scholar

page 196 note 3 Ibid. p. 102

page 196 note 4 Owen, H. P., Concepts of Deity (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 196 note 5 Aquinas, , Knowledge in God. p. 13Google Scholar. Emphasis mine.

page 196 note 6 An earlier draft of this paper was read to a session of the American Academy of Religion, Eastern International Region, on 15 April 1978. Incisive criticism by Professor Richard La Croix, CUNY, Buffalo caused me to see the need for developing this section on two interpretations of omniscience. I thank him.

page 198 note 1 There is, of course, the possibility that God might suspend judgment with regard to those propositions that cannot be known, but it seems more expressive of his supremely perfect nature that he hold true opinions rather than suspending judgment when he cannot have knowledge.

page 199 note 1 Owen, , Concepts of Deity, p. 30.Google Scholar

page 199 note 2 Henceforth I will use ‘Know’ for the strong sense of the term and let ‘know’ function vaguely.

page 201 note 1 Maimonides, , Guide, p. 293.Google Scholar