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On the artificiality of artificial intelligence

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Abstract

In this article the question is raised whether artificial intelligence has any psychological relevance, i.e. contributes to our knowledge of how the mind/brain works. It is argued that the psychological relevance of artificial intelligence of the symbolic kind is questionable as yet, since there is no indication that the brain structurally resembles or operates like a digital computer. However, artificial intelligence of the connectionist kind may have psychological relevance, not because the brain is a neural network, but because connectionist networks exhibit operating characteristics which mimic operant behavior. Finally it is concluded that, since most of the work done so far in ‘AI and Law’ is of the symbolic kind, it has as yet contributed little to our understanding of the legal mind.

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Crombag, H.F.M. On the artificiality of artificial intelligence. Artif Intell Law 2, 39–49 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00871746

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