Abstract
This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursuing certain non-taxation-based courses of action that are designed to alter the work choices of citizens (NTMs). Second, I argue that such actions are not permissible for Rawlsian institutions. It follows that a state governed by a Rawls-type political conception of justice is parasitic on the willingness of citizens to be sufficiently motivated by concern for the worst off, but it cannot require or even encourage them to be so motivated.
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Notes
For Rawls’s principles of justice, see Rawls 1971, 302; 2005, 5–6, 291; and 2001, 43.
This is also consistent with Rawls’s own comments on the difference principle. For example, he writes: ‘the difference principle specifies a social minimum derived from an idea of reciprocity. This covers at least the basic needs essential to a decent life, and presumably more’. Rawls 2001, 130. It is not entirely clear how Rawls arrives at this view; however, I take it that it does demonstrate that he regarded the satisfaction of basic welfare requirements as a necessary condition for a just society.
Rawls 2005, 35.
Stanczyk 2012, 144–164.
G.A. Cohen 1997, 13.
G.A. Cohen 1992, 265; 2008, 28 f.
See Rawls 2005, 7; 2001, 44.
Rawls 1971, 453f.
For example, see Rawls 1971, 245.
Stanczyk 2012, 152.
Rawls 1971, 243–251, 541–548; 2005, 315–324.
Rawls 2005, 181.
Rawls 2005, 6.
For example, consider Rawls’s rejection of the permissibility of a ‘head tax’ on personal abilities. See Rawls 2001, 158.
G.A. Cohen 2008, 186.
Rawls 1971, 318.
Stanczyk 2012, 154–158.
Stanczyk 2012, 158 f.
I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.
Stanczyk 2012, 158 f.
Rawls 2005, 176.
See Besch 2004, 26 f.
See Rawls 1971, 56; 2005, 66 f.
See also Williams 1998, 233 f.
Williams 1998, 235
Williams 1998, 235.
Williams 1998, 236 f.
Given Cohen’s desire to preserve the right to pursue self-interest to some extent (G.A. Cohen 2000, 213n.), it seems plausible that he does not quite intend for citizens to model the more or less perfect altruism of citizens in S1. However, it is difficult to deny that there is, to say the least, a close resemblance between citizens in S1 and citizens motivated by Cohen’s ethos.
See Quong 2010, 327 f.
Estlund 1998, 100–103.
Tan 2004, 345–352.
G.A. Cohen 2000, 3.
On the notion of agent-centred prerogatives, see Scheffler 1994.
Cohen 2000, 213n.
Williams 1998, 241.
Rawls 2005, 18.
Tan 2004, 333.
Rawls 2005, 19.
Rawls 2005, 66.
See de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2010, 34–58.
Rawls 1971, 178.
Rawls 1971, 179.
Rawls 1971, 178. Italics are mine.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Thomas Besch, and three anonymous referees for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
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Cross, B. Rawlsian Liberalism, Justice for the Worst Off, and the Limited Capacity of Political Institutions. SOPHIA 55, 215–236 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-015-0486-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-015-0486-9