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Observation and Interpretation: the Problem of the Problem of Universals

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Metaphysica

Abstract

It is argued that a number of related influential contemporary solutions to certain problems of the “realism–nominalism issue” seem to depend on an interpretation of those problems rather than upon observations of things. The problem of universals is a case in point. Therefore, there is a problem of the problem of universals and it has to be clarified what the problem of universals is. A primitive or uninterpreted raising of the problem is the main pupose of this paper. In order to accomplish such a task, a methodological statement is made in the first place, namely that the philosophical talk used by some property theorists to raise and answer “realism–nominalism” questions can provide us with a tool to discover when ontological analyses of things are consequences of interpretations. In the second place, a particular influential contemporary interpretation of particulars, universals, exemplification, and facts led by Armstrong, Mertz, Wolterstorff, Butchvarov, and Lowe, which I shall call “The Dogma of Repetition,” is extensively discussed.

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Notes

  1. D. W. Mertz, Moderate Realism and Its Logic, Yale University Press, 1996, p. 7.

  2. D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Westview Press, 1989, pp. 98–99.

  3. E. J. Lowe, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 23–24.

  4. D. M. Armstrong, Universals & Scientific Realism, vol. I: Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 115.

  5. I will use the expressions “counting,” “listing,” and “enumerating” interchangeably.

  6. See my “Categoriality: Three Disputes over the Structure of the World”. In J. Cumpa & E. Tegtmeier (Eds.), Ontological Categories, Ontos Verlag, 2011, pp. 15–65.

  7. N. Wolterstorff, “Qualities”. In C. Landesman (ed.), The Problem of Universals, New York, Basic Books, 1961, p. 201.

  8. A. N. Whitehead, An Inquiry Concerning The Principles of Natural Knowledge, Cosimo Inc. 1919/2007, p. 66.

  9. P. Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, Chap. “The recurrence of qualities”.

  10. Compare my “What is a Universal? Main Problems of Property Theory”. In Javier Cumpa (ed.), Studies in the Ontology of Reinhardt Grossmann, Ontos Verlag, 2010, pp. 95–118.

  11. D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 126–127.

  12. For more details, see my “A Transcendental “In”: The Molecular Theory of Exemplification”. In F. Nef, M. Rebuschi & L. Schneider (Eds.), The Ontology of Relations: Material, Formal, and Transcendental, Ontos Verlag, forthcoming.

  13. See my ““In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification”. In J. Cumpa, Exemplification. Special Issue of Axiomathes: International Journal of Ontology and Cognitive Sciences, Springer, 2012.

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Correspondence to Javier Cumpa.

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Cumpa, J. Observation and Interpretation: the Problem of the Problem of Universals. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 131–143 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0098-6

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