Abstract
Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not “very unexpected” as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are “deductively independent” — but this means that ⌝ a ⊢ b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, is untenable. Finally, it is shown that Popper-Miller's claim that deductive relations determine probabilistic support is untrue. In general, probabilistic support can vary greatly with fixed deductive relations as determined by the relevant Lindenbaum algebra.
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Cussens, J. Deduction, induction and probabilistic support. Synthese 108, 1–10 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414003
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414003