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The Logic of Pragmatic Truth

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Abstract

The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and pragmatic truth can be accommodated. One of the main results of this paper is that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent. The philosophical import of this result, which justifies the application of pragmatic truth to inconsistent settings, is also discussed.

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da Costa, N.C.A., Bueno, O. & French, S. The Logic of Pragmatic Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 27, 603–620 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004304228785

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