Abstract
This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p. The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Hornsby, J. (2008). “A Disjunctive Theory of Acting for Reasons,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, eds. by F. Macpherson and A. Haddock. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press
Hyman, J. (1999). “How Knowledge Works.” The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(197): 433–451
Hyman, J. (2006). “Knowledge and Evidence.” Mind, 115(460): 891–916
Prichard, H. A. (2002). “Duty and Ignorance of Fact,” in his Moral Writings, ed. by J. MacAdam. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson’s University Library
Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Williams, B. A. O. (1981). “Internal and External Reasons,” reprinted in his Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
About this article
Cite this article
Dancy, J. Acting in ignorance. Front. Philos. China 6, 345–357 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0143-5
Received:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0143-5