Abstract
This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p. The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p.
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Dancy, J. Acting in ignorance. Front. Philos. China 6, 345–357 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0143-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0143-5