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Knowledge claims and context: belief

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Abstract

The use of ‘S knows p’ varies from context to context. The contextualist theories of Cohen, Lewis, and DeRose explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses: ‘S knows p’ is indexical in meaning, referring to features of the ascriber’s context like salience, interests, and stakes. The linguistic evidence against contextualism is extensive. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims results from pragmatic factors. One is variable strictness (Davis, Philos Stud, 132(3):395–438, 2007). In addition to its strict use, ‘S knows p’ may be used loosely to implicate that S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes. Here I explore another variable: belief about what is known. This factor is pragmatic rather than semantic in that it affects the use of ‘S knows p’ without affecting its truth conditions. While variation in strictness accounts for the variation in the bank, parking, and some lottery cases, variation in belief accounts for the variation in other lottery cases and the epistemology cases. Along the way, I sketch an insensitive invariantist semantics that is strict but non-skeptical, and show how it works with these pragmatic factors.

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Notes

  1. Since the mere difference in time does not explain the variation in our cases, we will generally ignore tense. I rebut MacFarlane’S (2009) arguments for a nonindexical contextualism in Davis (2013a).

  2. See also Sosa (1988, pp. 139–143), Feldman (1999, p. 94), DeRose (1999, pp. 190–191, 2009, pp. 21–23), Williams (2000), Fogelin (2000, p. 44), Wright (2005).

  3. See Cohen (1986, 2005), Schaffer (2006), DeRose (2005, pp. 185–190, 2009, pp. 230–238), Brueckner (2005, pp. 316–317), Davis (2007, pp. 398ff), Henderson (2009, p. 122), Fantl and McGrath (2009, pp. 182, 186–187). Contrast Hawthorne (2004a, pp. 166–168, 186, 2004b), Stanley (2005, pp. 101–104), Brueckner (2005, p. 317ff), Henderson (2009, pp. 127–128).

  4. See DeRose (2000, 2009, Chap. 6), Davis (2005, p. 33, 2007, p. 398ff), Fantl and McGrath (2009, pp. 180–181).

  5. See Davis (2013a, ms).

  6. I discuss the linguistic objections to contextualism more fully in Davis (2007).

  7. See Cohen (1999, p. 60), MacFarlane (2005, p. 209ff), Stanley (2005, Chap. 2), Davis (2007, p. 418), Blome-Tillmann (2008), Wedgewood (2008). Contrast DeRose (2009, pp. 180–184).

  8. Hannah’s second knowledge claim contradicts her first relative to the assumption that the subject has not changed in relevant respects. DeRose (2005, p. 194, 2006, pp. 320ff, 333, 2009, pp. 158–159, 177), MacFarlane (2005, pp. 201–202), and Blome-Tillmann (2008, p. 32) deny that the claims seem contradictory. It is hard to draw any conclusions from DeRose’s anecdotal reports of student intuitions because we do not know if they properly distinguished between what Hannah and Dick said and what they meant. DeRose himself does not draw the distinction or assess its possible significance for the case. See Sect. 2 below.

  9. Cf. Kompa (2002), Cappelen and Lepore (2003, pp. 29, 31, 2005, p. 105ff), MacFarlane (2005, p. 202ff), Hawthorne (2004a, p. 107, fn. 125, 2004b). Davis (2005, 39, 2007, pp. 400–401), Bach (2005, p. 60), Stanley (2005, pp. 54ff, 115, 119ff), Fantl and McGrath (2009, p. 180ff). Contrast DeRose (1992, pp. 925–926, 2009, pp. 207–212), Cohen (2005, pp. 205–206), Blome-Tillmann (2008, pp. 34, 37). MacFarlane’s (2005, p. 219) “assessment rule” is subject to a similar objection (see Davis ms).

  10. Brown’s (2008, 2010) weak invariantist view also allows (2) to be true. Subject-sensitive invariantism has a related problem.

  11. I show in Davis (2007, pp. 415–417) that quantifier restriction does not account for this sort of variation.

  12. The theory of conversational implicature was developed by Grice (1975, 1978, 1989). See Davis (2010) for an introduction and references.

  13. Compare and contrast Unger (1975, pp. 68–69, 83–87, 1984, p. 6ff), Dretske (1981a, p. 378), Rysiew (2001, 487–488), DeRose (2009, pp. 124–127).

  14. Thus Hawthorne (2004a, pp. 116–118, 2004b) is wrong to suggest that a pragmatic account claims that all positive knowledge claims are exaggerations. See also DeRose (1999, p. 202, 2009, p. 15ff), Cohen (1999, p. 83), Stanley (2004, p. 141ff, 2005, p. 84), Harman (2007, p. 178), Brown (2010), Davis (2013b).

  15. I believe this is what happens in MacFarlane’s (2005, p. 210) courtroom case.

  16. One reader objected that this definition is uninformative on the grounds that to establish something is to get into a situation in which one knows it. My definition relies on the notion of evidence sufficient to establish something, however, not a person establishing something. A set of premises may be sufficient to establish the truth of a conclusion even if no one who knows those premises knows that conclusion. The subject may not have seen the connection, and so did not infer the conclusion from the premises. This is clear in mathematics, and I believe the same thing is possible in empirical cases where the evidence does not entail the proposition.

  17. Cf. DeRose (2009, pp. 186, fn. 1). Contrast Blome-Tillmann (2008, p. 40ff). The fact that I know the bank will be open, but not with absolute certainty is acceptable but not I do not know with absolute certainty that the bank will be open but know that it will be open indicates that the former is an idiom, conveying that the subject is close to while falling short of knowing.

  18. That sufficient to establish the truth of does not simply mean “entail” can be seen by observing that E entails that the probability of P being true is 1 together with P is true makes it at least plausible that E is sufficient to establish the truth of P even though it does not follow that E entails P.

  19. Dretske (1981b, pp. 49, 51–52, 56), Fantl and McGrath (2002), Henderson (2009, p. 127) and Jonathan Dancy (in discussion).

  20. See Cappelen and Lepore (2005, p. 105ff) and Davis (2014). MacFarlane’s (2005, p. 219) assessment rule is subject to a similar objection (let the context in (3) be a context of assessment); cf. Montminy (2009, p. 346). On the other hand, MacFarlane’s (2005, p. 228) commitment rule (one is committed to defending a knowledge claim against objection from any context of assessment) would seem to imply the sort of strong invariantist semantics I have sketched for ‘S knows p’ when it is affirmed, and a weak invariantist semantics when it is denied (cf. Montminy 2009, p. 354, Davis ms).

  21. I expand on this point in Davis (2013c).

  22. Cf. Rysiew (2001, p. 490), Bach (2005, p. 75), Brown (2005a, p. 280ff, 2005b, 2010), Williamson (2005b, p. 225), Brady and Pritchard (2005, p. 165), Black (2005), Hazlett (2007). Contrast DeRose (2002, p. 190, 2009, p. 111ff), Davis (2013b).

  23. Rysiew’s (2001, pp. 488–490) and Black’s (2005) explanation is that ‘I know the bank will be open’ seems inappropriate because it would falsely implicate that the speaker can eliminate error possibilities that are salient but not relevant to whether the speaker knows. But (i) on a weak invariantist semantics, there would be no reason to expect such an implicature; and (ii) the inappropriateness of the positive knowledge claim would not explain the appropriateness of its allegedly false denial. Cf. MacFarlane (2005, pp. 201, 208), DeRose (2009, pp. 118–124), Davis (2013b).

  24. One reader asked “what’s the point of the notion of word meaning if people usually don’t mean what they say”? The answer requires distinguishing two types of speaker meaning: the “cognitive” type studied by Grice (1975) that involves the expression of belief, and the “cogitative” type differentiated by Schiffer (1996) that involves the expression of ideas or thoughts. When I use ‘The surface is perfectly smooth’ loosely, I express the belief that the surface is close enough to perfectly smooth by expressing the thought that it is perfectly smooth. Hence I mean “perfectly smooth” by ‘perfectly smooth.’ I argue that word meaning should be defined in terms of cogitative rather than cognitive meaning in Davis (2003).

  25. If Joe is speaking loosely, he changes his mind about whether he is close enough to knowing that Harry lost.

  26. Another plausible reason is that whereas Fred may believe Paul is certain Sheila lost, Ed is unlikely to. Testimony often produces certainty; mere probabilities do not.

  27. See e.g. Dretske (1971), Hawthorne (2004a, pp. 15–16, 2004b). Compare and contrast DeRose (1996). In lotteries or other contests with no guaranteed winner, what we believe is that people with the same evidence in other contests have been wrong.

  28. See Schaffer (2005) for careful exposition of the different contextual variables that have been postulated, and arguments for the superiority of the relevant alternatives form of contextualism. I’ve adapted the exposition of Cohen’s view to conform with the most common formulation of the theory.

  29. Cf. Lewis (1996). Dretske (1981a, p. 371), DeRose (1995, p. 16), and Vogel (1999, p. 158) hold that S’s evidence rules out an alternative iff it enables S to know that it is false; on this definition, an account of knowledge in terms of ruling out alternatives is circular.

  30. On Hawthorne’s (2004a, pp. 158–161, 2004b) subject sensitive theory, what matters is the salience of M to Paul, not Fred.

  31. The definition Cohen (1988, pp. 101, 115–116) offers is no help in deciding what alternatives are relevant in any case.

  32. See Cohen (1999, pp. 72–73), Williamson (2000, Chap. 7), Davis (2004, pp. 259–262), Schaffer (2005, pp. 121–125), and Blome-Tillmann (2009) for further criticisms of tracking theory.

  33. See Davis (2007, pp. 423–425) for discussion of the “practical rationality constraint.”

  34. Cf. Hawthorne (2004b, p. 520), Richard (2004, p. 215ff), Williamson (2005b, pp. 220–221), McFarlane (2005, p. 203, 2007, pp. 18–21), Blome-Tillmann (2008, p. 34).

  35. There are of course cases in which we are embarrassed and regret having spoken loosely when we should have known it was inappropriate. This might be Hannah’s experience in a variant of the bank case if she thoughtlessly forgets that Bob has been worried all day about getting money in the bank before Monday. This would not be a case in which she was embarrassed because what she believed about the bank proved to be unjustified.

  36. Cf. Harman (2007, p. 175). Stanley (2005, p. 125ff) suggested that perhaps the epistemologist has a practical interest ordinary people lack, namely, learning and espousing the truth about skepticism. However, what is at stake for the epistemologist are the consequences of being right or wrong about whether he knows that he has a hand, which on Stanley’s theory determines the truth conditions of ‘S knows that he knows he has a hand.’ It is the consequences of being right or wrong about whether he has a hand that is relevant on Stanley’s theory to the truth of ‘David knows he has a hand.’ Those consequences do not differ between A and B.

  37. Cf. Lewis (1979, p. 355), Cohen (1988, pp. 96, 101), DeRose (1995, p. 4ff), Schaffer (2005, p. 117).

  38. See Feldman (1999, esp. 104–107, 111, 2001, pp. 62, 68), Klein (2000, p. 113), Rysiew (2001, p. 483), Davis (2004, p. 270, 2005, pp. 35–40, 2007, pp. 426–430), Bach (2005, pp. 68–71).

  39. Cf. Lewis (1979, p. 355), Cohen (1999, pp. 64–67, 2000a, b), DeRose (1992, p. 917, 1999, Sect. 6, 2002, p. 168, 2009, p. 41ff, 128), Hawthorne (2004a, p. 180, 2004b). Contrast Feldman (1999, pp. 104–107, 111), Wedgewood (2008, Sect. 7).

  40. ‘O’ denotes observation statements like ‘I have a hand.’ Cf. Lewis (1996, pp. 441–444), Cohen (1999, p. 67, 2000a, p. 102). DeRose (2004, p. 9, 2009, pp. 41ff, 128), Brady and Pritchard (2005, p. 163).

  41. Elke Brendel and Mark Lance pointed this out at the Mainz conference on contextualism. See also MacFarlane (2005, pp. 208–209), Wright (2005, p. 243), Brady and Pritchard (2005, p. 164), Blome-Tillmann (2008, p. 50ff), Montminy (2008, pp. 7–10), DeRose (2009, pp. 196, 207), Baumann (2008), Brendel (2014); and below, Sect. 10.

  42. Cf. MacFarlane (2005, pp. 213–216).

  43. See Cohen (1999, p. 79, 2001, pp. 89ff, 95ff, 2005, pp. 206, 208); Hawthorne (2004a, b, pp. 107–111, 114–115), Blome-Tillmann (2008, pp. 35–41, DeRose (2006). Contrast Schiffer (1996, p. 328), Davis (2004, p. 263ff), MacFarlane (2005, pp. 213–216), Stanley (2005, pp. 29–30, 116), Bach (2005, p. 67). Compare and contrast Hofweber (1999).

  44. DeRose (2006, p. 333ff) also asserts that many ordinary speakers will deny that David’s claim in the B case contradicts that in the A case, but I do not know where he gets his data.

  45. I explain in detail how conventional speaker meaning generates word meaning in Davis (2003).

  46. Contextualists cannot consistently assert that “conversations about sceptics” automatically put speakers in a skeptical context, as Blome-Tillmann (2008, p. 51) maintains. Cohen and DeRose do not make such a statement, as we will see in Sect. 10.

  47. See also DeRose (2004, p. 13, 2009, p. 142). Cf. Cohen (1988, p. 108): ‘there is nothing in the semantics of “know” that requires that we set the standards in this way. Nothing would prevent us from setting the standards in the explicit probability case in such a way that an attribution of knowledge would be correct.’

  48. Cf. MacFarlane (2005, pp. 202–203, 209–210, 2007), Richard (2004, pp. 215–216).

  49. DeRose (1992, p. 924, 1995, p. 46ff, 2009, pp. 49–51). Contrast DeRose (2006, p. 333, 2009, p. 177). See also Cohen (1999, pp. 65, 80, 83). Contrast Davis (2007, 428–430).

  50. It is evident in the cases under consideration that there is no existential or other presupposition failure.

  51. Cf. MacFarlane (2007, pp. 20–21), Montminy (2009). DeRose’s (2009, p. 149) response postulates even more truth value gaps.

  52. DeRose (1995, p. 17) had earlier said that “there is a rule for the changing of the standards for knowledge that governs the truth conditions of our thoughts regarding what is and is not known that mirrors the truth rule for the truth conditions of what is said regarding knowledge.” The rule for solitary thought cannot mirror one involving a conversational score. Moreover, while occurrent thoughts have something like a context of use, non-occurrent beliefs do not. The truth conditions of the belief that Wally knows he has a hand do not seem to depend on whether it is occurrent.

  53. Cf. Feldman (1999, esp. 104–107, 111), Klein (2000, p. 113), Kornblith (2000, p. 29), Williams (2000, p. 83), Richard (2004, p. 217), Wright (2005, p. 249ff), Williamson (2005a, p. 105, 2005b, p. 226). I discuss a normative version of contextualism according to which the proper standard is what varies from context to context in Davis (2005, Sect. 4).

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Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Emily Evans, Paul Naquin, Nate Olson, David Pierce, Mark Pitlyk, Diana Puglisi, Dan Quattrone, Mark Formichelli, Jeff Engelhardt, Gerhard Ernst, Paul Portner, Elena Herburger, Stephen Gross, Thom Brooks, Jessica Brown, Jonathan Schaffer, Hermann Cappelen, Crispin Wright, Max de Gaynesford, Emma Borg, Jonathan Dancy, Christoph Jäger, Matt McGrath, and several conscientious readers. My greatest thanks go to Stewart Cohen, a most admirable partner in the search for truth.

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  1. Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

    Wayne A. Davis

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Correspondence to Wayne A. Davis.

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Davis, W.A. Knowledge claims and context: belief. Philos Stud 172, 399–432 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0309-9

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