Abstract
The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from the phenomena’.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Feyerabend P.K. (1975). Against method. London,New Left Books
Feyerabend P.K. (1981). Problems of empiricism: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Fodor J.A. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, The MIT Press
Fodor J.A. (2000). The mind doesn’t work that way. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, The MIT Press
Garfinkel A. (1981). Forms of explanation. London and New Haven, Yale University Press
Hacking I. (1983). Representing and intervening. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Hempel C.G. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Hermer-Vasquez L., Spelke E., Katsnelson A. (1999). Sources of flexibility in human cognition: Dual task studies of space andlanguage. Cognitive Psychology 39, 3–36
Hume D. (1739/1989). In P. H. Nidditch (Ed.), A treatise of human nature. Oxford, Clarendon Press
Kuhn T.S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press
Laudan L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science 48, 19–48
Lipton P. (1990). Contrastive explanation. In: Knowles D. (ed) Explanation and its limits. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 247–266
Lipton P. (1991/2004). Inference to the best explanation (2nd ed.). London, Routledge
Mill, J. S. (1843/1973). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive books I–III. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected works of John Stuart Mill (Vol. VII). Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press; and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Mill, J. S. (1843/1974). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive books IV–VI. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected works of John Stuart Mill (Vol. VIII). Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press; and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Putnam H. (1975). Mathematics, matter and method: Philosophical papers (Vol. I). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Salamon S. (1992). Prairie patrimony: Family, farming, and community in the midwest. Chapee Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press
Shusterman A., Spelke E. (2005). Language and the development of spatial reasoning. In: Carruthers P., Laurence S., Stich S., (eds) The innate mind. Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress
van Fraassen B.C. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford, Clarendon Press
van Fraassen B.C. (1989). Laws and symmetry. Oxford, Clarendon Press
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Day, M., Botterill, G.S. Contrast, inference and scientific realism. Synthese 160, 249–267 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9117-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9117-x