META-PHILOSOPHY 3 on philosophy, cognitive science, art, religion

Ulrich de Balbian

Meta-philosophical investigations of - what is metaphilosophy, philosophy, philosophizing, the discourse of philosophy, its aim, methods and transcendentals, as well as exploration of syllabus of top philosophical schools

Meta-philosophical investigations of - what is meta-philosophy, philosophy, philosophizing, the discourse of philosophy, its aim, methods and transcendentals, as well as exploration of the syllabus of top philosophical schools

This is the first 26 pages of my forthcoming book Meta-philosophy Part 3. There are some individuals who are not satisfied with our experience, that we think about our experience and all sorts of other things, that we discuss those things, depict them in many ways and describe them in writing. A small percentage of people want to know more about all these things that occur to them as earth-situated and confined beings. The more they seek are not merely more information or data, but they wish to know how such things are known, perceived, experienced, thought, imagined, heard, touched, seen and understood. A few of these reflective persons associate their search for insights and greater understanding with the Western tradition of philosophical understanding, the socio-practical discourse of philosophizing and the philosophical discourse. For some people this gives meaning to their life, the reason for their existence. They usually are the ones who will consider these things, question and explore them in ways that are original because the ways of thinking about all aspects of their existence, life-worlds and realities they have internalized, acquired during their general and specialized socialization and the answers and insights such institutionalized ways of understanding they experience as imprisoning, lacking meaning, without validity and legitimacy and limiting. These individuals from all walks of life, classes, backgrounds, cultures, countries, religious backgrounds and historical periods (all planets, solar systems, galaxies and universes. Are there alien philosophers? Lol) are in need of the philosophical discourse. Not merely the investigation, understanding and learning of the history of philosophical ideas from the past, but the actual involvement in, the personal dealing with how and why we can make sense of things, understand things, discuss them, can depict them, know them and think about them. These individuals are in need of this particular socio-cultural practice because of their personality-type, without it they would be at a loss and have no reason to live and no meaning in their existence. They differ greatly from many who have academic qualifications in philosophy or who live off philosophy by working in this subject to earn a living as they automatically think philosophically, they must philosophize and are not able to exist without it. They are original, creative-thinking individuals and their ways of writing and talking philosophy differ greatly from the secondary, contrived, derivative styles of academic professionals. Those who produce philosophical articles, books, conference speeches and class lecturers in the pedantic, academic professional style, because it forms part of their tenured job-descriptions. Then there exist another breed of humans, not only do their personality-types and other factors determine and drive them to philosophical questioning and explorations, but they further feel the need to question, to explore, to investigate, to think, talk and write about philosophical activities, philosophical investigations and philosophizing itself. Those questions philosophers ask, such as what the nature of something is, what the structure of something is, how one can perceive, talk about, think about, depict and understand any, all, phenomena, they feel obliged to ask about philosophizing, philosophical activities and the philosophical discourse itself. Philosophy itself, because of its talking, think, writing about phenomena, their reflective activities, already appears to be a meta-activity, a second-order activity, and now here comes another kind of person who feels obligated to think about such meta-philosophical activities, to explore, investigate and research the nature, the reason for, the rationale of, the values, the attitudes, norms, rules, structure, the methodology, methods, techniques and practices of those already second-order or meta philosophical activities. I read that something, probably tongue-in-cheek, wrote so it becomes an ad infinitum meta of meta of meta of meta activity? No, this might have been said in a sarcastic or jocular manner, but meta-philosophy, meta-philosophizing and meta-explorations, investigations, questioning and problematization are much, much more serious than that. It is not intended as a joke or a game, but something essential, something necessary, an activity that first-order reflection, first-order philosophizing and the philosophical discourse requires, is in need of and cannot do without. Such activities explore the grounds, the values, the norms, the rules, the rationale, the purpose, aims, procedures, methods and subject-matter of the philosophical discourse, the socio-cultural practice of philosophy and philosophizing itself. 2

META-PHILOSOPHY PART 3 1 There are some individuals who are not satisfied with our experience, that we think about our experience and all sorts of other things, that we discuss those things, depict them in many ways and describe them in writing. A small percentage of people want to know more about all these things that occur to them as earth-situated and confined beings. The more they seek are not merely more information or data, but they wish to know how such things are known, perceived, experienced, thought, imagined, heard, touched, seen and understood. A few of these reflective persons associate their search for insights and greater understanding with the Western tradition of philosophical understanding, the socio-practical discourse of philosophizing and the philosophical discourse. For some people this gives meaning to their life, the reason for their existence. They usually are the ones who will consider these things, question and explore them in ways that are original because the ways of thinking about all aspects of their existence, life-worlds and realities they have internalized, acquired during their general and specialized socialization and the answers and insights such institutionalized ways of understanding they experience as imprisoning, lacking meaning, without validity and legitimacy and limiting. These individuals from all walks of life, classes, backgrounds, cultures, countries, religious backgrounds and historical periods (all planets, solar systems, galaxies and universes. Are there alien philosophers? Lol) are in need of the philosophical discourse. Not merely the investigation, understanding and learning of the history of philosophical ideas from the past, but the actual involvement in, the personal dealing with how and why we can make sense of things, understand things, discuss them, can depict them, know them and think about them. These individuals are in need of this particular socio-cultural practice because of their personality-type, without it they would be at a loss and have no reason to live and no meaning in their existence. They differ greatly from many who have academic qualifications in philosophy or who live off philosophy by working in this subject to earn a living as they automatically think philosophically, they must philosophize and are not able to exist without it. They are original, creative-thinking individuals and their ways of writing and talking philosophy differ greatly from the secondary, contrived, derivative styles of academic professionals. Those who produce philosophical articles, books, conference speeches and class lecturers in the pedantic, academic professional style, because it forms part of their tenured job-descriptions. Then there exist another breed of humans, not only do their personality-types and other factors determine and drive them to philosophical questioning and explorations, but they further feel the need to question, to explore, to investigate, to think, talk and write about philosophical activities, philosophical investigations and philosophizing itself. Those questions philosophers ask, such as what the nature of something is, what the structure of something is, how one can perceive, talk about, think about, depict and understand any, all, phenomena, they feel obliged to ask about philosophizing, philosophical activities and the philosophical discourse itself. Philosophy itself, because of its talking, think, writing about phenomena, their reflective activities, already appears to be a meta-activity, a second-order activity, and now here comes another kind of person who feels obligated to think about such meta-philosophical activities, to explore, investigate and research the nature, the reason for, the rationale of, the values, the attitudes, norms, rules, structure, the methodology, methods, techniques and practices of those already second-order or meta philosophical activities. I read that something, probably tongue-in-cheek, wrote so it becomes an ad infinitum meta of meta of meta of meta activity? No, this might have been said in a sarcastic or jocular manner, but meta-philosophy, meta-philosophizing and meta-explorations, investigations, questioning and problematization are much, much more serious than that. It is not intended as a joke or a game, but something essential, something necessary, an activity that first-order reflection, first-order philosophizing and the philosophical discourse requires, is in need of and cannot do without. Such activities explore the grounds, the values, the norms, the rules, the rationale, the purpose, aims, procedures, methods and subject-matter of the philosophical discourse, the socio-cultural practice of philosophy and philosophizing itself. 2 Situating the individual’s minute life-world, notion and perception of reality and the universe in the, for human thinking, the vast, seemingly endless, infinite universe. With the short life spam of homo sapiens sapiens compare the size and age of the earth, our solar system and visible universe. These are the sojourning, earth-centered and - restricted beings who attempt to imagine all-inclusive and explanatory ontologies for a universe which are 13.772 billion years old. In 2012, WMAP estimated the age of the universe to be 13.772 billion years, with an uncertainty of 59 million years. In 2013, Planck measured the age of the universe at 13.82 billion years. And, our solar system, derived from the study of meteorites (thought to be the oldest accessible material around) is near 5 billion years; that of the Earth is taken as 4.6 billion (4.543) years. The oldest rocks on Earth are dated as 3.8 billion years. It is now widely agreed that stromatolites are the oldest known lifeform on Earth which has left a record of its existence. Therefore, if life originated on Earth, this happened sometime between 4.4 billion years ago, when water vapor first liquefied, and 3.5 billion years ago. According to the recent African origin of modern humans theory, modern humans evolved in Africa possibly from Homo heidelbergensis, Homo rhodesiensis or Homo antecessor and migrated out of the continent some 50,000 to 100,000 years ago, gradually replacing local populations of Homo erectus, Denisova hominins, Homo …. The top 10 theories of life on earth – Panspermia, (so it is assumed that there exists life in space?), abiogenesis or biopoesis, cosmogeny (with 2 limitations on such theories of creation), endosymbiosis, spontaneous origination, clay theory, the idea of extinction paved the way for the theory of catastrophism or “consecutive creations”, materialistic theory, organic evolution, theory of special creation, electric spark, deep-sea vents, chilly start, RNA World, simple beginnings. "There may have been several origins," said David Deamer, a biochemist at the University of California, Santa Cruz. "We usually make 'origins' plural just to indicate that we don't necessarily claim there was just a single origin, but just an origin that didn't happen to get blasted by giant [asteroid] impacts." http://www.livescience.com/1804-greatest-mysteries-life-arise-earth.html The anthropic principles But "astronomical" is a relative term. In his book, The God Delusion, biologist Richard Dawkins entertains another possibility, inspired by work in astronomy and physics. Suppose, Dawkins says, the universe contains a billion billion planets (a conservative estimate, he says), then the chances that life will arise on one of them is not really so remarkable. Furthermore, if, as some physicists say, our universe is just one of many, ( multiverse theory - The multiverse (or meta-universe) is the hypothetical set of finite and infinite possible universes, including the universe in which we live. Together, these universes comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, and thephysical laws and constants that describe them. The various universes within the multiverse are called "parallel universes", "other universes" or "alternate universes." The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it, and the relationships among these universes differ from one multiverse hypothesis to another. Multiple universes have been hypothesized in cosmology, physics, astronomy, religion, philosophy, transpersonal psychology, and literature, particularly in science fiction and fantasy. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called "alternate universes", "quantum universes", "interpenetrating dimensions", "parallel dimensions", "parallel worlds", "alternate realities", "alternate timelines", and "dimensional planes". The physics community continues to debate the multiverse hypothesis. Prominent physicists disagree about whether the multiverse exists. Proponents of one of the multiverse hypotheses include Stephen Hawking,[16] Brian Greene,[17][18] Max Tegmark,[19] Alan Guth,[20] Andrei Linde,[21] Michio Kaku,[22] David Deutsch,[23] Leonard Susskind,[24] Alexander Vilenkin,[25] Yasunori Nomura,[26] Raj Pathria,[27] Laura Mersini-Houghton,[28][29] Neil deGrasse Tyson,[30] and Sean Carroll.[31] Scientists who are generally skeptical of the multiverse hypothesis include: Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg,[32] Nobel laureate David Gross,[33] Paul Steinhardt,[34] Neil Turok,[35] Viatcheslav Mukhanov,[36] Michael S. Turner,[37] Roger Penrose,[38] George Ellis,[39][40] Joe Silk,[41] Carlo Rovelli, [42] Adam Frank,[43] Marcelo Gleiser,[43] Jim Baggott,[44] and Paul Davies.[45] 4 levels Cosmologist Max Tegmark has provided a taxonomy of universes beyond the familiar observable universe. The four levels of Tegmark's classification are arranged such that subsequent levels can be understood to encompass and expand upon previous levels. They are briefly described below.[48][49] The American theoretical physicist and string theorist, Brian Greene, discussed nine types of parallel universes:[57] A multiverse of a somewhat different kind has been envisaged within string theory and its higher-dimensional extension, M-theory.[58] Black-hole cosmology, anthropic principle, possible worlds, modal realism, trans-world identity, counterpart theory. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse) and each universe contained a billion billion planets, then it's nearly a certainty that life will arise on at least one of them. As Dawkins writes, "There may be universes whose skies have no stars: but they also have no inhabitants to notice the lack." Shapiro doesn't think it's necessary to invoke multiple universes or life-laden comets crashing into ancient Earth. Instead, he thinks life started with molecules that were smaller and less complex than RNA, which performed simple chemical reactions that eventually led to a self-sustaining system involving the formation of more complex molecules. The above is just a few simplistic points about the universe/s our earthbound ontologizing and epistemologizing individuals are existing in. Ontologists, epistemologists and other types of philosophers attempt by thinking to identify that what exist and that what exists most fundamentally. Kant informed us that wherever we go in the universe/s we as humans will be employing certain basic notions and categories to make sense of whatever we encounter, experience, think, etc. Marx told us that social notions, especially those concerned with labour and class will structure our thinking and so on. From the information about the age of the universe and earth and speculations about the origins of life, we can see that philosophers have competition from another of other disciplines if they wish to reflect about many aspects of ontology and epistemology. Of course philosophers do not have to be naturalists but can employ other kinds of frames of reference and –isms to speculate about ontological and epistemological matters. Just as long as their reasoning and arguments conform to the rules as taught by academia!! They could for example follow Hegel and reduce their ontologies to playing with ideas, follow Marx and discuss class warfare and labour, Sartre and explore the human condition, the Wittgensteins and explore logic and mathematics or our language practices, Habermas and his sociologism, the deconstructivists, post-moderns and emphasize relativity. Some thinkers may not be satisfied with any of the above or other existing ontological and epistemological speculations. They could turn to theoretical physicists for ideas and treat them as the contemporary ontologists or of course mathematicians or logicians. The philosophical purists might however wish to concentrate on ontological descriptions that continue traditional philosophical notions and treatments of ontological concerns. With this in mind we can explore contemporary attempts and await future ones for guidance and in the meantime deal with such questions in a Nietzschean manner, or just take in a position of scepticism (soft, average or hard). Sise of the universe - It is estimated that the diameter of the observable universe is about 28.5 gigaparsecs (93 billion light-years, 8.8×1026 metres or 5.5×1023 miles), putting the edge of the observable universe at about 46.5 billion light-years away. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observable_universe The observable universe consists of at least two trillion galaxies,[7][8] and other matter that can, in principle, be observed from Earth at the present time because light and other signals from these objects have had time to reach Earth since the beginning of the cosmological expansion. Assuming the universe is isotropic, the distance to the edge of the observable universe is roughly the same in every direction. That is, the observable universe is spherical volume (a ball) centered on the observer. Every location in the Universe has its own observable universe, which may or may not overlap with the one centered on Earth. Visualization of the whole observable universe. The scale is such that the fine grains represent collections of large numbers of superclusters. The Virgo Supercluster – home of Milky Way – is marked at the center, but is too small to be seen. Diameter 8.8×1026 m (28.5 Gpc or 93 Gly)[1] Volume 4×1080 m3[2] Mass (ordinary matter) 1053 kg[3] Density 9.9×10−30 g/cm3 (equivalent to 6 protons per cubic meter of space)[4] Age 13.799±0.021 billion years[5] Average temperature 2.72548 K[6] Contents Ordinary (baryonic) matter (4.9%) Dark matter (26.8%) Dark energy (68.3%) The word observable used in this sense does not depend on whether modern technology actually permits detection of radiation from an object in this region (or indeed on whether there is any radiation to detect). It simply indicates that it is possible in principle for light or other signals from the object to reach an observer on Earth. In practice, we can see light only from as far back as the time of photon decoupling in the recombination epoch. That is when particles were first able to emit photons that were not quickly re-absorbed by other particles. Before then, the Universe was filled with a plasma that was opaque to photons. The detection of gravitational waves indicates there is now a possibility of detecting non-light signals from before the recombination epoch. The surface of last scattering is the collection of points in space at the exact distance that photons from the time of photon decoupling just reach us today. These are the photons we detect today as cosmic microwave background radiation (CMBR). However, with future technology, it may be possible to observe the still older relic neutrino background, or even more distant events via gravitational waves (which also should move at the speed of light). Sometimes astrophysicists distinguish between the visible universe, which includes only signals emitted since recombination – and the observable universe, which includes signals since the beginning of the cosmological expansion (the Big Bang in traditional cosmology, the end of the inflationary epoch in modern cosmology). According to calculations, the comoving distance (current proper distance) to particles from which the CMBR was emitted, which represent the radius of the visible universe, is about 14.0 billion parsecs (about 45.7 billion light years), while the comoving distance to the edge of the observable universe is about 14.3 billion parsecs (about 46.6 billion light years),[9] about 2% larger. The best estimate of the age of the universe as of 2015 is 13.799±0.021 billion years[5] but due to the expansion of space humans are observing objects that were originally much closer but are now considerably farther away (as defined in terms of cosmological proper distance, which is equal to the comoving distance at the present time) than a static 13.8 billion light-years distance.[10] It is estimated that the diameter of the observable universe is about 28.5 gigaparsecs (93 billion light-years, 8.8×1026 metres or 5.5×1023 miles),[11] putting the edge of the observable universe at about 46.5 billion light-years away.[12][13] The total mass of the universe can be accurately calculated with the speed of light C, gravitational constant G and the age of the universe to be 1.8×1053 kg with the relation of C3=GM/t.[14] Some parts of the Universe are too far away for the light emitted since the Big Bang to have had enough time to reach Earth, so these portions of the Universe lie outside the observable universe. In the future, light from distant galaxies will have had more time to travel, so additional regions will become observable. However, due to Hubble's law, regions sufficiently distant from the Earth are expanding away from it faster than the speed of light (special relativity prevents nearby objects in the same local region from moving faster than the speed of light with respect to each other, but there is no such constraint for distant objects when the space between them is expanding; see uses of the proper distance for a discussion) and furthermore the expansion rate appears to be accelerating due to dark energy. Assuming dark energy remains constant (an unchanging cosmological constant), so that the expansion rate of the Universe continues to accelerate, there is a "future visibility limit" beyond which objects will never enter our observable universe at any time in the infinite future, because light emitted by objects outside that limit would never reach the Earth. (A subtlety is that, because the Hubble parameter is decreasing with time, there can be cases where a galaxy that is receding from the Earth just a bit faster than light does emit a signal that reaches the Earth eventually[13][15]). This future visibility limit is calculated at a comoving distance of 19 billion parsecs (62 billion light years), assuming the Universe will keep expanding forever, which implies the number of galaxies that we can ever theoretically observe in the infinite future (leaving aside the issue that some may be impossible to observe in practice due to redshift, as discussed in the following paragraph) is only larger than the number currently observable by a factor of 2.36.[16] Artist's logarithmic scale conception of the observable universe with the Solar System at the center, inner and outer planets, Kuiper belt, Oort cloud, Alpha Centauri, Perseus Arm, Milky Way galaxy, Andromeda galaxy, nearby galaxies, Cosmic Web, Cosmic microwave radiation and the Big Bang's invisible plasma on the edge. Though in principle more galaxies will become observable in the future, in practice an increasing number of galaxies will become extremely redshifted due to ongoing expansion, so much so that they will seem to disappear from view and become invisible. Today we are fairly confident that the Milky Way is probably between 100,000 and 150,000 light years across. The observable Universe is, of course, much larger. According to current thinking it is about 93 billion light years in diameter. How can we be so sure? And how did we ever come up with such measurements from right here on Earth? The Universe is all of time and space and its contents.[9][10][11][12] It includes planets, moons, minor planets, stars, galaxies, the contents of intergalactic space, and all matter and energy. The observable universe is about 28 billion parsecs (91 billion light-years) in diameter.[3] The size of the entire Universe is unknown, but there are many hypotheses about the composition and evolution of the Universe.[13] The Milky Way is the galaxy that contains our Solar System. The Milky Way is a barred spiral galaxy that has a diameter usually considered to be about 100,000–120,000 light-years[28] but may be 150,000–180,000 light-years.[29] The Milky Way is estimated to contain 100–400 billion stars.[30][31] There are likely at least 100 billion planets in the Milky Way.[32][33] The Solar System is located within the disk, about 27,000 light-years from the Galactic Center, on the inner edge of one of the spiral-shaped concentrations of gas and dust called the Orion Arm. The stars in the inner ≈10,000 light-years form a bulge and one or more bars that radiate from the bulge. The very center is marked by an intense radio source, named Sagittarius A*, which is likely to be a supermassive black hole. Stars and gases at a wide range of distances from the Galactic Center orbit at approximately 220 kilometers per second. The constant rotation speed contradicts the laws of Keplerian dynamics and suggests that much of the mass of the Milky Way does not emit or absorb electromagnetic radiation. This mass has been termed "dark matter".[34] The rotational period is about 240 million years at the position of the Sun.[15] The Milky Way as a whole is moving reference. The oldest stars in the Milky Way are nearly as old as the Universe itself and thus likely formed shortly after the Dark Ages of the Big Bang.[9] The Milky Way has several satellite galaxies and is part of the Local Group of galaxies, which is a component of the Virgo Supercluster, which is itself a component of the Laniakea at a velocity of approximately 600 km per second with respect to extragalactic frames of Supercluster.[35][36] The Milky Way's Galactic Center in the night sky above Paranal Observatory (the laser creates a guide-star for the telescope). The Sun and planets of the Solar System (distances not to scale) Age 4.568 billion years Location Local Interstellar Cloud, Local Bubble, Orion–Cygnus Arm, Milky Way System mass 1.0014 Solar masses Nearest star Proxima Centauri (4.22 ly) Alpha Centauri system (4.37 ly) Nearest known planetary system Proxima Centauri system (4.25 ly) Planetary system Semi-major axis of outer known planet (Neptune) 30.10 AU (4.503 billion km) Distance to Kuiper cliff 50 AU Populations Stars 1 (Sun) Known planets 8 (Mercury Venus Earth Mars Jupiter Saturn Uranus Neptune) Known dwarf planets Possibly several hundred;[1] five currently recognized by the IAU (Ceres Pluto Haumea Makemake Eris) Known natural satellites 470 (173 planetary[2] 297 minor planetary[3]) Known minor planets 707,664 (as of 2016-03-07)[4] Known comets 3,406 (as of 2016-03-07)[4] Identified rounded satellites 19 Orbit about Galactic Center Invariable-to-galactic plane inclination 60.19° (ecliptic) Distance to Galactic Center 27,000 ± 1,000 ly Orbital speed 220 km/s Orbital period 225–250 Myr Star-related properties Spectral type G2V Frost line ≈5 AU[5] Distance to heliopause ≈120 AU Hill sphere radius ≈1–3 ly Objects by orbit by size by discovery date Lists Gravitationally-rounded (equilibrium) objects Possible dwarf planets Moons (natural satellites) Minor planets Comets Asteroids Our Solar System extends much, much farther than where the planets are. The furthest dwarf planet, Eris, orbits within just a fraction of the larger Solar System. The Kuiper Belt, where we find a Pluto, Eris, Makemake and Haumea, extends from 30 astronomical units all the way out to 50 AU, or 7.5 billion kilometers. The Solar System[a] is the gravitationally bound system comprising the Sun and the objects that orbit it, either directly or indirectly.[b] Of those objects that orbit the Sun directly, the largest eight are the planets,[c] with the remainder being significantly smaller objects, such as dwarf planets and small Solar System bodies. Of the objects that orbit the Sun indirectly, the moons, two are larger than the smallest planet, Mercury.[d] The Solar System formed 4.6 billion years ago from the gravitational collapse of a giant interstellar molecular cloud. The vast majority of the system's mass is in the Sun, with most of the remaining mass contained in Jupiter. The four smaller inner planets, Mercury, Venus, Earth and Mars, are terrestrial planets, being primarily composed of rock and metal. The four outer planets are giant planets, being substantially more massive than the terrestrials. The two largest, Jupiter and Saturn, are gas giants, being composed mainly of hydrogen and helium; the two outermost planets, Uranus and Neptune, are ice giants, being composed mostly of substances with relatively high melting points compared with hydrogen and helium, called volatiles, such as water, ammonia and methane. All planets have almost circular orbits that lie within a nearly flat disc called the ecliptic. The Solar System also contains smaller objects. Earth is the third planet from the Sun, the densest planet in the Solar System, the largest of the Solar System's four terrestrial planets, and the only astronomical object known to harbor life. Earth is not quite a sphere. The planet's rotation causes it to bulge at the equator. Earth's equatorial diameter is 7,926 miles (12,756 km), but from pole to pole, the diameter is 7,898 miles (12,714 km) — a difference of only 28 miles (42 km). Radius: 3,959 mi Mass: 5.972 × 10^24 kg Distance from Sun: 92.96 million mi Area: 196.9 million mi² Surface area: 196.9 million mi² Density: 5.51 g/cm³ Radius: 3,959 mi Mass: 5.972 × 10^24 kg Distance from Sun: 92.96 million mi Area: 196.9 million mi² Surface area: 196.9 million mi² Density: 5.51 g/cm³ PLANETS AND STARS SIZE - COMPARISON - EARTH SIZE - YouTube ▶ 2:22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYVKcDvokiM Planet Earth compared to other planets and stars in size. - YouTube ▶ 4:27 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=octRYMsiLX0 The size of Earth, like the size of all of the celestial bodies, is measured in a number of parameters including mass, volume, density, surface area, and equatorial/polar/mean diameter. While we live on this planet, very few people can quote you the figures for these parameters. Below is a table with many of the pieces of the data used to measure the size of the Earth. Mass 5.9736×1024kg Volume 1.083×1012 km3 Mean diameter 12,742 km Surface area 510,072,000 km2 Density 5.515 g/cm3 Circumference 40,041 km Those numbers tell you the size of the Earth, but what about its other statistics? The atmospheric pressure at the surface is 101.325 kPa, average temperature is 14°C, the axial tilt is approximately 23°, and it has an orbital speed of 29.78 km/s. Earth orbits with a perihelion of 147,098,290 km, and an aphelion of 152,098,232 km, making for a semi-major axis of 149,598,261 km. Even though we need oxygen to survive, it is the second most abundant component of Earth’s atmosphere. Nitrogen accounts for 78% of the gases in the atmosphere and oxygen occupies 21%. The Earth only has one moon. That is pretty uncommon in our Solar System. There are currently 166 recognized moon in our system. There is one asteroid that has a quasi relationship with Earth. 3753 Cruithne has a 1:1 orbital resonance with the Earth. It is a periodic inclusion planetoid that has a horseshoe orbit. It was discovered in 1986. Since we occupy this planet, it is understandably the most extensively studied body in space. We have sent scientist to most of the corners of our world. Yet, we find dozens of new species each year and there are areas that have rarely seen a human’s footprints. There are aspects of our world that we do not understand and have theories too inadequate to explain. Science is light years ahead of where it was just 50 years ago. These advancements are exciting enough to make the possibilities of the near future seem boundless. Now that you know the size of the Earth, you could look for information on extremophiles, the Mariana Trench, and the Tunguska event. Earth bound events are often taken for granted since we live here, but, with a little research, you may find much more excitement outside of your back door than you ever expected. We have written many articles about the Solar System for Universe Today. Here’s an article about the size of Mars, and here’s one about the size of the Moon. Want more resources on the Earth? Here’s a link to NASA’s Human Spaceflight page, and here’s NASA’s Visible Earth. We have also recorded an episode of Astronomy Cast about Earth, as part of our tour through the Solar System – Episode 51: Earth. Earth (otherwise known as the world,[n 5] in Greek: Γαῖα Gaia,[n 6] or in Latin: Terra[26]) is the third planet from the Sun, the densest planet in the Solar System, the largest of the Solar System's four terrestrial planets, and the only astronomical object known to harbor life. According to radiometric dating and other sources of evidence, Earth formed about 4.54 billion years ago.[27][28][29] Earth gravitationally interacts with other objects in space, especially the Sun and the Moon. During one orbit around the Sun, Earth rotates about its axis 366.26 times, creating 365.26 solar days or one sidereal year.[n 7] Earth's axis of rotation is tilted 23.4° away from the perpendicular of its orbital plane, producing seasonal variations on the planet's surface within a period of one tropical year (365.24 solar days).[30] The Moon is the Earth's only permanent natural satellite; their gravitational interaction causes ocean tides, stabilizes the orientation of Earth's rotational axis, and gradually slows Earth's rotational rate.[31] Earth's lithosphere is divided into several rigid tectonic plates that migrate across the surface over periods of many millions of years. 71% of Earth's surface is covered with water.[32] The remaining 29% is land mass—consisting of continents and islands—that together has many lakes, rivers, and other sources of water that contribute to the hydrosphere. The majority of Earth's polar regions are covered in ice, including the Antarctic ice sheet and the sea ice of the Arctic ice pack. Earth's interior remains active with a solid iron inner core, a liquid outer core that generates the Earth's magnetic field, and a convecting mantle that drives plate tectonics. Within the first billion years of Earth's history, life appeared in the oceans and began to affect the atmosphere and surface, leading to the proliferation of aerobic and anaerobic organisms. Since then, the combination of Earth's distance from the Sun, physical properties, and geological history have allowed life to evolve and thrive. Life arose on Earth by 3.5 billion years ago, though some geological evidence indicates that life may have arisen as much as 4.1 billion years ago.[33][34] In the history of the Earth, biodiversity has gone through long periods of expansion, occasionally punctuated by mass extinction events. Over 99% of all species of life[35] that ever lived on Earth are extinct.[36][37] Estimates of the number of species on Earth today vary widely;[38][39][40] most species have not been described.[41] Over 7.3 billion humans[42] live on Earth and depend on its biosphere and minerals for their survival. Humanity has developed diverse societies and cultures; politically, the world is divided into about 200 sovereign states 3 Human individuals who are earth-confined think they are the centre of this seemingly endless and ageless universe and their minute, contingent, irrelevant, mostly meaningless and pointless life-worlds, perceptions of ‘the world’ and their reality/ies are all which exist. It is from this point of reference and in terms of their very subjective perspectives and frames of reference that they construct notions of philosophy. Such notions are of course socio-culturally, historically, socio-economically, and many other factors, determined, limited and biased. These factors include their educational background and more specifically their philosophical education, socialization and indoctrination. All these things are historically determined and situated, so that what are the reigning philosophical paradigm, theory/ies and accepted ‘truths’ are of one year, one decade, one century are shown to be restricted, rather meaningless and sometimes quite bizarre when considered from a later year, decade and century and by someone with another philosophical education, socialization and indoctrination. I have no wish or intention to be the saviour of philosophers by opening their eyes to their time, space and place limitations. I do not wish to play the messiah of any philosopher, as far as I am concerned they can live and die confined by the limitations of their assumptions, pre-suppositions, ignorance and arrogance. Many of these earthbound individuals think and act as if they believe that they are not earth- or : Γαῖα Gaia,[n 6] or in Terra[26] originated and confined but that they have the divine, god-given right over meaning, truth and the nature of the universe and existence merely because they are ignorant, and have obtained a Ph.D or other qualifications and status in some microscopic academic subject. I am for truth, insights, meaningfulness and the multiverse, while these individuals are earth-bound , their vision is institutionalized, academically internalized, limited, restricted, confined and derivative. They only think within the limits and terms they internalized from their particular academic institutions and have few original thoughts of their own and little critical and original thinking and insights. These are the individuals who attempt to restrict the multiverse within and by their limited and oh so correct academic confinements. https://youtu.be/9N4ScyVtvmA Link to one of 100 videos of my work on You Tube. Ulrich de Balbian, Meta-Art (beyond asemic writing, post-modern, post-minimalism, process painting) Dear son/daughter of man you are, has always been and will always be part of the universe/multiverse you originated from. You are no different from the lamb, the calf, the chicken you slaughter to feed yourself, no different from the carrots, spinach, milk you fill yourself with, no different from your cat, dog or horse. You come from and out of the universes like all those organisms who were before you and those that will come after you, when you already have been long forgotten and left no footprint to be remembered by. Our clever brains, minds, consciousness developed out of the stuff the universe is made from, our species developed with the universe, our solar system and earth. We form part of it although we think we do not as we are not seem to be static like the sea, the mountains, the continents, lacking independence from nature and their instincts like flora and fauna. Our organisms, bodies, brains, cultures developed with our earth. In 10, 20, 100, 500 years the present academic credentials and expertise of our institutes of learning will be laughed at, their knowledge will prove to be as limited as those of 20, 40, 100, 1000 years ago. If traders in philosophy could execute their subject in writing, discussing, doing it in simple terms, express themselves and think in more simple, everyday language talk and usage they would. They cannot as their philosophical ways have been internalised in institutionalized complex notions. It’s me one whispers to a loved one as the loved one whispers to one, but all they know is professional, academic speak, like those who are trained in almost meaningless art-speak. So they are not able to see the loved one because of the complex terms they learned to use. Art and philosophy are strangers to them because of their notions that create a distance from their subject of study, from their subject-matter, their object, they are not intimate with it like the contemplative loved ones and their god. Contrived art-speak, philosophical academic speak and theological speak are not intimate, do not allow intimacy.The talk of lovers are gentle, kind, sensitive and simple; this is not how you talk to and about your beloved, your Sophos of philo, no you approach it but keeps here at a distance by your formal, contrived, institutionalized, emotionless speech, using words in the formal way one uses with a stranger, the stranger one tries to show respect to. So what do you receive in return for that approach of yours? You obtain factual knowledge, irrelevant data and information, instead of a subtle understanding of Sophos. So what does philosophy, what can philosophizing do? Everything from one point of view and nothing when viewed from another perspective. In one sense it can and does allow an approach to all things, all phenomena, everything – can be reflected upon, while when observed in another way, compared to the investigations of ‘physical’ and other sciences it can do nothing. So what is the philosophical way, what is the path of philosophizing? What are the ways of the sciences and has these ways, methods, anything to offer philosophy? More factual knowledge, more information and data, and mathematical operations and formulae to categorize, classify and systematize them with? Is this what first philosophy, the final philosophy, philosophy which created a closed, absolute, all-explanatory system or theory is attempting to realize? Or is its aim much more simple, is its rationale more humble, its purpose much more subtle? To obtain insights of and into what it knows and what it does not yet know, to realize always more subtle understanding? Like the contemplative, who seems to repeat the same words, the same prayers, the same chants over and over, but in fact these things are not the same, the contemplative realizes always more subtle grasps of the beloved. From the outside it might appear as if nothing changes as if nothing changed, but always more subtle and greater understanding of the beloved is realized. Always a more subtle and stronger unity are developed with the beloved of the contemplative until there no longer are two selves, but only the ONE, the one SELF. This is the lesson the original, creative-thinking philosopher could learn from the solitary contemplative. I have written more on this from the side of the contemplative on this site - https://sites.google.com/site/trinityprioryinternational/ 4 To me it was no surprise that from the many subjects I came across philosophy spoke to me, it replaced the need for all other disciplines, except the socio-cultural practice of the western tradition of fine art and more specifically the genre of painting. This is because I have always automatically and naturally reflected on all things, their whys, how, their nature, etc. Two points appear to me to follow from this, that the character, the personality-type, the ‘nature’ (and nurture), the individual’s place in his family of origin and other factors play a huge part in why certain individuals are drawn to philosophy, almost like a fish to water. Furthermore that some of these individuals almost automatically take the route of original and creative-thinkers, while others follow the path of academic, scholarly, professionals. The one type of philosopher is not necessarily ‘better’, more valuable or of greater importance to the philosophical discourse than the other. I suppose each of them has a function, a role to play in the socio-cultural practice of philosophy. I probably criticize a certain type so that I can differentiate myself from it? This is often said to be the case when someone tries to distinguish himself from others that are very close to him in some characteristic, belief, etc. However that, other kind of, philosopher is in many ways alien to me. I cannot really comprehend why anyone would wish to execute the things that kind of philosopher does as to me it appears lifeless, unreal, inessential, lacking meaning, being very boring and a waste of time. I am greatly reminded by Heidegger’s insights, not that I am particularly a supporter of his ideas or consider them to be philosophical absolutes. I merely wish to refer to him so as to make a point, to illustrate that what I am trying to describe and depict a bit clearer. Being and Time (German: Sein und Zeit) is a 1927 book by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, in which Heidegger seeks to analyse the concept of Being. This has fundamental importance for philosophy, he thought, because since the time of the Ancient Greeks, philosophy has avoided this question, turning instead to the analysis of particular beings. Heidegger seeks a more fundamental ontology through understanding being itself. He approaches this through seeking understanding of beings to whom the question of being is important, i.e. 'Dasein', or the human being in the abstract.[1] Although written quickly, and though Heidegger did not complete the project outlined in the introduction, Being and Time remains his most important work. As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring (Destruktion) of the philosophical tradition, an interpretative strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude of the metaphysics of presence. This use of the word Destruktion is meant to signify not a negative operation but rather a positive transformation or recovery. In Being and Time Heidegger briefly undertakes a destructuring of the philosophy of René Descartes, but the second volume, which was intended to be a Destruktion of Western philosophy in all its stages, was never written. In later works Heidegger uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Plato, among others. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being_and_Time http://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/heidegger/ https://arigiddesignator.wordpress.com/2011/11/12/heidegger-on-philosophy-itself/ It would seem that in order do philosophy at all, one must first know what philosophy is. Ha-ha, I love this, such assumptions are wonderful but in one sense very meaningful and true. Heidegger like all original thinking philosophers obviously came to a unique insight or response to what philosophy is. In three of Heidegger’s works, What is Philosophy? Basic Questions of Philosophy and Being & Time. He explains the correct way to reach a definition of philosophy, and the methods and attitudes with which philosophy should proceed given that definition. He Heidegger teaches that philosophy is concerned with making explicit our pre-theoretical understanding of being. And the importance of the philosophical mood, astonishment, (which he also describes as anxiety, perplexity, and awe) in helping us make this understanding explicit. Heidegger deals with the question “What is Philosophy?” in a lecture of the same name. His treatment of the question is something like the following. Naturally, we must answer this question before we can engage with philosophy. But, in order to ask “What is X?” we must already know X, at least enough to differentiate it from other things. Thus, we should rephrase our question to “What is that which is called ‘Philosophy’?” Obviously, all past philosophers have known, at least in part, that with which they have engaged. If this is so, we can come to an understanding of philosophy simply by taking the common denominator abstracted from the projects of each of these philosophers. The result would then apply to every philosopher with equal validity. And this is precisely why it is the worst thing we can do to try to answer the question. We would need to know what philosophy is even to decide who qualifies as a philosopher. And even if this strategy worked, it would merely give us a historical answer. We need a philosophical answer to this question if ever a philosophical answer is appropriate. In that case, we need to be able to engage in philosophy before we can decide what philosophy is; just the opposite of what is natural. This seems like a circle. “Philosophy itself seems to be this circle” This treatment of the definition of philosophy is characteristic of Heidegger’s method of definition in general. In Basic Questions of Philosophy, he writes “Philosophy is knowledge of the essence of things”. “For in order to discover the facts pertaining to the essence and to select them and exhibit them as justifications for the legitimacy of this positing of the essence, the positing of the essence must already be presupposed”. f we must presuppose the essence before we know anything about it and yet we are able to ask about the essence, we must not know the essence in the normal way. We cannot know any fact about something without already grasping its essence in some way. This means the essence of something will not be established by more information about the thing. Our grasp of essence must somehow come from what we already know since we have to know this before we can even ask the question. Heidegger goes on to talk about how we do grasp the essence. “The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth, since it is not directly present in the sphere of immediate representing and intending”. We have to grasp the essence already and we don’t know it explicitly, so we must bring it forth. Heidegger calls this act of bringing forth, “productive seeing” . Thus, the essence of that which we encounter depends on us in some way. However, we obviously don’t decide what the essence is since we have to ask what it is. Somehow we have implicitly brought forth the essence of the thing in order to interact with it at all. Philosophical knowledge based on fact is similarly repudiated and replaced with a more primordial form of knowledge in Being & Time. In What is Philosophy?, Heidegger finally answers that philosophy “consists in our corresponding to [answering to] that towards which philosophy is on the way. And that is—the Being of being” Philosophy is a dialogue with being. Being depends on us to bring it forth, but it is not all up to us. Being has something to say as well. Bringing forth the essence of a thing, and seeing the referential relationships that make a thing meaningful to us are examples of a correspondence with being. “For, to be sure, although we do remain always and everywhere in correspondence to the Being of being, … only at times does it become an unfolding attitude specifically adopted by us. Only when this happens do we really correspond to that which concerns philosophy”. Making our pre-theoretical understanding explicit is not easy. Heidegger thinks that we need to be in the right mood in order to explicitly see our correspondence with being. Having laid out the proper subject matter, goals, and methodology of philosophy, one might still wonder “Why?” Why is it important not to pass over the phenomenon of world? Or Why should we adopt the attitude that unfolds being? Heidegger only offers negative answers to these questions. This is sort of like asking – why do philosophy, what will what we reveal in this doing be like, what will its meaning, and aim be and what purpose will it serve? If philosophy is concerned with the essence of things, rather than the things themselves, it cannot provide any particular truth but only the essence of truth. This is a surprising result because if philosophy has no use, it would seem that we have no reason to read or study it. To even ask after the utility of philosophy shows the entrenchment of the technological understanding of being. Perhaps Heidegger wanted to shield philosophy from being turned into just another resource since this would only reinforce the problem. If philosophy is seen as useless, it might be spared from being taken over by the current understanding of being. Thus, Heidegger sees philosophy as an illuminating process which cannot solve the very problems it brings forth. https://arigiddesignator.wordpress.com/2011/11/12/heidegger-on-philosophy-itself/ I merely took Heidegger as an example and I am not trying to persuade anyone that the contents of what he says is meaningful or not, I only wish to show how original thinking philosophers question the nature, purpose, rationale for philosophy (meta-philosophy) while they are doing philosophy. And, this is probably the case their entire life. I used Heidegger as an example to show what I also attempted to say – before and while and after I was doing, what I later discovered was philosophizing, at the same time I questioned the meaning, the nature, the rationale of the philosophical discourse and philosophizing. In other words meta-philosophy/izing came to me as naturally and essentially to my being, existence, personality and character as philosophy itself. 5 In philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, cognitive closure is the proposition that human minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems. Cognition is the set of all mental abilities and processes related to knowledge, attention, memory and working memory, judgment and evaluation, reasoning and "computation", problem solving and decision making, comprehension and production of language, etc. http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/ http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/ http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1551-6709 http://www.cogsci.ucsd.edu/ http://cogsci.berkeley.edu// https://cognitivescience.ceu.edu/ http://www.sfu.ca/cognitive-science.html http://cogsci.jhu.edu/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/  1. History  2. Methods  3. Representation and Computation  4. Theoretical Approaches 4.1 Formal logic 4.2 Rules 4.3 Concepts 4.4 Analogies 4.5 Images 4.6 Connectionism 4.7 Theoretical neuroscience 4.8 Bayesian  5. Philosophical Relevance 5.1 Philosophical Applications Some philosophy, in particular naturalistic philosophy of mind, is part of cognitive science. But the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science is relevant to philosophy in several ways. First, the psychological, computational, and other results of cognitive science investigations have important potential applications to traditional philosophical problems in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Second, cognitive science can serve as an object of philosophical critique, particularly concerning the central assumption that thinking is representational and computational. Third and more constructively, cognitive science can be taken as an object of investigation in the philosophy of science, generating reflections on the methodology and presuppositions of the enterprise. Much philosophical research today is naturalistic, treating philosophical investigations as continuous with empirical work in fields such as psychology. From a naturalistic perspective, philosophy of mind is closely allied with theoretical and experimental work in cognitive science. Metaphysical conclusions about the nature of mind are to be reached, not by a priori speculation, but by informed reflection on scientific developments in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and computer science. Similarly, epistemology is not a stand-alone conceptual exercise, but depends on and benefits from scientific findings concerning mental structures and learning procedures. Ethics can benefit by using greater understanding of the psychology of moral thinking to bear on ethical questions such as the nature of deliberations concerning right and wrong. Here are some philosophical problems to which ongoing developments in cognitive science are highly relevant. Links are provided to other relevant articles in this Encyclopedia. Innateness. To what extent is knowledge innate or acquired by experience? Is human behavior shaped primarily by nature or nurture? Language of thought. Does the human brain operate with a language-like code or with a more general connectionist architecture? What is the relation between symbolic cognitive models using rules and concepts and sub-symbolic models using neural networks? Mental imagery. Do human minds think with visual and other kinds of imagery, or only with language-like representations? Folk psychology. Does a person's everyday understanding of other people consist of having a theory of mind, or of merely being able to simulate them? Meaning. How do mental representations acquire meaning or mental content? To what extent does the meaning of a representation depend on its relation to other representations, its relation to the world, and its relation to a community of thinkers? Mind-brain identity. Are mental states brain states? Or can they be multiply realized by other material states? What is the relation between psychology and neuroscience? Is materialism true? Free will. Is human action free or merely caused by brain events? Moral psychology. How do minds/brains make ethical judgments? The meaning of life. How can minds construed naturalistically as brains find value and meaning? Emotions. What are emotions, and what role do they play in thinking? Mental illness. What are mental illnesses, and how are psychological and neural processes relevant to their explanation and treatment? Appearance and reality. How do minds/brains form and evaluate representations of the external world? Social science. How do explanations of the operations of minds interact with explanations of the operations of groups and societies? Additional philosophical problems arise from examining the presuppositions of current approaches to cognitive science. 5.2 Critique of Cognitive Science The claim that human minds work by representation and computation is an empirical conjecture and might be wrong. Although the computational-representational approach to cognitive science has been successful in explaining many aspects of human problem solving, learning, and language use, some philosophical critics have claimed that this approach is fundamentally mistaken. Critics of cognitive science have offered such challenges as: The emotion challenge: Cognitive science neglects the important role of emotions in human thinking. The consciousness challenge: Cognitive science ignores the importance of consciousness in human thinking. The world challenge: Cognitive science disregards the significant role of physical environments in human thinking, which is embedded in and extended into the world. The body challenge: Cognitive science neglects the contribution of embodiment to human thought and action. The dynamical systems challenge: The mind is a dynamical system, not a computational system. The social challenge: Human thought is inherently social in ways that cognitive science ignores. The mathematics challenge: Mathematical results show that human thinking cannot be computational in the standard sense, so the brain must operate differently, perhaps as a quantum computer. The first five challenges are increasingly addressed by advances that explain emotions, consciousness, action, and embodiment in terms of neural mechanisms. The social challenge is being met by the development of computational models of interacting agents. The mathematics challenge is based on misunderstanding of Gödel's theorem and on exaggeration of the relevance of quantum theory to neural processes. 5.3 Philosophy of Cognitive Science Cognitive science raises many interesting methodological questions that are worthy of investigation by philosophers of science. What is the nature of representation? What role do computational models play in the development of cognitive theories? What is the relation among apparently competing accounts of mind involving symbolic processing, neural networks, and dynamical systems? What is the relation among the various fields of cognitive science such as psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience? Are psychological phenomena subject to reductionist explanations via neuroscience? Are levels of explanation best characterized in terms of ontological levels (molecular, neural, psychological, social) or methodological ones (computational, algorithmic, physical)? The increasing prominence of neural explanations in cognitive, social, developmental, and clinical psychology raises important philosophical questions about explanation and reduction. Anti-reductionism, according to which psychological explanations are completely independent of neurological ones, is becoming increasingly implausible, but it remains controversial to what extent psychology can be reduced to neuroscience and molecular biology. Essential to answering questions about the nature of reduction are answers to questions about the nature of explanation. Explanations in psychology, neuroscience, and biology in general are plausibly viewed as descriptions of mechanisms, which are systems of parts that interact to produce regular changes. In psychological explanations, the parts are mental representations that interact by computational procedures to produce new representations. In neuroscientific explanations, the parts are neural populations that interact by electrochemical processes to produce new activity in neural populations. If progress in theoretical neuroscience continues, it should become possible to tie psychological to neurological explanations by showing how mental representations such as concepts are constituted by activities in neural populations, and how computational procedures such as spreading activation among concepts are carried out by neural processes. The increasing integration of cognitive psychology with neuroscience provides evidence for the mind-brain identity theory according to which mental processes are neural, representational, and computational. Other philosophers dispute such identification on the grounds that minds are embodied in biological systems and extended into the world. However, moderate claims about embodiment are consistent with the identity theory because brain representations operate in several modalities (e.g. visual and motor) that enable minds to deal with the world.  Bibliography Anderson, J. R., 2007. How Can the Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. –––, 2010. Cognitive Psychology and its Implications , 7th edn., New York: Worth. Bechtel, W., 2008. Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neurosciences, New York: Routledge. Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (eds.), 1998. A Companion to Cognitive Science, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., Mundale, J., & Stufflebeam, R. S. (eds.), 2001. Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Boden, M. A., 2006. Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science , Oxford: Clarendon. Chemero, A., 2009, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Churchland, P. M., 2007. Neurophilosophy at Work, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Churchland, P. S., 2002. Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Clark, A., 2001. Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive science, New York: Oxford University Press. –––, 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, New York: Oxford University Press. Dawson, M. R. W., 1998. Understanding Cognitive Science, Oxford: Blackwell. Dehaene, S., 2014. Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts, New York: Viking. Dreyfus, H. L., 1992. What Computers Still Can't Do, (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Eliasmith, C., 2013. How to Build a Brain: A Neural Architecture for Biological Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eliasmith, C., & Anderson, C. H., 2003. Neural Engineering: Computation, Representation and Dynamics in Neurobiological Systems, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Friedenberg, J. D., & Silverman, G., 2005. Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Study of Mind, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Gibbs, R. W., 2005, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldman, A., 1993. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science, Boulder: Westview Press. Griffiths, T. L., Kemp, C., & Tenenbaum, J. B., 2008. “Bayesian Models of Cognition,” in R. Sun (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59-100. Johnson-Laird, P., 1988. The Computer and the Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Knobe, J., & Nichols, S. (eds.), 2008. Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. McCauley, R. N., 2007. “Reduction: Models of Cross-scientific Relations and their Implications for the Psychology-neuroscience Interface,” in P. Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 105-158. Murphy, D., 2006. Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Nadel, L. (ed.), 2003. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, London:Nature Publishing Group. Nisbett, R., 2003. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently … and Why, New York: Free Press. O'Reilly, R. C., Munakata, Y., Frank, M. J., Hazy, T. E., & Contributors, 2012. Computational Cognitive Neuroscience, Wiki Book, 1st Edition, URL = http://ccnbook.colorado.edu. Pessoa, L., 2013. The Cognitive-Emotional Brain: From Interactions to Integration, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Polk, T. A., & Seifert, C. M. (eds.), 2002. Cognitive Modeling, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Searle, J., 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Smith, E. E.., & Kosslyn, S. M., 2007. Cognitive Psychology: Mind and Brain, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Sobel, C. P., 2001. The Cognitive Sciences: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield. Stillings, N., et al., 1995. Cognitive Science, Second edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sun, R. (ed.), 2008. The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ––– (ed.), 2012. Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Thagard, P., 2005. Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science, second edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ––– (ed.), 2007. Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Amsterdam: Elsevier. –––, 2009. “Why cognitive science needs philosophy and vice versa, ” Topics in Cognitive Science, 1: 237-254. –––, 2010. The Brain and the Meaning of Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press. –––, 2012. The Cognitive Science of Science: Explanation, Discovery, and Conceptual Change, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Thompson, E., 2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Science of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Von Eckardt, B., 1993. What is Cognitive Science?, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. C. (eds.), 1999. The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  Academic Tools Thagard, Paul, "Cognitive Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cognitive-science/>. Other Internet Resources Artificial Intelligence on the Web Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science Cognitive Science Dictionary, University of Alberta Cognitive Science Society Computational Epistemology Lab at the University of Waterloo Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind Glossary of Cognitive Science Mind and Brain News from Science Daily Yahoo! Cognitive Science page More specific Cognitive Science links Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary, scientific study of the mind and its processes.[2] It examines the nature, the tasks, and the functions of cognition. Cognitive scientists study intelligence and behavior, with a focus on how nervous systems represent, process, and transform information. Mental faculties of concern to cognitive scientists include language, perception, memory, attention, reasoning, and emotion; to understand these faculties, cognitive scientists borrow from fields such as linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology.[3] The typical analysis of cognitive science spans many levels of organization, from learning and decision to logic and planning; from neural circuitry to modular brain organization. The fundamental concept of cognitive science is that "thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures."3 A central tenet of cognitive science is that a complete understanding of the mind/brain cannot be attained by studying only a single level. Marr[5] gave a famous description of three levels of analysis: the computational theory, specifying the goals of the computation; representation and algorithms, giving a representation of the inputs and outputs and the algorithms which transform one into the other; and the hardware implementation, how algorithm and representation may be physically realized Research methods 3.1 Behavioral experiments 3.2 Brain imaging 3.3 Computational modeling 3.4 Neurobiological methods Cognitive science has given rise to models of human cognitive bias and risk perception, and has been influential in the development of behavioral finance, part of economics. It has also given rise to a new theory of the philosophy of mathematics, and many theories of artificial intelligence, persuasion and coercion. It has made its presence known in the philosophy of language and epistemology - a modern revival of rationalism - as well as constituting a substantial wing of modern linguistics. Fields of cognitive science have been influential in understanding the brain's particular functional systems (and functional deficits) ranging from speech production to auditory processing and visual perception. It has made progress in understanding how damage to particular areas of the brain affect cognition, and it has helped to uncover the root causes and results of specific dysfunction, such as dyslexia, anopia, and hemispatial neglect. Some of the more recognized names in cognitive science are usually either the most controversial or the most cited. Within philosophy familiar names include Daniel Dennett who writes from a computational systems perspective, John Searle known for his controversial Chinese room, Jerry Fodor who advocates functionalism. David Chalmers who advocates Dualism, also known for articulating the hard problem of consciousness, Douglas Hofstadter, famous for writing Gödel, Escher, Bach, which questions the nature of words and thought. In the realm of linguistics, Noam Chomsky and George Lakoff have been influential (both have also become notable as political commentators). In artificial intelligence, Marvin Minsky, Herbert A. Simon, Allen Newell, and Kevin Warwick are prominent. Popular names in the discipline of psychology include George A. Miller, James McClelland, Philip Johnson-Laird, John O'Keefe, and Steven Pinker. Anthropologists Dan Sperber, Edwin Hutchins, Scott Atran, Pascal Boyer, Michael Posner, and Joseph Henrich have been involved in collaborative projects with cognitive and social psychologists, political scientists and evolutionary biologists in attempts to develop general theories of culture formation, religion, and political association.  Adapted from Miller, George A (2003). "The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective". Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7.   Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field of researchers from Linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, computer science, and anthropology that seek to understand the mind. How We Learn: Ask the Cognitive Scientist  Thagard, Paul, Cognitive Science, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science In philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, cognitive closure is the proposition that human minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems.[citation needed] Owen Flanagan calls this position anti-constructive naturalism or the new mysterianism and the primary advocate of the hypothesis, Colin McGinn,[1] calls it transcendental naturalism because it acknowledges the possibility that solutions might fall within the grasp of an intelligent non-human of some kind. According to McGinn, such philosophical questions include the mind-body problem, identity of the self, foundations of meaning, free will, and knowledge, both a priori and empirical.[2]  Harris, Errol E (2006), Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness, p. 51.  McGinn, Colin (1994). "The Problem of Philosophy". Philosophical Studies (76): 133–56. it combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural. As argued in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, human thinking is unavoidably structured by categories of the understanding: Quantity – Unity, Plurality, Totality. Quality – Reality, Negation, Limitation. Relation – Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community. Modality – Possibility or Impossibility, Existence or Non-Existence, Necessity or Contingence. These are ideas to which there is no escape, thus they pose a limit to thinking. What can be known through the categories is called phenomena and what is outside the categories is called noumena, the unthinkable "things in themselves". In his (famous) essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel mentions the possibility of cognitive closure to the subjective character of experience and the (deep) implications that it has for materialist reductionist science. Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book Science of the Mind that some modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness will never be completely explained. Flanagan called them "the new mysterians" after the rock group Question Mark and the Mysterians.[7] According to McGinn, the solution to the mind-body problem cannot be grasped, despite the fact that the solution is "written in our genes". Emergent materialism is a similar but different claim that humans are not smart enough to determine "the relationship between mind and matter." 6 MY NOTE: I cited the above for a number of reasons. I wished to indicate what cognitive sciences are about in general, what their relevance to philosophy is, what the nature and subject-matter of philosophy of cognitive sciences are about, that Kant touched on some of the issues concerning cognitive sciences. The contents I cited are merely general introductions for those who require some very elementary information on cognitive sciences and more specifically the relationship of cognitive sciences to philosophy and how the latter are involved in and why it is concerned with cognitive sciences. My main reason for using cognitive sciences in the context of philosophy/izing and meta-philosophy/izing is the following: I wish to indicate that the philosophical discourse once again loses vast areas of what traditionally were considered to be philosophy/ical have now been lost to or usurped by other disciplines and other, non-philosophical ways of thinking and investigation. Related to this loss of what once was thought to be typical philosophical subject-matter and areas of reflection by means of philosophizing and philosophical methods have now become part of another discipline, disciplines or inter-disciplinary subject-matter and fields of research and problems to be investigated inter-disciplinary. The first statement refers to a fact and cannot, perhaps regrettably, be changed or the clock turned back. Those areas traditionally formed part of philosophical fields such as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic etc. Sadly we will have to say goodbye to them, but interpreted in a less negative manner, with their departure we are able, hopefully, to clarify these philosophical fields and what their meaningful, suitable, legitimate areas of study and fields of investigation are. My second statement is the one referring to the real bummer. It refers to a serious problem concerning the norms and values of the philosophical discourse, its rationale, transcendental conditions, pre-suppositions, validity, assumptions and nature. We will, again, have to question the nature of philosophy, the validity and rationale of the philosophical discourse and subject-matter and of course the how, the methodology, methods, procedures and techniques of doing philosophy, of philosophizing. By its involvement in cognitive sciences philosophy becomes just another socio-cultural practice in the inter-disciplinary fields of the cognitive sciences. This involvement with empirical research investigations and sciences is the exact opposite of what the philosophical values and rational of the philosophical discourse is about. Either the meaning, nature and aims of the philosophical discourse must be changed drastically and then be labelled as something else, be given another name, or ‘philosophers’ should withdraw from these and other types of interdisciplinary practices and concerns (for example those that have been pushed by the so-called critical theory ‘sociologists’ and others who attempt to abuse philosophy to explore, develop and promote their social theories and theorizing). The reason why I turn my meta-philosophical explorations to the cognitive sciences and more specifically ‘philosophy’s’ involvement in those inter-disciplinary domains (and the investigation of some of its subject-matter, on certain levels and in certain dimensions of those disciplines) is because the involvement of first-order philosophy/izing and the discourse of philosophy in them goes completely against the grain of what philosophy and philosophizing is about. This involvement of philosophy is of the utmost importance for this discourse as it is another sign, another symptom of the dying, the death of philosophy. This is the real reason why I referred to the inter-disciplinary cognitive sciences and their inter-disciplinary subject-matter – they are fields and concerns that seriously distract those involved from the philosophical socio-cultural practice, the rationale, values, norms and nature of the philosophical discourse and thereby confuse and create confusions concerning these things. In short, either quit being involved in (doing) those non-philosophical activities in the name of philosophy, call that what you do something else, but not philosophy – be looking carefully and critically at what you do, your aims, your methodology, methods and procedure, then conceptualize what you are doing and proceed what you do in the name of the new notion you created and continue your inter-disciplinary activities in the name of that ‘new’ idea and socio-cultural practice. Name it anything you wish, but be aware that it is not philosophy and do not label your activities as philosophical. The above is an example of philosophy (already it frequently seems and appears as if it is a meta- or second order activity, because of its reflective, thinking, talking, writing about nature) and of meta-philosophy. Meta- philosophical explorations of first-order philosophy, meta-order investigation of first-order philosophizing and meta-philosophical reflections on first-order philosophical activities, thinking and other aspects and concerns and meta-philosophizing (in or by means of ordinary language and not in the terms of mathematics, logic or logico-mathematical practices). It should be clear that meta-philosophy has the concerns of philosophy, the philosophical discourse and of philosophizing at heart. In other words it investigates these things with the aim of trying to salvage philosophy, to clarify its practices, values, norms, rationale, nature, methods and other transcendentals with the purpose of enabling it to be continued, developed and preserved. 7 META-ART Meta-art is the school, the movement, the type of art that I create. It has, of course, a lengthy tradition and background from the Western tradition of Fine Art and more specifically the genre of painting. The ‘meta’ refers to the fact that it is a consideration of, a thinking about, a reflection on art, or in this case, painting. The philosophical field I am investigating and writing about is meta-philosophy. I have written a lot about this area and have included endless sources, discussions, articles, books, references, encyclopaedia articles, bibliographies, explanations, university courses and much else on the topic of meta-philosophy. To understand more about the ‘meta’ aspect in general and more specifically the philosophical part see my articles on that idea. Either on my personal philosophical site : https://sites.google.com/site/philosophyphilosophizing/home, or on Academia.edu https://independent.academia.edu/UlrichdeBalbian or on Philosophical Papers http://philpapers.org/profile/342710 https://www.google.com/search?q=Authentic+in+your+art+ulrich+de+balbian&sa=N&biw=1366&bih=589&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&ved=0ahUKEwiyld7N4rHQAhXJK8AKHUc2Dq84ChCwBAgY I reflect on, think about and deal with philosophy in my meta-philosophy articles, as far as my art is concerned, I became aware that I do not merely paint, that I am not only interested in art and painting as such, but that I explore these things, that I investigate them and that I reflect on them. Therefore my type of art is meta-art. The ‘art’ part of this notion refers to my practical art work. I realized that it is post-modern, relativizing many things, being sceptical of most things taken for granted (in this case concerning art and painting) and that my painting is based upon these notion. Other ideas that are expressed through my art, unintentionally, as I do not intentionally attempt to create a new school or movement, are ideas such as post-minimalism, the minimalistic aspects of my work. This concerns the colours I use, the colour combinations, the forms, the composition, the techniques being employed and much else. Another aspect of my work is a concentration on and a highlighting of the process/es of painting, in other words process painting. These then are the notions that will assist in the explanation of meta-art. It is not something cerebral, something that I try to do, but something that gradually, naturally and automatically developed during the many decades that I have been painting. Painting for the creative, original, serious artist is not about making ‘nice’ pictures, nice images, but it is about being authentic and true to oneself. The artist does what he has to do, what he must do – concerning the colours employed, the paint, techniques, forms and other structures, he does what he must do at that moment. It is as if he has no choice in the matter, tapping from, expressing and realizing that what comes from the deepest layers of his consciousness and sub-consciousness. I have written on this authenticity here https://www.linkedin.com/today/author/0_2ySTeoi8hXCT9wNuwdiycB?trk=prof-sm among more than 2000 other articles on art. Painting = 5 Golden Rules | ulrich de balbian | LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/painting-5-golden-rules-ulrich-de-balbian Nov 28, 2015 - Painting = FIVE Golden Rules Here are five golden rules for the socio-cultural ... (1) The artist is totally, completely and absolutely authentic (and .... Lack of email etiquette Please tell me people at your work are not sending ... https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/painting-5-golden-rules-ulrich-de-balbian Painting = FIVE Golden Rules Here are five golden rules for the socio-cultural practice or the activity of painting when it is exercised in the Western Tradition of Fine and visual art and more specifically the genre of painting. These rules concern the artist as a whole, his Self, constructions of reality, social relationships, values, norms, attitudes, emotional and intellectual development, beliefs, etc. These are things he will get in order during his life time, for as Socrates is alleged to have said, "an unexamined life is not worth living". He will obviously question himself, his pre-suppositions and assumptions concerning all aspects of existence. It is in this totality of his existence that the subtlety and complexities of these rules should be interpreted, understood and individuated by each person. (1) The artist is totally, completely and absolutely authentic (and increasingly so) in his entire being and all areas of his existence. (2) S/he is unintentionally and naturally original and unique in his approach to and understanding of reality (internal and external realities), the discourse of art, the socio-cultural practice of Fine or Visual Art and painting. (3) S/he is naturally and intentionally questioning, reflective and aware of the subtle problematics of all things, phenomena and situations. (4) A work of art makes one, clear statement. (5) The real aim of a work of art is to be, subconsciously so, an emotional punch, a KO through and as 'feeling'. 1) He should learn to be authentic in all areas of his existence, he must endlessly question and examine himself, his Self, and entire existence. With this refined and highly developed skills of self-examination, that have become second nature to him and/or be applied sub-consciously all the time, he should approach his artist reality. This exercise will assist him to become increasingly truthful to himself, both in his entire existence and all aspects of his being and obviously in his artistic practices. 2) He will increasingly become unique in all areas of his existence and obviously in his original artistic work. This most definitely does not mean that he will use or abuse art to shock, merely attempting to attract attention and become in/famous. For an artist to be original it is essential that he explores and develops many aspects of the discourse and processes of painting, for example techniques, different media, supports and the structural or formal aspects of painting (such as color, composition, form, etc.) 3) His painting and his attitude towards painting will reveal that he, similar to creative thinking and questioning individuals in all socio-cultural practices and specialized discourses (for example, philosophy, natural and social sciences, visual and performance arts, mathematics, theology, composition of music, etc) and all areas of daily existence (for example parenting, work, leisure, relationships, beliefs, etc), investigates and explores phenomena and do not merely accept them on face-value, or the way they are constructed, perceived and understood by his time and place - his culture and sub-culture, class, age group, personality-type and other socio-cultural, psychological, biological and human factors. In other words he will be experimental, explorative and questioning and able to interpret and translate everything as problems, by systematic, logical and controlled problematization or problematizing. He will continually and constantly have a reflective, questioning and open frame of mind and reference towards all aspects of existence and his own artistic practices. He would deal in depth with the formal and structural aspects of his work (and all aspects of his existence, for example the re/construction of his external environments as well as his inner worlds) be it in painting itself (for example the exploration of certain aspects of painting by working in series), drawing, installations, performance, photography, videos and other new media. 4) Every single one of his paintings will make one, clear statement. This point and the next point (5) are really the different sides of the same coin. In fact all 5 points are merely different perspectives on or views of the 'same' object, for example perceiving a house (and architectural plans of it) from the front, the top and the different sides. 5) All socio-cultural, personal, structural and formal aspects concerning a painting will work together in unity, or disunity (some aspects of the work might be 'slightly off' and intentionally so) with the single purpose and sole aim to convey an 'emotional or feeling-based' punch or KO. This, is the real aim and overriding purpose of every work of art - the pre-conceptual,(conceptually) ineffable, emotional, feeling expression or 'message' it conveys, expresses and communicates. In my case to be true to myself, to be authentic in my existence and all things I do, including specialized socio-cultural practices such as philosophy, art, theology etc implies that I do and must create in a meta- or reflective manner. That I must think about and carefully consider in a philosophical manner what I do, how I do it and why I do it. Therefore when I do philosophy, I do meta-philosophy, when I am involved in art or painting, I create meta-art, etc. 8 Philosophy of religion and meta-philosophy Philosophy of religion is the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents. The scope of much of the work done in philosophy of religion has been limited to the various theistic religions. www.iep.utm.edu/religion/ Philosophy of religion according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is, "the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions."[1] It is an ancient discipline, being found in the earliest known manuscripts concerning philosophy, and relates to many other branches of philosophy and general thought, including metaphysics, logic, and history.[2] The philosophy of religion differs from religious philosophy in that it seeks to discuss questions regarding the nature of religion as a whole, rather than examining the problems brought forth by a particular belief system. It is designed such that it can be carried out dispassionately by those who identify as believers or non-believers.[3] Philosophy of religion has classically been regarded as a part of metaphysics. In Aristotle's Metaphysics, the necessarily prior cause of eternal motion was an unmoved mover, who, like the object of desire, or of thought, inspires motion without itself being moved.[4] This, according to Aristotle, is God, the subject of study in theology. Today, however, philosophers have adopted the term "philosophy of religion" for the subject, and typically it is regarded as a separate field of specialization, although it is also still treated by some, particularly Catholic philosophers, as a part of metaphysics. Note: with this involvement in religious studies philosophizing again became unclear by being drawn into theology and religious issues. Although the term did not come into general use until the nineteenth century,[5] perhaps the earliest strictly philosophical writings about religion can be found in the Hindu Upanishads. Around the same time, the works of Daoism and Confucianism also dealt, in part, with reasoning about religious concepts. The Buddhist writing in the Pali canon "contains acute philosophical thinking", and "we have in Buddhism a very shrewd grasp of the nature of religion as philosophy illuminates it."[6] Philosophy of religion covers alternative beliefs about God, the varieties of religious experience, the interplay between science and religion, the nature and scope of good and evil, and religious treatments of birth, history, and death.[1] The field also includes the ethical implications of religious commitments, the relation between faith, reason, experience and tradition, concepts of the miraculous, the sacred revelation, mysticism, power, and salvation.[7] The philosophy of religion has been distinguished from theology by pointing out that, for theology, "its critical reflections are based on religious convictions".[8] Also, "theology is responsible to an authority that initiates its thinking, speaking, and witnessing ... [while] philosophy bases its arguments on the ground of timeless evidence."[9] Three considerations that are basic to the philosophy of religion concerning deities are: the existence of God, the nature of God, and the knowledge of God.[10] There are several main positions with regard to the existence of God that one might take: Theism - the belief in the existence of one or more divinities or deities. Pantheism - the belief that God exists as all things of the cosmos, that God is one and all is God; God is immanent. Panentheism - the belief that God encompasses all things of the cosmos but that God is greater than the cosmos; God is both immanent and transcendent. Deism - the belief that God does exist but does not interfere with human life and the laws of the universe; God is transcendent. Monotheism - the belief that a single deity exists which rules the universe as a separate and individual entity. Polytheism - the belief that multiple deities exist which rule the universe as separate and individual entities. Henotheism - the belief that multiple deities may or may not exist, though there is a single supreme deity. Henology - believing that multiple avatars of a deity exist, which represent unique aspects of the ultimate deity. Agnosticism - (literally, not knowing or without knowledge) the belief that the existence or non-existence of deities or God is currently unknown or unknowable and cannot be proven. A weaker form of this might be defined as simply a lack of certainty about gods' existence or nonexistence.[citation needed] Atheism - the rejection of belief in the existence of deities.[11][12] Weak atheism is simply the absence of belief that any deities exist.[13][14][15] Strong atheism is specifically the position that there are no deities.[13][16] Apatheism - a complete disinterest in, or lack of caring for, whether or not any deity or deities exists. Possibilianism These are not mutually exclusive positions. For example, agnostic theists choose to believe God exists while asserting that knowledge of God's existence is inherently unknowable. Similarly, agnostic atheists reject belief in the existence of all deities, while asserting that whether any such entities exist or not is inherently unknowable. Note: arguments for and against the existence of God has a long history in the philosophical discourse. For details concerning the existence of god see for example here http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/ The problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil with that of a deity who is, in either absolute or relative terms, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.[18][19] An argument from evil attempts to show that the co-existence of evil and such a deity is unlikely or impossible if placed in absolute terms. Attempts to show the contrary have traditionally been discussed under the heading of theodicy. Note: the problem of evil, that bad things happen to good people and free will , ethics and morality take on all sorts of philosophical discussions and problems, for example free will and determinism. In Analytic Philosophy of Religion, James Franklin Harris noted that analytic philosophy has been a very heterogeneous 'movement'.... some forms of analytic philosophy have proven very sympathetic to the philosophy of religion and have actually provided a philosophical mechanism for responding to other more radical and hostile forms of analytic philosophy.[20]:3 As with the study of ethics, early analytic philosophy tended to avoid the study of philosophy of religion, largely dismissing (as per the logical positivists view) the subject as part of metaphysics and therefore meaningless.[21] The collapse of logical positivism renewed interest in philosophy of religion, prompting philosophers like William Alston, John Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Merrihew Adams, Richard Swinburne, and Antony Flew not only to introduce new problems, but to re-open classical topics such as the nature of miracles, theistic arguments, the problem of evil, (see existence of God) the rationality of belief in God, concepts of the nature of God, and many more.[22] Plantinga, Mackie and Flew debated the logical validity of the free will defense as a way to solve the problem of evil.[23] Alston, grappling with the consequences of analytic philosophy of language, worked on the nature of religious language. Adams worked on the relationship of faith and morality.[24] Analytic epistemology and metaphysics has formed the basis for a number of philosophically-sophisticated theistic arguments, like those of the reformed epistemologists like Plantinga. Analytic philosophy of religion has also been preoccupied with Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion.[25] Using first-hand remarks (which would later be published in Philosophical Investigations, Culture and Value, and other works), philosophers such as Peter Winch and Norman Malcolm developed what has come to be known as contemplative philosophy, a Wittgensteinian school of thought rooted in the "Swansea tradition" and which includes Wittgensteinians such as Rush Rhees, Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips, among others. The name "contemplative philosophy" was first coined by D. Z. Phillips in Philosophy's Cool Place, which rests on an interpretation of a passage from Wittgenstein's "Culture and Value."[26] This interpretation was first labeled, "Wittgensteinian Fideism," by Kai Nielsen but those who consider themselves Wittgensteinians in the Swansea tradition have relentlessly and repeatedly rejected this construal as a caricature of Wittgenstein's considered position; this is especially true of D. Z. Phillips.[27] Responding to this interpretation, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips became two of the most prominent philosophers on Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.[28] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_philosophers_of_religion Comparative theology Evolutionary origin of religions Evolutionary psychology of religion Issues in Science and Religion Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion by Hegel Major world religions Phenomenology of religion Theories of religion Worldview  Taliaferro, Charles (2014-01-01). Zalta, Edward N., ed. Philosophy of Religion (Winter 2014 ed.).   Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Philosophy of Religion."   Evans, C. Stephen (1985). Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith. InterVarsity Press. p. 16. ISBN 0-87784-343-0.   Aristotle, Professor Barry D. Smith, Crandall University   Wainwright, WJ., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2004, p. 3. "The expression “philosophy of religion” did not come into general use until the nineteenth century, when it was employed to refer to the articulation and criticism of humanity's religious consciousness and its cultural expressions in thought, language, feeling, and practice."   Encyclopedia of Philosophy: History of the philosophy of religion.   Bunnin, N, Tsui-James, The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, John Wiley & Sons, 2008, p. 453.   Encyclopædia Britannica: Theology.   Encyclopædia Britannica: Theology; Relationship of theology to the history of religions and philosophy; Relationship to philosophy.   Encyclopædia Britannica: Basic themes and problems in the philosophy of religion.   Nielsen, Kai (2010). "Atheism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 2011-04-09. Atheism, in general, the critique and denial of metaphysical beliefs in God or spiritual beings.... Instead of saying that an atheist is someone who believes that it is false or probably false that there is a God, a more adequate characterization of atheism consists in the more complex claim that to be an atheist is to be someone who rejects belief in God for the following reasons (which reason is stressed depends on how God is being conceived)...   Edwards, Paul (2005) [1967]. "Atheism". In Donald M. Borchert. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 1 (2nd ed.). MacMillan Reference USA (Gale). p. 359. ISBN 978-0-02-865780-6. On our definition, an 'atheist' is a person who rejects belief in God, regardless of whether or not his reason for the rejection is the claim that 'God exists' expresses a false proposition. People frequently adopt an attitude of rejection toward a position for reasons other than that it is a false proposition. It is common among contemporary philosophers, and indeed it was not uncommon in earlier centuries, to reject positions on the ground that they are meaningless. Sometimes, too, a theory is rejected on such grounds as that it is sterile or redundant or capricious, and there are many other considerations which in certain contexts are generally agreed to constitute good grounds for rejecting an assertion.(page 175 in 1967 edition)   Cline, Austin (2006). "Strong Atheism vs. Weak Atheism: What's the Difference?". about.com. Retrieved 2011-04-09.   Religioustolerance.org's short article on Definitions of the term "Atheism" suggests that there is no consensus on the definition of the term. Simon Blackburn summarizes the situation in The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy: "Atheism. Either the lack of belief in a god, or the belief that there is none". Most dictionaries (see the OneLook query for "atheism") first list one of the more narrow definitions.   Runes, Dagobert D.(editor) (1942). Dictionary of Philosophy. New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co. Philosophical Library. ISBN 0-06-463461-2. Retrieved 2011-04-09. (a) the belief that there is no God; (b) Some philosophers have been called "atheistic" because they have not held to a belief in a personal God. Atheism in this sense means "not theistic". The former meaning of the term is a literal rendering. The latter meaning is a less rigorous use of the term though widely current in the history of thought – entry by Vergilius Ferm   Rowe, William L. (1998). "Atheism". In Edward Craig. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-07310-3. Retrieved 2011-04-09. As commonly understood, atheism is the position that affirms the nonexistence of God. So an atheist is someone who disbelieves in God, whereas a theist is someone who believes in God. Another meaning of "atheism" is simply nonbelief in the existence of God, rather than positive belief in the nonexistence of God. ...an atheist, in the broader sense of the term, is someone who disbelieves in every form of deity, not just the God of traditional Western theology.   see e.g. Antony Flew, John Polkinghorne, Keith Ward and Richard Swinburne   The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil", Michael Tooley   The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Evidential Problem of Evil", Nick Trakakis   Harris, James Franklin (2002). Analytic philosophy of religion. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ISBN 140200530X. (432 pages) (volume 3 of Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ISSN 1568-1556)   (a notable exception is the series of Michael B. Forest's 1934-36 Mind articles involving the Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern science).   Peterson, Michael et al. (2003). Reason and Religious Belief   Mackie, John L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God   Adams, Robert M. (1987). The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology   Creegan, Charles. (1989). Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method   Phillips, D. Z. (1999). Philosophy's Cool Place. Cornell University Press. The quote is from Wittgenstein's Culture and Value (2e): "My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them.   "Fideism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Nielsen, Kai and D.Z. Phillips. (2005). Wittgensteinian Fideism? “Fideism” is the name given to that school of thought—to which Tertullian himself is frequently said to have subscribed—which answers that faith is in some sense independent of, if not outright adversarial toward, reason. In contrast to the more rationalistic tradition of natural theology, with its arguments for the existence of God, fideism holds—or at any rate appears to hold (more on this caveat shortly)—that reason is unnecessary and inappropriate for the exercise and justification of religious belief. The term itself derives from fides, the Latin word for faith, and can be rendered literally as faith-ism. “Fideism” is thus to be understood not as a synonym for “religious belief,” but as denoting a particular philosophical account of faith’s appropriate jurisdiction vis-a-vis that of reason. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/ Rhees, Wittgenstein, and the Swansea School wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-ontos/article/download/2225/2337 Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2008.08.14 bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2008/2008-08-14.html Apr 3, 2009 - Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2007. ... of the traditions of philosophical concepts as traced throughout non- or pre-philosophical .. ‘Work on philosophy,’ as Wittgenstein always insisted, ‘is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.)’,3 where this seeing is, in turn, influenced by one’s culture’s dominant paradigms of inquiry. These paradigms, as Wittgenstein notes in the Blue Book, can be seriously distorting, not least in the context of philosophical inquiry: Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws. . . . Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’. . . . Instead of ‘craving for generality’ I could also have said ‘the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case’.4 I think it would be fair to say that Wittgenstein’s observation on the precarious prestige of scientific methodology and the subtle ways in which it may reinforce a natural ‘craving for generality’, and his requirement that one attend to particulars – whether in an analysis of the relation between language and the world, reflections on epistemological issues, elucidations of moral or aesthetic phenomena, or grammatical expositions of key religious concepts – was shared by all members of the Swansea School.5 Indeed, the need for attention to ‘the particular case’, so important to Wittgenstein’s own elucidatory task, also explains the School’s concern with literature as a distinctive mode of understanding and potential corrective to philosophical confusion, especially in the area of moral phenomenology. Rhees, Wittgenstein, and the Swansea School wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-ontos/article/download/2225/2337 Problems with understanding Wittgenstein (especially his ‘new’ way of writing philosophy) and therefore misinterpretations of his work and the Swansea school. The occasions on which D. Z. Phillips, for example, has been asked whether he is a ‘realist’ or a ‘non-realist’ about belief in God, are legion, and yet the question continues to be asked with the same obstinacy with which critics persist in branding him a ‘Wittgensteinian fideist’. As Phillips himself has observed: Talk of ‘realism’ and ‘nonrealism’, at least has to do with familiar misunderstandings of his [Wittgenstein’s] work, whereas the label ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’, making a recent comeback despite my textual refutations in Belief, Change and Forms of Life (you can’t keep a good label down), is simply a scandal in scholarship.30 It was in light of such responses, too, that Wittgenstein wondered whether the manuscript of Philosophical Investigations should even be published: Up to a short time ago I had really given up the idea of publishing my work in my lifetime. It used, indeed, to be revived from time to time: mainly because I was obliged to learn that my results (which I had communicated in lectures, typescripts and discussions), variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in circulation.31 Reflecting on the reasons for the widespread misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s writings, Rhees once commented: ‘I think it is clear that he was asking for more than most readers would be able to give or to do’,32 an observation echoed in Winch’s conviction that ‘[a] fairly small proportion would have read his work at all extensively or carefully’.33 Even to such a formidable intellect as Rhees, the confrontation with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, for example, posed a serious challenge. It did not seem to be the kind of work that could be understood without guidance from the author himself. Recalling the peculiar difficulty of the thoughts expressed in it, Rhees writes: Wittgenstein did go through the Investigations with me – some parts of it several times – before it was published. And although such understanding of it as I have has come more since his death, I should have understood less if I had not heard him read it and had him discuss it with me.34 While the idiom in which Wittgenstein’s thoughts were presented was nontechnical and free of jargon, it did not conform to standard philosophical writing, either. But then, so Rhees observes, ‘[We] cannot say, “It is a pity that Wittgenstein could not have presented his ideas in something more nearly the accepted philosophical style,”’ since ‘[that] would not have been a presentation of his philosophical views.’35 For Wittgenstein, form and content were just as inseparably connected as they were for a thinker like Nietzsche, who would similarly have scoffed at any attempt to reformulate his pregnant aphorisms as propositions, scholia or lemmas in the style of Spinoza’s Ethics, or to present them in the form of a neat and tidy architectonic structure à la Kant or Hegel. Wittgenstein, too, experienced ‘the accepted philosophical style’ as a structural corset that could only distort the phenomena under investigation, and hence as something to be overcome – not artificially, with the aid of an abstract symbolism or a specially invented vocabulary, but by remaining firmly rooted in the language of everyday discourse. As Peter Winch has put it: I think it is clear that in the case of both (early) Plato and Wittgenstein, the relation between the literary presentation and the philosophical content is an ‘internal’ one. This is more marked in the case of Plato’s elenchic dialogues, because of the dramatic aspect; different philosophical views as expressions of different forms of life.36 Closely connected with this observation is the recognition that the issues in question could not be properly appreciated without a serious personal struggle against the (natural) predilections of the intellect. And in this endeavor, so Wittgenstein assured Rhees, it certainly helped to have a serious discussion partner: ‘It is true that the blind can’t lead the blind; but two blind men have 4 feet between them & can therefore stabilize each other a bit.’ Note: I quote this at length for several reasons: the style of writing by original, creative thinkers compared to the institutionalzed way of writing by academic professionals. Secondly the so-called Swansea School did work on philosophy of religion. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/ Note: note the many areas of philosophy that are involved in the field of philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions. It involves all the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics and value theory, the philosophy of language, philosophy of science, law, sociology, politics, history, and so on. Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on). Note: more on the nature of the philosophy of religion – Philosophy of Religion is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the philosophical study of religion, including arguments over the nature and existence of God, religious language, miracles, prayer, the problem of evil, and the relationship between religion and other value-systems such as science and ethics. It is often regarded as a part of Metaphysics, especially insofar as it is interested in understanding what it is for something to exist, although arguably it also touches on issues commonly dealt with in Epistemology, Ethics, Logic and the Philosophy of Language. It asks such questions as "Are there sound reasons to think that God does (or does not) exist?", "If there is a God, then what is he like?", "What, if anything, would give us good reason to believe that a miracle has occurred?", "What is the relationship between faith and reason?", "Does petitionary prayer make sense?" It does not ask "What is God?", as that would assume the existence of God, and that God has a knowable nature, which is more the territory of theology (which usually considers the existence of God as axiomatic, or self-evident, and merely seeks to justify or support religious claims). Note: more on the different types of belief – The main forms of religious belief are: Theism: The belief in the existence of one or more divinities or deities, which exist within the universe and yet transcend it. These gods also in some way interact with the universe (unlike Deism), and are often considered to be omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. The word "theism" was first coined in the 17th Century to contrast with Atheism. Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, Baha'i and Zoroastrianism are all theistic religions. Monotheism: The view that only one God exists. The Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), as well as Plato's concept of God, all affirm monotheism, and this is the usual conception debated within Western Philosophy. Jews, Christians and Muslims would probably all agree that God is an eternally existent being that exists apart from space and time, who is the creator of the universe, and is omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), omnibenevolent (all-good or all-loving) and possibly omnipresent (all-present). The religions, however, differ in the details: Christians, for example, would further affirm that there are three aspects to God (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit). Exclusive Monotheism: The belief that there is only one deity, and that all other claimed deities are distinct from it and false. The Abrahamic religions, and the Hindu denomination of Vaishnavism (which regards the worship of anyone other than Vishnu as incorrect) are examples of Exclusive Monotheism. Inclusive monotheism: The belief that there is only one deity, and that all other claimed deities are just different names for it. The Hindu denomination of Smartism is an example of Inclusive Monotheism. Substance Monotheism: The belief (found in some indigenous African religions) that the many gods are just different forms of a single underlying substance. Pantheism: The belief that God is equivalent to Nature or the physical universe, or that everything is of an all-encompassing immanent abstract God. The concept has been discussed as far back as the time of the philosophers of Ancient Greece, including Thales, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Baruch Spinoza also believed in a kind of naturalistic pantheism in which the universe, although unconscious and non-sentient as a whole, is a meaningful focus for mystical fulfillment. Panentheism: The belief (also known as Monistic Monotheism), similar to Pantheism, that the physical universe is joined to God, but stressing that God is greater than (rather than equivalent to) the universe. Thus, the one God interpenetrates every part of nature, and timelessly extends beyond as well. The universe is part of God, but not all of God. The word (which can be translated as "all in God") was coined by the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) in 1828 in an attempt to reconcile Monotheism and Pantheism. Deism: A form of monotheism in which it is believed that one God exists, but that this God does not intervene in the world, or interfere with human life and the laws of the universe. It posits a non-interventionist creator who permits the universe to run itself according to natural laws. Deism derives the existence and nature of God from reason and personal experience, rather than relying on revelation in sacred scriptures or the testimony of others, and can maybe best be descibed as a basic belief rather than as a religion in itself. The roots of Deism lie with Heraclitus and Plato, but it was also popular with the natural theologists of 17th Century France and, particularly, Britain, who rejected any special or supposedly supernatural revelation of God. Pandeism: The belief that God preceded the universe and created it, but is now equivalent to it - a composite of Deism and Pantheism. Panendeism is a composite of Deism and Panentheism. It holds that, while the universe is part of God, it operates according to natural mechanisms without the neeed for the intervention of a traditional God, somewhat similar to the Native American concept of the all- pervading Great Spirit. Polydeism: The belief that multiple gods exist, but do not intervene with the universe - a composite of Deism and Polytheism. Misotheism: The belief that a God or gods exist, but that they are actually evil. The English word was coined by Thomas de Quincey in 1846. Strictly speaking, the term connotes an attitude of hatred towards the god or gods, rather than making a statement about their nature. Dystheism: The belief that a God or gods exist, but that they are not wholly good, or possibly even evil (as opposed to eutheism, the belief that God exists and is wholly good). Trickster gods found in polytheistic belief systems often have a dystheistic nature, and there are various examples of arguable dystheism in the Bible. Ditheism (or Duotheism): The belief in two equally powerful gods, often, but not always, with complementary properties and in constant opposition, such as God and Goddess in Wicca, or Good and Evil in Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism. The early mystical religion Gnosticism is another example of a ditheistic belief of sorts, due to their claim that the thing worshipped as God in this world is actually an evil impostor, but that a true benevolent deity worthy of being called "God" exists beyond this world. Polytheism: The belief in, or worship of, multiple gods (usually assembled in a pantheon). These gods are often seen as similar to humans (anthropomorphic) in their personality traits, but with additional individual powers, abilities, knowledge or perceptions. Hard Polytheism views the gods as being distinct and separate beings, such as in Ancient Greek Mythology. Soft Polytheism views the gods as being subsumed into a greater whole, as in most forms of Hinduism. Henotheism: The devotion to a single god while accepting the existence of other gods, and without denying that others can with equal truth worship different gods. It has been called "monotheism in principle and polytheism in fact". Monolatrism (or Monolatry): The belief in the existence of many gods, but with the consistent worship of only one deity. Unlike Henotheism, Monolatrism asserts that there is only one god who is worthy of worship, though other gods are known to exist. Kathenotheism: The belief that there is more than one deity, but only one deity at a time should be worshipped, each being supreme in turn. Animism: The belief that souls inhabit all or most objects (whether they be animals, vegetables or minerals). Animistic religions generally do not accept a sharp distinction between spirit and matter, and assume that this unification of matter and spirit plays a role in daily life. Early Shintoism was animistic in nature, as are many indigenous African religions. Shamanism (communication with the spirit world) and Ancestor Worship (worship of deceased family members, who are believed to have a continued existence and influence) are similar categories. Atheism (or Nontheism): The belief that gods do not exist, or a complete rejection of Theism in any form. Some atheists argue a lack of empirical evidence for the existence of deities, while others argue for Atheism on philosophical, social or historical grounds. Many atheists tend toward secular philosophies such as Humanism and Naturalism. Atheism may be implicit (someone who has never thought about belief in gods) or explicit (someone who has made an assertion, either weak or strong, regarding their lack of belief in gods). Confucianism, Taoism, Jainism and some varieties of Buddhism, either do not include belief in a personal god as a tenet of the religion, or actively teach nontheism. Agnosticism: The belief that the nature and existence of gods is unknown and cannot ever be known or proven. Technically, this position is strong agnosticism: in popular usage, an agnostic may just be someone who takes no position, pro or con, on the existence of gods, or who has not yet been able to decide, or who suspends judgment due to lack of evidence one way or the other (weak agnosticism). The earliest professed agnostic was Protagoras, although the term itself, which literally means "without knowledge", was not coined until the 1880s by T. H. Huxley (1825 - 1895). Humanism: Humanism is more an ethical process, not a dogma about the existence or otherwise of gods. But in general terms, it rejects the validity of transcendental justifications, such as a dependence on belief without reason, the supernatural, or texts of allegedly divine origin. It is therefore generally compatible with Atheism and Agnosticism, but does not require these, and can be compatible with some religions. To some extent, it supplements or supplants the role of religions, and can be considered in some ways as "equivalent" to a religion. Note: more on arguments for the existence of God –  The Ontological Argument:  The Ontological Argument, initially proposed by St. Anselm and Avicenna in the 11th Century, attempts to prove the existence of God through a priori abstract reasoning alone. It argues that part of what we mean when we speak of “God” is “perfect being”, or one of whom nothing greater can be conceived, and that that is essentially what the word “God” means. A God that exists, of course, is better than a God that doesn’t, so to speak of God as a perfect being is therefore necessarily to imply that he exists. So God’s existence is implied by the very concept of God, and when we speak of “God” we cannot but speak of a being that exists. By this argument, to say that God does not exist is a contradiction in terms.  The argument is certainly ingenious, but has the appearance of a linguistic trick. The same ontological argument could be used to prove the existence of any perfect thing at all (for example, Anselm's contemporary, the monk Gaunilo, used it to show that a perfect island must exist). Immanuel Kant argued against the ontological argument on the grounds that existence is not a property of objects but a property of concepts, and that, whatever ideas may participate in a given concept, it is a further question whether that concept is instantiated.  The Cosmological Argument: The Cosmological Argument is the argument that the existence of the world or universe implies the existence of a being that brought it into existence (and keeps it in existence). In essence, the argument is that everything that moves is moved by something else; an infinite regress (that is, going back through a chain of movers forever) is impossible; and therefore there must exist a first mover (i.e. God). It comes in two forms, modal (having to do with possibility), and temporal (having to do with time): The Modal Cosmological Argument: This argument, also known as the Argument from Contingency, suggests that because the universe might not have existed (i.e. it is contingent, as opposed to necessary), we then need some explanation of why it does exist. Wherever there are two possibilities, something must determine which of those possibilities is realised. Therefore, as the universe is contingent, there must be some reason for its existence, i.e. it must have a cause. In fact, the only kind of being whose existence requires no explanation is a necessary being, a being that could not have failed to exist. The ultimate cause of everything must therefore be a necessary being, such as God. Critics of the argument from contingency have sometimes questioned whether the universe is in fact contingent, and why God should be considered a necessary being (simply asking "Does God have a cause of his existence?” raises as many problems as the cosmological argument solves). Also, even if God is thought not to have, or not to need, a cause of his existence, then his existence would be a counter-example to the initial premise that everything that exists has a cause of its existence). The Temporal Cosmological Argument: This argument, also known as the Kalam Argument for the medieval Muslim school of philosophy of al-Kindi (801 - 873) and al-Ghazali (1058 - 1111) which first proposed it, argues that all indications are that there is a point in time at which the universe began to exist, (a universe stretching back in time into infinity being both philosophically and scientifically problematic), and that this beginning must either have been caused or uncaused. The idea of an uncaused event is absurd, because nothing comes from nothing. The universe must therefore have been brought into existence by something outside it, which can be called "God". The argument rests on the somewhat controversial claim that the universe has a beginning in time, but also does not explain why there could not be more than one first cause/mover, or why the chain could not lead back to several ultimate causes, each somehow outside the universe (potentially leading to several different Gods).  The Teleological Argument:  The Teleological Argument (also known as the Argument from Design or Intelligent Design) suggests that the order in the world implies a being that created it with a specific purpose (the creation of life) in mind. The universe is an astoundingly complex but highly ordered system, and the world is fine-tuned to provide exactly the right conditions for the development and sustenance of life. To say that the universe is so ordered by chance is therefore unsatisfactory as an explanation of the appearance of design around us. St Thomas Aquinas was the most famous subscriber to this argument, but the most cited statement of the argument is that of William Paley (1743 - 1805), who likened the universe to a watch, with many ordered parts working in harmony to further some purpose.  Evolutionary theory, however, can explain the appearance of biological design, even if not the laws of nature. David Hume counter-argued that we know that man-made structures were designed because we have seen them being built, but how can we be sure that the analogy holds? He also pointed out that certain events in the world (e.g. natural disasters) suggest that God didn't do a very good job of designing the universe, which belies the concept of a perfect being. Others, who reject the argument in its entirety, dispute whether the order and complexity in the universe does in fact constitute design. The mere fact that it something is enormously improbable does not by itself give us reason to conclude that it occurred by design. Also, the idea that our universe is but one material universe in a "multiverse" in which all possible material universes are ultimately realized, suggests that there is nothing particularly suspicious about the fact that at least one of them is a fine-tuned universe.  The Moral Argument: The Moral Argument argues that the existence or nature of morality implies the existence of God. Three forms of moral argument are distinguished, formal, perfectionist and Kantian: The Formal Moral Argument: This argument suggests that the form of morality implies that it has a divine origin. If morality consists of an ultimately authoritative set of commands, where can these commands have come from but a commander that has ultimate authority (namely God)? It begs the question, however, as to whether morality is in fact ultimately authoritative, and whether morals actually exist or have meaning independently of us or whether there are alternative explanations for the existence of morals. The Perfectionist Moral Argument: This argument suggests that morality requires perfection of us, but we are not in fact perfect. However, although we cannot achieve moral perfection by our own strength, we can do so with God’s help, which implies the existence of God. The gap between our moral duties and what we are capable of doing therefore implies the existence of a God, as the only way to resolve this paradox. Immanuel Kant, however, argues that “ought” implies “can”, so that if we have an obligation to do a thing then it logically follows that we are able to do it, and morality cannot require of us more than we are able to give. Or it can also be argued that morality is just a guide and does not actually require perfection of us, and that it is in fact acceptable to fall short of the moral standard. The Kantian Moral Argument: This argument, proposed by Immanuel Kant, presupposes that moral behaviour is rational and that we should have good reason to behave morally. Looking around the world, though, we see that in many cases immoral behaviour does profit more than moral behaviour, and that life is not fair. Kant therefore argued that moral behaviour will only be rational is there is more than just this life, if justice is administered in the next life. However, this does not fully answer why should it have to be God in particular that brings about the higher good, nor why something should necessarily have to be, just because we decide it both ought and can.  The Religious Experience Argument:  The Religious Experience Argument posits that one can only perceive that which exists, and so God must exist because there are those that have experienced him. The fact that there are many people who testify to having had such experiences constitutes at least indirect evidence of God’s existence, even to those who have not had such experiences themselves.  Some, though, argue that religious experiences involve imagination rather than perception, and there is always the possibility of fabricating artificial experiences of God, or that the experiences are not religious but merely interpreted that way by religious people. Also, adherents of all religions (mutually inconsistent and conflicting) claim to have had experiences that validate those religions, and if not all of these appeals are valid then none can be. In addition, why do we not all have religions experiences? Yet another counter-argument is the skeptical idea that all experiences (including religious experiences) are subjective, and no matter how one person perceives the world to be, there are any number of ways that it could be. Barely tangible religious experiences are by their nature even more uncertain than our familiar and lucid experiences of the external world, which are themselves unreliable.  The Miracles Argument:  The Argument from Miracles argues that the occurrence of miracles (which involve the suspension of the natural operation of the universe as some supernatural event occurs), presupposes the existence of some supernatural being. If the Bible is to be believed, then, such miracles demonstrate both the existence of God and the truth of Christianity.  However, the essential implicit assumption in this argument is "if the Bible is to be believed", which is by no means a given. In addition, according to David Hume, no matter how strong the evidence for a specific miracle may be, it will always be more rational to reject the miracle than to believe in it (given that there are two factors to assess in deciding whether to believe any given piece of testimony: the reliability of the witness, and the probability of that to which they testify).  Pascal’s Wager:  Blaise Pascal argued for belief in God based not on an appeal to evidence that God exists, but rather that it is in our interests to believe in God and it is therefore rational for us to do so: If we believe in God, then if he exists we will receive an infinite reward in heaven, while if he does not then we have lost little or nothing. Conversely, if we do not believe in God, then if he exists we will receive an infinite punishment in hell, while if he does not then we will have gained little or nothing. "Either receiving an infinite reward in heaven or losing little or nothing" is clearly preferable to "either receiving an infinite punishment in hell or gaining little or nothing", so it is rational to believe in God, even if there is no evidence that he exists.  However, this only works if the only possible criterion for entrance into heaven is belief in the Christian God and the only possible criterion for entrance into hell is disbelief in the Christian God. Also, if one argues that the probability that God exists (and therefore of either receiving an infinite reward in heaven or of receiving an infinite punishment in hell) is so small that these possible outcomes of belief or disbelief can be discounted, then Atheism is the rational course of action as it is better to gain little or nothing than it is to lose little or nothing. Thirdly, Pascal’s Wager asks us to believe without reason, whereas in practice one requires evidence for the truth of a belief. Note: the problem of evil, good and bad and morality – The Problem of Evil has been stated in different ways: The Logical Problem of Evil, considered by many to be one of the most formidable objections to the existence of God, was first identified in antiquity by Epicurus when he noted that there were four possibilities: 1) If God wishes to take away evils and is not able to, then he is feeble. 2) If God is able to take away evils but does not wish to, then he is malevolent. 3) If God neither wishes to nor is able to take away evils, then he is both malevolent and feeble and therefore not God at all. 4) If God wishes to take away evils and is able to, then why are there evils in the world, and why does he not remove them? In response, St. Thomas Aquinas argued that it is not necessarily clear that the world would be more perfect in the absence of evil, and that worthy concepts such as justice, kindness, fairness and self-sacrifice would be meaningless if there were no evil to set against them. The so-called Unknown Purpose Defence argues that human limitations might not permit us to guess the motivations of God, especially if, as some argue, He cannot be known directly. The Empirical Problem of Evil, initially formulated by David Hume, argues that if people did not have a prior commitment to believe the contrary (i. e. religious convictions), their experience of the world and its evils would lead them to Atheism and the conclusion that a God who is good and all-powerful cannot exist. A counter-argument to this might be that the apparent senselessness of some evil might in itself force a person to seek an explanation for it, which might be God. The Probabilistic Argument from Evil argues that the very existence of evil is evidence that no God exists, although Alvin Plantinga notes that the meaning of this claim depends on the probabilistic theory we hold to. Theodicy is the specific branch of theology and philosophy that attempts to reconcile the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent God. Therefore it accepts that evil exists and that God is both good and able to remove evil, and then seeks to explain why he does not do so. One of the most famous formulations is that of Gottfried Leibniz in 1710, who made the optimistic claim that our world is optimal among all possible worlds, and that it must be the best possible and most balanced world, simply because it was created by a perfect God. An example of this is the free-will defence, according to which it was not possible for God to create a world with good but no evil because his purpose for the universe required humans to have free will, and that good could not exist without freedom to choose evil (similar to Aquinas's argument above), although it can also be argued that there still seems to be a disproportionate amount of evil in the world. Another example is the question of why He allows the suffering of animals (for whom free will is assumed not to apply). Some defences suggest that the purpose of such suffering may be unknown, or that most of the suffering occurs when we remove animals from their natural surroundings, or just that we are given the free will to try to do something about it. Recurring defences in theodicy include: that what people consider evil or suffering is an illusion or unimportant; that events thought to be evil are not really so; that what we see as evil is really part of a divine design that is actually good, but our limitations prevent us from seeing the big picture; that God, if he exists, is so far superior to man that he cannot be judged by man, and that to even try is mere arrogance; that evil is the consequence of God giving people free will; that evil and suffering are intended as a test for humanity, to see if we are worthy of His grace; that evil is the consequence of people not observing God's revealed will, and not actually caused by God; that evil is propagated by the Devil in opposition to God; that God is a righteous judge and, if someone suffers, it is because they have committed a sin that merits such punishment; that neither good nor evil could exist without both existing simultaneously. Note: Some of my investigations and research in this field are https://sites.google.com/site/trinityprioryinternational/ Here I explored religious communities, monastic life, spirituality and contemplation and prayer. I also have/had two Yahoo groups – https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/monasterion/info Studies, information and advice on religious life, contemplation, prayer, etc https://uk.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/cat_har/info Studies, information and advice on Cathars. Also a blog on Cathars, information, texts, guides, sites, etc. http://cathar7.blogspot.co.za/ Ignore the first page concerning people to be careful of. A number of members complained about them, therefore the notice. The reason why I mention the Cathar religion is because it relates to studies on ‘religion, violence and war’. The Cathars were persecuted, and killed, especially in France, by the Roman Catholic Church. Another issue on this topic is the contemporary ISIS and other extreme Islamic groups, for example in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and a number of countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Somali, Ethiopia, Egypt, Lybia, Marocco, etc. And the Christian (Roman Catholic) Crusades during the Middle Ages, the many religious wars in Europe for example between the Protestants and the Roman Catholic Church in France, Germany, etc after the development of Lutherism there and in Great Britain. In Ireland and Ulster, Scotland and England. The philosophical aspect of this section concentrated mainly on the Anglo-saxon analytic tradition. Of course there are numerous studies from Continental philosophical points of views. This site has more on Continental schools. It seems, from all the religious quotes, as if it is more concerned with spirituality (theology, as applied belief that God exists, rather than questioning the existence of God, as philosophy of religion does?) http://www.friesian.com/religion.htm Philosophy of religion, discipline concerned with the philosophical appraisal of human religious attitudes and of the real or imaginary objects of those attitudes, God or the gods. The philosophy of religion is an integral part of philosophy as such and embraces central issues regarding the nature and extent of human knowledge, the ultimate character of reality, and the foundations of morality. https://global.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-religion This site gives information on Continental studies of religion https://www.questia.com/library/1331422/the-philosophy-of-religion Below American sites, some Humanist and atheists – http://users.ox.ac.uk/~worc0337/phil_topics_religion.html http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-religion many articles 9 Although I continue the previous section 8 on issues concerning (meta) philosophy of religion I treat this as a new section because I wish to introduce and discuss a very large topic. It concerns the so-called ‘unity experience’ of being one/d with God, the true Self, the Buddha mind, etc. One finds this search at the heart of the spirituality of all religions for example Sufism in Islam. The search for, the nature of and the paths to the realization of this experience have been described in all religions as well as in philosophy. The love and need of this unity resembles that of the love of wisdom by the philosopher. Plato’s work for example points in many ways to this. Plotinus made it explicit in his philosophy. Plotinus (/plɒˈtaɪnəs/; Greek: Πλωτῖνος; c. 204/5 – 270) was a major Greek-speaking philosopher of the ancient world. In his philosophy there are three principles: the One, the Intellect, and the Soul. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plotinus Taking his lead from his reading of Plato, Plotinus developed a complex spiritual cosmology involving three foundational elements: the One, the Intelligence, and the Soul. It is from the productive unity of these three Beings that all existence emanates, according to Plotinus. http://www.iep.utm.edu/plotinus/ Here are some books of Plotinus goo.gl/NviSz7 . A good one about him is The Origin of Western Mysticism. It can be downloaded here as PDF for free http://www.themysticsvision.com/uploads/1/3/9/2/13928072/plotinus_the_origin_of_western_mysticism-rev._2012.pdf It is written by Swami Abhayananda. Born: August 14, 1938 (age 78), Indianapolis, Indiana, United States Here is his website http://www.themysticsvision.com/ and more books for download. http://www.themysticsvision.com/downloads.html https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/309655.S_Abhayananda/blog He has written and excellent book on many traditions and paths to the unity experience that is sought by all mystics, religious and contemplatives, such as the Sufis, Advaita Vedanta followers, serious Buddhists, monks and nuns. It describes unity seekers who realized this state. http://www.themysticsvision.com/uploads/1/3/9/2/13928072/30th_anniv._of_history_of_mysticism__revised_2015_.pdf A wonderful book in the Sufi tradition on this path is The Conference of the Birds. The Conference of the Birds or Speech of the Birds, is a long and celebrated Sufi poem of approximately 4500 lines written in Persian by the poet Farid ud-Din Attar, who is commonly known as Attar of Nishapur. https://www.amazon.com/Conference-Birds-Penguin-Classics/dp/0140444343 Composed in the twelfth century in north-eastern Iran, Attar's great mystical poem is among the most significant of all works of Persian literature. A marvellous, allegorical rendering of the Islamic doctrine of Sufism - an esoteric system concerned with the search for truth through God - it describes the consequences of the conference of the birds of the world when they meet to begin the search for their ideal king, the Simorgh bird. On hearing that to find him they must undertake an arduous journey, the birds soon express their reservations to their leader, the hoopoe. With eloquence and insight, however, the hoopoe calms their fears, using a series of riddling parables to provide guidance in the search for spiritual truth. By turns witty and profound, The Conference of the Birds transforms deep belief into magnificent poetry. A wonderful book that is very dear to me and that I have read thousands of times since very young is by F C Happold an Englishman. Frederick Crossfield Happold, DSO, LLD, MA (1893–1971) was an educational pioneer, tenured headmaster, author and decorated British army officer. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Crossfield_Happold https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Anthology-F-C-Happold/dp/0140137467 Happold's book is in two parts, a study of the meaning and significance of mysticism and an anthology of mystical texts. The latter are mainly from Christian authors, and Happold has altogether an avowed Christian approach. Writing of the absence of any examples of Jewish mysticism from the anthology, he admits: 'Of the rich vein of Jewish mysticism I felt I knew too little.' In a footnote he remarks that there are 'some interesting examples' in Victor Gollancz's Year of Grace. Note: Now to pull all these threads together. I myself have been since I can remember interested in philosophy (the work of original, creative thinkers, philo Sophos, the love of wisdom and have been scribbling down my thinking in process – night and day and wherever I found myself, as I am and was reflecting non-stop. Interesting while writing, that also causes further reflections. I also was, am interested in visual art (especially Paul Klee, Das Bauhaus and Black Mountain College) and mysticism from all religions. I became a contemplative monastic and hermit, with my main interest being the realization of the untiy experience, being one/d with the ONE, or as Vedanta would say, realization of our one true SELF, Sufi’s Beloved (who when he knocks on your door your response eventuially, in the unity state, will be: is that I, or Buddha mind, from the Japanese Shingon and Tendai traditions. As we saw from Plotinus above, the notion of the ONE, formed part of Western philosophy from the outset. So my love for philosophy and mysticism go hand in hand or like two catr horses, actually three, as visual art, more specifically painting, formed part of this search or realization. Another old friend that must be mentioned is Meister Eckhart (and of Course John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart Eckhart von Hochheim O.P. (c. 1260 – c. 1328[1]), commonly known as Meister Eckhart [ˈmaɪ̯stɐ ˈɛkʰaʀt], was a German theologian, philosopher and mystic, born near Gotha, in the Landgraviate of Thuringia in the Holy Roman Empire.[note 1] Eckhart came into prominence during the Avignon Papacy, at a time of increased tensions between monastic orders, diocesan clergy, the Franciscan Order, and Eckhart's Dominican Order of Preachers. In later life, he was accused of heresy and brought up before the local Franciscan-led Inquisition, and tried as a heretic by Pope John XXII.[note 2] He seems to have died before his verdict was received ][note 3] He was well known for his work with pious lay groups such as the Friends of God and was succeeded by his more circumspect disciples John Tauler and Henry Suso. Since the 19th century, he has received renewed attention. He has acquired a status as a great mystic within contemporary popular spirituality, as well as considerable interest from scholars situating him within the medieval scholastic and philosophical tradition.[2] His works https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart#Works His teachings https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart#Teachings In Eckhart's vision, God is primarily fecund. Out of overabundance of love the fertile God gives birth to the Son, the Word in all of us. Clearly,[note 4] this is rooted in the Neoplatonic notion of "ebullience; boiling over" of the One that cannot hold back its abundance of Being. Eckhart had imagined the creation not as a "compulsory" overflowing (a metaphor based on a common hydrodynamic picture), but as the free act of will of the triune nature of Deity (refer Trinitarianism). Another bold assertion is Eckhart's distinction between God and Godhead (Gottheit in German, meaning Godhood or Godliness, state of being God). These notions had been present in Pseudo-Dionysius's writings and John the Scot's De divisione naturae, but Eckhart, with characteristic vigor and audacity, reshaped the germinal metaphors into profound images of polarity between the Unmanifest and Manifest Absolute. Matthew Fox (born 1940) is an American theologian.[65] Formerly a priest and a member of the Dominican Order within the Roman Catholic Church, Fox was an early and influential exponent of a movement that came to be known as Creation Spirituality. The movement draws inspiration from the wisdom traditions of Christian scriptures, and the philosophies of such medieval Catholic visionaries as Hildegard of Bingen, Thomas Aquinas, Saint Francis of Assisi, Julian of Norwich, Dante Alighieri, Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa, and others. Fox has written a number of articles on Eckhart,[citation needed] and a book titled "Breakthrough: Meister Eckhart's Creation Spirituality in New Translation."[66] The French philosopher Jacques Derrida distinguishes Eckhart's Negative Theology from his own concept of différance although John D. Caputo in his influential 'The Tears and Prayers of Jacques Derrida' emphasises the importance of that tradition for this thought.[67] Meister Eckhart has become one of the timeless heroes of modern spirituality, which thrives on an all-inclusive syncretism.[68] This syncretism started with the colonisation of Asia, and the search of similarities between eastern and western religions.[69] Western monotheism was projected onto eastern religiosity by western orientalists, trying to accommodate eastern religiosity to a western understanding, whereafter Asian intellectuals used these projections as a starting point to propose the superiority of those eastern religions.[69] Early on, the figure of Meister Eckhart has played a role in these developments and exchanges.[69] Renewed academic attention to Eckhart has attracted favorable attention to his work from contemporary non-Christian mystics. Eckhart's most famous single quote, "The Eye with which I see God is the same Eye with which God sees me", is commonly cited by thinkers within neopaganism and ultimatist Buddhism as a point of contact between these traditions and Christian mysticism. The first translation of Upanishads appeared in two parts in 1801 and 1802.[69] The 19th-century philosopher Schopenhauer was influenced by the early translations of the Upanishads, which he called "the consolation of my life".[70][note 5] Schopenhauer compared Eckhart's views to the teachings of Indian, Christian and Islamic mystics and ascetics: If we turn from the forms, produced by external circumstances, and go to the root of things, we shall find that Sakyamuni and Meister Eckhart teach the same thing; only that the former dared to express his ideas plainly and positively, whereas Eckhart is obliged to clothe them in the garment of the Christian myth, and to adapt his expressions thereto.[71] Schopenhauer also stated: Buddha, Eckhardt, and I all teach essentially the same.[72] The Theosophical Society had a major influence on Hindu reform movements.[74][note 7] A major proponent of this "neo-Hinduism", also called "neo-Vedanta",[80] was Vivekananda[81][82] (1863–1902) who popularised his modernised interpretation[83] of Advaita Vedanta in the 19th and early 20th century in both India and the west,[82] emphasising anubhava ("personal experience"[84]) over scriptural authority.[84] Vivekanda's teachings have been compared to Eckhart's teachings.[85][86] In the 20th century, Eckhart's thoughts were also compared to Shankara's Advaita Vedanta by Rudolf Otto in his Mysticism East and West.[87] According to King, the aim of this work was to redeem Eckhart's mysticism in Protestant circles,[88] attempting "to establish the superiority of the German mysticism of Eckhart over the Indian mysticism of Sankara".[72] Reiner Schurmann, a Professor of Philosophy, while agreeing with Daisetz T. Suzuki that there exist certain similarities between Zen Buddhism and Meister Eckhart's teaching, also disputed Suzuki's contention that the ideas expounded in Eckhart's sermons closely approach Buddhist thought, "so closely indeed, that one could stamp them almost definitely as coming out of Buddhist speculations".[96] Schurmann's several clarifications included: On the question of "Time" and Eckhart's view (claimed as parallel to Buddhism in reducing awakening to instantaneity) that the birth of the Word in the ground of the mind must accomplish itself in an instant, in "the eternal now", that in fact Eckhart in this respect is rooted directly in the catechisis of the Fathers of the Church rather than merely derived from Buddhism;[96] On the question of "Isness" and Suzuki's contention that the "Christian experiences are not after all different from those of the Buddhist; terminology is all that divides us", that in Eckhart "the Godhead's istigkeit [translated as "isness" by Suzuki] is a negation of all quiddities; it says that God, rather than non-being, is at the heart of all things" thereby demonstrating with Eckhart's theocentrism that "the istigkeit of the Godhead and the isness of a thing then refer to two opposite experiences in Meister Eckhart and Suzuki: in the former, to God, and in the latter, to `our ordinary state of the mind'" and Buddhism's attempts to think "pure nothingness";[99] On the question of "Emptiness" and Eckhart's view (claimed as parallel to Buddhist emphasis "on the emptiness of all 'composite things'") that only a perfectly released person, devoid of all, comprehends, "seizes", God, that the Buddhist "emptiness" seems to concern man's relation to things while Eckhart's concern is with what is "at the end of the road opened by detachment [which is] the mind espouses the very movement of the divine dehiscence; it does what the Godhead does: it lets all things be; not only must God also abandon all of his own—names and attributes if he is to reach into the ground of the mind (this is already a step beyond the recognition of the emptiness of all composite things), but God's essential being – releasement – becomes the being of a released man."[100] The notable humanistic psychoanalyst and philosopher Erich Fromm was another scholar who brought renewed attention in the west to Eckhart's writings, drawing upon many of the latters themes in his large corpus of work. Eckhart was a significant influence in developing United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's conception of spiritual growth through selfless service to humanity, as detailed in his book of contemplations called Vägmärken ('Markings').[note 8] Since the 1960s debate has been going on in Germany whether Eckhart should be called a "mystic".[106] The philosopher Karl Albert had already argued that Eckhart had to be placed in the tradition of philosophical mysticism of Parmenides, Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus and other neo-Platonistic thinkers.[107] Heribert Fischer argued in the 1960s that Eckhart was a mediaeval theologian.[107] Kurt Flasch, a member of the so-called Bochum-school of mediaeval philosophy,[107] strongly reacted against the influence of New Age mysticism and "all kinds of emotional subjective mysticism", arguing for the need to free Eckhart from "the Mystical Flood".[107] He sees Eckhart strictly as a philosopher. Flasch argues that the opposition between "mystic" and "scholastic" is not relevant because this mysticism (in Eckhart's context) is penetrated by the spirit of the University, in which it occurred.[citation needed] According to Hackett, Eckhart is to be understood as an "original hermeneutical thinker in the Latin tradition".[107] To understand Eckhart, he has to be properly placed within the western philosophical tradition of which he was a part. [108] Josiah Royce, an objective idealist, saw Eckhart as a representative example of 13th and 14th century Catholic mystics "on the verge of pronounced heresy" but without original philosophical opinions. Royce attributes Eckhart's reputation for originality to the fact that he translated scholastic philosophy from Latin into German, and that Eckhart wrote about his speculations in German instead of Latin.[109](pp262, 265–266) Eckhart generally followed Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of the Trinity, but Eckhart exaggerated the scholastic distinction between the divine essence and the divine persons. The very heart of Eckhart's speculative mysticism, according to Royce, is that if, through what is called in Christian terminology the procession of the Son, the divine omniscience gets a complete expression in eternal terms, still there is even at the centre of this omniscience the necessary mystery of the divine essence itself, which neither generates nor is generated, and which is yet the source and fountain of all the divine. The Trinity is, for Eckhart, the revealed God and the mysterious origin of the Trinity is the Godhead, the absolute God.[109](pp279–282) Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Stuttgart and Berlin: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 11 Vols., 1936– [This is the critical edition of Meister Eckhart's works. The Latin works comprise six volumes, of which five are complete. The Middle High German works will be in five volumes, of which four are complete] Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense, trans. and ed. by Bernard McGinn and Edmund Colledge, New York: Paulist Press, 1981. [Re-published in paperback without notes and a foreword by John O’Donohue as Meister Eckhart, Selections from His Essential Writings, (New York, 2005)] Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, trans. and ed. by Bernard McGinn and Frank Tobin, New York and London: Paulist Press/SPCK, 1987. C. de B. Evans, Meister Eckhart by Franz Pfeiffer, 2 vols., London: Watkins, 1924 and 1931. Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. Raymond B. Blakney, New York: Harper and Row, 1941, ISBN 0-06-130008-X [a translation of about one-half the works including treatises, 28 sermons, Defense] Otto Karrer Meister Eckhart Speaks The Philosophical Library, Inc. New York, 1957. James M. Clark and John V. Skinner, eds. and trans., Treatises and Sermons of Meister Eckhart, New York: Octagon Books, 1983. (Reprint of Harper and Row ed., 1958/London: Faber & Faber, 1958.) Armand Maurer, ed., Master Eckhart: Parisian Questions and Prologues, Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974. Meister Eckhart, Sermons and Treatises, trans. by M. O'C. Walshe, 3 vols., (London: Watkins, 1979–1981; later printed at Longmead, Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1979–1990). [Now published as The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. and ed. by M. O’C. Walshe, rev. by Bernard McGinn (New York, 2009)] Matthew Fox, Breakthrough: Meister Eckhart's Creation Spirituality in New Translation (Garden City, New York, 1980) Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings, ed. and trans. by Oliver Davies, London: Penguin, 1994. Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Stuttgart and Berlin: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 11 Vols., 1936– [This is the critical edition of Meister Eckhart's works. The Latin works comprise six volumes, of which five are complete. The Middle High German works will be in five volumes, of which four are complete] Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense, trans. and ed. by Bernard McGinn and Edmund Colledge, New York: Paulist Press, 1981. [Re-published in paperback without notes and a foreword by John O’Donohue as Meister Eckhart, Selections from His Essential Writings, (New York, 2005)] Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, trans. and ed. by Bernard McGinn and Frank Tobin, New York and London: Paulist Press/SPCK, 1987. C. de B. Evans, Meister Eckhart by Franz Pfeiffer, 2 vols., London: Watkins, 1924 and 1931. Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. Raymond B. Blakney, New York: Harper and Row, 1941, ISBN 0-06-130008-X [a translation of about one-half the works including treatises, 28 sermons, Defense] Otto Karrer Meister Eckhart Speaks The Philosophical Library, Inc. New York, 1957. James M. Clark and John V. Skinner, eds. and trans., Treatises and Sermons of Meister Eckhart, New York: Octagon Books, 1983. (Reprint of Harper and Row ed., 1958/London: Faber & Faber, 1958.) Armand Maurer, ed., Master Eckhart: Parisian Questions and Prologues, Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974. Meister Eckhart, Sermons and Treatises, trans. by M. O'C. Walshe, 3 vols., (London: Watkins, 1979–1981; later printed at Longmead, Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1979–1990). [Now published as The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. and ed. by M. O’C. Walshe, rev. by Bernard McGinn (New York, 2009)] Matthew Fox, Breakthrough: Meister Eckhart's Creation Spirituality in New Translation (Garden City, New York, 1980) Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings, ed. and trans. by Oliver Davies, London: Penguin, 1994. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart#References https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart#Sources https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart#Further_reading https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meister_Eckhart#External_links I refer to and quote about Meister Eckhart for a number of reasons, because of my love for and interest in him and his works, that modern philosophers (even Derrida) studied him, and that he is placed in the tradition of philosophical mysticism of Parmenides, Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus and other neo-Platonistic thinkers. Hackett, Jeremiah (2012), A Companion to Meister Eckhart, Brill These, among many other, streams are what I wish to bring together in this section – the nature of, the traditions in different religions and philosophy of, the search for and the realization of the unity experience (the only real SELF of Vedanta, the Buddha mind, the Beloved of Sufism, the Godhead of Eckhart, the union of the soul with God of John of the Cross, and Teresa of Avila (the ascent of the soul in four stages). In the case of meta-philosophy of philosophy or philosophy of philosophy I talked about, reflected on and wrote about the meaning, nature, methods, rationale, purpose, aims and other transcendentals of philosophy. In the case of meta-philosophy and (philosophy of) religion and more specifically mysticism (as core, rationale, aim and purpose of religion) I do the opposite. I do not talk about, reflect on and write about philosophy of religion. I instead explore the transcendentals of religion, religious seeking and understanding, religious knowledge and the rational for religion and religious practice. This I find in the core of religion, of religious spirituality, just as philosophy as philo Sophos is the love for wisdom, that what drives the philosopher, the need for ever greater unity with Sophos, for becoming united or one/d with Sophos, so is the love for, the need for ever more subtle and greater unity with THE ONE. 10 46

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META-PHILOSOPHY 3 on philosophy, cognitive science, art, religion

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