(Meta)PHILOSOPHY – subject-matter 1 What are the objectives of philosophy? I ask this as that will determine what meta-philosophy says about this question. What is the subject-matter or the subjects of investigation of philosophy? Metaphysics informs us what philosophy is, so one would guess that hints concerning the subject-matter or objects of philosophy will be found in what metaphysics says. 2 It is suggested (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) this is what philosophy is about – Philosophy (from Greek φιλοσοφία, philosophia, literally "love of wisdom"[1][2][3][4]) Note: very vague, almost meaningless statement is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language.[5][6] note: this is more specific, but other disciplines also study these things or ideas The term was probably coined by Pythagoras (c. 570 – c. 495 BC). Philosophical methods include questioning, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Questioning Questioning with a certain purpose in mind and certain ways or methods of questioning are employed by philosophy. Note: now we turn to philosophy as asking questions, in other words we become involved in WHAT is philosophizing? What is philosophy doing when it does philosophy? So we have to analyse and investigate what the methods, the methodology the techniques are that are being used to do philosophy or during the doing of philosophy/izing. It is for this reason that I wrote the meta-philosophical article , Philosophy: methods, approaches, methodology. https://www.academia.edu/30148411/Philosophy_methods_methodology As a background to this article my other articles on philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, etc should be read here - https://independent.academia.edu/UlrichdeBalbian Questioning is a major form of human thought and interpersonal communication. It involves employing a series of questions to explore an issue, an idea or something intriguing. Questioning is the process of forming and wielding that serves to develop answers and insight. http://beyondpenguins.ehe.osu.edu/issue/energy-and-the-polar-environment/questioning-techniques-research-based-strategies-for-teachers https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_88.htm The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico-mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be ... https://www.academia.edu/3891157/Philosophical_Enterprise-Final_Paper http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/phil/101q.php http://operationmeditation.com/discover/65-deep-philosophical-questions/ http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12035/abstract HOW is a philosophical question? http://www.sapere.org.uk/AboutP4C/PhilosophicalQuestions.aspx Philosophical method (or philosophical methodology) is the study of how to do philosophy. A common view among philosophers is that philosophy is distinguished by the ways that philosophers follow in addressing philosophical questions. There is not just one method that philosophers use to answer philosophical questions. Formulate questions and problems Another element of philosophical method is to formulate questions to be answered or problems to be solved. The working assumption is that the more clearly the question or problem is stated, the easier it is to identify critical issues. A relatively small number of major philosophers prefer not to be quick, but to spend more time trying to get extremely clear on what the problem is all about. Enunciate a solution Another approach is to enunciate a theory, or to offer a definition or analysis, which constitutes an attempt to solve a philosophical problem. Sometimes a philosophical theory by itself can be stated quite briefly. All the supporting philosophical text is offered by way of hedging, explanation, and argument. Not all proposed solutions to philosophical problems consist of definitions or generalizations. Sometimes what is called for is a certain sort of explanation — not a causal explanation, but an explanation for example of how two different views, which seem to be contrary to one another, can be held at the same time, consistently. One can call this a philosophical explanation. Justify the solution A argument is a set of statements, one of which (the conclusion), it is said or implied, follows from the others (the premises). One might think of arguments as bundles of reasons — often not just a list, but logically interconnected statements — followed by the claim they are reasons for. The reasons are the premises, the claim they support is the conclusion; together they make an argument. Philosophical arguments and justifications are another important part of philosophical method. It is rare to find a philosopher, particularly in the Western philosophical tradition, who lacks many arguments. Philosophers are, or at least are expected to be, very good at giving arguments. They constantly demand and offer arguments for different claims they make. This therefore indicates that philosophy is a quest for arguments. A good argument — a clear, organized, and sound statement of reasons — may ultimately cure the original doubts that motivated us to take up philosophy. If one is willing to be satisfied without any good supporting reasons, then a Western philosophical approach may not be what one actually requires. https://philosophyofquestions.com/ The philosophy of questions explores the nature and value of questions and questioning in our everyday lives. From the questions of daily life – ‘what is the time’, ‘where are my keys’ – to the questions of philosophy, science and religion that aim to deepen our understanding of the world around us. Questioning in all these contexts is at once an intriguing and indispensable human practice. The philosophy of questions is about exploring this practice and so attempting to understand something fundamental about what we do and how we live. Explore the website to find out more about the philosophy of questions. Check out my recent posts or my current research at the University of Edinburgh and take part in the project by completing this questionnaire. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/questions/ After going over some preliminaries we will focus on three lines of work on questions: one located at the intersection of philosophy of language and formal semantics, focusing on the semantics of what Belnap and Steel (1976) call elementary questions; a second located at the intersection of philosophy of language and philosophy of science, focusing on why-questions and the notion of explanation; and a third located at the intersection of philosophy of language and epistemology, focusing on embedded or indirect questions. 1. Preliminaries 1.1 Questions, answers, and presuppositions 1.2 Kinds of questions 2. The semantics of elementary questions 2.1 Classical semantic theories of questions 2.2 Questions in dynamic semantics 2.3 Inquisitive semantics 2.4 Structured question meanings 2.5 Pointers to further reading 3. Why-questions 3.1 A formal approach: abnormic laws and Bromberger's theory 3.2 A pragmatic approach: explanatory contrast and van Fraassen's theory 4. Embedded (or indirect) questions 4.1 Knowledge-wh and the imperative-epistemic theory of wh-questions 4.2 Wh-complements as meaningful units 4.3 Wh-complements contextually defined 4.4 Information provision versus contextualism 4.5 Question-relativity 4.6 Wh-complements as predicates Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries https://www.academia.edu/30148411/Philosophy_methods_methodology see pages 3 and 4. critical discussion, (or the Socratic method) 2a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socratic_method The Socratic method is a method of hypothesis elimination, in that better hypotheses are found by steadily identifying and eliminating those that lead to contradictions. Socratic method, also known as maieutics, method of elenchus, elenctic method, or Socratic debate, is a form of cooperative argumentative dialogue between individuals, based on asking and answering questions to stimulate critical thinking and to draw out ideas and underlying presumptions. It is a dialectical method, often involving a discussion in which the defense of one point of view is questioned; one participant may lead another to contradict themselves in some way, thus weakening the defender's point. This method is named after the classical Greek philosopher Socrates and is introduced by him in Plato's Theaetetus as midwifery (maieutics) because it is employed to bring out definitions implicit in the interlocutors' beliefs, or to help them further their understanding. The Socratic method is a method of hypothesis elimination, in that better hypotheses are found by steadily identifying and eliminating those that lead to contradictions. The Socratic method searches for general, commonly held truths that shape beliefs and scrutinizes them to determine their consistency with other beliefs. The basic form is a series of questions formulated as tests of logic and fact intended to help a person or group discover their beliefs about some topic, exploring definitions or logoi (singular logos) and seeking to characterize general characteristics shared by various particular instances. Aristotle attributed to Socrates the discovery of the method of definition and induction, which he regarded as the essence of the scientific method.  Development  2 Method Elenchus (Ancient Greek: ἔλεγχος elengkhos "argument of disproof or refutation; cross-examining, testing, scrutiny esp. for purposes of refutation"[3]) is the central technique of the Socratic method. The Latin form elenchus (plural elenchi ) is used in English as the technical philosophical term.[4] The most common adjectival form in English is elenctic; elenchic and elenchtic are also current. In Plato's early dialogues, the elenchus is the technique Socrates uses to investigate, for example, the nature or definition of ethical concepts such as justice or virtue. According to Vlastos,[5] it has the following steps: Socrates' interlocutor asserts a thesis, for example "Courage is endurance of the soul", which Socrates considers false and targets for refutation. Socrates secures his interlocutor's agreement to further premises, for example "Courage is a fine thing" and "Ignorant endurance is not a fine thing". Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that these further premises imply the contrary of the original thesis; in this case, it leads to: "courage is not endurance of the soul". Socrates then claims that he has shown that his interlocutor's thesis is false and that its negation is true. One elenctic examination can lead to a new, more refined, examination of the concept being considered, in this case it invites an examination of the claim: "Courage is wise endurance of the soul". Most Socratic inquiries consist of a series of elenchi and typically end in puzzlement known as aporia. Frede[6] points out that Vlastos' conclusion in step #4 above makes nonsense of the aporetic nature of the early dialogues. Having shown that a proposed thesis is false is insufficient to conclude that some other competing thesis must be true. Rather, the interlocutors have reached aporia, an improved state of still not knowing what to say about the subject under discussion. The exact nature of the elenchus is subject to a great deal of debate, in particular concerning whether it is a positive method, leading to knowledge, or a negative method used solely to refute false claims to knowledge.[7] W. K. C. Guthrie in The Greek Philosophers sees it as an error to regard the Socratic method as a means by which one seeks the answer to a problem, or knowledge. Guthrie claims that the Socratic method actually aims to demonstrate one's ignorance. Socrates, unlike the Sophists, did believe that knowledge was possible, but believed that the first step to knowledge was recognition of one's ignorance. Guthrie writes, "[Socrates] was accustomed to say that he did not himself know anything, and that the only way in which he was wiser than other men was that he was conscious of his own ignorance, while they were not. The essence of the Socratic method is to convince the interlocutor that whereas he thought he knew something, in fact he does not."{pg 74}  3 Application 3.1 Socratic Circles A Socratic Circle (also known as a Socratic Seminar) is a pedagogical approach based on the Socratic method and uses a dialogic approach to understand information in a text. Its systematic procedure is used to examine a text through questions and answers founded on the beliefs that all new knowledge is connected to prior knowledge, that all thinking comes from asking questions, and that asking one question should lead to asking further questions.[8] A Socratic Circle is not a debate. The goal of this activity is to have participants work together to construct meaning and arrive at an answer, not for one student or one group to “win the argument”.[9] This approach is based on the belief that participants seek and gain deeper understanding of concepts in the text through thoughtful dialogue rather than memorizing information that has been provided for them.[9] 3.1.1 Various approaches to Socratic Circles 3.1.2 Text selection Pertinent elements of an effective Socratic text Socratic seminar texts are able to challenge participants’ thinking skills by having these characteristics: Ideas and values Complexity and challenge Relevance to participants' curriculum Ambiguity 1. Ideas and values - The text must introduce ideas and values that are complex and difficult to summarize.[13] Powerful discussions arise from personal connections to abstract ideas and from implications to personal values. 2. Complexity and challenge - The text must be rich in ideas and complexity [10] and open to interpretation.[15] Ideally it should require multiple readings,[16] but should be neither far above the participants' intellectual level nor very long. 3. Relevance to participants and curriculum - An effective text has identifiable themes that are recognizable and pertinent to the lives of the participants.[14] Themes in the text should relate to the curriculum. 4. Ambiguity - The text must be approachable from a variety of different perspectives, including perspectives that seem mutually exclusive, thus provoking critical thinking and raising important questions. The absence of right and wrong answers promotes a variety of discussion and encourages individual contributions.[10][16] 3.1.3 Questioning methods in Socratic Circles Socratic Circles specify three types of questions to prepare: Opening questions generate discussion at the beginning of the seminar in order to elicit dominant themes.[10][15] Guiding questions help deepen and elaborate the discussion, keeping contributions on topic and encouraging a positive atmosphere and consideration for others. Closing questions lead participants to summarize their thoughts and learning[10] and personalize what they’ve discussed.[15] 3.2 Law schools 3.3 Psychotherapy The Socratic method has also recently inspired a new form of applied philosophy: socratic dialogue, also called philosophical counseling. In Europe Gerd B. Achenbach is probably the best known practitioner, and Michel Weber has also proposed another variant of the practice.  4 See also  5 References  6 Further reading  7 External links rational argument 2 b) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ), also known as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned arguments. The term dialectic is not synonymous with the term debate. While in theory debaters are not necessarily emotionally invested in their point of view, in practice debaters frequently display an emotional commitment that may cloud rational judgment. Debates are won through a combination of persuading the opponent, proving one's argument correct, or proving the opponent's argument incorrect. Debates do not necessarily require promptly identifying a clear winner or loser; however clear winners are frequently determined by either a judge, jury, or by group consensus. The term dialectics is also not synonymous with the term rhetoric, a method or art of discourse that seeks to persuade, inform, or motivate an audience.[1] Concepts, like "logos" or rational appeal, "pathos" or emotional appeal, and "ethos" or ethical appeal, are intentionally used by rhetoricians to persuade an audience.[2] Socrates favoured truth as the highest value, proposing that it could be discovered through reason and logic in discussion: ergo, dialectic. Socrates valued rationality (appealing to logic, not emotion) as the proper means for persuasion, the discovery of truth, and the determinant for one's actions. To Socrates, truth, not aretē, was the greater good, and each person should, above all else, seek truth to guide one's life. Therefore, Socrates opposed the Sophists and their teaching of rhetoric as art and as emotional oratory requiring neither logic nor proof.[3] Different forms of dialectical reasoning have emerged throughout history from the Indosphere (Greater India) and the West (Europe). These forms include the Socratic method, Hindu, Buddhist, Medieval, Hegelian dialectics, Marxist, Talmudic, and Neo-orthodoxy.  rinciples  2 Western dialectical forms 2.1 Classical philosophy 2.1.1 Socratic dialogue 2.1.2 Aristotle 2.2 Medieval philosophy 2.3 Modern philosophy 2.3.1 Hegelian dialectic 2.3.2 Marxist dialectic Dialectical method and dualism Another way to understand dialectics is to view it as a method of thinking to overcome formal dualism and monistic reductionism.[69] For example, formal dualism regards the opposites as mutually exclusive entities, whilst monism finds each to be an epiphenomenon of the other. Dialectical thinking rejects both views. The dialectical method requires focus on both at the same time. It looks for a transcendence of the opposites entailing a leap of the imagination to a higher level, which (1) provides justification for rejecting both alternatives as false and/or (2) helps elucidate a real but previously veiled integral relationship between apparent opposites that have been kept apart and regarded as distinct. For example, the superposition principle of quantum physics can be explained using the dialectical method of thinking—likewise the example below from dialectical biology. Such examples showing the relationship of the dialectic method of thinking to the scientific method to a large part negates the criticism of Popper (see text below) that the two are mutually exclusive. The dialectic method also examines false alternatives presented by formal dualism (materialism vs idealism; rationalism vs empiricism; mind vs body, etc.) and looks for ways to transcend the opposites and form synthesis. In the dialectical method, both have something in common, and understanding of the parts requires understanding their relationship with the whole system. The dialectical method thus views the whole of reality as an evolving process. Criticisms Dialectics has become central to "Continental" philosophy, but it plays no part in "Anglo-American" philosophy. In other words, on the continent of Europe, dialectics has entered intellectual culture as what might be called a legitimate part of thought and philosophy, whereas in America and Britain, the dialectic plays no discernible part in the intellectual culture, which instead tends toward positivism. A prime example of the European tradition is Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, which is very different from the works of Popper, whose philosophy was for a time highly influential in the UK where he resided (see below). Sartre states: "Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover there concrete syntheses. It can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving, dialectical totalisation, which is nothing else but history or—from the strictly cultural point of view adopted here—'philosophy-becoming-the world'."[70] Karl Popper has attacked the dialectic repeatedly. In 1937 he wrote and delivered a paper entitled "What Is Dialectic?" in which he attacked the dialectical method for its willingness "to put up with contradictions".[71] Popper concluded the essay with these words: "The whole development of dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy should not be made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that philosophers should be much more modest in their claims. One task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science" (Ibid., p. 335). In chapter 12 of volume 2 of The Open Society and Its Enemies (1944; 5th rev. ed., 1966) Popper unleashed a famous attack on Hegelian dialectics, in which he held that Hegel's thought (unjustly, in the view of some philosophers, such as Walter Kaufmann,[72]) was to some degree responsible for facilitating the rise of fascism in Europe by encouraging and justifying irrationalism. In section 17 of his 1961 "addenda" to The Open Society, entitled "Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism," Popper refused to moderate his criticism of the Hegelian dialectic, arguing that it "played a major role in the downfall of the liberal movement in Germany,... by contributing to historicism and to an identification of might and right, encouraged totalitarian modes of thought.  . . . [and] undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty".[73] Formalism Main article: Logic and dialectic In the past few decades, European and American logicians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectical logic or argument. There had been pre-formal treatises on argument and dialectic, from authors such as Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of Argument), Nicholas Rescher (Dialectics), and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (Pragma-dialectics). One can include the communities of informal logic and paraconsistent logic. However, building on theories of defeasible reasoning (see John L. Pollock), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defeasible_reasoning In logic, defeasible reasoning is a kind of reasoning that is rationally compelling though not deductively valid.[1] The distinction between defeasibility and indefeasibility may be seen in the context of this joke: During a train trip through the countryside, an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician observe a flock of sheep. The engineer remarks, "I see that the sheep in this region are white." The physicist offers a correction, "Some sheep in this region are white." And the mathematician responds, "In this region there exist sheep that are white on at least one side." The engineer in this story has reasoned defeasibly; since engineering is a highly practical discipline, it is receptive to generalizations. In particular, engineers cannot and need not defer decisions until they have acquired perfect and complete knowledge. But mathematical reasoning, having different goals, inclines one to account for even the rare and special cases, and thus typically leads to a stance that is indefeasible. Defeasible reasoning is a particular kind of non-demonstrative reasoning, where the reasoning does not produce a full, complete, or final demonstration of a claim, i.e., where fallibility and corrigibility of a conclusion are acknowledged. In other words defeasible reasoning produces a contingent statement or claim. Other kinds of non-demonstrative reasoning are probabilistic reasoning, inductive reasoning, statistical reasoning, abductive reasoning, and paraconsistent reasoning. Defeasible reasoning is also a kind of ampliative reasoning because its conclusions reach beyond the pure meanings of the premises. The differences between these kinds of reasoning correspond to differences about the conditional that each kind of reasoning uses, and on what premise (or on what authority) the conditional is adopted: Deductive (from meaning postulate, axiom, or contingent assertion): if p then q (i.e., q or not-p) Defeasible (from authority): if p then (defeasibly) q Probabilistic (from combinatorics and indifference): if p then (probably) q Statistical (from data and presumption): the frequency of qs among ps is high (or inference from a model fit to data); hence, (in the right context) if p then (probably) q Inductive (theory formation; from data, coherence, simplicity, and confirmation): (inducibly) "if p then q"; hence, if p then (deducibly-but-revisably) q Abductive (from data and theory): p and q are correlated, and q is sufficient for p; hence, if p then (abducibly) q as cause Defeasible reasoning finds its fullest expression in jurisprudence, ethics and moral philosophy, epistemology, pragmatics and conversational conventions in linguistics, constructivist decision theories, and in knowledge representation and planning in artificial intelligence. It is also closely identified with prima facie (presumptive) reasoning (i.e., reasoning on the "face" of evidence), and ceteris paribus (default) reasoning (i.e., reasoning, all things "being equal"). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason Reason is the capacity for consciously making sense of things, applying logic, establishing and verifying facts, and changing or justifying practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing information.[1] It is closely associated with such characteristically human activities as philosophy, science, language, mathematics, and art and is normally considered to be a definitive characteristic of human nature.[2] Reason, or as aspect of it, is sometimes referred to as rationality. Reasoning is associated with thinking, cognition, and intellect. Reasoning may be subdivided into forms of logical reasoning (forms associated with the strict sense): deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning; and other modes of reasoning considered more informal, such as intuitive reasoning and verbal reasoning. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_reasoning Informally, two kinds of logical reasoning can be distinguished in addition to formal deduction: induction and abduction. Given a precondition or premise, a conclusion or logical consequence and a rule or material conditional that implies the conclusion given the precondition, one can explain that: Deductive reasoning determines whether the truth of a conclusion can be determined for that rule, based solely on the truth of the premises. Example: "When it rains, things outside get wet. The grass is outside, therefore: when it rains, the grass gets wet." Mathematical logic and philosophical logic are commonly associated with this type of reasoning. Inductive reasoning attempts to support a determination of the rule. It hypothesizes a rule after numerous examples are taken to be a conclusion that follows from a precondition in terms of such a rule. Example: "The grass got wet numerous times when it rained, therefore: the grass always gets wet when it rains." While they may be persuasive, these arguments are not deductively valid, see the problem of induction. Science is associated with this type of reasoning. Inductive-creative reasoning this term has been coined by D. Iosif to combine the specificity of the observation set from the inductive arena and the creativity (and intuition) element from the abductive arena therefore providing a cogent view of the future. This methodology will result in grounded creative thinking and can be used in strategy planning to generate future as-yet unobserved phenomena. One example would be: "we observed a large number of white swans on all continents and hypothesize that we need to protect by law all swans that are white but also black (in existence but unobserved) and red (possibly to be re-engineered in a distant future)". While inductive reasoning cannot yield an absolutely certain conclusion, it can actually increase human knowledge (it is ampliative). Abductive reasoning, aka inference to the best explanation, selects a cogent set of preconditions. Given a true conclusion and a rule, it attempts to select some possible premises that, if true also, can support the conclusion, though not uniquely. Example: "When it rains, the grass gets wet. The grass is wet. Therefore, it might have rained." This kind of reasoning can be used to develop a hypothesis, which in turn can be tested by additional reasoning or data. Diagnosticians, detectives, and scientists often use this type of reasoning.  1 Etymology and related words  2 Philosophical history 2.1 Classical philosophy 2.2 Subject-centred reason in early modern philosophy 2.3 Substantive and formal reason 2.4 The critique of reason  3 Reason compared to related concepts 3.1 Compared to logic 3.2 Reason compared to cause-and-effect thinking, and symbolic thinking 3.3 Reason, imagination, mimesis, and memory 3.4 Logical reasoning methods and argumentation 3.4.1 Deductive reasoning 3.4.2 Inductive reasoning 3.4.3 Abductive reasoning 3.4.4 Analogical reasoning 3.4.5 Fallacious reasoning  4 Traditional problems raised concerning reason 4.1 Reason versus truth, and "first principles" 4.2 Reason versus emotion or passion 4.3 Reason versus faith or tradition  5 Reason in particular fields of study 5.1 Reason in political philosophy and ethics 5.2 Psychology 5.2.1 Behavioral experiments on human reasoning 5.2.2 Developmental studies of children's reasoning 5.2.3 Neuroscience of reasoning 5.3 Computer science 5.3.1 Automated reasoning 5.3.2 Meta-reasoning 5.4 Evolution of reason Along these lines, a distinction is often drawn between discursive reason, reason proper, and intuitive reason,[3] in which the reasoning process—however valid—tends toward the personal and the opaque. Although in many social and political settings logical and intuitive modes of reason may clash, in others contexts, intuition and formal reason are seen as complementary, rather than adversarial as, for example, in mathematics, where intuition is often a necessary building block in the creative process of achieving the hardest form of reason, a formal proof. Reason, like habit or intuition, is one of the ways by which thinking comes from one idea to a related idea. For example, it is the means by which rational beings understand themselves to think about cause and effect, truth and falsehood, and what is good or bad. It is also closely identified with the ability to self-consciously change beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and institutions, and therefore with the capacity for freedom and self-determination.[4] In contrast to reason as an abstract noun, a reason is a consideration which explains or justifies some event, phenomenon, or behavior.[5] The field of logic studies ways in which human beings reason formally through argument.[6] Psychologists and cognitive scientists have attempted to study and explain how people reason, e.g. which cognitive and neural processes are engaged, and how cultural factors affect the inferences that people draw. The field of automated reasoning studies how reasoning may or may not be modeled computationally. Animal psychology considers the question of whether animals other than humans can reason.  Etymology and related words  2 Philosophical history  Etymology and related words  2 Philosophical history 2.1 Classical philosophy 2.2 Subject-centred reason in early modern philosophy In his search for a foundation of all possible knowledge, Descartes deliberately decided to throw into doubt all knowledge – except that of the mind itself in the process of thinking: At this time I admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason – words of whose meanings I was previously ignorant.[16] This eventually became known as epistemological or "subject-centred" reason, because it is based on the knowing subject, who perceives the rest of the world and itself as a set of objects to be studied, and successfully mastered by applying the knowledge accumulated through such study. Breaking with tradition and many thinkers after him, Descartes explicitly did not divide the incorporeal soul into parts, such as reason and intellect, describing them as one indivisible incorporeal entity. This eventually became known as epistemological or "subject-centred" reason, because it is based on the knowing subject, who perceives the rest of the world and itself as a set of objects to be studied, and successfully mastered by applying the knowledge accumulated through such study. Breaking with tradition and many thinkers after him, Descartes explicitly did not divide the incorporeal soul into parts, such as reason and intellect, describing them as one indivisible incorporeal entity. A contemporary of Descartes, Thomas Hobbes described reason as a broader version of "addition and subtraction" which is not limited to numbers.[17] This understanding of reason is sometimes termed "calculative" reason. Similar to Descartes, Hobbes asserted that "No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come" but that "sense and memory" is absolute knowledge.[18] In the late 17th century, through the 18th century, John Locke and David Hume developed Descartes' line of thought still further. Hume took it in an especially skeptical direction, proposing that there could be no possibility of deducing relationships of cause and effect, and therefore no knowledge is based on reasoning alone, even if it seems otherwise.[19][20] Hume famously remarked that, "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."[21] Hume also took his definition of reason to unorthodox extremes by arguing, unlike his predecessors, that human reason is not qualitatively different from either simply conceiving individual ideas, or from judgments associating two ideas,[22] and that "reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations."[23] It followed from this that animals have reason, only much less complex than human reason. 2.3 Substantive and formal reason In the formulation of Kant, who wrote some of the most influential modern treatises on the subject, the great achievement of reason is that it is able to exercise a kind of universal law-making. Kant was able therefore to re-formulate the basis of moral-practical, theoretical and aesthetic reasoning, on "universal" laws. Here practical reasoning is the self-legislating or self-governing formulation of universal norms, and theoretical reasoning the way humans posit universal laws of nature.[24] Under practical reason, the moral autonomy or freedom of human beings depends on their ability to behave according to laws that are given to them by the proper exercise of that reason. This contrasted with earlier forms of morality, which depended on religious understanding and interpretation, or nature for their substance.[25] According to Kant, in a free society each individual must be able to pursue their goals however they see fit, so long as their actions conform to principles given by reason. He formulated such a principle, called the "categorical imperative" In contrast to Hume then, Kant insists that reason itself (German Vernunft) has natural ends itself, the solution to the metaphysical problems, especially the discovery of the foundations of morality. Kant claimed that this problem could be solved with his "transcendental logic" which unlike normal logic is not just an instrument, which can be used indifferently, as it was for Aristotle, but a theoretical science in its own right and the basis of all the others.[27] According to Jürgen Habermas, the "substantive unity" of reason has dissolved in modern times, such that it can no longer answer the question "How should I live?" Instead, the unity of reason has to be strictly formal, or "procedural." He thus described reason as a group of three autonomous spheres (on the model of Kant's three critiques): Cognitive-instrumental reason is the kind of reason employed by the sciences. It is used to observe events, to predict and control outcomes, and to intervene in the world on the basis of its hypotheses; Moral-practical reason is what we use to deliberate and discuss issues in the moral and political realm, according to universalizable procedures (similar to Kant's categorical imperative); and Aesthetic reason is typically found in works of art and literature, and encompasses the novel ways of seeing the world and interpreting things that those practices embody. For Habermas, these three spheres are the domain of experts, and therefore need to be mediated with the "lifeworld" by philosophers. In drawing such a picture of reason, Habermas hoped to demonstrate that the substantive unity of reason, which in pre-modern societies had been able to answer questions about the good life, could be made up for by the unity of reason's formalizable procedures.[28] 2.4 The critique of reason From subject to intersubjective (communal) Hamann, Herder, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Rorty, and many other philosophers have contributed to a debate about what reason means, or ought to mean. Some, like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Rorty, are skeptical about subject-centred, universal, or instrumental reason, and even skeptical toward reason as a whole. Others, including Hegel, believe that it has obscured the importance of intersubjectivity, or "spirit" in human life, and attempt to reconstruct a model of what reason should be. Some thinkers, e.g. Foucault, believe there are other forms of reason, neglected but essential to modern life, and to our understanding of what it means to live a life according to reason.[10] In the last several decades, a number of proposals have been made to "re-orient" this critique of reason, or to recognize the "other voices" or "new departments" of reason: For example, in opposition to subject-centred reason, Habermas has proposed a model of communicative reason that sees it as an essentially cooperative activity, based on the fact of linguistic intersubjectivity.[29] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_pragmatics Universal pragmatics, more recently placed under the heading of formal pragmatics, is the philosophical study of the necessary conditions for reaching an understanding through communication. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas coined the term in his essay "What is Universal Pragmatics?" (Habermas 1979), where he suggests that human competition, conflict, and strategic action are attempts to achieve understanding that have failed because of modal confusions. The implication is that coming to terms with how people understand or misunderstand one another could lead to a reduction of social conflict. By coming to an "understanding," he means at the very least, when two or more social actors share the same meanings about certain words or phrases; and at the very most, when these actors are confident that those meanings fit relevant social expectations (or a "mutually recognized normative background"). (1979:3) For Habermas, the goal of coming to an understanding is "intersubjective mutuality ... shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another". (1979:3) In other words, the underlying goal of coming to an understanding would help to foster the enlightenment, consensus, and good will necessary for establishing socially beneficial norms. Habermas' goal is not primarily for subjective feeling alone, but for development of shared (intersubjective) norms which in turn establish the social coordination needed for practical action in pursuit of shared and individual objectives. (See Communicative action of 1983) As an interdisciplinary subject, universal pragmatics draws upon material from a large number of fields, from pragmatics, semantics, semiotics, informal logic, and the philosophy of language, through social philosophy, sociology, and symbolic interactionism, to ethics, especially discourse ethics, and on to epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Universal pragmatics (UP) seeks to overcome three dichotomies: the dichotomy between body and mind, between theory and practice, and between analytic and continental philosophy.[citation needed] It is part of a larger project to rethink the relationship between philosophy and the individual sciences during a period of social crisis. The project is within the tradition of Critical Theory, a program that traces back to the work of Max Horkheimer. The term "universal pragmatics" includes two different traditions that Habermas and his collaborator, colleague, and friend Karl-Otto Apel have attempted to reconcile. On the one hand, ideas are drawn from the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, wherein words and concepts are regarded as universally valid idealizations of shared meanings. And, on the other hand, inspiration is drawn from the American Pragmatist tradition (feat. Charles Sanders Peirce, George Herbert Mead, Charles W. Morris), for whom words are arbitrary signs devoid of intrinsic meaning, and whose function is to denote the things and processes in the objective world that surrounds the speakers.[citation needed] UP shares with speech act theory, semiotics, and linguistics an interest in the details of language use and communicative action. However, unlike those fields, it insists on a difference between the linguistic data that we observe in the 'analytic' mode, and the rational reconstruction of the rules of symbol systems that each reader/listener possesses intuitively when interpreting strings of words. In this sense, it is an examination of the two ways that language usage can be analyzed: as an object of scientific investigation, and as a 'rational reconstruction' of intuitive linguistic 'know-how'. Goals and methods Universal pragmatics is associated with the philosophical method of rational reconstruction. The basic concern in universal pragmatics is utterances (or speech acts) in general. This is in contrast to most other fields of linguistics, which tend to be more specialized, focusing exclusively on very specific sorts of utterances such as sentences (which in turn are made up of words, morphemes, and phonemes). For Habermas, the most significant difference between a sentence and an utterance is in that sentences are judged according to how well they make sense grammatically, while utterances are judged according to their communicative validity (see section 1). (1979:31) Universal pragmatics is also distinct from the field of sociolinguistics, because universal pragmatics is only interested in the meanings of utterances if they have to do with claims about truth or rightness, while sociolinguistics is interested in all utterances in their social contexts. (1979:31,33) Three aspects of universal pragmatics There are three ways to evaluate an utterance, according to UP. There are theories that deal with elementary propositions, theories of first-person sentences, and theories of speech acts. A theory of elementary propositions investigates those things in the real world that are being referenced by an utterance, and the things that are implied by an utterance, or predicate it. For example, the utterance "The first Prime Minister of Canada" refers to a man who went by the name of Sir John A. Macdonald. And when a speaker delivers the utterance, "My husband is a lawyer", it implies that the speaker is married to a man. A theory of first-person sentences examines the expression of the intentions of the actor(s) through language and in the first-person. Finally, a theory of speech acts examines the setting of standards for interpersonal relations through language. The basic goal for speech act theory is to explain how and when utterances in general are performative. (1979:34) Central to the notion of speech acts are the ideas of "illocutionary force" and perlocutionary force, both terms coined by philosopher J.L. Austin. Illocutionary force describes the intent of the speaker, while perlocutionary force means the effect an utterance has in the world, or more specifically, the effect on others. A performative utterance is a sentence where an action being performed is done by the utterance itself. For example: "I inform you that you have a moustache", or "I promise you I will not burn down the house". In these cases, the words are also taken as significant actions: the act of informing and promising (respectively). Habermas adds to this the observation that speech acts can either succeed or fail, depending on whether or not they succeed on influencing another person in the intended way. (1979:35) This last method of evaluation—the theory of speech acts—is the domain that Habermas is most interested in developing as a theory of communicative action. Communicative action There are a number of ways to approach Habermas's project of developing a formal pragmatic analysis of communication. Because Habermas developed it in order to have a normative and philosophical foundation for his critical social theory, most of the inroads into formal pragmatics start from sociology, specifically with what is called action theory. Action theory concerns the nature of human action, especially the manner in which collective actions are coordinated in a functioning society. The coordination and integration of social action has been explained in many ways by many theories. Rational choice theory and game theory are two examples, which describe the integration of individuals into social groups by detailing the complex manner in which individuals motivated only by self-interest will form mutually beneficial and cooperative social arrangements. In contrast to these, Habermas has formulated a theory of communicative action. (Habermas 1984; 1987) This theory and the project of developing a formal pragmatic analysis of communication are inseparable. Habermas makes a series of distinctions in the service of explaining social action. The first major differentiation he makes is between two social realms, the system and the lifeworld. These designate two distinct modes of social integration: The kind of social integration accomplished in the system is accomplished through the functional integration of the consequences of actions. It bypasses the consciousness of individuals and does not depend upon their being oriented towards acting collectively. Economic and industrial systems are great examples, often producing complex forms of social integration and interdependence despite the openly competitive orientations of individuals. The social integration accomplished in the lifeworld, by contrast, depends upon the coordination of action plans and the conscious action-orientations of individuals. It relies on processes of human interaction involving symbolic and cultural forms of meaning. More specifically, as Habermas maintains, the coordination of the lifeworld is accomplished through communicative action. Thus, communicative action is an indispensable facet of society. It is at the heart of the lifeworld and is, Habermas claims, responsible for accomplishing several fundamental social functions: reaching understanding, cultural reproduction, coordinating action-plans, and socializing individuals. However, Habermas is quick to note, different modes of interaction can (in some ways) facilitate these social functions and achieve integration within the lifeworld. This points towards the second key distinction Habermas makes, which differentiates communicative action from strategic action. The coordination of action plans, which constitutes the social integration of the lifeworld, can be accomplished either through consensus or influence. Strategic action is action oriented towards success, while communicative action is action oriented towards understanding. Both involve the symbolic resources of the lifeworld and occur primarily by way of linguistic interaction. On the one hand, actors employing communicative actions draw on the uniquely impelling force of mutual understanding to align the orientation of their action plans. It is this subtle but insistent binding force of communicative interactions that opens the door to an understanding of their meanings. On the other hand, actors employing strategic actions do not exploit the potential of communication that resides in the mutual recognition of a shared action-oriented understanding. Instead strategic actors relate to others with no intention of reaching consensus or mutual understanding, but only the intention of accomplishing pre-determined ends unrelated to reaching an understanding. Strategic action often involves the use of communicative actions to achieve the isolated intentions of individuals, manipulating shared understanding in the service of private interests. Thus, Habermas claims, strategic action is parasitic on communicative action, which means communicative action is the primary mode of linguistic interaction. Reaching a reciprocally defined understanding is communication's basic function. Keeping in mind this delineation of the object domain, the formal pragmatics of communication can be more readily laid out. The essential insight has already been mentioned, which is that communication is responsible for irreplaceable modes of social integration, and this is accomplished through the unique binding force of a shared understanding. This is, in a sense, the pragmatic piece of formal pragmatics: communication does something in the world. What needs to be explained are the conditions for the possibility of what communication already does. This is, in a sense, the formal piece of formal pragmatics: a rational reconstruction of the deep generative structures that are the universal conditions for the possibility of a binding and compelling mutual understanding. From here, Habermas heads the analysis in two directions. In 1) one direction is a kind of linguistic analysis (of speech acts), which can be placed under the heading of the validity dimensions of communication. The 2) other direction entails a categorization of the idealized presuppositions of communication. Communicative competence Habermas argues that when speakers are communicating successfully, they will have to defend their meaning by using these four claims. That they have uttered something understandably — or their statements are intelligible; That they have given other people something to understand — or are speaking something true; That the speaker is therefore understandable — or their intentions are recognized and appreciated for what they are; and, That they have come to an understanding with another person — or, they have used words that both actors can agree upon. (1979:4) Habermas is emphatic that these claims are universal—no human communication oriented at achieving mutual understanding could possibly fail to raise all of these validity claims. Additionally, to illustrate that all other forms of communication are derived from that which is oriented toward mutual understanding, he argues that there are no other kinds of validity claims whatsoever. This is important, because it is the basis of Habermas' critique of postmodernism. The fundamental orientation toward mutual understanding is at the heart of universal pragmatics, as Habermas explains: "The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible mutual understanding... other forms of social action—for example, conflict, competition, strategic action in general—are derivatives of action oriented toward reaching understanding. Furthermore, since language is the specific medium of reaching understanding at the sociocultural stage of evolution, I want to go a step further and single out explicit speech actions from other forms of communicative action."[1] Any meaning that meets the above criteria, and is recognized by another as meeting the criteria, is considered "vindicated" or communicatively competent. In order for anyone to speak validly — and therefore, to have his or her comments vindicated, and therefore reach a genuine consensus and understanding — Habermas notes that a few more fundamental commitments are required. First, he notes, actors have to treat this formulation of validity so seriously that it might be a precondition for any communication at all. Second, he asserts that all actors must believe that their claims are able to meet these standards of validity. And third, he insists that there must be a common conviction among actors that all validity claims are either already vindicated or could be vindicated. Examining the validity of speech Habermas claims that communication rests upon a non-egoistic understanding of the world, which is an idea he borrowed from thinkers like Jean Piaget. A subject capable of a de-centered understanding can take up three fundamentally different attitudes to the world. Habermas refers to such attitudes as dimensions of validity. Specifically, this means individuals can recognize different standards for validity—i.e., that the validation of an empirical truth claim requires different methods and procedures than the validation of subjective truthfulness, and that both of those require different methods and procedures of validation than claims to normative rightness. These dimensions of validity can be summarized as claims to truth (IT), truthfulness (I), and rightness (WE). So the ability to differentiate between the attitudes (and their respective "worlds") mentioned above should be understood as an ability to distinguish between types of validity claims. M. Cooke provided the only book length treatment of Habermas's communication theory. Cooke explains: "when we adopt an objectifying attitude we relate, in the first instance to the objective world of facts and existing states of affairs [IT]; when we adopt a norm-conformative attitude we relate, in the first instance, to the social world of normatively regulated interactions [WE]; when we adopt an expressive attitude we relate, in the first instance to the subjective world of inner experience [I]". (Cooke 1994) This is fundamental to Habermas's analysis of communication. He maintains that the performance of any speech act necessarily makes reference to these dimensions of validity, by raising at least three validity claims. One way to grasp this idea is to take an inventory of the ways in which an attempt at communication can misfire, the ways a speech act can fail. A hearer may reject the offering of a speech act on the grounds that it is invalid because it: presupposes or explicates states of affairs which are not the case (IT); does not conform to accepted normative expectations (WE); raises doubts about the intentions or sincerity of the speaker (I). Of course from this it follows that a hearer who accepts the offering of a speech act does so on the grounds that it is valid because it: presupposes or explicates states of affairs that are true (IT); conforms to accepted normative expectations (WE); raises no doubts concerning the intentions or sincerity of the speaker (I). This means that when engaging in communication the speaker and hearer are inescapably oriented to the validity of what is said. A speech act can be understood as an offering, the success or failure of which depends upon the hearer's response of either accepting or rejecting the validity claims it raises. The three dimensions of validity pointed out above are implicated in any attempt at communication. Thus, communication relies on its being embedded within relations to various dimensions of validity. Any and every speech act is infused with inter-subjectively recognized claims to be valid. This implicitly ties communication to argumentation and various discursive procedures for the redemption of validity claims. This is true because to raise a validity claim in communication is to simultaneously imply that one is able to show, if challenged, that one's claim is justified. Communication is possible because speakers are accountable for the validity of what they say. This assumption of responsibility on the part of the speaker is described by Habermas as a "warranty", because in most cases the validity claims raised during communication are taken as justified, and communication proceeds on that basis. Similarly, the hearer is accountable for the stance he or she takes up in relation to the validity claims raised by the speaker. Both speaker and hearer are bound to the validity claims raised by the utterances they share during communication. They are bound by the weak obligations inherent in pursuing actions oriented towards reaching an understanding. Habermas would claim that this obligation is a rational one: "With every speech act, by virtue of the validity claims it raises, the speaker enters into an interpersonal relationship of mutual obligation with the hearer: The speaker is obliged to support her claims with reasons, if challenged, and the hearer is obliged to accept a claim unless he has good reason not to do so. The obligation in question is, in the first instance, not a moral one but a rational one -- the penalty of failure to fulfill it is the charge not of immorality but of irrationality -- although clearly the two will often overlap" (Cooke, 1994). This begins to point towards the idea of communicative rationality, which is the potential for rationality that is implicit in the validity basis of everyday communication, the shape of reason that can be extracted from Habermas's formal-pragmatic analyses. "The modern -- decentered -- understanding of the world has opened up different dimensions of validity; to the extent that each dimension of validity has its own standards of truth and falsity and its own modes of justification for determining these, one may say that what has been opened up are dimensions of rationality" (Cooke, 1994). However, before the idea of communicative rationality can be described, the other direction of Habermas's formal pragmatic analyses of communication needs to be explained. This direction looks towards the idealized presuppositions of communication. Ideal presuppositions of communication When individuals pursue actions oriented towards reaching an understanding, the speech acts they exchange take on the weight of a mutually recognized validity. This means each actor involved in communication takes the other as accountable for what they have said, which implies that good reasons could be given by all to justify the validity of the understanding that is being achieved. Again, in most situations the redemption of validity claims is not an explicit undertaking (except in discourses, see below). Instead, each actor issues a "warranty" of accountability to the other, which only needs to be redeemed if certain validity claims are thrown into question. This suggests that the validity claims raised in every communicative interaction implicitly tie communication to argumentation. It is here that the idealized presuppositions of communication arise. Habermas claims that all forms of argumentation, even implicit and rudimentary ones, rest upon certain "idealizing suppositions," which are rooted in the very structures of action oriented towards understanding. These "strong idealizations" are always understood as at least approximately satisfied by participants in situations where argumentation (and communication) is thought to be taking place. Thus, when during communication it is discovered that the belief that these presuppositions are satisfied is not justified it is always taken as problematic. As a result, steps are usually taken to reestablish and maintain the belief that they are approximately satisfied, or communication is simply called off. The most basic of these idealized presuppositions is the presupposition that participants in communicative exchange are using the same linguistic expressions in the same way. This is an obvious but interesting point, which clearly illustrates what an idealized presupposition is. It is a presupposition because communication would not proceed if those involved did not think it was at least approximately satisfied (in this case that a shared language was being used). It's idealized because no matter how closely it is approximated it is always counterfactual (because, in this case, the fact is that all meanings are to some degree personally defined). Another, basic idealized presupposition of argumentation is the presupposition that no relevant argument is suppressed or excluded by the participants. Another is the presupposition that no persuasive force except that of the better argument is exerted. There is also the presupposition that all the participants are motivated only by a concern for the better argument. There is the presupposition of attributing a context-transcending significance to validity claims. This presupposition is controversial but important (and becomes expanded and clarified in the presuppositions of discourse, see below). The idea is that participants in communication instill their claims with a validity that is understood to have significance beyond the specific context of their agreement. The presupposition that no validity claim is exempt in principle from critical evaluation in argumentation; The presupposition that everyone capable of speech and action is entitled to participate, and everyone is equally entitled to introduce new topics or express attitudes needs or desires. In sum, all these presuppositions must be assumed to be approximately satisfied in any situation of communication, despite their being necessarily counterfactual. Habermas refers to the positing of these idealized presuppositions as the "simultaneously unavoidable and trivial accomplishments that sustain communicative action and argumentation". Habermas calls discourses those forms of communication that come sufficiently close to actually satisfying these presuppositions. Discourses often occur within institutionalized forms of argumentation that self-reflectively refine their procedures of communication, and as a result have a more rigorous set of presuppositions in addition to the ones listed above. A striking feature of discourse is that validity claims tend to be explicitly thematized and there is the presupposition that all possible interlocutors would agree to the universal validity of the conclusions reached. Habermas especially highlights this in what he calls theoretical discourses and practical discourses. These are tied directly to two of the three dimensions of validity discussed above: theoretical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized regarding objective states of affairs (IT); practical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized concerning the rightness of norms governing social interactions (WE). Habermas understands presupposition (5) to be responsible for generating the self-understanding and continuation of theoretical and practical discourses. Presupposition (5) points out that the validity of an understanding reached in theoretical or practical discourse, concerning some factual knowledge or normative principle, is always expanded beyond the immediate context in which it is achieved. The idea is that participants in discourses such as these presuppose that any understanding reached could attain universal agreement concerning its universal validity if these discourses could be relieved of the constraints of time and space. This idealized presupposition directs discourses concerning truth and normative certainty beyond the contingencies of specific communicative situations and towards the idealized achievements of universal consensus and universal validity. It is a rational reconstruction of the conditions for the possibility of earnest discourses concerning facts and norms. Recall that, for Habermas, rational reconstructions aim at offering the most acceptable account of what allows for the competencies already mastered by a wide range of subjects. In order for discourse to proceed, the existence of facts and norms must be presupposed, yet the certainty of an absolute knowledge of them must be, in a sense, postponed. Striking a Piagetian and Peircean chord, Habermas understands the deep structures of collective inquiry as developmental. Thus, the presupposition shared by individuals involved in discourse is taken to reflect this. The pursuit of truth and normative certainty is taken to be motivated and grounded, not in some objective or social world that is treated as a "given", but rather in a learning process. Indeed, Habermas himself is always careful to formulate his work as a research project, open to refinement. In any case, reconstructing the presuppositions and validity dimensions inherent to communication is valuable because it brings into relief the inescapable foundations of everyday practices. Communicative action and the rudimentary forms of argumentation that orient the greater part of human interaction cannot be left behind. By reconstructing the deep structures of these Habermas has discovered a seed of rationality planted in the very heart of the lifeworld. Everyday practices, which are common enough to be trivial, such as reaching an understanding with another, or contesting the reasons for pursuing a course of action, contain an implicit and idealized rationality. In other words, communication is always somewhat rational. Communication could not occur if the participants thought that the speech acts exchanged did not carry the weight of a validity for which those participating could be held accountable. Nor would anyone feel that a conclusion was justified if it was achieved by any other means than the uncoerced force of the better argument. Nor could the specialized discourses of law, science and morality continue if the progress of knowledge and insight was denied in favor of relativism. That said, it is a question how appropriate it is to speak of "communication" tenselessly, and of "everyday practices" as though they cut across all times and cultures. That they do cannot be assumed, and anthropology provides evidence of significant difference. It is possible to ignore these facts by limiting the scope of universal pragmatics to current forms of discourse, but this runs the risk of contradicting Habermas's own demand for (5). Moreover, the initial unease with the classical and liberal views of rationality had to do precisely with their ahistorical character and refusal, or perhaps inability, to acknowledge their own origins in circumstances of the day. Their veneer of false universality torn off by the likes of Foucault, it remains to be seen whether "universal" pragmatics can stand up to the same challenges posed by deconstruction and skepticism. . This view of reason is concerned with clarifying the norms and procedures by which agreement can be reached, and is therefore a view of reason as a form of public justification. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communicative_rationality Nikolas Kompridis has proposed a widely encompassing view of reason as "that ensemble of practices that contributes to the opening and preserving of openness" in human affairs, and a focus on reason's possibilities for social change.[30] The philosopher Charles Taylor, influenced by the 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger, has proposed that reason ought to include the faculty of disclosure, which is tied to the way we make sense of things in everyday life, as a new "department" of reason.[31] In the essay "What is Enlightenment?", Michel Foucault proposed a concept of critique based on Kant's distinction between "private" and "public" uses of reason. This distinction, as suggested, has two dimensions: Private reason is the reason that is used when an individual is "a cog in a machine" or when one "has a role to play in society and jobs to do: to be a soldier, to have taxes to pay, to be in charge of a parish, to be a civil servant." Public reason is the reason used "when one is reasoning as a reasonable being (and not as a cog in a machine), when one is reasoning as a member of reasonable humanity." In these circumstances, "the use of reason must be free and public."[32] Communicative rationality, or communicative reason (German: kommunikative Rationalität), is a theory or set of theories which describes human rationality as a necessary outcome of successful communication. In particular, it is tied to the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, and their program of universal pragmatics, along with its related theories such as those on discourse ethics and rational reconstruction. This view of reason is concerned with clarifying the norms and procedures by which agreement can be reached, and is therefore a view of reason as a form of public justification. According to the theory of communicative rationality, the potential for certain kinds of reason is inherent in communication itself. Building from this, Habermas has tried to formalize that potential in explicit terms. According to Habermas, the phenomena that need to be accounted for by the theory are the "intuitively mastered rules for reaching an understanding and conducting argumentation", possessed by subjects who are capable of speech and action. The goal is to transform this implicit "know-how" into explicit "know-that", i.e. knowledge, about how we conduct ourselves in the realm of "moral-practical" reasoning. The result of the theory is a conception of reason that Habermas sees as doing justice to the most important trends in twentieth century philosophy, while escaping the relativism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativism Relativism is the concept that points of view have no absolute truth or validity within themselves, but rather only relative, subjective value according to differences in perception and consideration.[1] As moral relativism, the term is often used in the context of moral principles, where principles and ethics are regarded as applicable in only limited context. There are many forms of relativism which vary in their degree of controversy.[2] The term often refers to truth relativism, which is the doctrine that there are no absolute truths, i.e., that truth is always relative to some particular frame of reference, such as a language or a culture (cultural relativism).[3] Anthropological relativism refers to a methodological stance, in which the researcher suspends (or brackets) his or her own cultural biases while attempting to understand beliefs and behaviors in their local contexts. This has become known as methodological relativism, and concerns itself specifically with avoiding ethnocentrism or the application of one's own cultural standards to the assessment of other cultures.[4] Philosophical relativism, in contrast, asserts that the truth of a proposition depends on the metaphysical, or theoretical frame, or the instrumental method, or the context in which the proposition is expressed, or on the person, groups, or culture who interpret the proposition.[5] Methodological relativism and philosophical relativism can exist independently from one another, but most anthropologists base their methodological relativism on that of the philosophical variety.[6] The concept of relativism also has importance both for philosophers and for anthropologists in another way. In general, anthropologists engage in descriptive relativism, whereas philosophers engage in normative relativism, although there is some overlap (for example, descriptive relativism can pertain to concepts, normative relativism to truth). Descriptive relativism assumes that certain cultural groups have different modes of thought, standards of reasoning, and so forth, and it is the anthropologist's task to describe, but not to evaluate the validity of these principles and practices of a cultural group. Normative relativism concerns normative or evaluative claims that modes of thought, standards of reasoning, or the like are only right or wrong relative to a framework. ‘Normative’ is meant in a general sense, applying to a wide range of views; in the case of beliefs, for example, normative correctness equals truth. This does not mean, of course, that framework-relative correctness or truth is always clear, the first challenge being to explain what it amounts to in any given case (e.g., with respect to concepts, truth, epistemic norms). Normative relativism (say, in regard to normative ethical relativism) therefore implies that things (say, ethical claims) are not simply true in themselves, but only have truth values relative to broader frameworks (say, moral codes). (Many normative ethical relativist arguments run from premises about ethics to conclusions that assert the relativity of truth values, bypassing general claims about the nature of truth, but it is often more illuminating to consider the type of relativism under question directly. The term "relativism" often comes up in debates over postmodernism, poststructuralism and phenomenology. Critics of these perspectives often identify advocates with the label "relativism". For example, the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis is often considered a relativist view because it posits that linguistic categories and structures shape the way people view the world. Stanley Fish has defended postmodernism and relativism.[9] These perspectives do not strictly count as relativist in the philosophical sense, because they express agnosticism on the nature of reality and make epistemological rather than ontological claims. Nevertheless, the term is useful to differentiate them from realists who believe that the purpose of philosophy, science, or literary critique is to locate externally true meanings. Important philosophers and theorists such as Michel Foucault, Max Stirner, political movements such as post-anarchism Post-anarchism or postanarchism is an anarchist philosophy that employs post-structuralist and postmodernist approaches (the term post-structuralist anarchism is used as well, so as not to suggest having moved beyond anarchism). Post-anarchism is not a single coherent theory, but rather refers to the combined works of any number of post-structuralists such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan; postmodern feminists such as Judith Butler; and post-Marxists such as Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière; with those of the classical anarchists, although he wasn't an anarchist nor would he consider himself an anarchist with particular concentration on ancient Chinese thinker and Warring states philosopher Zhuang Zhou, Emma Goldman, Max Stirner, and Friedrich Nietzsche Duane Rousselle has claimed post-anarchism is beginning to move away from the epistemological characterization and toward an ontological characterization.[13] He has written numerous articles and books on the topic or post-Marxism can also be considered as relativist in this sense - though a better term might be social constructivist. The spread and popularity of this kind of "soft" relativism varies between academic disciplines The spread and popularity of this kind of "soft" relativism varies between academic disciplines. It has wide support in anthropology and has a majority following in cultural studies. It also has advocates in political theory and political science, sociology, and continental philosophy (as distinct from Anglo-American analytical philosophy). It has inspired empirical studies of the social construction of meaning such as those associated with labelling theory, which defenders can point to as evidence of the validity of their theories (albeit risking accusations of performative contradiction in the process). Advocates of this kind of relativism often also claim that recent developments in the natural sciences, such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, quantum mechanics, chaos theory and complexity theory show that science is now becoming relativistic. However, many scientists who use these methods continue to identify as realist or post-positivist, and some sharply criticize the association. Relationism is the theory that there are only relations between individual entities, and no intrinsic properties. Despite the similarity in name, it is held by some to be a position distinct from relativism—for instance, because "statements about relational properties [...] assert an absolute truth about things in the world Relativism is not skepticism. Skepticism superficially resembles relativism, because they both doubt absolute notions of truth. However, whereas skeptics go on to doubt all notions of truth, relativists replace absolute truth with a positive theory of many equally valid relative truths. For the relativist, there is no more to truth than the right context, or the right personal or cultural belief, so there is a lot of truth in the world which characterizes postmodernism, Postmodernism describes both an era and a broad movement that developed in the mid to late 20th century across philosophy, the arts, architecture, and criticism which marked a departure from modernism.[1][2][3] While encompassing a broad range of ideas and projects, postmodernism is typically defined by an attitude of skepticism or distrust toward grand narratives, ideologies, and various tenets of Enlightenment rationality, including the existence of objective reality and absolute truth, as well as notions of rationality, human nature, and progress.[4] Instead, it asserts that knowledge and truth are the product of unique systems of social, historical, and political discourse and interpretation, and are therefore contextual and constructed. Accordingly, postmodern thought is broadly characterized by tendencies to epistemological and moral relativism, pluralism, self-referentiality, and irony.[4] The term postmodernism has been applied both to the era following modernity, and to a host of movements within that era (mainly in art, music, and literature) that reacted against tendencies in modernism.[5] Postmodernism includes skeptical critical interpretations of culture, literature, art, philosophy, history, linguistics, economics, architecture, fiction, and literary criticism. Postmodernism is often associated with schools of thought such as deconstruction and post-structuralism, as well as philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, and Frederic Jameson.  Origins of term  2 Influential postmodernist philosophers  3 Deconstruction  4 Postmodernism and structuralism  5 Post-postmodernism  Origins of term  2 Influential postmodernist philosophers  3 Deconstruction  4 Postmodernism and structuralism  5 Post-postmodernism The connection between postmodernism, posthumanism, and cyborgism has led to a challenge of postmodernism, for which the terms "postpostmodernism" and "postpoststructuralism" were first coined in 2003:[22][23] "In some sense, we may regard postmodernism, posthumanism, poststructuralism, etc., as being of the `cyborg age' of mind over body. Deconference was an exploration in post-cyborgism (i.e. what comes after the postcorporeal era), and thus explored issues of postpostmodernism, postpoststructuralism, and the like. To understand this transition from `pomo' (cyborgism) to `popo' (postcyborgism) we must first understand the cyborg era itself."[24] More recently metamodernism, post-postmodernism and the "death of postmodernism" have been widely debated: in 2007 Andrew Hoberek noted in his introduction to a special issue of the journal Twentieth Century Literature titled "After Postmodernism" that "declarations of postmodernism's demise have become a critical commonplace". A small group of critics has put forth a range of theories that aim to describe culture or society in the alleged aftermath of postmodernism, most notably Raoul Eshelman (performatism), Gilles Lipovetsky (hypermodernity), Nicolas Bourriaud (altermodern), and Alan Kirby (digimodernism, formerly called pseudo-modernism). None of these new theories and labels have so far gained very widespread acceptance. The exhibition Postmodernism - Style and Subversion 1970–1990 at the Victoria and Albert Museum (London, 24 September 2011 – 15 January 2012) was billed as the first show to document postmodernism as a historical movement.  6 Influence on art https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodern_art Postmodern art is a body of art movements that sought to contradict some aspects of modernism or some aspects that emerged or developed in its aftermath. In general, movements such as intermedia, installation art, conceptual art and multimedia, particularly involving video are described as postmodern. There are several characteristics which lend art to being postmodern; these include bricolage, the use of words prominently as the central artistic element, collage, simplification, appropriation, performance art, the recycling of past styles and themes in a modern-day context, as well as the break-up of the barrier between fine and high arts and low art and popular culture.[1][2] Postmodernism describes movements which both arise from, and react against or reject, trends in modernism.[22] General citations for specific trends of modernism are formal purity, medium specificity, art for art's sake, authenticity, universality, originality and revolutionary or reactionary tendency, i.e. the avant-garde. However, paradox is probably the most important modernist idea against which postmodernism reacts. Paradox was central to the modernist enterprise, which Manet introduced. Manet's various violations of representational art brought to prominence the supposed mutual exclusiveness of reality and representation, design and representation, abstraction and reality, and so on. The incorporation of paradox was highly stimulating from Manet to the conceptualists. The status of the avant-garde is controversial: many institutions argue being visionary, forward-looking, cutting-edge, and progressive are crucial to the mission of art in the present, and therefore postmodern art contradicts the value of "art of our times". Postmodernism rejects the notion of advancement or progress in art per se, and thus aims to overturn the "myth of the avant-garde". Rosalind Krauss was one of the important enunciators of the view that avant-gardism was over, and the new artistic era is post-liberal and post-progress.[23] Griselda Pollock studied and confronted the avant-garde and modern art in a series of groundbreaking books, reviewing modern art at the same time as redefining postmodern art.[24][25][26] One characteristic of postmodern art is its conflation of high and low culture through the use of industrial materials and pop culture imagery. The use of low forms of art were a part of modernist experimentation as well, as documented in Kirk Varnedoe and Adam Gopnik's 1990–91 show High and Low: Popular Culture and Modern Art at New York's Museum of Modern Art,[27] an exhibition that was universally panned at the time as the only event that could bring Douglas Crimp and Hilton Kramer together in a chorus of scorn.[28] Postmodern art is noted for the way in which it blurs the distinctions between what is perceived as fine or high art and what is generally seen as low or kitsch art.[29] Whilst this concept of 'blurring' or 'fusing' high art with low art had been experimented during modernism, it only ever became fully endorsed after the advent of the postmodern era.[29] Postmodernism introduced elements of commercialism, kitsch and a general camp aesthetic within its artistic context; postmodernism takes styles from past periods, such as Gothicism, the Renaissance and the Baroque,[29] and mixes them so as to ignore their original use in their corresponding artistic movement. Such elements are common characteristics of what defines postmodern art. Fredric Jameson suggests postmodern works abjure any claim to spontaneity and directness of expression, making use instead of pastiche and discontinuity. Against this definition, Art and Language's Charles Harrison and Paul Wood maintained pastiche and discontinuity are endemic to modernist art, and are deployed effectively by modern artists such as Manet and Picasso.[30] One compact definition is postmodernism rejects modernism's grand narratives of artistic direction, eradicating the boundaries between high and low forms of art, and disrupting genre's conventions with collision, collage, and fragmentation. Postmodern art holds all stances are unstable and insincere, and therefore irony, parody, and humor are the only positions critique or revision cannot overturn. "Pluralism and diversity" are other defining features.[31] In general, Pop Art and Minimalism began as modernist movements: a paradigm shift and philosophical split between formalism and anti-formalism in the early 1970s caused those movements to be viewed by some as precursors or transitional postmodern art. Other modern movements cited as influential to postmodern art are conceptual art and the use of techniques such as assemblage, montage, bricolage, and appropriation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodern_art#Movements_in_postmodern_art Neo-expressionism and painting Main article: Neo-expressionism The return to the traditional art forms of sculpture and painting in the late 1970s and early 1980s seen in the work of Neo-expressionist artists such as Georg Baselitz and Julian Schnabel has been described as a postmodern tendency,[56] and one of the first coherent movements to emerge in the postmodern era.[57] Its strong links with the commercial art market has raised questions, however, both about its status as a postmodern movement and the definition of postmodernism itself. Hal Foster states that neo-expressionism was complicit with the conservative cultural politics of the Reagan-Bush era in the U.S.[50] Félix Guattari disregards the "large promotional operations dubbed 'neo-expressionism' in Germany," (an example of a "fad that maintains itself by means of publicity") as a too easy way for him "to demonstrate that postmodernism is nothing but the last gasp of modernism."[7] These critiques of neo-expressionism reveal that money and public relations really sustained contemporary art world credibility in America during the same period that conceptual artists, and practices of women artists including painters and feminist theorists like Griselda Pollock,[58][59] were systematically reevaluating modern art.[60][61][62] Brian Massumi claims that Deleuze and Guattari open the horizon of new definitions of Beauty in postmodern art.[63] For Jean-François Lyotard, it was painting of the artists Valerio Adami, Daniel Buren, Marcel Duchamp, Bracha Ettinger, and Barnett Newman that, after the avant-garde's time and the painting of Paul Cézanne and Wassily Kandinsky, was the vehicle for new ideas of the sublime in contemporary art.[64][65] Institutional critique Main article: Institutional Critique https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutional_Critique Critiques on the institutions of art (principally museums and galleries) are made in the work of Michael Asher, Marcel Broodthaers, Daniel Buren and Hans Haacke. Institutional Critique is a form of commentary on the various institutions and conventions of art, as well as a radical disarticulation of the institution of art. For instance, assumptions about the supposed aesthetic autonomy or neutrality of painting and sculpture are often explored as a subject in the field of art, and are then historically and socially mapped out (e.g. ethnographically, archaeologically) as discursive formations, then (re)framed within the context of the museum itself. As such, Institutional Critique seeks to make visible the historically and socially constructed boundaries between inside and outside, public and private. Institutional Critique is often critical of the false separations often made between distinctions of taste and supposedly disinterested aesthetic judgement, and affirms that taste is an institutionally cultivated sensibility that may tend to differ according to the class, ethnic, sexual and gender backgrounds of art's audiences. One of the criticisms of Institutional Critique is its complexity. As many have noted, it is a practice that often only advanced artists, theorists, historians, and critics can participate in. Due to its highly sophisticated understanding of modern art and society, as part of a privileged discourse like that of any other specialized form of knowledge, it can often leave layman viewers alienated and/or marginalized. Another criticism is that it can be a misnomer, since it could be argued that institutional critique artists often work within the context of the very same institutions. Most institutional critique art, for instance, is displayed in museums and galleries, despite its critical stance towards them. 6.1 Architecture 6.2 Urban planning 6.3 Literature 6.4 Music 6.5 Graphic design  7 Criticisms  Origins of term  2 Influential postmodernist philosophers  3 Deconstruction  4 Postmodernism and structuralism  5 Post-postmodernism  6 Influence on art 6.1 Architecture 6.2 Urban planning 6.3 Literature 6.4 Music 6.5 Graphic design  7 Criticisms  6 Influence on art 6.1 Architecture 6.2 Urban planning 6.3 Literature 6.4 Music 6.5 Graphic design  7 Criticisms and also providing necessary standards for critical evaluation.[1] According to Habermas, the "substantive" (i.e. formally and semantically integrated) rationality that characterized pre-modern worldviews has, since modern times, been emptied of its content and divided into three purely "formal" realms: (1) cognitive-instrumental reason; (2) moral-practical reason; and (3) aesthetic-expressive reason. The first type applies to the sciences, where experimentation and theorizing are geared towards a need to predict and control outcomes. The second type is at play in our moral and political deliberations (very broadly, answers to the question "how should I live?"), and the third type is typically found in the practices of art and literature. It is the second type which concerns Habermas. For Habermas, rational reconstruction is a philosophical and linguistic method that systematically translates intuitive knowledge of rules into a logical form.[1] In other words, it is an approach to science and philosophy which attempts to put meanings into language properly. The type of formal analysis called rational reconstruction is used by Jürgen Habermas to name the task that he sees as appropriate for philosophy. This mode of philosophical reflection can be compared to procedures traditionally taken up in philosophy and is concerned with the questions traditionally posed. That is, rational reconstruction involves making explicit and theoretically systematizing the universal and inescapable conditions for the possibility of certain types of phenomena. Put more specifically, it can be said that rational reconstruction is a manner of explicating the deep generative structures that give rise to and allow for particular performances, behaviours, and other symbolically pre-structured realities There are a number of specific trends that Habermas identifies as important to twentieth century philosophy, and to which he thinks his conception of communicative rationality contributes. To look at these trends is to give a clear outline of Habermas's understanding of communicative rationality. He labels all these trends as being post-metaphysical.[3] These post-metaphysical philosophical movements have, among other things: called into question the substantive conceptions of rationality (e.g. "a rational person thinks this") and put forward procedural or formal conceptions instead (e.g. "a rational person thinks like this"); replaced foundationalism with fallibilism with regard to valid knowledge and how it may be achieved; cast doubt on the idea that reason should be conceived abstractly beyond history and the complexities of social life, and have contextualized or situated reason in actual historical practices; replaced a focus on individual structures of consciousness with a concern for pragmatic structures of language and action as part of the contextualization of reason; and given up philosophy's traditional fixation on theoretical truth and the representational functions of language, to the extent that they also recognize the moral and expressive functions of language as part of the contextualization of reason. Habermas' conception of communicative rationality moves along with these contemporary currents of philosophy. Concerning (1) it can be said that: [Communicative] rationality refers primarily to the use of knowledge in language and action, rather than to a property of knowledge. One might say that it refers primarily to a mode of dealing with validity claims, and that it is in general not a property of these claims themselves. Furthermore...this perspective suggests no more than formal specifications of possible forms of life... it does not extend to the concrete form of life...[4] Concerning (2), Habermas clearly and explicitly understands communicative rationality according to the terms of a reconstructive science. This means that the conception of communicative rationality is not a definitive rendering of what reason is, but rather a fallible claim. It can prescribe only formal specifications concerning what qualifies as reasonable, being open to revision in cause of experience and learning. On (3) and (4), Habermas's entire conceptual framework is based on his understanding of social interaction and communicative practices, and he ties rationality to the validity basis of everyday speech. This framework locates reason in the everyday practices of modern individuals. This is in contradistinction to theories of rationality (e.g. Plato, Kant, etc.) that seek to ground reason in an intelligible and non-temporal realm, or objective "view from nowhere", which supposes that reason is able adequately to judge reality from a detached and disinterested perspective. While Habermas's notion of communicative rationality is contextualized and historicized, it is not relativistic. Many philosophical contextualists take reason to be entirely context-dependent and relative. Habermas holds reason to be relatively context specific and sensitive. The difference is that Habermas explicates the deep structures of reason by examining the presuppositions and validity dimensions of everyday communication, while the relativists focus only on the content displayed in various concrete standards of rationality. Concerning (5), Habermas's communicative rationality emphasizes the equal importance of the three validity dimensions, which means it sees the potential for rationality in normative rightness (WE), theoretical truth (IT) and expressive or subjective truthfulness (I). The differentiation of these three “worlds” is understood as a valuable heuristic. This leaves each to its specific forms of argumentation and justification. However, these validity dimensions should be related to one another and understood as complementary pieces in a broader conception of rationality. This points towards a productive interpenetration of the validity dimensions, for example the use of moral insights by the sciences without their having to sacrifice theoretical rigor, or the inclusion of psychological data into resources of moral philosophy. Critique The theory of communicative rationality has been criticized for being utopian and idealistic,[5] for being blind to issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality,[6] and for ignoring the role of conflict, contest, and exclusion in the historical constitution of the public sphere.[7] More recently, Nikolas Kompridis has taken issue with Habermas' conception of rationality as incoherent and insufficiently complex, proposing a "possibility-disclosing" role for reason that goes beyond the narrow proceduralism of Habermas' theory.[8] Kompridis argues that Habermasian critical theory, which has in recent decades become the main paradigm of that tradition, has largely severed its own roots in German Idealism, while neglecting modernity's distinctive relationship to time and the utopian potential of critique. While drawing on many of Habermas' own insights (along with the philosophical traditions of German Idealism, American Pragmatism, and the work of many others), Kompridis proposes an alternative approach to social criticism and what he sees as its role in facilitating social change. This interpretation is guided by an engagement with Martin Heidegger's concept of world disclosure, as well as alternative conceptions of key philosophical categories, like critique, agency, reason, and normativity. Arguing against Habermas' procedural conception of reason and in favour of a new paradigm Kompridis calls reflective disclosure, the book suggests that critical theory should become a "possibility-disclosing" practice of social criticism "if it is to have a future worthy of its past." World disclosure (German: Erschlossenheit, literally development or comprehension) is a phenomenon described by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger in his landmark book Being and Time. It has also been discussed by philosophers such as John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas, Nikolas Kompridis and Charles Taylor.[1] It refers to how things become intelligible and meaningfully relevant to human beings, by virtue of being part of an ontological world – i.e., a pre-interpreted and holistically structured background of meaning. This understanding is said to be first disclosed to human beings through their practical day-to-day encounters with others, with things in the world, and through language. Some philosophers, such as Ian Hacking and Nikolas Kompridis, have also described how this ontological understanding can be re-disclosed in various ways (including through innovative forms of philosophical argument). Reflective disclosure is a model of social criticism proposed and developed by philosopher Nikolas Kompridis. It is partly based on Martin Heidegger's insights into the phenomenon of world disclosure, which Kompridis applies to the field of political theory. The term refers to practices through which we can imagine and articulate meaningful alternatives to current social and political conditions, by acting back on their conditions of intelligibility. This could uncover possibilities that were previously suppressed or untried, or make us insightfully aware of a problem in a way that allows us to go on differently with our institutions, traditions and ideals. In his book Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future, Kompridis describes a set of heterogeneous social practices he believes can be a source of significant ethical, political, and cultural transformation.[1] Highlighting the work of theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor, Michel Foucault and others, Kompridis calls such practices examples of "reflective disclosure" after Martin Heidegger's insights into the phenomenon of world disclosure. He also argues that social criticism or critique, and in particular critical theory, ought to incorporate Heidegger's insights about this phenomenon and reorient itself around practices of reflective disclosure if it is, as he puts it, "to have a future worthy of its past".[2] These practices, according to Kompridis, constitute what Charles Taylor calls a "new department" of reason[3] which is distinct from instrumental reason, from reason understood merely as the slave of the passions (Hume), and from the idea of reason as public justification (Rawls). In contrast to theories of social and political change that emphasize socio-historical contradictions (i.e., Marxist and neo-Marxist), theories of recognition and self-realization, and theories that try to make sense of change in terms of processes that are outside the scope of human agency, Kompridis' paradigm for critical theory, with reflective disclosure at the centre, is to help reopen the future by disclosing alternative possibilities for speech and action, self-critically expanding what he calls the normative and logical "space of possibility".[4] Kompridis contrasts his own vision of critical theory with a Habermasian emphasis on the procedures by which we can reach agreement in modern democratic societies. He claims the latter has ignored the utopian concerns that previously animated critical theory, and narrowed its scope in a way that brings it closer to liberal and neo-Kantian theories of justice.  3 Reason compared to related concepts 3.1 Compared to logic 3.2 Reason compared to cause-and-effect thinking, and symbolic thinking 3.3 Reason, imagination, mimesis, and memory 3.4 Logical reasoning methods and argumentation 3.4.1 Deductive reasoning 3.4.2 Inductive reasoning 3.4.3 Abductive reasoning 3.4.4 Analogical reasoning 3.4.5 Fallacious reasoning  4 Traditional problems raised concerning reason 4.1 Reason versus truth, and "first principles" 4.2 Reason versus emotion or passion 4.3 Reason versus faith or tradition  5 Reason in particular fields of study 5.1 Reason in political philosophy and ethics 5.2 Psychology 5.2.1 Behavioral experiments on human reasoning 5.2.2 Developmental studies of children's reasoning 5.2.3 Neuroscience of reasoning 5.3 Computer science 5.3.1 Automated reasoning 5.3.2 Meta-reasoning 5.4 Evolution of reason 2.1 Classical philosophy 2.2 Subject-centred reason in early modern philosophy 2.3 Substantive and formal reason 2.4 The critique of reason  3 Reason compared to related concepts 3.1 Compared to logic 3.2 Reason compared to cause-and-effect thinking, and symbolic thinking 3.3 Reason, imagination, mimesis, and memory 3.4 Logical reasoning methods and argumentation 3.4.1 Deductive reasoning 3.4.2 Inductive reasoning 3.4.3 Abductive reasoning 3.4.4 Analogical reasoning 3.4.5 Fallacious reasoning  4 Traditional problems raised concerning reason 4.1 Reason versus truth, and "first principles" 4.2 Reason versus emotion or passion 4.3 Reason versus faith or tradition  5 Reason in particular fields of study 5.1 Reason in political philosophy and ethics 5.2 Psychology 5.2.1 Behavioral experiments on human reasoning 5.2.2 Developmental studies of children's reasoning 5.2.3 Neuroscience of reasoning 5.3 Computer science 5.3.1 Automated reasoning 5.3.2 Meta-reasoning 5.4 Evolution of reason systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed assumptions, and rules for shifting burden. Many of these logics appear in the special area of artificial intelligence and law, though the computer scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build decision support and computer-supported collaborative work systems.[74] and systematic presentation.[7][8] note: methods of philosophy – see my article on this topic here - https://www.academia.edu/30148411/Philosophy_methods_methodology Classic philosophical questions include: Is it possible to know anything and to prove it?[9][10][11] What is most real? However, philosophers might also pose more practical and concrete questions such as: Is there a best way to live? Is it better to be just or unjust (if one can get away with it)?[12] Do humans have free will?[13] Note: more general ideas as the subject-matter of philosophy Historically, "philosophy" encompassed any body of knowledge.[14] Note: take note of this!! From the time of Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle to the 19th century, "natural philosophy" encompassed astronomy, medicine and physics.[15] note this! For example, Newton's 1687 Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy later became classified as a book of physics. In the 19th century, the growth of modern research universities led academic philosophy and other disciplines to professionalize and specialize.[16][17] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy#Professional_philosophy note: the professionalization of philosophy and the consequences of that In the modern era, some investigations that were traditionally part of philosophy became separate academic disciplines, including psychology, sociology, linguistics and economics. Note Other investigations closely related to art, science, politics, or other pursuits remained part of philosophy. For example, is beauty objective or subjective?[18][19] Are there many scientific methods or just one?[20] Is political utopia a hopeful dream or hopeless fantasy?[21][22][23] Major sub-fields of academic philosophy include metaphysics ("concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being"),[24] Note: so this is philosophy’s subject-matter, even today? epistemology (about the "nature and grounds of knowledge [and]...its limits and validity" note: and this [25]), ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, logic, philosophy of science and the history of Western philosophy. Note: and this Since the 20th century professional philosophers contribute to society primarily as professors, researchers and writers. However, many of those who study philosophy in undergraduate or graduate programs contribute in the fields of law, journalism, politics, religion, science, business and various art and entertainment activities.[26] Note: the praxis of philosophy became the activities of academics from all subjects and what that includes  "Strong's Greek Dictionary 5385".   "Home : Oxford English Dictionary". oed.com.   "Online Etymology Dictionary". Etymonline.com. Retrieved 22 August 2010.   The definition of philosophy is: "1. orig., love of, or the search for, wisdom or knowledge 2. theory or logical analysis of the principles underlying conduct, thought, knowledge, and the nature of the universe". Webster's New World Dictionary (Second College ed.).   Jenny Teichmann and Katherine C. Evans, Philosophy: A Beginner's Guide (Blackwell Publishing, 1999), p. 1: "Philosophy is a study of problems which are ultimate, abstract and very general. These problems are concerned with the nature of existence, knowledge, morality, reason and human purpose."   A.C. Grayling, Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 1: "The aim of philosophical inquiry is to gain insight into questions about knowledge, truth, reason, reality, meaning, mind, and value."   Adler, Mortimer J. (28 March 2000). How to Think About the Great Ideas: From the Great Books of Western Civilization. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court. ISBN 978-0-8126-9412-3.   Quinton, Anthony, The ethics of philosophical practice, p. 666, Philosophy is rationally critical thinking, of a more or less systematic kind about the general nature of the world (metaphysics or theory of existence), the justification of belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and the conduct of life (ethics or theory of value). Each of the three elements in this list has a non-philosophical counterpart, from which it is distinguished by its explicitly rational and critical way of proceeding and by its systematic nature. Everyone has some general conception of the nature of the world in which they live and of their place in it. Metaphysics replaces the unargued assumptions embodied in such a conception with a rational and organized body of beliefs about the world as a whole. Everyone has occasion to doubt and question beliefs, their own or those of others, with more or less success and without any theory of what they are doing. Epistemology seeks by argument to make explicit the rules of correct belief formation. Everyone governs their conduct by directing it to desired or valued ends. Ethics, or moral philosophy, in its most inclusive sense, seeks to articulate, in rationally systematic form, the rules or principles involved. in Honderich 1995.   Greco, John, ed. (1 October 2011). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-983680-2.   Glymour, Clark (10 April 2015). "Chapters 1–6". Thinking Things Through: An Introduction to Philosophical Issues and Achievements (2nd ed.). A Bradford Book. ISBN 978-0-262-52720-0.   "Contemporary Skepticism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu. Retrieved 25 April 2016.   "The Internet Classics Archive | The Republic by Plato". classics.mit.edu. Retrieved 25 April 2016.   "Free Will | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu. Retrieved 25 April 2016.   "Philosophy". www.etymonline.com. Online Etymological Dictionary. Retrieved 19 March 2016. The English word "philosophy" is first attested to c. 1300, meaning "knowledge, body of knowledge."   Lindberg 2007, p. 3.   Shapin, Steven (1 January 1998). The Scientific Revolution (1st ed.). University Of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-75021-7.   Briggle, Robert Frodeman and Adam. "When Philosophy Lost Its Way". Opinionator. Retrieved 25 April 2016.   Sartwell, Crispin (1 January 2014). Zalta, Edward N., ed. Beauty (Spring 2014 ed.).   "PLATO, Hippias Major | Loeb Classical Library". Loeb Classical Library. Retrieved 27 April 2016.   Feyerabend, Paul; Hacking, Ian (11 May 2010). Against Method (4th ed.). Verso. ISBN 978-1-84467-442-8.   "Nozick, Robert: Political Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu. Retrieved 25 April 2016.   "Rawls, John | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu. Retrieved 25 April 2016.   More, Thomas (8 May 2015). Utopia. Courier Corporation. ISBN 978-0-486-11070-7.   "Merriam-Webster Dictionary". www.merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 14 May 2016.   "Merriam-Webster Dictionary". www.merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 14 May 2016.  "Why Study Philosophy? An Unofficial "Daily Nous" Affiliate". www.whystudyphilosophy.com. Retrieved 2016-05-02. 3 Perhaps we will get a few hints what philosophy is about from what metaphysics says it is concerned with? Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy investigating the fundamental nature of being and the world that encompasses it.[1] Metaphysics attempts to answer two basic questions:[2] Ultimately, what is there? What is it like? Topics of metaphysical investigation include existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility. A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into the basic categories of being and how they relate to one another. Another central branch is metaphysical cosmology: which seeks to understand the origin and meaning of the universe by thought alone. There are two broad conceptions about what "world" is studied by metaphysics. The strong, classical view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist independently of any observer, so that the subject is the most fundamental of all sciences. The weaker, more modern view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist inside the mind of an observer, so the subject becomes a form of introspection and conceptual analysis. Some philosophers, notably Kant, discuss both of these "worlds" and what can be inferred about each one. Some philosophers and scientists, such as the logical positivists, reject the entire subject of metaphysics as meaningless, while others disagree and think that it is legitimate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics Central questions Here we should get clues about what the subject-matter of philosophy is? What are the things philosophy is investigating? We can therefore say what are the phenomena that it is acceptable that philosophy may explore (should? Must? Must not explore?) - 1.1 Being and ontology 1.2 Identity and change 1.3 Causality and time 1.4 Necessity and possibility 1.5 Cosmology and cosmogony 1.6 Mind and matter 1.7 Determinism and free will 1.8 Religion and spirituality Below we will see how notions have changed of what metaphysics is about and what it should be and the subject-matter it should be about. And how the questions being asked in philosophy have changed - History and schools of metaphysics 4.1 Pre-history 4.2 Bronze age 4.3 Pre-Socratic Greece 4.4 Ancient China 4.5 Socrates and Plato Socrates is known for his dialectic or questioning approach to philosophy rather than a positive metaphysical doctrine. His pupil, Plato is famous for his theory of forms (which he places in the mouth of Socrates in the dialogues he wrote to expound it). Platonic realism (also considered a form of idealism)[25] is considered to be a solution to the problem of universals; i.e., what particular objects have in common is that they share a specific Form which is universal to all others of their respective kind. The theory has a number of other aspects: Epistemological: knowledge of the Forms is more certain than mere sensory data. Ethical: The Form of the Good sets an objective standard for morality. Time and Change: The world of the Forms is eternal and unchanging. Time and change belong only to the lower sensory world. "Time is a moving image of Eternity". Abstract objects and mathematics: Numbers, geometrical figures, etc., exist mind-independently in the World of Forms. ONTOLOGY in the two last sentences above. Platonism developed into Neoplatonism, a philosophy with a monotheistic and mystical flavour that survived well into the early Christian era. 4.6 Aristotle Plato's pupil Aristotle wrote widely on almost every subject, including metaphysics. His solution to the problem of universals contrasts with Plato's. Whereas Platonic Forms are existentially apparent in the visible world, Aristotelian essences dwell in particulars. Potentiality and Actuality[26] are principles of a dichotomy which Aristotle used throughout his philosophical works to analyze motion, causality and other issues. The Aristotelian theory of change and causality stretches to four causes: the material, formal, efficient and final. The efficient cause corresponds to what is now known as a cause simpliciter. Final causes are explicitly teleological, a concept now regarded as controversial in science.[27] The Matter/Form dichotomy was to become highly influential in later philosophy as the substance/essence distinction. The opening arguments in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book I, revolve around the senses, knowledge, experience, theory, and wisdom. The first main focus in the Metaphysics is attempting to determine how intellect "advances from sensation through memory, experience, and art, to theoretical knowledge".[28] Aristotle claims that eyesight provides us with the capability to recognize and remember experiences, while sound allows us to learn. 4.7 Classical India 4.7.1 Sāṃkhya 4.7.2 Vedānta 4.8 Islamic metaphysics 4.9 Scholasticism and the Middle Ages 4.10 Rationalism and Continental Rationalism In the early modern period (17th and 18th centuries), the system-building scope of philosophy is often linked to the rationalist method of philosophy, that is the technique of deducing the nature of the world by pure reason. The scholastic concepts of substance and accident were employed. Leibniz proposed in his Monadology a plurality of non-interacting substances. Descartes is famous for his Dualism of material and mental substances. Spinoza believed reality was a single substance of God-or-nature. 4.11 British empiricism British empiricism marked something of a reaction to rationalist and system-building philosophy, or speculative metaphysics as it was pejoratively termed. The sceptic David Hume famously declared that most metaphysics should be consigned to the flames (see below). Hume was notorious among his contemporaries as one of the first philosophers to openly doubt religion, but is better known now for his critique of causality. John Stuart Mill, Thomas Reid and John Locke were less sceptical, embracing a more cautious style of metaphysics based on realism, common sense and science. Other philosophers, notably George Berkeley were led from empiricism to idealistic metaphysics. 4.12 Kant Immanuel Kant attempted a grand synthesis and revision of the trends already mentioned: scholastic philosophy, systematic metaphysics, and skeptical empiricism, not to forget the burgeoning science of his day. As did the systems builders, he had an overarching framework in which all questions were to be addressed. Like Hume, who famously woke him from his 'dogmatic slumbers', he was suspicious of metaphysical speculation, and also places much emphasis on the limitations of the human mind. Kant described his shift in metaphysics away from making claims about an objective noumenal world, towards exploring the subjective phenomenal world, as a Copernian revolution, by analogy to (though opposite in direction to) Copernicus' shift from man (the subject) to the sun (an object) at the center of the universe. Kant saw rationalist philosophers as aiming for a kind of metaphysical knowledge he defined as the synthetic apriori—that is knowledge that does not come from the senses (it is a priori) but is nonetheless about reality (synthetic). Inasmuch as it is about reality, it differs from abstract mathematical propositions (which he terms analytical apriori), and being apriori it is distinct from empirical, scientific knowledge (which he terms synthetic aposteriori). The only synthetic apriori knowledge we can have is of how our minds organise the data of the senses; that organising framework is space and time, which for Kant have no mind-independent existence, but nonetheless operate uniformly in all humans. Apriori knowledge of space and time is all that remains of metaphysics as traditionally conceived. There is a reality beyond sensory data or phenomena, which he calls the realm of noumena; however, we cannot know it as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us. He allows himself to speculate that the origins of phenomenal God, morality, and free will might exist in the noumenal realm, but these possibilities have to be set against its basic unknowability for humans. Although he saw himself as having disposed of metaphysics, in a sense, he has generally been regarded in retrospect as having a metaphysics of his own, and as beginning the modern analytical conception of the subject . 4.13 Kantians Nineteenth century philosophy was overwhelmingly influenced by Kant and his successors. Schopenhauer, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel all purveyed their own panoramic versions of German Idealism, Kant's own caution about metaphysical speculation, and refutation of idealism, having fallen by the wayside. The idealistic impulse continued into the early twentieth century with British idealists such as F. H. Bradley and J. M. E. McTaggart. Followers of Karl Marx took Hegel's dialectic view of history and re-fashioned it as materialism. 4.14 Early analytical philosophy and positivism During the period when idealism was dominant in philosophy, science had been making great advances. The arrival of a new generation of scientifically minded philosophers led to a sharp decline in the popularity of idealism during the 1920s. Analytical philosophy was spearheaded by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Russell and William James tried to compromise between idealism and materialism with the theory of neutral monism. The early to mid twentieth century philosophy also saw a trend to reject metaphysical questions as meaningless. The driving force behind this tendency was the philosophy of logical positivism as espoused by the Vienna Circle. At around the same time, the American pragmatists were steering a middle course between materialism and idealism. System-building metaphysics, with a fresh inspiration from science, was revived by A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. 4.15 Continental philosophy The forces that shaped analytical philosophy—the break with idealism, and the influence of science—were much less significant outside the English speaking world, although there was a shared turn toward language. Continental philosophy continued in a trajectory from post Kantianism. The phenomenology of Husserl and others was intended as a collaborative project for the investigation of the features and structure of consciousness common to all humans, in line with Kant's basing his synthetic apriori on the uniform operation of consciousness. It was officially neutral with regards to ontology, but was nonetheless to spawn a number of metaphysical systems. Brentano's concept of intentionality would become widely influential, including on analytical philosophy. Heidegger, author of Being and Time, saw himself as re-focusing on Being-qua-being, introducing the novel concept of Dasein in the process. Classing himself an existentialist, Sartre wrote an extensive study of Being and Nothingness. The speculative realism movement marks a return to full blooded realism. 4.16 Process metaphysics There are two fundamental aspects of everyday experience: change and persistence. Until recently, the Western philosophical tradition has arguably championed substance and persistence, with some notable exceptions, however. According to process thinkers, novelty, flux and accident do matter, and sometimes they constitute the ultimate reality. In a broad sense, process metaphysics is as old as Western philosophy, with figures such as Heraclitus, Plotinus, Duns Scotus, Leibniz, David Hume, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Charles Renouvier, Karl Marx, Ernst Mach, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Émile Boutroux, Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander and Nicolas Berdyaev. It seemingly remains an open question whether major "Continental" figures such as the late Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, or Jacques Derrida should be included.[58] In a strict sense, process metaphysics may be limited to the works of a few founding fathers: G. W. F. Hegel, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Henri Bergson, A. N. Whitehead, and John Dewey. From a European perspective, there was a very significant and early Whiteheadian influence on the works of outstanding scholars such as Émile Meyerson (1859–1933), Louis Couturat (1868–1914), Jean Wahl (1888–1974), Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943), Philippe Devaux (1902–1979), Hans Jonas (1903–1993), Dorothy M. Emmett (1904–2000), Maurice Merleau Ponty (1908–1961), Enzo Paci (1911–1976), Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887–1971), Wolfe Mays (1912–), Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003), Jules Vuillemin (1920–2001), Jean Ladrière (1921–), Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928–), and Reiner Wiehl (1929–2010).[59] 4.17 Later analytical philosophy While early analytic philosophy tended to reject metaphysical theorizing, under the influence of logical positivism, it was revived in the second half of the twentieth century. Philosophers such as David K. Lewis and David Armstrong developed elaborate theories on a range of topics such as universals, causation, possibility and necessity and abstract objects. However, the focus of analytical philosophy generally is away from the construction of all-encompassing systems and toward close analysis of individual ideas. Among the developments that led to the revival of metaphysical theorizing were Quine's attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction, which was generally taken to undermine Carnap's distinction between existence questions internal to a framework and those external to it.[60] The philosophy of fiction, the problem of empty names, and the debate over existence's status as a property have all come of relative obscurity into the limelight, while perennial issues such as free will, possible worlds, and the philosophy of time have had new life breathed into them.[61][62] The analytic view is of metaphysics as studying phenomenal human concepts rather than making claims about the noumenal world, so its style often blurs into philosophy of language and introspective psychology. Compared to system-building, it can seem very dry, stylistically similar to computer programming or mathematics. Despite, or perhaps because of, this scientific dryness, it is generally regarded as having made "progress" where other schools have not. For example, concepts from analytical metaphysics are now routinely employed and cited as useful guides in computational ontologies for databases and to frame computer natural language processing and knowledge representation software. 4 Note that in our search for WHAT philosophy is, we arrived at HOW philosophy is? How philosophizing is done. Then, since Descartes, we realized that we cannot answer metaphysical or Ontological questions (Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy investigating the fundamental nature of being and the world that encompasses it.[1] Metaphysics attempts to answer two basic questions:[2] Ultimately, what is there? What is it like? Topics of metaphysical investigation include existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility. A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into the basic categories of being and how they relate to one another. Another central branch is metaphysical cosmology: which seeks to understand the origin and meaning of the universe by thought alone. There are two broad conceptions about what "world" is studied by metaphysics. The strong, classical view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist independently of any observer, so that the subject is the most fundamental of all sciences. The weaker, more modern view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist inside the mind of an observer, so the subject becomes a form of introspection and conceptual analysis. Some philosophers, notably Kant, discuss both of these "worlds" and what can be inferred about each one. Some philosophers and scientists, such as the logical positivists, reject the entire subject of metaphysics as meaningless, while others disagree and think that it is legitimate.) Unless we ask questions about who is doing philosophy? Descartes therefore investigated the subject of philosophizing. Kant took this line of questions further and realized that he need to investigate underlying assumptions when the subject experiences, reasons, asks questions and do other epistemological things. Kant revealed the transcendentals conditions that underlie all activities of the subjects, namely the limits and conditions of the framework of human existence, actions, thinking, etc.Hegel took this further in his on way, as did Marx, the Empiricists, Continental philosophers, the logical positivist and Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophers. The latter ended up in some kind of self-enclosed, professional, incestuous obsession with every greater micro-scopic details of reasoning, thinking, perception, logic, etc. The results appear to have little to do with what original, creative thinking philosophers did, why they did it, how they did it and the rationale and purpose of the philosophical discourse. Continental philosophers on the other hand also lost the steep, narrow road of authentic philosophy by their indulgence in other minutiae, for example the deconstructionists. Some Germans like Habermas on the other hand became an apostle, a saviour, by developing Hegel and Marx with the assistance of an emphasis on certain aspects of socio-cultural practice. His emphasis on certain features of inter-subjectivity, no longer the isolated subject of Descartes, or the static inter-subjective transcendental limits, conditions and framework of experience, perception, thinking, understanding and being of Kant, but a social reduction of Heidegger. The inter-subjective, social and oh so rational communal Being has become both the new investigated subject-matter or object as well as the investigating subject, the purpose of philosophy and philosophizing. All what is necessary is to explore and map out all aspects and regions of the rational, communicative, inter-subjective, socialized being/s. Philosophy, its subject-matter and its investigating inter/subject/s have become reduced to a sociologism. This however was not a simple process but required the invention or fabrication of endless domains, with many levels and numerous dimensions – and to be able to do this one had to contrive all sorts of neologisms. It seems the German and French languages lend themselves very well to this kind of activity. The second generation Critical Theory –ism of Habermas has already gone through a third generation to a fourth generation. Regardless of the generation all individuals are invited to the public sphere to assist in revealing the new ideal of of??? The public sphere (German: Öffentlichkeit) is an area in social life where individuals can come together to freely discuss and identify societal problems, and through that discussion influence political action. Communication scholar Gerard A. Hauser has defined it as "a discursive space in which individuals and groups associate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment about them."[1] The public sphere can be seen as "a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk"[2] and "a realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed". The basic ideal belief in public sphere theory is that the government's laws and policies should be steered by the public sphere, and that the only legitimate governments are those that listen to the public sphere.[10] "Democratic governance rests on the capacity of and opportunity for citizens to engage in enlightened debate".[11] Much of the debate over the public sphere involves what is the basic theoretical structure of the public sphere, how information is deliberated in the public sphere, and what influence the public sphere has over society. And we have endless new social media to allow individuals to participate in the construction by means of their phones, tablets, phablets, You Tube, Instagram, etc posts. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sphere  Media 5.1 As actors in the political public sphere 5.2 YouTube as a public sphere 5.3 Limitations of media and the internet 5.4 The information age 5.5 The virtual public sphere 5.6 Mediated publicness 5.7 The public service model  6 Non-liberal theories 6.1 Proletarian public spheres 6.2 Public spheres of production 6.3 Biopolitical public We are presented with the nature of and the rules for doing this in these two bibles of Social Theory –  Theory  2 Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1  3 Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 The theory of communicative action is a critical project which reconstructs a concept of reason which is not grounded in instrumental or objectivistic terms, but rather in an emancipatory communicative act.[8] This reconstruction proposes "human action and understanding can be fruitfully analysed as having a linguistic structure", [9] and each utterance relies upon the anticipation of freedom from unnecessary domination.[10] These linguistic structures of communication can be used to establish a normative understanding of society.[11][12][13] This conception of society is used "to make possible a conceptualization of the social-life context that is tailored to the paradoxes of modernity."[14] This project started after the critical reception of Habermas's book Knowledge and Human Interests (1968),[15][16] after which Habermas chose to move away from contextual and historical analysis of social knowledge toward what would become the theory of communicative action.[17][18] The theory of communicative action understands language as the foundational component of society and is an attempt to update Marxism by "drawing on Systems theory (Luhmann), developmental psychology (Piaget, Kohlberg), and social theory (Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, Mead, etc.)".[9] Based on lectures initially developed in On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction Habermas was able to expand his theory to a large understanding of society. Thomas A. McCarthy states that The Theory of Communicative Action has three interrelated concerns: (1) to develop a concept of rationality that is no longer tied to, and limited by, the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory; (2) to construct a two-level concept of society that integrates the lifeworld and systems paradigms; and, finally, (3) to sketch out, against this background, a critical theory of modernity which analyzes and accounts for its pathologies in a way that suggests a redirection rather than an abandonment of the project of enlightenment. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1 sets out "to develop a concept of rationality that is no longer tied to, and limited by, the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory."[4] With this failure of the search for ultimate foundations by "first philosophy" or "the philosophy of consciousness", an empirically tested theory of rationality must be a pragmatic theory based on science and social science. (reductionistsic sociologism) This implies that any universalist claims can only be validated by testing against counterexamples in historical (and geographical) contexts – not by using transcendental ontological assumptions. In other words a transformation of Kant assisted by Marx. This 'purposive rational action' is steered by the "media" of the state, which substitute for oral language as the medium of the coordination of social action. An antagonism arises between these two principles of societal integration—language, which is oriented to understanding and collective well being, and "media", which are systems of success-oriented action. Following Weber, Habermas sees specialisation as the key historical development, which leads to the alienating effects of modernity, which 'permeate and fragment everyday consciousness' Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 Habermas finds in the work of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) concepts which can be used to free Weber's theory of rationalisation from the aporias of the philosophy of consciousness. Mead's most productive concept[citation needed] is his theoretical base of communication and Durkheim's[citation needed] is his idea of social integration. Mead also stressed the social character of perception: our first encounters are social.[22] From these bases, Habermas develops his concept of communicative action: communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge, in a process of achieving mutual understandings. It then coordinates action towards social integration and solidarity. Finally, communicative action is the process through which people form their identities.[23] Society is integrated socially both through the actions of its members and systemically by the requirements of the economic/hierarchical/oppressive system in a way that tends to interpenetrate and overwhelm autonomous action orientations.[who?] This gives rise to a dual concept of modern society; the internal subjective viewpoint of the "lifeworld" and the external viewpoint of the "system". Following Weber again, an increasing complexity arises from the structural and institutional differentiation of the lifeworld, which follows the closed logic of the systemic rationalisation of our communications. There is a transfer of action co-ordination from 'language' over to 'steering media', such as money and power, which bypass consensus-oriented communication with a 'symbolic generalisation of rewards and punishments'. After this process the lifeworld "is no longer needed for the coordination of action". This results in humans ('lifeworld actors') losing a sense of responsibility with a chain of negative social consequences. Lifeworld communications lose their purpose becoming irrelevant for the coordination of central life processes. This has the effect of ripping the heart out of social discourse, allowing complex differentiation to occur but at the cost of social pathologies.[24] Disciples of the new religion do not have to fear – this project is never ending – one only needs to analyse existing work to draw out endless implications, more contrived concepts, levels and dimensions. It reminds one of the endless publications by Scientology, discovering more and more work by their founder, or the Transcendental Meditation crowd and the numerous other sects. For example the following – There is a transfer of action co-ordination from 'language' over to 'steering media', such as money and power, which bypass consensus-oriented communication with a 'symbolic generalisation of rewards and punishments'. After this process the lifeworld "is no longer needed for the coordination of action". This results in humans ('lifeworld actors') losing a sense of responsibility with a chain of negative social consequences. Lifeworld communications lose their purpose becoming irrelevant for the coordination of central life processes. This has the effect of ripping the heart out of social discourse, allowing complex differentiation to occur but at the cost of social pathologies.[24] "In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus dependent co-ordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake. In these areas, the mediatization of the lifeworld assumes the form of colonisation".[25] Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno, like Weber before them, confused system rationality with action rationality. This prevented them from dissecting the effects of the intrusion of steering media into a differentiated lifeworld, and the rationalisation of action orientations that follows. They could then only identify spontaneous communicative actions within areas of apparently 'non-rational' action, art and love on the one hand or the charisma of the leader on the other, as having any value. According to Habermas, lifeworlds become colonised by steering media when four things happen:[26] 1. Traditional forms of life are dismantled. 2. Social roles are sufficiently differentiated. 3. There are adequate rewards of leisure and money for the alienated labour. 4. Hopes and dreams become individuated by state canalization of welfare and culture. These processes are institutionalised by developing global systems of jurisprudence. Crucial terms are international, global, cosmopolitan etc – all really very cool! He here indicates the limits of an entirely juridified concept of legitimation and practically calls for more anarchistic 'will formation' by autonomous networks and groups. "Counterinstitutions are intended to dedifferentiate some parts of the formally organised domains of action, remove them from the clutches of the steering media, and return these 'liberated areas' to the action co-ordinating medium of reaching understanding".[27] Once we have extricated ourselves from Weber's overly negative use of rationalisation, it is possible to look at the Enlightenment ideal of reason in a fresh light. Rationality is redefined as thinking that is ready to submit to criticism and systematic examination as an ongoing process. A broader definition is that rationality is a disposition expressed in behaviour for which good reasons can be given. Habermas is now ready to make a preliminary definition of the process of communicative rationality: this is communication that is "oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus – and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims".[28] With this key definition he shifts the emphasis in our concept of rationality from the individual to the social. This shift is fundamental to the Theory of Communicative Action. It is based on an assumption that language is implicitly social and inherently rational. Language has almost taken on a life of its own – it no longer has a history, or related to humans and societies and cultures or has it? Argument of some kind is central to the process of achieving a rational result. Contested validity claims are thematised and attempts are then made to vindicate or criticise them in a systematic and rigorous way. This may seem to favour verbal language, but allowance is also given for 'practical discourses' in which claims to normative rightness are made thematic and pragmatically tested. Non-verbal forms of cultural expression could often fall into this category. Habermas proposes three integrated conditions from which argumentative speech can produce valid results: "The structure of the ideal speech situation (which means that the discourse is) immunised against repression and inequality in a special way… The structures of a ritualised competition for the better arguments… The structures that determine the construction of individual arguments and their interrelations".[29] If we accept such principles of rational argumentation, Communicative Rationality is: 1. The processes by which different validity claims are brought to a satisfactory resolution. 2. The relations to the world that people take to forward validity claims for the expressions they deem important.[30] Habermas then discusses three further types of discourse that can be used to achieve valid results in addition to verbal argument: these are the Aesthetic, the Therapeutic and the Explicative. Because these are not followed through in the Theory of Communicative Action the impression is given that these are secondary forms of discourse. 1. Aesthetic discourses work by mediators arguments bringing us to consider a work or performance which itself demonstrates a value. "A work validated through aesthetic experience can then in turn take the place of an argument and promote the acceptance of precisely those standards according to which it counts as an authentic work.[31] Habermas considers the mediation of the critic, the curator or the promoter as essential to bring people to the revelatory aesthetic experience. Assistance and disciples of the saviour and his message This mediation is often locked into economic interests either directly or through state agency. When Habermas considers the question of context he does refer to culture. Every process of understanding takes place against the background of a culturally ingrained preunderstanding... The interpretative task consists in incorporating the others interpretation of the situation into one's own... this does not mean that interpretation must lead in every case to a stable and unambiguously differentiated assignment.[32] Speech acts are embedded in contexts that are also changed by them. The relationship is dynamic and occurs in both directions. To see context as a fixed background or preunderstanding is to push it out of the sphere of communicative action. 2. Therapeutic discourse is that which serves to clarify systematic self-deception. Such self-deceptions typically arise from developmental experiences, which have left certain rigidities of behaviour or biases of value judgement. These rigidities do not allow flexible responses to present time exigencies. Habermas sees this in terms of psychoanalysis but does not expand on this in TCA. (Habermas discusses psychoanalysis in Knowledge and Human Interests (1972)) A related aspect of this discourse is the adoption of a reflective attitude, which is a basic condition of rational communication.[31] But the claim to be free from illusions implies a dimension of self-analysis if it is to engage with change. The most intractable illusions are surely embedded within our subconscious. 3. Explicative discourse focuses on the very means of reaching understanding – the means of (linguistic) expression. Rationality must include a willingness to question the grammar of any system of communication used to forward validity claims. The question of whether visual language can put forward an argument is not broached by Habermas. Although language is broadly defined as any communicative action upon which you can be reflective it is verbal discourse that is prioritised in Habermas' arguments. Verbal language certainly has the prominent place in his model of human action. Oral contexts of communication have been relatively little studied and the distinction between oral and literary forms is not made in Theory of Communicative Action. As the System colonises the lifeworld most enterprises are not driven by the motives of their members. The bureaucratic disempowering and desiccation of spontaneous processes of opinion and will formation expands the scope for engineering mass loyalty and makes it easier to uncouple political decision making from concrete, identity forming contexts of life.[33] The system does this by rewarding or coercing that which legitimates it from the cultural spheres. Such conditions of public patronage invisibly negate the freedom that is supposedly available in the cultural field. Reception The Theory of Communicative Action was the subject of a collection of critical essays published in 1986,[34] has inspired many responses by social theorists and philosophers, and in 1998 was listed by the International Sociological Association as the eighth most important sociological book of the 20th century, behind Norbert Elias' The Civilizing Process (1939) but ahead of Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social Action (1937).[7 For more on sociologism see here - https://sites.google.com/site/philosophyphilosophizing/home and on the left hand side of that page – look for sociologism 5 We have seen how philosophy has been reduced to epistemology after Descartes and the result of that in Anglo-Saxon ‘analysis’ and Critical Theory’s sociologism. Perhaps we can find hints in Ontology of what philosophy is, what its subject-matter is, what the limits and conditions of the philosophical discourse is and what philosophizing can do, cannot do and must do and other norms of this intersubjective (!) socio-cultural practice. Of course Ontology has been reduced by ‘analysis’ and critical theory to some sort of sociologism, be it of the social kind, the norms of professional philosophers, language, language use, linguistic analysis, the analysis of the logic being employed for such analyses, etc. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence or reality as well as the basic categories of being and their relations.[1] Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities may be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences. Although ontology as a philosophical enterprise is highly theoretical, it also has practical application in information science and technology, such as ontology engineering. Types Philosophers can classify ontologies in various ways using criteria such as the degree of abstraction and field of application: Vesselin Petrov (2011). "Chapter VI: Process ontology in the context of applied philosophy". In Vesselin Petrov, ed. Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy. Ontos Verlag. pp. 137 ff. ISBN 3868381074. Upper ontology: concepts supporting development of an ontology, meta-ontology Domain ontology: concepts relevant to a particular topic or area of interest, for example, information technology or computer languages, or particular branches of science Interface ontology: concepts relevant to the juncture of two disciplines Process ontology: inputs, outputs, constraints, sequencing information, involved in business or engineering processes Ontology and language Some philosophers suggest that the question of "What is?" is (at least in part) an issue of usage rather than a question about facts.[20] This perspective is conveyed by an analogy made by Donald Davidson: Suppose a person refers to a 'cup' as a 'chair' and makes some comments pertinent to a cup, but uses the word 'chair' consistently throughout instead of 'cup'. One might readily catch on that this person simply calls a 'cup' a 'chair' and the oddity is explained.[21] Analogously, if we find people asserting 'there are' such-and-such, and we do not ourselves think that 'such-and-such' exist, we might conclude that these people are not nuts (Davidson calls this assumption 'charity'), they simply use 'there are' differently than we do. The question of What is? is at least partially a topic in the philosophy of language, and is not entirely about ontology itself.[22] This viewpoint has been expressed by Eli Hirsch.[23][24] Hirsch interprets Hilary Putnam as asserting that different concepts of "the existence of something" can be correct.[24] This position does not contradict the view that some things do exist, but points out that different 'languages' will have different rules about assigning this property.[24][25] How to determine the 'fitness' of a 'language' to the world then becomes a subject for investigation. https://www.ontology.co/ Ontology is the theory of objects and their ties. It provides criteria for distinguishing different types of objects (concrete and abstract, existent and nonexistent, real and ideal, independent and dependent) and their ties (relations, dependencies and predication). We can distinguish: a) formal, b) descriptive and c) formalized ontologies. a) Formal ontology was introduced by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1): according to Husserl, its object is the study of the genera of being, the leading regional concepts, i.e., the categories; its true method is the eidetic reduction coupled with the method of categorial intuition. The phenomenological ontology is divided into two: (I) Formal, and (II) Regional, or Material, Ontologies. The former investigates the problem of truth on three basic levels: (a) Formal Apophantics, or formal logic of judgments, where the a priori conditions for the possibility of the doxic certainty of reason are to be sought, along with (b) the synthetic forms for the possibility of the axiological, and (c) "practical" truths. In other words it is divided into formal logic, formal axiology, and formal praxis. In contemporary philosophy, formal ontology has been developed in two principal ways. The first approach has been to study formal ontology as a part of ontology, and to analyze it using the tools and approach of formal logic: from this point of view formal ontology examines the logical features of predication and of the various theories of universals. The use of the specific paradigm of the set theory applied to predication, moreover, conditions its interpretation. This approach is best exemplified by Nino Cocchiarella; according to whom "Formal Ontology is the result of combining the intuitive, informal method of classical ontology with the formal, mathematical method of modern symbolic logic, and ultimately of identifying them as different aspects of one and the same science. That is, where the method of ontology is the intuitive study of the fundamental properties, modes, and aspects of being, or of entities in general, and the method of modern symbolic logic is the rigorous construction of formal, axiomatic systems, formal ontology, the result of combining these two methods, is the systematic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all forms of being. As such, formal ontology is a science prior to all others in which particular forms, modes, or kinds of being are studied." (2) The second line of development returns to its Husserlian origins and analyses the fundamental categories of object, state of affairs, part, whole, and so forth, as well as the relations between parts and the whole and their laws of dependence -- once all material concepts have been replaced by their correlative form concepts relative to the pure 'something'. This kind of analysis does not deal with the problem of the relationship between formal ontology and material ontology." (3). b) Descriptive ontology concerns the collection of information about the list of objects that can be dependent or independent items (real or ideal). c) Formalized ontology attempts to constructs a formal codification for the results descriptively acquired at the preceding levels. http://protege.stanford.edu/publications/ontology_development/ontology101-noy-mcguinness.html What is in an ontology? The Artificial-Intelligence literature contains many definitions of an ontology; many of these contradict one another. For the purposes of this guide an ontology is a formal explicit description of concepts in a domain of discourse (classes (sometimes called concepts)), properties of each concept describing various features and attributes of the concept (slots (sometimes called roles or properties)), and restrictions on slots (facets (sometimes called role restrictions)). An ontology together with a set of individual instances of classes constitutes a knowledge base. In reality, there is a fine line where the ontology ends and the knowledge base begins. Classes are the focus of most ontologies. Classes describe concepts in the domain. http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/ontology_pic.pdf Philosophical Ontology Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ is often used by philosophers as a synonym of ‘metaphysics’ (a label meaning literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. Sometimes ‘ontology’ is used in a broader sense, to refer to the study of what might exist; ‘metaphysics’ is then used for the study ofwhich of the various alternative possible ontologies is in fact true of reality. (Ingarden 1964) The term ‘ontology’ (or ontologia) was coined in 1613, independently, by two philosophers, Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius), in his Lexicon philosophicumand Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus), in his Theatrum philosophicum Its first occurrence in English asrecorded by the OED appears in Bailey’s dictionary of 1721, which defines ontology as ‘an Account of being in the Abstract’. Ontology seeks to provide a definitive and exhaustive classification of entities in all spheres of being. The classification should be definitive in the sense that it can serve as an answer to such questions as: What classes of entities are needed for a complete description and explanation of a ll the goings-on in the universe? Or: What classes of entities are needed to give an account of what makes true all truths? It should be exhaustive in the sense that all types of entities should be included in the classification, including also the types of relations by which entities are tied together to form larger wholes. Different schools of philosophy offer different approaches to the provision of such classifications. One large division is 1) that between what we might call substantialists and fluxists, which is to say between those who conceive ontology as a substance- or thing- (or continuant-) based discipline and 2) those who favour an ontology centred on events or processes (or occurrents). Another large division is between a) what we might call adequatists and b) reductionists.a) Adequatists seek a taxonomy of the entities in reality at all levels of aggregation, from the microphysical to the cosmological, and including also the middle world (the mesocosmos) of human-scale entities in between. b) Reductionists see reality in terms of some one privileged level of existents; they seek to establish the ‘ultimate furniture of the universe’ by decomposing reality into its simplest constituents, or they seek to ‘reduce’ in some other way the apparent variety of types of entities existing in reality. It is the work of adequatist philosophical ontologists such as Aristotle, Ingarden (1964), and Chisholm (1996) which will be of primary importance for us here. Their taxonomies are in many ways comparable to the taxonomies produced by sciences such as biology or chemistry, though they are of course radically more general than these. Adequatists transcend the dichotomy between substantialism and fluxism, since they accept categories of both continuants and occurrents. They study the totality of those objects, properties, processes and relations that make up the world on different levels of focus and granularity, and whose different parts and moments are studied by the different scientific disciplines. Ontology, for the adequatist, is then a descriptive enterprise. It is thus distinguished from the special sciences not only a) in its radical generality but b) also in its goal or focus: it seeks not predication, but rather taxonomy. The methods of ontology – henceforth in philosophical contexts always used in the adequatist sense – are the methods of philosophy in general. They include the i) development of theories of wider or narrower scope and ii) the testing and refinement of such theories by measuring them up, a) either against difficult counter examples or b) against the results of science. These methods were familiar already to Aristotle himself. In the course of the twentieth century a range of new formal tools became available to ontologists for the development and testing of their theories. Ontologists nowadays have a choice of 1) formal frameworks (deriving from algebra, category theory, mereology, set theory, topology) in terms of which their theories can be formulated. These new formal tools, along with the language of formal logic, allow philosophers to express intuitive principles and definitions in clear and rigorous fashion, and, 2) through the a application of the methods of formal semantics, they can allow also for the testing of theories for a) consistency and b) completeness. With the work of Quine (1953) there arose in this connection a new conception of the proper method of ontology according to which the ontologist’s task is to establish what kinds of entities scientists are committed to in their theorizing. The ontologist studies the world by drawing conclusions from the theories of the natural sciences, which Quine takes to be our best sources of knowledge as to what the world is like. Such theories are extensions of the theories we develop and use informally in everyday life, but they are developed with closer attention to certain special kinds of evidence that confer a higher degree of probability on the claims made. Quine takes ontology seriously. His aim is to use science for ontological purposes, which means: to find the ontology in scientific theories. Ontology is then a network of claims, derived from the natural sciences, about what exists coupled with the attempt to establish what types of entities are most basic. Each natural science has, Quine holds, its own preferred repertoire of types of objects to the existence of which it is committed. Each such theory embodies only a partial ontology. This is defined by the vocabulary of the corresponding theory and (most importantly for Quine) by its canonical formalization in the language of first-order logic. Note that ontology is for Quine himself not the meta-level study of the ontological commitments or presuppositions embodied in the different natural-scientific theories. Ontology is rather these commitments themselves. Quine moves to the meta-level, making a semantic ascent to consider the statements in a theory, only in setting out to establish those expressions which definitively carry its commitments. Quine fixes upon the language of first-order logic as the medium of canonical representation not out of dogmatic devotion to this particular form, but rather because he holds that this is the only really clear form of language. First-order logic is itself just a regimentation of corresponding parts of ordinary language, a regimentation from which, in Quine’s eyes, logically problematic features have been excised. It is then, Quine argues, only the bound variables of a theory that carry its definitive commitment to existence. It is sentences like ‘There are horses,’ ‘There are numbers,’ ‘There are electrons,’ that do this job. His so-called ‘criterion of ontological commitment’ is captured in the slogan: To be is to be the value of a bound variable. Quine’s approach is thus most properly conceived not as a reduction of ontology to the study of scientific language, but rather as a continuation of ontology in the traditional sense. When viewed in this light, however, it can be seen to be in need of vital supplementation. For the objects of scientific theories are discipline-specific. This means that the relations between objects belonging to different disciplinary domains fall out of bounds for Quinean ontology. Only something like a philosophical theory of how different scientific theories (or their objects) relate to each other can fulfil the task of providing an inventory of all the types of entities in reality. Quine himself would resist this latter conclusion. For him the best we can achieve in ontology lies in the quantified statements of particular theories, theories supported by the best evidence we can muster. We have no way to rise above the particular theories we have; no way to harmonize and unify their respective claims. Quine is a realist philosopher. He believes in a world beyond language and beliefs, a world which the theories of natural science give us the power to illuminate. another tendency in twentieth-century analytic philosophy, a tendency often associated with Quine but inspired much rather by Kant and promulgated by thinkers such as Carnap and Putnam, according to which ontology is a meta-level discipline which concerns itself not with the world itself but rather only with theories or languages or systems of beliefs. Ontology as a first-level discipline of the world beyond – ontology as what these philosophers call ‘external metaphysics’ – is impossible. The best we can achieve, they hold, is internal metaphysics, which means precisely the study of the ontological commitments of specific theories or systems of beliefs. Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics is one example of such internal metaphysics. Model-theoretic semantics, too, is often implicitly understood in internal-metaphysical terms – the idea being that we cannot understand what a given language or theory is really about, but we can build models with more or less nice properties. What we can never do is compare these models to some reality beyond. Ontology in the traditional philosophical sense thus comes to be replaced by the study of how a given language or science conceptualizes a given domain. It becomes a theory of the ontological content of certain representations. Traditional ontologists are seeking principles that are true of reality. The practitioners of internal metaphysics, in contrast, are seeking to elicit principles from subjects or theories. The elicited principles may or may not be true, but this, to the practitioner of internal metaphysics, is of no concern, since the significance of these principles lies elsewhere – for instance in yielding a correct account of the taxonomical system used by speakers of a givenlanguage or by the scientists working in a given discipline. certain extra-philosophical disciplines, as linguists, psychologists and anthropologists have sought to elicit the ontological commitments (‘ontologies’, in the plural) of different cultures and groups. Thus, they have sought to establish the ontology underlying common-sense or folk theories of various sorts by using the standard empirical methods of the cognitive sciences Ontology and Information Science The methods used in the construction of ontologies thus conceived are derived on the one hand from earlier initiatives in database management systems. But they also include methods similar to those employed in philosophy (as described in Hayes 1985), including the methods used by logicians when developing formal semantic theories. The initial project of building one single ontology, even one single top-level ontology, which would be at the same time non-trivial and also readily adopted by a broad population of different information systems communities, has largely been abandoned. The reasons for this can be summarized as follows. The task of ontology-building proved much more difficult than had initially been anticipated (the difficulties being at least in part identical to those with which philosophical ontologists have grappled for some 2000 years). The information systems world itself, on the other hand, is very often subject to the short time horizons of the commercial environment. This means that the requirements placed on information systems change at a rapid rate, so that already for this reason work on the construction of corresponding ontological translation modules has been unable to keep pace. The newly fashionable usage of ‘ontology’ as meaning just ‘conceptual model’ is by now firmly entrenched in many information systems circles. A conceptualization is an abstract, simplified view of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose. Every knowledge base, knowledge-based system, or knowledge-level agent is committed to some conceptualization, explicitly or implicitly. (Gruber 1995) What can Information Scientists learn from Philosophical Ontologists? As we have seen, some ontological engineers have recognized that they can improve their models by drawing on the results of the philosophical work in ontology carried out over the last 2000 years. This does not in every case mean that they are ready to abandon their pragmatic perspective. Rather, they see it as useful to employ a wider repertoire of ontological theories and frameworks and, like philosophers themselves, they are willing to be maximally opportunistic in their selection of resources for purposes of ontology-construction. Guarino and his collaborators, for example, use standard philosophical analyses of notions such as identity, set-theoretical subsumption, part-whole subsumption and the like in order to expose inconsistencies in standard upper-level ontologies such as CYC, and they go on from there to derive meta-level constraints which all ontologies must satisfy if they are to avoid inconsistencies of the sorts exposed. Given what was said above, however, it appears that information ontologists may have sound pragmatic reasons to take the philosopher ontologist’s traditional concern for truth more seriously still. For the very abandonment of the focus on mere conceptualisations and on conceptualisation-generated object-surrogates may itself have positive pragmatic consequences. Where ontology is directed in this fashion, towards the real world of flesh-and-blood objects in which we all live, then this itself reduces the likelihood of inconsistency and systematic error in the theories which result, HOW does this work? and, conversely, it increases the likelihood of our being able to build a single workable system of ontology that will be at the same time non-trivial. On the other hand, however, the ontological project thus conceived will take much longer to complete and it will face considerable internal difficulties along the way. Traditional ontology is a difficult business. At the same time, however, it has the potential to reap considerable rewards – not least in terms of a greater stability and conceptual coherence of the software artefacts constructed on its basis. To put the point another way: it is precisely because good conceptualizations are transparent to reality that they have a reasonable chance of being integrated together in robust fashion into a single unitary ontological system. The fact that the real world itself plays a significant role in ensuring the unifiability of our separate ontologies thus implies that, if we are to accept a conceptualization-based methodology as one stepping stone towards the construction of adequate ontologies, then we must abandon the attitude of tolerance towards both good and bad conceptualizations. For it is this very tolerance which is fated to undermine the project of ontology itself. What Can Philosophers Learn from Information Systems Ontologists? Developments in modal, temporal and dynamic logics as also in linear, substructural and paraconsistent logics have demonstrated the degree to which advances in computer science can yield benefits in logic – benefits not only of a strictly technical nature, but also sometimes of wider philosophical significance. Something similar can be true, I suggest, in relation to the developments in ontological engineering referred to above. The example of the successes and failures of information systems ontologists can first of all help to encourage existing tendencies in philosophical ontology (nowadays often grouped under the heading ‘analytic metaphysics’) 1) towards opening up new domains of investigation, for example the domain of social institutions (Mulligan 1987, Searle 1995), of patterns (Johansson 1998), of artefacts (Dipert 1993, Simons and Dement 1996), of boundaries (Smith 2001), of dependence and instantiation (Mertz 1996, Degen et al., 2001), of holes (Casati and Varzi 1994), and parts (Simons 1987). 2) Secondly, it can shed new light on the many existing contributions to ontology, from Aristotle to Goclenius and beyond (Burkhardt and Smith 1991), whose significance was for a long time neglected by philosophers in the shadow of Kant and other enemies of metaphysics.3) Thirdly, if philosophical ontology can properly be conceived as a kind of generalized chemistry, then information systems can help to fill one important gap in ontology as it has been practiced thus far, which lies in the absence of any analogue of chemical experimentation. For one can, as C. S. Peirce remarked (1933, 4.530), ‘make exact experiments upon uniform diagrams’. The new tools of ontological engineering might help us to realize Peirce’s vision of a time when operations upon diagrams will ‘take the place of the experiments upon real things that one performs in chemical and physical research.’ 4) Finally, the lessons drawn from information systems ontology can support the efforts of those philosophers who have concerned themselves not only with a) the development of ontological theories, but b) also – in a field sometimes called ‘applied ontology’ (Koepsell 1999, 2000) – with the application of such theories in domains such as law, or commerce, or medicine. The tools of philosophical ontology have been applied to solve practical problems, for example concerning the nature of intellectual property or concerning the classification of the human foetus at different stages of its development. Collaboration with information systems ontologists can support such ventures in a variety of ways, i) first of all because the results achieved in specific application-domains can provide stimulation for philosophers, but ii) also – and not least importantly – because information systems ontology is itself an enormous new field of practical application that is crying out to be explored by the methods of rigorous philosophy. 6 Did we learn anything of relevance to what philosophy is, must be, must not be and might from Smith’s treatment of Ontology? About the subject-matter, or objects of study, of philosophy? Of the methods employed during the doing of philosophy or the different stages of the process and activities of philosophizing? http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-011-7638-5_1#page- https://philgcg11chd.wordpress.com/2014/08/21/nature-of-philosophy/ Informs us about three basic problems of philosophy Branches of Philosophy Methods of Philosophy common features of the methods – Doubt: Notice doubts that one has about the meaning or justification of some common, everyday belief one has. Formulate a problem; Formulate the doubts in a philosophical problem, or question. Explain the problem very clearly and carefully. Offer a solution: Offer a solution to the problem: either something like a philosophical analysis or a philosophical explanation. Argument; Give an argument or several arguments supporting the solution. Dialectic :Present the solution and arguments for criticism by other philosophers, and help them judge their own. Methods The Socratic Method The Rational Dialogue The Method of Criticism The Speculative Method The Descriptive Method Inductive Method Deductive Method Dialectical Method The. Method of Analysis The Method of Synthesis Method of Intuition https://www.ontology.co/subject-metaphysics.htm "As it now exists, the subject of metaphysics can be described by a distinction that became standard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (*) According to this distinction, metaphysics has two principal divisions: general metaphysics and special metaphysics. General metaphysics includes ontology and most of what has been called universal science; it is concerned, on the whole, with the general nature of reality: with problems about abstract and concrete being, the nature of particulars, the distinction between appearance and reality, and the universal principles holding true of what has fundamental being. Special metaphysics is concerned with certain problems about particular kinds or aspects of being. These special problems are associated with the distinction between the mental and the physical, the possibility of human freedom, the nature of personal identity, the possibility of survival after death, and the existence of God. The traditional subject of what is real as opposed to what is mere appearance is treated in both general and special metaphysics, for some of the issues relevant to it are more general or fundamental than others." http://www.uefap.com/reading/exercise/ess2/berlin.htm From an article by Sir Isaiah Berlin in The Sunday Times, 14th November, 1962 https://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10113.pdf The Purpose of Philosophy http://www.ditext.com/broad/st/st-intro.html The Subject-matter of Philosophy, and its Relations to the special Sciences this task of clearing up the meanings and determining the relations of fundamental concepts Now the most fundamental task of Philosophy is to take the concepts that we daily use in common life and science, to analyse them, and thus to determine their precise meanings and their mutual relations. Evidently this is an important duty. In the first place, clear and accurate knowledge of anything is an advance on a mere hazy general familiarity with it. Moreover, in the absence of clear knowledge of the meanings and relations of the concepts that we use, we are certain sooner or later to apply them wrongly or to meet with exceptional cases where we are puzzled as to how to apply them at all. For instance, we all agree pretty well as to the place of a certain pin which we are looking at. But suppose we go on to ask: "Where is the image of that pin in a certain mirror; and is it in this place (whatever it may be? in precisely the sense in which the pin itself is in its place?" We shall find the question a very puzzling one, and there will be no hope of answering it until we have carefully analysed what we mean by being in a place. Philosophy has another and closely connected task. We not only make continual use of vague and unanalysed concepts. We have also a number of uncriticised beliefs, which we constantly assume in ordinary life and in the sciences. We constantly assume, e.g. that every event has a cause, that nature obeys uniform laws, that we live in a world of objects whose existence and behaviour are independent of our knowledge of them, and so on. Now science takes over these beliefs without criticism from common-sense, and simply works with them. We know by experience, however, that beliefs which are very strongly held may be mere prejudices. Negroes find it very hard to believe that water can become solid, because they have always lived in a warm climate. Is it not possible that we believe that nature as a whole will always act uniformly simply because the part of nature in which the human race has lived has happened to act so up to the present? All such beliefs then, however deeply rooted, call for criticism. The first duty of Philosophy is to state them clearly; and this can only be done when we have analysed and defined the concepts that they involve. Until you know exactly what you mean by change and by cause you cannot know what is meant by the statement that every change has a cause. And not much weight can be attached to a person's most passionate beliefs if he does not know what precisely he is passionately believing. The next duty of Philosophy is to test such beliefs; and this can only be done by resolutely and honestly exposing them to every objection that one can think of oneself or find in the writings of others. We ought only to go on believing a propositions if, at the end of this process, we still find it impossible to doubt it. Even then of course it may not be true, but we have at least done our best. These two branches of Philosophy -- the analysis and definition of our fundamental concepts, and the clear statement and resolute criticism of our fundamental beliefs -- I call Critical Philosophy. Philosophy is mainly concerned, not with remote conclusions, but with the analysis and appraisement of the original premises. For this purpose analytical power and a certain kind of insight are necessary, and the mathematical method is not of much use. Before ending this chapter I will say a word about the three sciences which are commonly thought to be specially philosophical. These are Logic, Ethics, and Psychology. Logic simply is the most fundamental part of Critical Philosophy. It deals with such concepts as truth, implication, probability, class, etc. In fact it may be defined as the science which deals with propositional forms, their parts, their qualities, and their relations. Its business is to analyse and classify forms, and to consider the formal relations that can subsist between them. Now all science consists of definite propositions, and each of these is of one of the forms which Logic studies; but it is not the business of any other science explicitly to discuss propositional forms. Similarly all science is full of inferences, good and bad, and all inference depends on relations that are supposed to subsist between premises and conclusion. But it is for Logic, and for it alone, to decide what relations do in fact justify inference, and whether these relations do actually subsist in a given case. Thus Logic is that part of Critical Philosophy which deals with the most general and pervasive of all concepts, and with those fundamental beliefs which form the "connective tissue" of all knowledge. Note: This typical Broad who first worked in Science and Mathematics. According to him those disciplines were too difficult so he moved to philosophy. He became professor of philosophy at a number of univ ersities in the UK. This work had the title of: THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS, AND THEIR GRADUAL MODIFICATION WITHIN THE REGION OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE http://psc.sagepub.com/content/14/2/203.extract Paul Ricoeur the human being as the subject(matter?) of philosophy Here is another article on The Philosophical Approaches to the Study of Man "Existentialism and Man's Search form Meaning" by Manuel Dy, Jr. as there are many definitions of philosophy and many schools of philosophy, so there are many approaches to the philosophical reflection/inquiry on man. - In our course, we will not examine all the different approaches in a specific and elaborate manner. - Rather, using Manuel Dy's article, - first, we just study the fundamental approaches which could be discerned if we survey the three periods in the History of Western Philosophy and examine what is distinctive in each period in its philosophical reflection on man: - we could characterize the distinctive fundamental approach of each period as: - Ancient Philosophy: COSMOCENTRIC Man - is seen, conceived and understood as part of the cosmos, in relation to the cosmos - he might be different from other things, but he is similar to the cosmos - in fact, man is a cosmos in miniature, a microcosm; there is a proper proportionality between cosmos and man - to understand the cosmos is to understand man - if the cosmos is made of material stuff, then man is a material reality - if the cosmos is a duality of the world of things and world of ideas, then man is a duality of Body and Soul - if the cosmos is one world of matter and form, man is one substance made up of body (matter) and soul (form). - Medieval: THEOCENTRIC with the collapse of the Graeco-Roman civililzation, and the coming and predominance of Christianity in Medieval Europe, there was a shift in the content and method of philosophizing. i. Primary and Central Concern of Philosophical Inquiry/Reflection - GOD/FAITH: - Not as known by man himself using reason - God of Revelation: God as he revealed himself, what he has revealed about himself, about Man and the World - Everything is seen in relation to God and what he has revealed - Philosophy is used to explicitate, defend, explain and systematize the faith. - And philosophical issues, speculation, insight arose out of faith and were referred back to faith. - In this sense, philosophy became a handmaid of theology/faith. Man - Part of Nature, Cosmos - Cosmos: - is not seen in itself, not simply in terms of its own consistency, harmony, unity and stability but in relation to God, the Absolutely Transcendent Reality - Creator-Creation relationship - Though man is part of nature, he has unique and special relationship with God compared to anything, compared to the totality of the things or created order - Thus, man is seen not simply in relation to the cosmos, but in his unique relationship with God and God's unique relationship with him. - Modern: ANTHROPOCENTRIC General Remarks: - shift in primary and central concern: from the cosmos, from God to man himself - everything is seen in relation to man, and man is starting point, point of departure for any philosophical reflection - subjective turn/shift: - subject: the one who philosophizes, the one who knows about nature, about God, has now become the important, primary, fundamental and central object of philosophical reflection. - These three fundamental approaches do not explain away the uniqueness, and the subtle and nuanced distinction of the different philosophies within each period nor they are true in the same extent to all philosophers in each period. - then, we will study in details one particular approach: Existentialism, which is the approach taken in this course. Pre-Socratics Totality of Things Material Stuff Plato World of Things and World of Ideas Ideas Aristotle One World of ConcreteThings made up of matter and form. 4 Causes or Principle:material, efficient, formal, Did the notion of the Anthropocene strengthen the idea of us being in the Anthropo-centrc age of man? Or is it a new idea, so that we now live in or as the Anthropocene age? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocene The Anthropocene is a proposed epoch dating from when human activities started to have a significant global impact on Earth's geology and ecosystems.[1][2][3] As of August 2016, neither the International Commission on Stratigraphy nor the International Union of Geological Sciences has yet officially approved the term as a recognized subdivision of geological time,[3][4][5] although the Working Group on the Anthropocene (WGA) voted to formally designate the epoch Anthropocene and presented the recommendation to the International Geological Congress on 29 August 2016.[6] Scientists in the Soviet Union appear to have used the term "Anthropocene" as early as the 1960s to refer to the Quaternary, the most recent geological period.[7] Ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer subsequently used "Anthropocene" with a different sense in the 1980s[8] and the term was widely popularized in 2000 by atmospheric chemist Paul J. Crutzen,[9] who regards the influence of human behavior on Earth's atmosphere in recent centuries as so significant as to constitute a new geological epoch for its lithosphere. A January 2016 paper in Science investigating climatic, biological, and geochemical signatures of human activity in sediments and ice cores suggested the era since the mid-20th century should be recognised as a distinct geological epoch from the Holocene.[10] In 2008 a proposal was presented[by whom?] to the Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London to make the Anthropocene a formal unit of geological epoch divisions.[3][11] A large majority of that Stratigraphy Commission decided the proposal had merit and should be examined further. Independent working groups of scientists from various geological societies have begun to determine whether the Anthropocene will be formally accepted into the Geological Time Scale.[12] Scientists have begun to use the term "anthropocene",[13] and the Geological Society of America entitled its 2011 annual meeting: Archean to Anthropocene: The past is the key to the future.[14] The Anthropocene has no agreed start-date, but some scientists propose that, based on atmospheric evidence, it may be considered[by whom?] to start with the Industrial Revolution (late eighteenth century).[11][15] Other scientists link the new term to earlier events, such as the rise of agriculture and the Neolithic Revolution (around 12,000 years BP). Evidence of relative human impact - such as the growing human influence on land use, ecosystems, biodiversity, and species extinction - is substantial; scientists think that human impact has significantly changed (or halted) the growth of biodiversity.[16][17] Those arguing for earlier dates posit that the proposed Anthropocene may have begun as early as 14,000 to 15,000 years before present, based on lithospheric evidence; this has led other scientists to suggest that "the onset of the Anthropocene should be extended back many thousand years";[18]:1 this would be closely synchronous with the current term, Holocene. In January 2015, 26 of the 38 members of the International Anthropocene Working Group published a paper suggesting the Trinity test on July 16, 1945 as the starting point of the proposed new epoch.[19] However a significant minority supports one of several alternative dates.[19] In March 2015, a paper published in Nature suggested either 1610 or 1964 as the beginning of Anthropocene.[20] Other scholars point to the diachronous character of the physical strata of the Anthropocene, arguing that onset and impact are spread out over time, not reducible to a single instant or date of start.[21] The Anthropocene Working Group met in Oslo in April 2016 to consolidate evidence supporting the argument for the Anthropocene as a true geologic epoch.[22] Evidence was evaluated and the group voted to recommend "Anthropocene" as the new geological age in August 2016.[6] Should the International Commission on Stratigraphy approve the recommendation, the proposal to adopt the term will have to be ratified by the International Union of Geological Sciences before its formal adoption as part of the geologic time scale.[5]  Etymology  2 Nature of human effects 2.1 Biodiversity 2.2 Biogeography 2.3 Climate 2.4 Geomorphology 2.5 Stratigraphy 2.5.1 Sedimentological record 2.5.2 Fossil record 2.5.3 Trace elements  3 Anthropocene temporal limit 3.1 "Early anthropocene" model 3.2 Antiquity 3.3 Industrial Revolution 3.4 Anthropocene marker  4 In culture  5 See also  6 References  7 Further reading  8 External links http://www.anthropocene.info/ https://www.academia.edu/29839267/The_Anthropocene_Event_in_Social_Theory_On_Catching_Up_with_Non-_Humans in social theory Abstract Signaling that ‘humanity’ now carries the burden of having radically changed the Earth’s environmental parameters, the notion of the Anthropocene currently generates debate across the social sciences. In this paper, we examine new mate--‐ rialist and neo--‐Marxist responses to this novel situation. Yet, while we share their conviction that the Anthropocene holds the potential to institute a genuine ‘event’ for social theory and practice, we argue that the pathways cleared so far largely move us backwards. Hence, rather than social science finally “catching up” with the natural sciences by learning to take material reality seriously, we find ourselves in a situation where the natural sciences (and some traditions within social science) are finally beginning to catch up with the inseparability of nature and society, which has been key to science and technology studies (STS) for decades. In search of a viable pathway for social theory into the Anthropocene, we turn to Isabelle Stengers’ argument that we must ‘accept the reality of Gaia’. In dialogue with STS analyses of nonhuman agency, Stengers proposition is a call for a situated, non--‐foundational, and experimental reconstruction of social theo--‐ ry. This reconstruction, we argue, requires developing an art of immanent atten--‐ tion to the politics of matter across the planet. A social theory adequate to the Anthropocene event would thus be committed to following, learning to be affect--‐ ed by, and experimenting with the divergent knowledges and practices of natural science, environmental activism, and concerned publics that make up our ecolo--‐ gy of practices. Keywords: Anthropocene; event; Gaia; Isabelle Stengers; new materialism; neo--‐ Marxism; science and technology studies (STS) The stories of both the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene teeter con--‐ stantly on the brink of becoming much Too Big. Marx did better than that, as did Darwin (Haraway 2016: 50) In recent years, the Anthropocene has become something of a clarion call across the natural and social sciences, and extending well into the humanities. http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urge-geological-congress-human-impact-earth http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-is-the-anthropocene-and-are-we-in-it-164801414/ https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Anthropocene https://www.scribd.com/document/129590630/Lecture-2-Different-Approaches http://www.slideshare.net/SircDb/philosophy-of-man-51413270 http://www.acgrayling.com/philosophy-1-a-guide-through-the-subject http://evolvingthoughts.net/2011/09/what-is-philosophy/ https://cas.umkc.edu/philosophy/vade-mecum/apaguide.htm https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works/dialectical-materialism/ch01.html 6 It is said that ontology and therefore philosophy lost more of its traditional subject-matter with the development of the physical sciences such as Theoretical Physics. Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence or reality as well as the basic categories of being and their relations.[1] Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities may be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences. Although ontology as a philosophical enterprise is highly theoretical, it also has practical application in information science and technology, such as ontology engineering. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology Principal questions of ontology include: "What can be said to exist?" "What is a thing?"[3] "Into what categories, if any, can we sort existing things?" "What are the meanings of being?" "What are the various modes of being of entities?" Various philosophers have provided different answers to these questions. One common approach involves dividing the extant subjects and predicates into groups called categories. Of course, such lists of categories differ widely from one another, and it is through the co-ordination of different categorical schemes that ontology relates to such fields as library science and artificial intelligence. Such an understanding of ontological categories, however, is merely taxonomic, classificatory. Aristotle's categories are the ways in which a being may be addressed simply as a being, such as: what it is (its 'whatness', quiddity, haecceity or essence) how it is (its 'howness' or qualitativeness) how much it is (quantitativeness) where it is, its relatedness to other beings[4] Further examples of ontological questions include:[citation needed] What is existence, i.e. what does it mean for a being to be? Is existence a property? Is existence a genus or general class that is simply divided up by specific differences? Which entities, if any, are fundamental? Are all entities objects? How do the properties of an object relate to the object itself? Do physical properties actually exist? What features are the essential, as opposed to merely accidental attributes of a given object? How many levels of existence or ontological levels are there? And what constitutes a "level"? What is a physical object? Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object exists? Can one give an account of what it means to say that a non-physical entity exists? What constitutes the identity of an object? When does an object go out of existence, as opposed to merely changing? Do beings exist other than in the modes of objectivity and subjectivity, i.e. is the subject/object split of modern philosophy inevitable? Concepts Essential ontological dichotomies include: universals and particulars substance and accident abstract and concrete objects essence and existence determinism and indeterminism monism and dualism idealism and materialism Philosophers can classify ontologies in various ways using criteria such as the degree of abstraction and field of application:[5] Upper ontology: concepts supporting development of an ontology, meta-ontology Domain ontology: concepts relevant to a particular topic or area of interest, for example, information technology or computer languages, or particular branches of science Interface ontology: concepts relevant to the juncture of two disciplines Process ontology: inputs, outputs, constraints, sequencing information, involved in business or engineering processes The concept of 'ontological formations' refers to formations of social relations understood as dominant ways of living. Temporal, spatial, corporeal, epistemological and performative relations are taken to be central to understanding a dominant formation. That is, a particular ontological formation is based on how ontological categories of time, space, embodiment, knowing and performing are lived—objectively and subjectively. Different ontological formations include the customary (including the tribal), the traditional, the modern and the postmodern. The concept was first introduced by Paul James' Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism[14] together with a series of writers including Damian Grenfell and Manfred Steger. In the engaged theory approach, ontological formations are seen as layered and intersecting rather than singular formations. They are 'formations of being'. This approach avoids the usual problems of a Great Divide being posited between the modern and the pre-modern. Here it can be seen the areas of ontology lost to social sciences. And below to biology, ecology and cognitive sciences. Schools of subjectivism, objectivism and relativism existed at various times in the 20th century, and the postmodernists and body philosophers tried to reframe all these questions in terms of bodies taking some specific action in an environment. This relied to a great degree on insights derived from scientific research into animals taking instinctive action in natural and artificial settings—as studied by biology, ecology,[17] and cognitive science and ‘philosophy’ of language. Some philosophers suggest that the question of "What is?" is (at least in part) an issue of usage rather than a question about facts.[20] This perspective is conveyed by an analogy made by Donald Davidson: Suppose a person refers to a 'cup' as a 'chair' and makes some comments pertinent to a cup, but uses the word 'chair' consistently throughout instead of 'cup'. One might readily catch on that this person simply calls a 'cup' a 'chair' and the oddity is explained.[21] Analogously, if we find people asserting 'there are' such-and-such, and we do not ourselves think that 'such-and-such' exist, we might conclude that these people are not nuts (Davidson calls this assumption 'charity'), they simply use 'there are' differently than we do. The question of What is? is at least partially a topic in the philosophy of language, and is not entirely about ontology itself.[22] This viewpoint has been expressed by Eli Hirsch.[23][24] Hirsch interprets Hilary Putnam as asserting that different concepts of "the existence of something" can be correct.[24] This position does not contradict the view that some things do exist, but points out that different 'languages' will have different rules about assigning this property.[24][25] How to determine the 'fitness' of a 'language' to the world then becomes a subject for investigation -= As well as to human geography In human geography there are two types of ontology: small "o" which accounts for the practical orientation, describing functions of being a part of the group, thought to oversimplify and ignore key activities. The other "o", or big "O", systematically, logically, and rationally describes the essential characteristics and universal traits. This concept relates closely to Plato's view that the human mind can only perceive a bigger world if they continue to live within the confines of their "caves". However, in spite of the differences, ontology relies on the symbolic agreements among members. That said, ontology is crucial for the axiomatic language frameworks. And here to physics - There is an established and long philosophical history of the concept of atoms as microscopic physical objects.They are far too small to be visible to the naked eye. It was as recent as the nineteenth century that precise estimates of the sizes of putative physical atoms began to become plausible. Almost direct empirical observation of atomic effects was due to the theoretical investigation of Brownian motion by Albert Einstein in the very early twentieth century. But even then, the real existence of atoms was debated by some. Such debate might be labeled 'microcosmic ontology'. Here the word 'microcosm' is used to indicate a physical world of small entities, such as for example atoms. Subatomic particles are usually considered to be much smaller than atoms. Their real or actual existence may be very difficult to demonstrate empirically.[29] A distinction is sometimes drawn between actual and virtual subatomic particles. Reasonably, one may ask, in what sense, if any, do virtual particles exist as physical entities? For atomic and subatomic particles, difficult questions arise, such as do they possess a precise position, or a precise momentum? A question that continues to be controversial is 'to what kind of physical thing, if any, does the quantum mechanical wave function refer?' http://ontologia.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Programa-XII-IOC54.pdf http://ontologia.net/ Physics in XII International Ontology Congress https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTsaZWzVJ4c http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/ An article that shows the intersections of ontology and logic. A number of important philosophical problems are at the intersection of logic and ontology. Both logic and ontology are diverse fields within philosophy and, partly because of this, there is not one single philosophical problem about the relation between them. In this survey article we will first discuss what different philosophical projects are carried out under the headings of “logic” and “ontology” and then we will look at several areas where logic and ontology overlap. 1. Introduction 2. Logic 2.1. Different conceptions of logic 2.2. How the different conceptions of logic are related to each other 3. Ontology 3.1. Different conceptions of ontology As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is. Some contest this formulation of what ontology is, so it's only a first approximation. Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology: the question whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of universals, etc.. These are all problems in ontology in the sense that they deal with whether or not a certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists. But ontology is usually also taken to encompass problems about the most general features and relations of the entities which do exist. There are also a number of classic philosophical problems that are problems in ontology understood this way. For example, the problem of how a universal relates to a particular that has it (assuming there are universals and particulars), or the problem of how an event like John eating a cookie relates to the particulars John and the cookie, and the relation of eating, assuming there are events, particulars and relations. These kinds of problems quickly turn into metaphysics more generally, which is the philosophical discipline that encompasses ontology as one of its parts. The borders here are a little fuzzy. But we have at least two parts to the overall philosophical project of ontology: first, say what there is, what exists, what the stuff is reality is made out off, secondly, say what the most general features and relations of these things are. This way of looking at ontology comes with two sets of problems which leads to the philosophical discipline of ontology being more complex than just answering the above questions. The first set of problems is that it isn't clear how to approach answering these questions. This leads to the debate about ontological commitment. The second set of problems is that it isn't so clear what these questions really are. This leads to the philosophical debate about meta-ontology. Lets look at them in turn. One of the troubles with ontology is that it not only isn't clear what there is, it also isn't so clear how to settle questions about what there is, at least not for the kinds of things that have traditionally been of special interest to philosophers: numbers, properties, God, etc. Ontology is thus a philosophical discipline that encompasses besides the study of what there is and the study of the general features of what there is also the study of what is involved in settling questions about what there is in general, especially for the philosophically tricky cases. How we can find out what there is isn't an easy question to answer. It seems simple enough for regular objects that we can perceive with our eyes, like my house keys, but how should we decide it for such things as, say, numbers or properties? One first step to making progress on this question is to see if what we believe already rationally settles this question. That is to say, given that we have certain beliefs, do these beliefs already bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to such questions as ‘Are there numbers?’ If our beliefs bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to an ontological question about the existence of certain entities then we can say that we are committed to the existence of these entities. What precisely is required for such a commitment to occur is subject to debate, a debate we will look at momentarily. To find out what one is committed to with a particular set of beliefs, or acceptance of a particular theory of the world, is part of the larger discipline of ontology. Besides it not being so clear what it is to commit yourself to an answer to an ontological question, it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. Nonetheless it is helpful to separate it out as a special part of ontology. Many of the philosophically most fundamental questions about ontology really are meta-ontological questions. Meta-ontology has not been too popular in the last couple of decades, partly because one meta-ontological view, the one often associated with Quine, has been accepted as the correct one, but this acceptance has been challenged in recent years in a variety of ways. One motivation for the study of meta-ontology is simply the question of what question ontology aims to answer. Take the case of numbers, for example. What is the question that we should aim to answer in ontology if we want to find out if there are numbers, that is, if reality contains numbers besides whatever else it is made up from? This way of putting it suggest an easy answer: ‘Are there numbers?’ But this question seems like an easy one to answer. An answer to it is implied, it seems, by trivial mathematics, say that the number 7 is less than the number 8. If the latter, then there is a number which is less than 8, namely 7, and thus there is at least one number. Can ontology be that easy? The study of meta-ontology will have to determine, amongst others, if ‘Are there numbers?’ really is the question that the discipline of ontology is supposed to answer, and more generally, what ontology is supposed to do. We will pursue these questions below. As we will see, several philosophers think that ontology is supposed to answer a different question than what there is, but they often disagree on what that question is. The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts: (O1) the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to, (O2) the study of what there is, (O3) the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways, (O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered. 3.2. How the different conceptions of ontology are related to each other The relationship between these four seems rather straightforward. (O4) will have to say how the other three are supposed to be understood. In particular, it will have to tell us if the question to be answered in (O2) indeed is the question what there is, which was taken above to be only a first approximation for how to state what ontology is supposed to do. Maybe it is supposed to answer the question what is real instead, or what is fundamental, some other question. Whatever one says here will also affect how one should understand (O1). We will at first work with what is the most common way to understand (O2) and (O1), and discuss alternatives in turn. If (O1) has the result that the beliefs we share commit us to a certain kind of entity then this requires us either to accept an answer to a question about what there is in the sense of (O2) or to revise our beliefs. If we accept that there is such an entity in (O2) then this invites questions in (O3) about its nature and the general relations it has to other things we also accept. On the other hand, investigations in (O3) into the nature of entities that we are not committed to and that we have no reason to believe exist would seem like a rather speculative project, though, of course, it could still be fun and interesting 4. Areas of overlap 4.1. Formal languages and ontological commitment. (L1) meets (O1) and (O4) Formal ontologies are theories that attempt to give precise mathematical formulations of the properties and relations of certain entities. Such theories usually propose axioms about these entities in question, spelled out in some formal language based on some system of formal logic. Formal ontology can been seen as coming in three kinds, depending on their philosophical ambition. Let's call them representational, descriptive, and systematic. We will in this section briefly discuss what philosophers, and others, have hoped to do with such formal ontologies. A formal ontology is a mathematical theory of certain entities, formulated in a formal, artificial language, which in turn is based on some logical system like first order logic, or some form of the lambda calculus, or the like 4.2. Is logic neutral about what there is? (L2) meets (O2) 4.3. Formal ontology. (L1) meets (O2) and (O3) 4.4. Carnap's rejection of ontology. (L1) meets (O4) and (the end of?) (O2) One interesting view about the relationship between formal languages, ontology, and meta-ontology is the one developed by Carnap in the first half of the 20th century, and which is one of the starting points of the contemporary debate in ontology, leading to the well-known exchange between Carnap and Quine, to be discussed below. According to Carnap one crucial project in philosophy is to develop frameworks that can be used by scientists to formulate theories of the world. Such frameworks are formal languages that have a clearly defined relationship to experience or empirical evidence as part of their semantics. For Carnap it was a matter of usefulness and practicality which one of these frameworks will be selected by the scientists to formulate their theories in, and there is no one correct framework that truly mirrors the world as it is in itself. The adoption of one framework rather than another is thus a practical question. Carnap distinguished two kinds of questions that can be asked about what there is. One are the so-called ‘internal questions’, questions like ‘Are there infinitely many prime numbers?’ What the philosophers aim to ask, according to Carnap, is not a question internal to the framework, but external to it. They aim to ask whether the framework correctly corresponds to reality, whether or not there really are numbers. However, the words used in the question ‘Are there numbers?’ only have meaning within the framework of talk about numbers, and thus if they are meaningful at all they form an internal question, with a trivial answer. The external questions that the metaphysician tries to ask are meaningless. Carnap's rejection of ontology, and metaphysics more generally, has been widely criticized from a number of different angles. One common criticism is that it relies on a too simplistic conception of natural language that ties it too closely to science or to evidence and verification. In particular, Carnap's more general rejection of metaphysics used a verificationist conception of meaning, which is widely seen as too simplistic. Carnap's rejection of ontology has been criticized most prominently by Quine, and the debate between Carnap and Quine on ontology is a classic in this field Carnap's arguments for the rejection of ontology are presently widely rejected. However, several philosophers have recently attempted to revive some parts or others of Carnap's ideas. Yablo, See (Hofweber 2000) and (Hofweber 2005). Putnam, for example in (Putnam 1987), has developed a view that revives some of the pragmatic aspects of Carnap's view. See (Sosa 1993) for a critical discussion of Putnam's view, and (Sosa 1999) for a related, positive proposal. Although ontology is often understood as the discipline that tries to find out what there is, or what exists, this is not universally accepted. Some philosophers think that the job of ontology is something different, and there is disagreement among them what it is more precisely. Among the proposed options are the projects of finding out what is real, or what is fundamental, or what the primary substances are, or what reality is like in itself, or something like this. Proponents of these approaches often find the questions about what there is too inconsequential and trivial to take them to be the questions for ontology. Some philosophers have proposed that natural language might be unsuitable for the purposes of ontology. It might be unsuitable since it carries with it too much baggage from our particular conceptual scheme. See (Burgess 2005) for a discussion. 4.5. The fundamental language. (L1) meets (O4) and (the new beginning of?) (O2) 4.6. The structure of thought and the structure of reality. (L4) meets (O3) One way to understand logic is as the study of the most general forms of thought or judgment, what we called (L4). One way to understand ontology is as the study of the most general features of what there is, our (O3). Now, there is a striking similarity between the most general forms of thought and the most general features of what there is. Take one example. Many thoughts have a subject of which they predicate something. What there is contains individuals that have properties. It seems that there is the same structure in thought as well as in reality. And similarly for other structural features. Does this matching between thought and the world ask for a substantial philosophical explanation? Is it a deep philosophical puzzle? 5. Conclusion Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries https://www.ontology.co/ For details see Table of Ontologists of 19th and 20th Centuries https://www.ontology.co/ontologists.htm Detailed information (bibliographies, abstract of relevant publications, and selections of critical judgments) for the thinkers mentioned in the Table of Ontologists are partly available and will be completed in the near future; I will publish also pages in French and Italian with selections of critical studies available in these languages, but not translated in English. An important feature of this site will be the bibliographies about the history of ontology, selected authors and ontological topics that have not yet been covered in such detail; bibliographical entries will not only include the most relevant books, but also a selection of articles from about one hundred philosophical reviews; attention will be paid to the relations with logic, semantics and semiotics, in particular to the theories of predication and reference and to the relation between thought, language and the world. The completion of this job will require some years; more than 15,000 bibliographic references are already available in the following languages, in decreasing order of frequency: English, French, German, Italian, Spanish; the Bibliographies will be constantly expanded and updated, and new abstracts of existing entries will be added. I wish to apologize to readers of other languages, not included only because of my foreign language limitations (my mother tongue is Italian), but I hope that students and researchers will find sufficient material for a more thorough study and will enjoy discovering many philosophical treasures, some little known, but in no way less significant. For lists of past and present Ontologists see here https://www.ontology.co/ontologists.htm http://ontology.buffalo.edu/contemporary.htm   National Center for Ontological Research Basic Formal Ontology The Philosophome Ontology and Education Information as Ontologization Information Artifact Ontology Peter Simons: Against Set Theory Applied Ontology (journal) Jan Berg: Aristotle's Theory of Definition Cambridge Social Ontology Group Ontospace (University of Bremen) General Ontology for Linguistic Description Analytic Metaphysics Portal Ontologies: Philosophical and Computational Formal Ontology in Information Systems Vagueness The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate Logic and Ontology Standard Upper Ontology Formal Models of Common-Sense Geographic Worlds Ontology: A Resource Guide for Philosophers Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects Geographic Categories Geographic Ontology Ontology of Environments Ontology of Boundaries Conference on Applied Ontology, April 1998 What is an Ontology? Ontology of Text The Monist: Topology for Philosophers The Monist: The Ontology of Scientific Realism The Monist: Temporal Parts Metaphysics Research Lab https://ontologynetwork.wordpress.com/ http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/ontology-and-metaontology-9781441182890/ http://www.spep.org/conferences/the-ontological-turn-in-contemporary-philosophy-october-3-to-5-pucrs-brazil/ The Ontological Turn in Contemporary Philosophy – October 3 to 5, PUCRS, Brazil The so-called ‘linguistic turn’ is widely regarded as the defining trait of 20th century philosophy in the continental as well as the analytic tradition. Prepared since the 18th century by the critical impulse which elevated the question of the human access to the world to the position of primary philosophical problem, it has, however, led to a number of impasses that are both internal and external: to what extent can we accept the pretence of doing philosophy in a way that would be entirely free from implicit ontological presuppositions and commitments? To what extent is not critique today a matter of exposing and criticising these presuppositions, as well as proposing others? To what extent can we accept the paradoxically autarchic role that this turn, in its extreme versions, ascribes to language in regard to being? How to navigate between the two equally untenable reductionisms of a ‘common sense’, logicism or scientism devoid of self-reflexivity, on the one hand, and the sacrifice of all objectivity at the altar of the signifier’s free play, on the other? There is a growing trend in contemporary philosophy to consider that the reduction of each and every philosophical question to the theme of the relation between human and world, however defined – what Quentin Meillassoux has famously called ‘correlationism’ –, not only leaves us spinning in a void, but also renders us incapable of giving answers to the challenges that call for thought in the present: the environmental crisis, the blurring of the boundaries between nature and technique, the different political and cultural dimensions of what is understood as ‘life’, the questions raised by contemporary biology, cognitive science, mathematics and physics. Saturated of a play of mirrors that ultimately seem to reflect nothing, are we ready for an ontological turn in philosophy? Should such a movement in philosophy prosper, it would certainly not be through a return to pre-critical metaphysics, but through deepening and transforming modernity’s reflexive task. https://materialismos.wordpress.com/ http://philosophy.ou.edu/Websites/philosophy/images/irvin/Contemporary_Art--Ontology.pdf Oxford University Press CONTEMPORARY ART: ONTOLOGY The ontology of visual artworks might be thought comparable to the ontology of other sorts of artifacts: a work of painting seems to be materially constituted by a particular canvas with paint on it, just as a spoon is constituted by a particular piece of metal (Baker, 2000; Thomson, 1998). But recent developments have complicated the situation, requiring a new account of the ontology of contemporary art. These developments also shed light on the ontology of works from earlier historical eras. New Developments On a common--‐sense conception of the nature of visual artworks such as paintings, the following are true: 1. The artwork is a particular material object. 2. The appearance of the painted surface is central to the work’s identity. 3. Extensive, irreversible change to the painted surface is sufficient for destruction of the work. Can analogous claims be made of modern and contemporary artworks? Consider some examples. Saburo Murakami stipulated that flaking paint is integral to his Peeling Off Paintings (1957), not damage to be avoided or repaired. Gerald Ferguson’s Maintenance Paintings (c. 1979--‐1982). http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.820.6778&rep=rep1&type=pdf The above are merely a few examples of the type of work that forms part of Contemporary Ontology. What does it tell us about the subject-matter of philosophy as far as the field of ontology is concerned? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 7 Other disciplines that absorbed and differentiated questions, sets of questions and fields that traditionally formed part of philosophy are cognitive psychology cognitive sociology and cognitive sciences. These and all other disciplines, even art and meta-art, have developed or are in need of development of its own ontology. Cognitive sociology is a sociological sub-discipline devoted to the study of the social and cultural contingencies and consequences of human cognition. Notable authors include, but are not limited to, Eviatar Zerubavel, Aaron Cicourel, Barry Schwartz, Karen A. Cerulo and Paul DiMaggio. Cognition and cognitive notions have become one of the major and most fashionable impulses, attractions and notions in contemporary sociology. Here are a few examples – http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_sociology This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2015) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Cognitive sociology is a sociological sub-discipline devoted to the study of the social and cultural contingencies and consequences of human cognition. Notable authors include, but are not limited to, Eviatar Zerubavel, Aaron Cicourel, Barry Schwartz, Karen A. Cerulo and Paul DiMaggio.[1] The term 'cognitive sociology' was used already in 1974 by Cicourel.[2] However, in 1997 DiMaggio[3] published what has been referred to as a now classic paper[4] of Cognitive Sociology in its current form. Special journal issues on the topic of Cognitive Sociology has been published by the scientific journals Poetics[5] and the European Journal of Social Theory in 2010 and 2007 respectively. Graduate-level courses in cognitive sociology has been organized at the University of Copenhagen in 2014 and 2016 . http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/socf.12131/abstract Based on remarks delivered at a special session on “What Should the Sociology of Cognition Look Like?” organized by Karen A. Cerulo at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, Baltimore, MD, February 2014 The sociology of cognition could serve as a more effective bridge between sociology and other disciplines, and more of a two-way thoroughfare, if we would consider doing the following two things, which we are already doing here and there. First, we need to take a stand in philosophy of social science debates. Second, we need to show how what we do contributes to sociological methods, and not only say that what we do contributes to sociological theory, however fundamental that contribution may be. https://www.academia.edu/427279/On_the_Contributions_of_Cognitive_Sociology_for_the_Sociological_Study_of_Race https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Cognitive_Sociology https://www.academia.edu/29377441/Brekhus_Wayne_H_Culture_and_Cognition_Patterns_in_the_Social_Construction_of_Reality https://www.academia.edu/27109564/Sciences_et_pseudo-sciences_Recension https://www.academia.edu/19673939/Toward_a_New_Materialism_in_Sociology_How_the_Sociology_of_Culture_Killed_Culture_and_Why_thats_a_Good_Thing https://www.academia.edu/16199192/Culture_Cognition_and_Embodimen https://www.academia.edu/15034217/Beyond_the_Comtean_Schema_The_Sociology_of_Culture_and_Cognition_Versus_Cognitive_Social_Science http://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/4420/what-is-the-relationship-between-sociology-and-cognitive-sciences What is the relationship between sociology and cognitive sciences? up vote 7 down vote favorite 2 I want to know what is the relationship between sociology and cognitive sciences. Let me start by short consideration of both: Sociology - well established discipline or a field of research Sociology is a part of social sciences. Cognitive sciences - a bit more recent field of research. Cognitive science cannot be considered a discipline, it lacks core basics, there is bigger and less connected variety of research methods and objects. Cognitive sciences is also part of social sciences, but has stronger ties with biomedicine (neurology, pharmacology). Sociology considers that main causes of our behavior lie outside, in the social environment. At the same time cognitive sciences look for causation within psyche/brain. I believe that there are three ways of looking into relations: Connections between sociological and cognitive-science journals? Semantic relations like use of similar concepts and definitions? Interdisciplinary projects that include both sociology and cognitive sciences? http://home.uchicago.edu/~jlmartin/901%20syllabus.pdf 1 Culture and Cognition Sociology 901 John Levi Martin University of Wisconsin, Madison Spring 2005 Overview: In recent years there has been a buddi ng of a new interest in culture that has revolved around the incantation of “culture and cogn ition.” In any abstract, formal sense, it is hard to defend this as a new field, but in the soci ological sense (which is all that really matters) there is clearly something new afoot. This inte rest is different from the sociology of culture generally conceived in two ways. First, it is not specifically concerned with Culture in the narrow sense of productions, but culture in th e wider anthropologica l sense (although specific cultural products may be used to get at this culture). * Second, it is not inte rested in the vague, evanescent and global leve l of culture involving things such as “symbols” unless these can be made concrete and related to defensible models of cognition. This interest is also different from social psychology as currently cons tituted, basically because of a l ack of interest in the problems that (largely for historical r easons) became central to social psychology as it currently stands. (The substitution of “cognition” for “psychol ogy” also seems to imply that conventional psychological models are considered to be exhausted.) Instead , the study of culture and cogniti on is an attempt to look at patternings in subjectivity that arise because of the placement of that cogni zing apparatus which we call the human mind in institutional settings. How exactly this is to be done, however, is not yet worked out. This makes the field incredibly exciting. This class will be in modest form a contribution to the project—fortunately, there is littl e enough work that we need not simply survey what has been done. We are also free to determine the lines of what should be done. This class will both survey what there is in this area and de termine where further work should take place. http://sociology.rutgers.edu/documents/graduate-course-syllabi/fall-2013-graduate-courses/231-cognitive-sociology/file Welcome to “C ognitive Sociology, ” where we w ill venture to ex plor e the fascinating relations between the social and the mental. Using classical and contemporary works in sociology, anthropology, psychology, history, geography, linguistics, and phil osophy , we will ex amin e the sociocultural underpinnings of major mental processes ( perception, attention, memory, classification, signification ) as well as the sociocognitive foundations of identity . In so doing , we will be drawing on major theoretical traditions such as phenomenology, social constructionism, ethnomethodology, symbolic anthropology, structuralism, fra me analysis, and semiotics. Throughout the s emester, you will use these traditions in a variety of substantive contexts, acquire a n intellectually pluralistic perspective that promotes engagement with different theoretical perspectives, and produce original, thematically - inspired pieces of sociological thinking. There are s ix books we will be using extensively t hroughout the course – Eviatar Zerubavel’s Social Mindscapes (ISBN 0 - 674 - 81390 - 1), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (ISBN 0 - 385 - 05898 - 5), Eviatar Zerubavel’s The Fine Line (ISBN 0 - 226 - 98159 - 2), Christena Nippert - Eng’s H ome and Work (ISBN 0 - 226 - 58146 - 2), Wayne Brekhus’s Peacocks, Chameleons, Centaurs (ISBN 0 - 226 - 07292 - 4), and Eviatar Zerubavel’s Ancestors and Relatives (ISBN 978 - 0 - 19 - 933604 - 3). http://www.sacra.cz/2011-2/3_Sacra_9-2011-2_6.pdf 40 Jan Krátký Cognitive sociology and the study of human Cognition: A critical point Jan Krátký, FF MU, Departement for the Study of Religions e-mail: jan.kratky@mail.muni.cz Abstract I base my paper on review of a leading texts from the field of cognitive sociology with the attempt to compare the implicit notion of cognition with the conceptions elaborated in the field of cognitive science and allied disciplines (e.g. cognitive psychology, cognitive anthropology, cognitive science of religion, cognitive archeology etc.). I will refer mainly to Cerulo (2002a, 2009), DiMaggio (2002), Vaughan (2002), Wakefield (2002) and Zerubavel (1997, 2002, 2003). The exemplar issues will be presented in the course of four steps. First, I problematize the notion of cognition limited merely to habituated behavioral forms related to specific local situations as presented in study by Vaughan (2002). Second, I discuss the excessive focus on local structures of meaning that are conceived as one of the goals of sociology of mind presented by Zerubavel (1997). I point out the problematic position of sociology of mind, since it draws a substantial focus on intersubjectivity defined in contrast to cognitive individualism and universalism. I present this methodological stance in relation to interpretative program of social sciences. Consequently, I show that this type of cognitive theorizing casts vital doubts on results emerging from the field itself as well as on cross-disciplinary relevancy of that investigation. Viable forms of collaboration between cultural theorizing based on interpretative and descriptive methods and cognitive science will be explained throughout the paper as well as in its final conclusion http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/?tag=cognitive-sociology http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/news/cognitive-sociology-culture-and-international-law/ https://digilib.phil.muni.cz/handle/11222.digilib/124443 The above are only a few examples of the proliferation of articles, lectures, conferences, books, etc concerned cognitive sociology. This new dream child sociology gave birth to appears as if it is giving life to this discipline by means of providing it with a new ontology, a frame of reference, other transcendentals such as assumptions and pre-suppositions, endless new concepts and ways of generating more concepts and ideas, methodologies, techniques, methods and a treasure of new topics for sociological investigation, research, lectures, theses and publications. Most important in this context is the effect of that and the implications for philosophy and its subject-matter. More fields of what used to be considered philosophy has been usurped by cognitive sociology, cognitive psychology, law etc, etc. The most important discipline is sociology because it has been prepared for this new differentiation of sociological subject-matter by developments in the discipline during the last century for example by second generation Critical Theory such as Habermas and the work surrounding him and others of that school and developments in ‘philosophy’ and other fields in France, deconstruction, Derrida, phenomenology, semiotics, etc. And, with the sociologization of reason, cognition and the introduction of social theory into philosophy and philosophizing boundaries between the disciplines of philosophy and sociology have been blurred and intentionally so. The latter led to sociologism not only in the discipline of sociology, but also he introduction of it into the discourse of philosophy and the doing of philosophy – this was initially restricted to Germany, then later top other geographical areas of Western Europe and gradually into North America. And, so far I have only pointed to cognitive sociology and not even mentioned other disciplines that are involved in the cognitive sciences bandwagon. When we look at them we will no doubt discover that a similar process of de-philosophizing (transformation of fields, questions, investigation, concepts, conceptual practices, etc of the philosophical discourse and socio-cultural practice and intersubjectivity) has occurred because of the involvement of other disciplines involved in cognitive sciences. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognition Cognition is "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses."[1] It encompasses processes such as knowledge, attention, memory and working memory, judgment and evaluation, reasoning and "computation", problem solving and decision making, comprehension and production of language, etc. Human cognition is conscious and unconscious, concrete or abstract, as well as intuitive (like knowledge of a language) and conceptual (like a model of a language). Cognitive processes use existing knowledge and generate new knowledge. The processes are analyzed from different perspectives within different contexts, notably in the fields of linguistics, anesthesia, neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology, education, philosophy, anthropology, biology, systemics, logic, and computer science.[2][page needed] These and other different approaches to the analysis of cognition are synthesised in the developing field of cognitive science, a progressively autonomous academic discipline. Within psychology and philosophy, the concept of cognition is closely related to abstract concepts such as mind and intelligence. It encompasses the mental functions, mental processes (thoughts), and states of intelligent entities (humans, collaborative groups, human organizations, highly autonomous machines, and artificial intelligences).[3] Thus, the term's usage varies across disciplines; for example, in psychology and cognitive science, "cognition" usually refers to an information processing view of an individual's psychological functions. It is also used in a branch of social psychology called social cognition to explain attitudes, attribution, and group dynamics.[4] In cognitive psychology and cognitive engineering, cognition is typically assumed to be information processing in a participant’s or operator’s mind or brain.[3] Cognition can in some specific and abstract sense also be artificial.[5] The term "cognition" is often incorrectly used to mean "cognitive abilities" or "cognitive skills." Look at the role cognition and related ideas played in philosophy - Cognition is a word that dates back to the 15th century, when it meant "thinking and awareness".[7] Attention to the cognitive process came about more than eighteen centuries ago, beginning with Aristotle and his interest in the inner workings of the mind and how they affect the human experience. Aristotle focused on cognitive areas pertaining to memory, perception, and mental imagery. The Greek philosopher found great importance in ensuring that his studies were based on empirical evidence; scientific information that is gathered through observation and conscientious experimentation.[8] Centuries later, as psychology became a burgeoning field of study in Europe and then gained a following in America, other scientists like Wilhelm Wundt, Herman Ebbinghaus, Mary Whiton Calkins, and William James, to name a few, would offer their contributions to the study of cognition. Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) heavily emphasized the notion of what he called introspection: examining the inner feelings of an individual. With introspection, the subject had to be careful to describe his or her feelings in the most objective manner possible in order for Wundt to find the information scientific.[9][10] Though Wundt's contributions are by no means minimal, modern psychologists find his methods to be quite subjective and choose to rely on more objective procedures of experimentation to make conclusions about the human cognitive process. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) conducted cognitive studies that mainly examined the function and capacity of human memory. Ebbinghaus developed his own experiment in which he constructed over 2,000 syllables made out of nonexistent words, for instance EAS. He then examined his own personal ability to learn these non-words. He purposely chose non-words as opposed to real words to control for the influence of pre-existing experience on what the words might symbolize, thus enabling easier recollection of them.[9][11] Ebbinghaus observed and hypothesized a number of variables that may have affected his ability to learn and recall the non-words he created. One of the reasons, he concluded, was the amount of time between the presentation of the list of stimuli and the recitation or recall of same. Ebbinghaus was the first to record and plot a "learning curve," and a "forgetting curve."[12] His work heavily influenced the study of serial position and its effect on memory, discussed in subsequent sections. Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) was an influential American pioneer in the realm of psychology. Her work also focused on the human memory capacity. A common theory, called the recency effect, can be attributed to the studies that she conducted.[13] The recency effect, also discussed in the subsequent experiment section, is the tendency for individuals to be able to accurately recollect the final items presented in a sequence of stimuli. Her theory is closely related to the aforementioned study and conclusion of the memory experiments conducted by Hermann Ebbinghaus.[14] William James (1842–1910) is another pivotal figure in the history of cognitive science. James was quite discontent with Wundt's emphasis on introspection and Ebbinghaus' use of nonsense stimuli. He instead chose to focus on the human learning experience in everyday life and its importance to the study of cognition. James' major contribution was his textbook Principles of Psychology that preliminarily examines many aspects of cognition like perception, memory, reasoning, and attention, to name a few Cognitive studies and notions presented psychology, as it did with sociology, with a new life, areas of research, conceptual schemes and much else - The sort of mental processes described as cognitive are largely influenced by research which has successfully used this paradigm in the past, likely starting with Thomas Aquinas, who divided the study of behavior into two broad categories: cognitive (how we know the world), and affective (how we understand the world via feelings and emotions)[disputed – discuss].[citation needed] Consequently, this description tends to apply to processes such as memory, association, concept formation, pattern recognition, language, attention, perception, action, problem solving and mental imagery.[15][16] Traditionally, emotion was not thought of as a cognitive process. This division is now regarded as largely artificial, and much research is currently being undertaken to examine the cognitive psychology of emotion; research also includes one's awareness of one's own strategies and methods of cognition called metacognition and includes metamemory. Empirical research into cognition is usually scientific and quantitative, or involves creating models to describe or explain certain behaviors. While few people would deny that cognitive processes are a function of the brain, a cognitive theory will not necessarily make reference to the brain or other biological process (compare neurocognitive). It may purely describe behavior in terms of information flow or function. Relatively recent fields of study such as cognitive science and neuropsychology aim to bridge this gap, using cognitive paradigms to understand how the brain implements these information-processing functions (see also cognitive neuroscience), or how pure information-processing systems (e.g., computers) can simulate cognition (see also artificial intelligence). The branch of psychology that studies brain injury to infer normal cognitive function is called cognitive neuropsychology. The links of cognition to evolutionary demands are studied through the investigation of animal cognition. And conversely, evolutionary-based perspectives can inform hypotheses about cognitive functional systems' evolutionary psychology. The theoretical school of thought derived from the cognitive approach is often called cognitivism. The phenomenal success of the cognitive approach can be seen by its current dominance as the core model in contemporary psychology (usurping behaviorism in the late 1950s). And, of course the role it plays in sociology and social sciuences - For every individual, the social context in which he or she is embedded provides the symbols of his or her representation and linguistic expression. The human society sets the environment where the newborn will be socialized and develop his or her cognition. For example, face perception in human babies emerges by the age of two months: young children at a playground or swimming pool develop their social recognition by being exposed to multiple faces and associating the experiences to those faces. Education has the explicit task in society of developing cognition. Choices are made regarding the environment and permitted action that lead to a formed experience. Language acquisition is an example of an emergent behavior. From a large systemic perspective, cognition is considered closely related to the social and human organization functioning and constrains. For example, the macro-choices made by the teachers influence the micro-choices made by students.. The semantic network of knowledge representation systems has been studied in various paradigms. One of the oldest is the leveling and sharpening of stories as they are repeated from memory studied by Bartlett. The semantic differential used factor analysis to determine the main meanings of words, finding that value or "goodness" of words is the first factor. More controlled experiments examine the categorical relationships of words in free recall. The hierarchical structure of words has been explicitly mapped in George Miller's Wordnet. More dynamic models of semantic networks have been created and tested with neural network experiments based on computational systems such as latent semantic analysis (LSA), Bayesian analysis, and multidimensional factor analysis. The semantics (meaning) of words is studied by all the disciplines of cognitive science. Other disciplines increasing involved in cognitive studies – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_biology Cognitive biology is an emerging science that regards natural cognition as a biological function.[1] It is based on the theoretical assumption that every organism—whether a single cell or multicellular—is continually engaged in systematic acts of cognition coupled with intentional behaviors, i.e., a sensory-motor coupling.[2] That is to say, if an organism can sense stimuli in its environment and respond accordingly, it is cognitive. Any explanation of how natural cognition may manifest in an organism is constrained by the biological conditions in which its species survives to evolve.[3] And since by Darwinian theory the species of every organism is evolving from a common root, three further elements of cognitive biology are required: (i) the study of cognition in one species of organism is useful, through contrast and comparison, to the study of another species’ cognitive abilities;[4] (ii) it is useful to proceed from organisms with simpler to those with more complex cognitive systems,[5] and (iii) the greater the number and variety of species studied in this regard, the more we understand the nature of cognition.[6 While cognitive science endeavors to explain human thought and the conscious mind, the work of cognitive biology is focused on the most fundamental process of cognition for any organism. In the past several decades, biologists have investigated cognition in organisms large[7] and small,[8] both plant[9] and animal.[10] “Mounting evidence suggests that even bacteria grapple with problems long familiar to cognitive scientists, including: integrating information from multiple sensory channels to marshal an effective response to fluctuating conditions; making decisions under conditions of uncertainty; communicating with conspecifics and others (honestly and deceptively); and coordinating collective behaviour to increase the chances of survival.”[11] Without thinking or perceiving as humans would have it, an act of basic cognition is arguably a simple step-by-step process through which an organism senses a stimulus, then finds an appropriate response in its repertoire and enacts the response. However, the biological details of such basic cognition have neither been delineated for a great many species nor sufficiently generalized to stimulate further investigation. This lack of detail is due to the lack of a science dedicated to the task of elucidating the cognitive ability common to all biological organisms. That is to say, a science of cognitive biology has yet to be established.[12] A prolegomena[13] for such science was presented in 2007 and several authors[14] have published their thoughts on the subject since the late 1970s. Yet as the examples in the next section suggest, there is neither consensus on the theory nor widespread application in practice. Although the two terms are sometimes used synonymously,[15] cognitive biology should not be confused with the biology of cognition in the sense that it is used by adherents to the Chilean School of Biology of Cognition.[16] Also known as the Santiago School, the biology of cognition is based on the work of Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana,[17] who crafted the doctrine of autopoiesis. Their work began in 1970 while the first mention of cognitive biology by Brian Goodwin (discussed below) was in 1977 from a different perspective.[18] More and more disciplines are drawn into cognitive studies and consequently areas of spcialization in such studies are differentiated in those disciplines. The words ‘cognitive’ and ‘biology’ are also used together as the name of a category. The category of cognitive biology has no fixed content but, rather, the content varies with the user. If the content can only be recruited from cognitive science, then cognitive biology would seem limited to a selection of items in the main set of sciences included by the interdisciplinary concept—cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive anthropology.[39] These six separate sciences were allied “to bridge the gap between brain and mind” with an interdisciplinary approach in the mid-1970s.[40] Participating scientists were concerned only with human cognition. As it gained momentum, the growth of cognitive science in subsequent decades seemed to offer a big tent to a variety of researchers.[41] Some, for example, considered evolutionary epistemology a fellow-traveler. Others appropriated the keyword, as for example Donald Griffin in 1978, when he advocated the establishment of cognitive ethology. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santiago%27s_theory_of_cognition Initiated by Humberto Maturana in 1978 with the publication of his Biology of Cognition, his subsequent work in partnership with Francisco Varela in Santiago eventually came to be called the Santiago theory of cognition. They and their work, their cohorts and like-minded intellectuals similarly came to be known as the Santiago School.[1] The theory can be encapsulated in two sentences: Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with or without a nervous system.[2] This theory contributes a perspective that cognition is a process present at other organic levels. The Santiago theory of cognition is a direct theoretical consequence of the theory of autopoiesis. Cognition is considered as the ability of adaptation in a certain environment. That definition is not as strange as it seems at first glance: for example, one is considered to have a good knowledge of Mathematics if he can understand and subsequently solve a Mathematical problem. That is, one can recognize the mathematical entities, their interrelations and the procedures used to view other aspects of the relevant phenomena; all these, are the domain of Mathematics. And one with knowledge of that domain, is one adapted to that domain, for he can tweak the problems, the entities and the procedures within the certain domain. Cognition emerges as a consequence of continuous interaction between the system and its environment. The continuous interaction triggers bilateral perturbations; perturbations are considered problems – therefore the system uses its functional differentiation procedures to come up with a solution (if it doesn't have one handy already through its memory). Gradually the system becomes "adapted" to its environment – that is it can confront the perturbations so as to survive. The resulting complexity of living systems is cognition produced by the history of bilateral perturbations within the system/environment schema. This theory contributes to the philosophical discussion of awareness, consciousness, cognition and the philosophy of mind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_computing Cognitive computing (CC) describes technology platforms that, broadly speaking, are based on the scientific disciplines of Artificial Intelligence and Signal Processing. These platforms encompass machine learning, reasoning, natural language processing, speech and vision, human-computer interaction, dialog and narrative generation and more https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_cognition Comparative cognition is the comparative study of the mechanisms and origins of cognition in various species. From a biological point of view, work is being done on the brains of fruit flies that should yield techniques precise enough to allow an understanding of the workings of the human brain on a scale appreciative of individual groups of neurons rather than the more regional scale previously used. Similarly, gene activity in the human brain is better understood through examination of the brains of mice by the Seattle-based Allen Institute for Brain Science (see link below), yielding the freely available Allen Brain Atlas. This type of study is related to comparative cognition, but better classified as one of comparative genomics. Increasing emphasis in psychology and ethology on the biological aspects of perception and behavior is bridging the gap between genomics and behavioral analysis. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genomics Genomics refers to the study of the genome[1] in contrast to genetics which refers to the study of genes and their roles in inheritance.[1] Genomics can be considered a discipline in genetics. It applies recombinant DNA, DNA sequencing methods, and bioinformatics to sequence, assemble, and analyze the function and structure of genomes (the complete set of DNA within a single cell of an organism).[2][3] Advances in genomics have triggered a revolution in discovery-based research to understand even the most complex biological systems such as the brain.[4] The field includes efforts to determine the entire DNA sequence of organisms and fine-scale genetic mapping. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_processing_technology_and_aging https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_thought Thought (also called thinking) – the mental process in which beings form psychological associations and models of the world. Thinking is manipulating information, as when we form concepts, engage in problem solving, reason and make decisions. Thought, the act of thinking, produces thoughts. A thought may be an idea, an image, a sound or even an emotional feeling that arises from the brain. Types of thoughts Concept Abstract concept Concrete concept Conjecture Decision (see § Decision-making below) Definition Explanation Hypothesis Idea Logical argument Logical assertion Mental image Percept / Perception Premise Proposition Syllogism Thought experiment Content of thoughts Argument Belief Data Information Knowledge Schema Human thought Main article: Human thought Analysis Awareness Calculation Estimation Categorization Causal thinking Cognitive restructuring Computational thinking Convergent thinking Counterfactual thinking Critical thinking Divergent thinking Evaluation Integrative thinking Internal monologue (surface thoughts) Introspection Learning and memory Parallel thinking Prediction Recollection Stochastic thinking Strategic thinking Visual thinking Classifications of thought Bloom's taxonomy Dual process theory Fluid and crystallized intelligence Higher-order thinking Theory of multiple intelligences Three-stratum theory Williams' taxonomy Creative processes Brainstorming Cognitive module Creativity Creative problem solving Creative writing Creativity techniques Design thinking Imagination Lateral thinking Noogenesis Six Thinking Hats Speech act Stream of consciousness Thinking outside the box Decision-making Main article: Decision-making Choice Cybernetics Decision theory Executive system Goals and goal setting Judgement Planning Rational choice theory Speech act Value (personal and cultural) Value judgment Erroneous thinking See also: Error and Human error Black and white thinking Catastrophization Cognitive bias Cognitive distortions Dysrationalia Emotional reasoning Exaggeration Foolishness Fallacies (see also List of fallacies) Fallacies of definition Logical fallacy Groupthink Irrationality Linguistic errors Magical thinking Minimisation (psychology) Motivated reasoning Rationalization (psychology) Rhetoric Straight and Crooked Thinking (book) Target fixation Wishful thinking Emotional intelligence (emotionally based thinking) Main article: Emotional intelligence Acting Affect logic Allophilia Attitude (psychology) Curiosity Elaboration likelihood model Emotions and feelings Emotion and memory Emotional contagion Empathy Epiphany (feeling) Mood (psychology) Motivation Propositional attitude Rhetoric Self actualization Self control Self-esteem Self-determination theory Social cognition Will (philosophy) Volition (psychology) Problem solving Main article: Problem solving Problem solving steps Problem finding Problem shaping Process of elimination Systems thinking Critical systems thinking Problem-solving strategy – steps one would use to find the problem(s) that are in the way to getting to one’s own goal. Some would refer to this as the ‘problem-solving cycle’ (Bransford & Stein, 1993). In this cycle one will recognize the problem, define the problem, develop a strategy to fix the problem, organize the knowledge of the problem cycle, figure-out the resources at the user's disposal, monitor one's progress, and evaluate the solution for accuracy. Abstraction – solving the problem in a model of the system before applying it to the real system Analogy – using a solution that solves an analogous problem Brainstorming – (especially among groups of people) suggesting a large number of solutions or ideas and combining and developing them until an optimum solution is found Divide and conquer – breaking down a large, complex problem into smaller, solvable problems Hypothesis testing – assuming a possible explanation to the problem and trying to prove (or, in some contexts, disprove) the assumption Lateral thinking – approaching solutions indirectly and creatively Means-ends analysis – choosing an action at each step to move closer to the goal Method of focal objects – synthesizing seemingly non-matching characteristics of different objects into something new Morphological analysis – assessing the output and interactions of an entire system Proof – try to prove that the problem cannot be solved. The point where the proof fails will be the starting point for solving it Reduction – transforming the problem into another problem for which solutions exist Research – employing existing ideas or adapting existing solutions to similar problems Root cause analysis – identifying the cause of a problem Trial-and-error – testing possible solutions until the right one is found Troubleshooting – Problem-solving methodology 5 Whys Decision cycle Eight Disciplines Problem Solving GROW model How to Solve It Learning cycle OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, and act) PDCA (plan–do–check–act) Problem structuring methods RPR Problem Diagnosis (rapid problem resolution) TRIZ (in Russian: Teoriya Resheniya Izobretatelskikh Zadatch, "theory of solving inventor's problems") Reasoning Main article: Reasoning Abstract thinking Adaptive reasoning Analogical reasoning Analytic reasoning Case-based reasoning Critical thinking Defeasible reasoning – from authority: if p then (defeasibly) q Diagrammatic reasoning – reasoning by means of visual representations. Visualizing concepts and ideas with of diagrams and imagery instead of by linguistic or algebraic means Emotional reasoning (erroneous) – a cognitive distortion in which emotion overpowers reason, to the point the subject is unwilling or unable to accept the reality of a situation because of it. Fallacious reasoning (erroneous) – logical errors Heuristics Historical thinking Intuitive reasoning Lateral thinking Logic / Logical reasoning Abductive reasoning – from data and theory: p and q are correlated, and q is sufficient for p; hence, if p then (abducibly) q as cause Deductive reasoning – from meaning postulate, axiom, or contingent assertion: if p then q (i.e., q or not-p) Inductive reasoning – theory formation; from data, coherence, simplicity, and confirmation: (inducibly) "if p then q"; hence, if p then (deducibly-but-revisably) q Inference Moral reasoning – process in which an individual tries to determine the difference between what is right and what is wrong in a personal situation by using logic.[4] This is an important and often daily process that people use in an attempt to do the right thing. Every day for instance, people are faced with the dilemma of whether or not to lie in a given situation. People make this decision by reasoning the morality of the action and weighing that against its consequences. Probabilistic reasoning – from combinatorics and indifference: if p then (probably) q Proportional reasoning – using "the concept of proportions when analyzing and solving a mathematical situation."[5] Rational thinking Semiosis Statistical reasoning – from data and presumption: the frequency of qs among ps is high (or inference from a model fit to data); hence, (in the right context) if p then (probably) q Synthetic reasoning Verbal reasoning – understanding and reasoning using concepts framed in words Visual reasoning – process of manipulating one's mental image of an object in order to reach a certain conclusion – for example, mentally constructing a piece of machinery to experiment with different mechanisms Machine thought Main articles: Machine thought and Outline of artificial intelligence Artificial creativity Automated reasoning Commonsense reasoning Model-based reasoning Opportunistic reasoning Qualitative reasoning – automated reasoning about continuous aspects of the physical world, such as space, time, and quantity, for the purpose of problem solving and planning using qualitative rather than quantitative information Spatial–temporal reasoning Textual case based reasoning Computer program (recorded machine thought instructions) Human-based computation Natural language processing (outline) Organizational thought Organizational thought (thinking by organizations) Management information system Organizational communication Organizational planning Strategic planning Strategic thinking Systems thinking Aspects of the thinker Aspects of the thinker which may affect (help or hamper) his or her thinking: Attitude Cognitive style Common sense Experience Instinct Intelligence Metacognition Mind's eye Mindset Rationality Wisdom Sapience Properties of thought Accuracy Cogency Dogma Effectiveness Efficacy Efficiency Freethought Frugality Meaning Prudence Rights Skepticism Soundness Validity Value theory Wrong Fields that study thought Linguistics Philosophy Logic Philosophy of mind Neuroscience Cognitive science Psychology Cognitive psychology Social psychology Psychiatry Mathematics Operations research Thought tools and thought research Cognitive model Design tool Diagram Argument map Concept map Mind map DSRP Intelligence amplification Language Meditation Six Thinking Hats Synectics History of thinking Main article: History of reasoning History of artificial intelligence History of cognitive science History of creativity History of ideas History of logic History of psychometrics Organizational thinking concepts Main articles: Organizational studies and Organizational psychology Attribution theory Communication Concept testing Evaporating Cloud Fifth discipline Groupthink Group synergy Ideas bank Interpretation Learning organization Metaplan Operations research Organization development Organizational communication Organizational culture Organizational ethics Organizational learning Rhetoric Smart mob Theory of Constraints Think tank Wisdom of crowds Teaching methods and skills Main articles: Education and Teaching Active learning Classical conditioning Directed listening and thinking activity Discipline Learning theory (education) Mentoring Operant conditioning Problem-based learning Punishment Reinforcement Scholars of thinking Aaron T. Beck Edward de Bono David D. Burns – author of Feeling Good: The New Mood Therapy and The Feeling Good Handbook. Burns popularized Aaron T. Beck's cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) when his book became a best seller during the 1980s.[6] Tony Buzan Noam Chomsky Albert Ellis Howard Gardner Douglas Hofstadter Ray Kurzweil Marvin Minsky Steven Pinker Baruch Spinoza Robert Sternberg Related concepts Cognition Knowledge Multiple intelligences Strategy Structure System Awareness and perception Main articles: Awareness and Perception Attention Cognition Cognitive dissonance Cognitive map Concept Concept map Conceptual framework Conceptual model Consciousness Domain knowledge Heuristics in judgment and decision making Information Intelligence Intuition Knowledge Memory suppression Mental model Metaknowledge (knowledge about knowledge) Mind map Mindfulness (psychology) Model (abstract) Percept Perception Self-awareness Self-concept Self-consciousness Self-knowledge Self-realization Sentience Situational awareness Understanding Learning and memory Main articles: Education, Learning, and Memory Autodidacticism Biofeedback Cognitive dissonance Dual-coding theory Eidetic memory (total recall) Emotion and memory Empiricism Feedback Feedback loop Free association Heuristics Hyperthymesia Hypnosis Hypothesis Imitation Inquiry Knowledge management Language acquisition Memorization Memory and aging Memory inhibition Memory-prediction framework Method of loci Mnemonics Neurofeedback Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) Observation Pattern recognition Question Reading Recall Recognition Recollection (recall) Scientific method Self-perception theory Speed reading Study Skills Subvocalization Transfer of learning Transfer of training Visual learning See also Thinking portal Artificial intelligence Outline of artificial intelligence Human intelligence Outline of human intelligence Neuroscience Outline of neuroscience Psychology Gestalt psychology (theory of mind) Outline of psychology Place these Adaptation Association of Ideas Attacking Faulty Reasoning Autistic thinking (see Glossary of psychiatry) Backcasting Causality Chunking (psychology) Cognition Cognitive biology Cognitive computing Cognitive deficit Cognitive dissonance Cognitive linguistics Cognitive module Cognitive psychology Cognitive science Cognitive space Cognitive style Communicating Comparative cognition Concept-formation Conceptual metaphor Conceptual thinking Conscience Consciousness Constructive criticism Conversation Criticism Dereistic thinking (see Glossary of psychiatry) Design (and re-design) Dialectic Discovery (observation) Distinction (philosophy) Distributed cognition Distributed multi-agent reasoning system Educational assessment Emotion Empirical knowledge Empiricism Epistemology Evidential reasoning (disambiguation) Evidential reasoning approach Expectation (epistemic) Experimentation Explanation Extension (semantics) Facilitation (business) Fantasy Fideism Figure Reasoning Test Fuzzy logic Fuzzy-trace theory Generalizing Gestalt psychology Group cognition Heuristics in judgment and decision making Holism Human multitasking Human self-reflection Hypervigilance Identification (information) Inductive reasoning aptitude Intellect Intelligence (trait) Intentionality Inventing Judging Kinesthetic learning Knowledge management Knowledge representation and reasoning Language Linguistics List of cognitive scientists List of creative thought processes List of emotional intelligence topics List of emotions List of organizational thought processes List of perception-related topics Mathematics Mechanization and Automated Reasoning Platform Mental function Mental model theory of reasoning Meta-analytic thinking Meta-ethical Methodic doubt Mimesis Mind Models of scientific inquiry Morphological analysis (problem-solving) Natural language processing Nonduality Nous Object pairing Pattern matching Personal experience Personality psychology Persuasion Philomath Philosophical analysis Philosophical method Planning Po (term) Practical reason Preconscious Prediction Procedural reasoning system Pseudoscience Pseudoskepticism Psychological projection Psychology of reasoning Qualitative Reasoning Group Rationality and Power Reasoning Mind Reasoning system Recognition primed decision Reflective disclosure Scientific method SEE-I Self-deception Semantic network Semantics Semiotics Sensemaking Situated cognition Situational awareness Skepticism Source criticism Spatial Cognition Speculative reason Spiral: The Bonds of Reasoning Storytelling Stream of consciousness (psychology) Subconscious Substitution (logic) Suspicion (emotion) Theories Thinking processes (theory of constraints) Thought disorder Thought sonorization (see Glossary of psychiatry) Translation Truth Unconscious mind Understanding VPEC-T wikt:entrained thinking wikt:synthesis Working memory World disclosure Thinking Buckminster Fuller: Thinking Out Loud (documentary) Critical-Creative Thinking and Behavioral Research Laboratory History of political thinking Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines Partial concurrent thinking aloud Po (lateral thinking) Six Thinking Hats SolidThinking Straight and Crooked Thinking Systematic Inventive Thinking The Art of Negative Thinking The Lake of Thinking The Leonardo da Vinci Society for the Study of Thinking The Magic of Thinking Big The Year of Magical Thinking Thinking about Consciousness Thinking about the immortality of the crab Thinking Allowed (PBS) Thinking Allowed Thinking Cap Quiz Bowl Thinking processes (Theory of Constraints) Thinking Skills Assessment Thinking, Fast and Slow Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking Unified structured inventive thinking When You're Through Thinking, Say Yes World Thinking Day Lists List of neurobiology topics List of cognitive science topics List of philosophical theories List of psychology topics List of cognitive scientists Glossary of philosophical isms List of cognitive biases List of emotions List of memory biases List of mnemonics List of neurobiology topics List of NLP topics List of psychometric topics List of thought processes NOTE: note all the fields, concepts, ideas etc concerning thought/thinking that traditionally formed part of philosophical subject-matter that are already differentiated and form part of other disciplines and/or fields in other disciplines. A similar observation can be made concerning the notion of intelligences - NOTE: note all the fields, concepts, ideas etc concerning intelligence that traditionally formed part of philosophical subject-matter that are already differentiated and form part of other disciplines and/or fields in other disciplines. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_human_intelligence Contents 1 Traits and aspects 2 Emergence and evolution 3 Augmented with technology 4 Capacities 5 Types of people, by intelligence 6 Models and theories 7 Related factors 8 Fields that study human intelligence 9 History 10 Organizations 11 Publications 12 Scholars and researchers 13 See also 14 Further reading 15 External links https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noogenesis Noogenesis (Ancient Greek: νοῦς=mind + γένεσις = origin, becoming) is the emergence and evolution of intelligence Contents  1 Term origin  2 Recent developments 2.1 Modern understanding 2.2 Interdisciplinary nature Interdisciplinary nature The term "noogenesis" can be used in a variety of fields i.e. medicine,[11][12] biophysics,[13] semiotics,[14] mathematics,[15] information technology,[16] psychology etc. thus making it a truly cross-disciplinary one. In astrobiology noogenesis concerns the origin of intelligent life and more specifically technological civilizations capable of communicating with humans and or traveling to Earth.[17] The lack of evidence for the existence of such extraterrestrial life creates the Fermi paradox.  3 Aspects of emergence and evolution of mind The emergence of the human mind is considered to be one of the five phenomena of emergent evolution.[18] To understand the mind, necessary to determine what the reasonable person's thinking differs from other thinking beings. Such differences include the ability to generate calculations, to combine dissimilar concepts, to use mental symbols, to think abstractly.[19] The knowledge of the phenomenon of intelligent systems - the emergence of reason (noogenesis) boils down to: Emergence and evolution of the "sapiens" (phylogenesis); A conception of a new idea (insight, creativity synthesis, intuition, decision-making, eureka); Development of an individual mind (ontogenesis ); Appearance of the Global Intelligence concept 3.1 To the parameters of the phenomenon "noo", "intellectus" 3.2 Aspects of evolution "sapiens" Historical evolutionary development[21] and emergence of H.sapiens as species,[22] include emergence of such concepts as anthropogenesis, phylogenesis, morphogenesis, cephalization,[23] systemogenesis ,[24] cognition systems autonomy.[25] On the other hand, development of an individual’s intellect deals with concepts of embryogenesis, ontogenesis,[26] morphogenesis, neurogenesis,[27] higher nervous function of I.P.Pavlov and his philosophy of mind.[28] Despite the fact that the morphofunctional maturity is usually reached by the age of 13, the definitive functioning of the brain structures is not complete until about 16–17 years of age 3.3 The future of intelligence Bioinformatics, genetic engineering, noopharmacology, cognitive load, brain stimulation, the efficient use of altered states of consciousness, use of non-human cognition, information technology (IT), artificial intelligence (AI) are all believed to be effective methods of intelligence advancement.  4 Issues and further research prospects The development of the human brain, perception, cognition, memory and neuroplasticity are unsolved problems in neuroscience. Several megaprojects are being carried out in the American BRAIN Initiative and the European Human Brain Project in attempt to better our understanding of the brain's functionality along with the intention to develop human cognitive performance in the future with artificial intelligence, informational, communication and cognitive technology. Autopoiesis Biological neural network Cognitive science Collective consciousness Collective intelligence Digital ecosystem Emergence Global brain Human evolution Information society Knowledge commons Knowledge ecosystem Digital ecology Knowledge management Knowledge tagging Management cybernetics Media ecology Mind Neuroinformatics Psychophysics Sensory system Technological singularity Social organism Sociology of knowledge Superorganism Territoriality (nonverbal communication) World Brain Evolutionary biology portal Earth sciences portal Logic portal Mind and brain portal Neuroscience portal Psychology portal Thinking portal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noogenesis#Interdisciplinary_nature Interdisciplinary nature The term "noogenesis" can be used in a variety of fields i.e. medicine,[11][12] biophysics,[13] semiotics,[14] mathematics,[15] information technology,[16] psychology etc. thus making it a truly cross-disciplinary one. In astrobiology noogenesis concerns the origin of intelligent life and more specifically technological civilizations capable of communicating with humans and or traveling to Earth.[17] The lack of evidence for the existence of such extraterrestrial life creates the Fermi paradox. Cognitive epidemiology is a field of research that examines the associations between intelligence test scores (IQ scores or extracted g-factors) and health, more specifically morbidity (mental and physical) and mortality. Typically, test scores are obtained at an early age, and compared to later morbidity and mortality. In addition to exploring and establishing these associations, cognitive epidemiology seeks to understand causal relationships between intelligence and health outcomes. Researchers in the field argue that intelligence measured at an early age is an important predictor of later health and mortality difference https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_epidemiology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution_of_human_intelligence  History 1.1 Hominidae 1.2 Homininae 1.3 Homo 1.4 Homo sapiens 1.4.1 Homo sapiens intelligence  2 Models 2.1 Social brain hypothesis 2.2 Social exchange theory 2.3 Sexual selection 2.4 Intelligence as a disease resistance sign 2.5 Ecological dominance-social competition model 2.6 Intelligence dependent on brain size 2.7 Group selection 2.8 Nutritional status Dates approximate, consult articles for details (From 2000000 BC till 2013 AD in (partial) exponential notation) See also: Java Man (−1.75e+06), Yuanmou Man (−1.75e+06 : -0.73e+06), Lantian Man (−1.7e+06), Nanjing Man (- 0.6e+06), Tautavel Man (- 0.5e+06), Peking Man (- 0.4e+06), Solo Man (- 0.4e+06), and Peștera cu Oase (- 0.378e+05) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary, scientific study of the mind and its processes.[2] It examines the nature, the tasks, and the functions of cognition. Cognitive scientists study intelligence and behavior, with a focus on how nervous systems represent, process, and transform information. Mental faculties of concern to cognitive scientists include language, perception, memory, attention, reasoning, and emotion; to understand these faculties, cognitive scientists borrow from fields such as linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology.[3] The typical analysis of cognitive science spans many levels of organization, from learning and decision to logic and planning; from neural circuitry to modular brain organization. The fundamental concept of cognitive science is that "thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures."[3] The cognitive sciences began as an intellectual movement in the 1950s, called the cognitive revolution, arguably initiated by Noam Chomsky.  Principles 1.1 Levels of analysis Marr[5] gave a famous description of three levels of analysis: the computational theory, specifying the goals of the computation; representation and algorithms, giving a representation of the inputs and outputs and the algorithms which transform one into the other; and the hardware implementation, how algorithm and representation may be physically realized. 1.2 Interdisciplinary nature Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field with contributors from various fields, including psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy of mind, computer science, anthropology, sociology, and biology. Cognitive scientists work collectively in hope of understanding the mind and its interactions with the surrounding world much like other sciences do. The field regards itself as compatible with the physical sciences and uses the scientific method as well as simulation or modeling, often comparing the output of models with aspects of human cognition. Similarly to the field of psychology, there is some doubt whether there is a unified cognitive science, which have led some researchers to prefer 'cognitive sciences' in plural.[6] Many, but not all, who consider themselves cognitive scientists hold a functionalist view of the mind—the view that mental states and processes should be explained by their function - what they do. According to the multiple realizability account of functionalism, even non-human systems such as robots and computers can be ascribed as having cognition. 1.3 Cognitive science: the term  2 Scope Cognitive science is a large field, and covers a wide array of topics on cognition. However, it should be recognized that cognitive science has not always been equally concerned with every topic that might bear relevance to the nature and operation of minds. Among philosophers, classical cognitivists have largely de-emphasized or avoided social and cultural factors, emotion, consciousness, animal cognition, and comparative and evolutionary psychologies. However, with the decline of behaviorism, internal states such as affects and emotions, as well as awareness and covert attention became approachable again. For example, situated and embodied cognition theories take into account the current state of the environment as well as the role of the body in cognition. With the newfound emphasis on information processing, observable behavior was no longer the hallmark of psychological theory, but the modelling or recording of mental states. 2.1 Artificial intelligence 2.2 Attention 2.3 Knowledge and processing of language The ability to learn and understand language is an extremely complex process. Language is acquired within the first few years of life, and all humans under normal circumstances are able to acquire language proficiently. A major driving force in the theoretical linguistic field is discovering the nature that language must have in the abstract in order to be learned in such a fashion. Some of the driving research questions in studying how the brain itself processes language include: (1) To what extent is linguistic knowledge innate or learned?, (2) Why is it more difficult for adults to acquire a second-language than it is for infants to acquire their first-language?, and (3) How are humans able to understand novel sentences? The study of language processing ranges from the investigation of the sound patterns of speech to the meaning of words and whole sentences. Linguistics often divides language processing into orthography, phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Many aspects of language can be studied from each of these components and from their interaction. 2.4 Learning and development A major question in the study of cognitive development is the extent to which certain abilities are innate or learned. This is often framed in terms of the nature and nurture debate. The nativist view emphasizes that certain features are innate to an organism and are determined by its genetic endowment. The empiricist view, on the other hand, emphasizes that certain abilities are learned from the environment. Although clearly both genetic and environmental input is needed for a child to develop normally, considerable debate remains about how genetic information might guide cognitive development. In the area of language acquisition, for example, some (such as Steven Pinker)[9] have argued that specific information containing universal grammatical rules must be contained in the genes, whereas others (such as Jeffrey Elman and colleagues in Rethinking Innateness) have argued that Pinker's claims are biologically unrealistic. They argue that genes determine the architecture of a learning system, but that specific "facts" about how grammar works can only be learned as a result of experience. 2.5 Memory 2.6 Perception and action Perception is the ability to take in information via the senses, and process it in some way. Vision and hearing are two dominant senses that allow us to perceive the environment. Some questions in the study of visual perception, for example, include: (1) How are we able to recognize objects?, (2) Why do we perceive a continuous visual environment, even though we only see small bits of it at any one time? One tool for studying visual perception is by looking at how people process optical illusions. The image on the right of a Necker cube is an example of a bistable percept, that is, the cube can be interpreted as being oriented in two different directions. The study of haptic (tactile), olfactory, and gustatory stimuli also fall into the domain of perception. Action is taken to refer to the output of a system. In humans, this is accomplished through motor responses. Spatial planning and movement, speech production, and complex motor movements are all aspects of action. 2.7 Consciousness Consciousness is the awareness whether something is an external object or something within oneself. This helps the mind having the ability to experience or to feel a sense of self.  3 Research methods 3.1 Behavioral experiments In order to have a description of what constitutes intelligent behavior, one must study behavior itself. This type of research is closely tied to that in cognitive psychology and psychophysics. 3.2 Brain imaging Brain imaging involves analyzing activity within the brain while performing various tasks. This allows us to link behavior and brain function to help understand how information is processed. Different types of imaging techniques vary in their temporal (time-based) and spatial (location-based) resolution. Brain imaging is often used in cognitive neuroscience. 3.3 Computational modeling Computational models require a mathematically and logically formal representation of a problem. Computer models are used in the simulation and experimental verification of different specific and general properties of intelligence. Computational modeling can help us understand the functional organization of a particular cognitive phenomenon. There are two basic approaches to cognitive modeling. The first is focused on abstract mental functions of an intelligent mind and operates using symbols, and the second, which follows the neural and associative properties of the human brain, is called subsymbolic. 3.4 Neurobiological methods Research methods borrowed directly from neuroscience and neuropsychology can also help us to understand aspects of intelligence. These methods allow us to understand how intelligent behavior is implemented in a physical system. Single-unit recording Direct brain stimulation Animal models Postmortem studies  4 Key findings Cognitive science has given rise to models of human cognitive bias and risk perception, and has been influential in the development of behavioral finance, part of economics. It has also given rise to a new theory of the philosophy of mathematics, and many theories of artificial intelligence, persuasion and coercion. It has made its presence known in the philosophy of language and epistemology - a modern revival of rationalism - as well as constituting a substantial wing of modern linguistics. Fields of cognitive science have been influential in understanding the brain's particular functional systems (and functional deficits) ranging from speech production to auditory processing and visual perception. It has made progress in understanding how damage to particular areas of the brain affect cognition, and it has helped to uncover the root causes and results of specific dysfunction, such as dyslexia, anopia, and hemispatial neglect.  5 History The cognitive sciences began as an intellectual movement in the 1950s, called the cognitive revolution. Cognitive science has a prehistory traceable back to ancient Greek philosophical texts (see Plato's Meno and Aristotle's De Anima); and includes writers such as Descartes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Benedict de Spinoza, Nicolas Malebranche, Pierre Cabanis, Leibniz and John Locke. However, although these early writers contributed greatly to the philosophical discovery of mind and this would ultimately lead to the development of psychology, they were working with an entirely different set of tools and core concepts than those of the cognitive scientist. The modern culture of cognitive science can be traced back to the early cyberneticists in the 1930s and 1940s, such as Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts, who sought to understand the organizing principles of the mind. McCulloch and Pitts developed the first variants of what are now known as artificial neural networks, models of computation inspired by the structure of biological neural networks. Another precursor was the early development of the theory of computation and the digital computer in the 1940s and 1950s. Alan Turing and John von Neumann were instrumental in these developments. The modern computer, or Von Neumann machine, would play a central role in cognitive science, both as a metaphor for the mind, and as a tool for investigation. The first instance of cognitive science experiments being done at an academic institution took place at MIT Sloan School of Management, established by J.C.R. Licklider working within the social psychology department and conducting experiments using computer memory as models for human cognition.[11] In 1959, Noam Chomsky published a scathing review of B. F. Skinner's book Verbal Behavior. At the time, Skinner's behaviorist paradigm dominated psychology. Most psychologists focused on functional relations between stimulus and response, without positing internal representations. Chomsky argued that in order to explain language, we needed a theory like generative grammar, which not only attributed internal representations but characterized their underlying order. The term cognitive science was coined by Christopher Longuet-Higgins in his 1973 commentary on the Lighthill report, which concerned the then-current state of Artificial Intelligence research.[12] In the same decade, the journal Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society were founded.[13] The founding meeting of the Cognitive Science Society was held at the University of California, San Diego in 1979, which resulted in cognitive science becoming an internationally visible enterprise.[14] In 1982, Vassar College became the first institution in the world to grant an undergraduate degree in Cognitive Science.[15] In 1986, the first Cognitive Science Department in the world was founded at the University of California, San Diego.[14] In the 1970s and early 1980s, much cognitive science research focused on the possibility of artificial intelligence. Researchers such as Marvin Minsky would write computer programs in languages such as LISP to attempt to formally characterize the steps that human beings went through, for instance, in making decisions and solving problems, in the hope of better understanding human thought, and also in the hope of creating artificial minds. This approach is known as "symbolic AI". Eventually the limits of the symbolic AI research program became apparent. For instance, it seemed to be unrealistic to comprehensively list human knowledge in a form usable by a symbolic computer program. The late 80s and 90s saw the rise of neural networks and connectionism as a research paradigm. Under this point of view, often attributed to James McClelland and David Rumelhart, the mind could be characterized as a set of complex associations, represented as a layered network. Critics argue that there are some phenomena which are better captured by symbolic models, and that connectionist models are often so complex as to have little explanatory power. Recently symbolic and connectionist models have been combined, making it possible to take advantage of both forms of explanation  6 Notable researchers Some of the more recognized names in cognitive science are usually either the most controversial or the most cited. Within philosophy familiar names include Daniel Dennett who writes from a computational systems perspective, John Searle known for his controversial Chinese room, Jerry Fodor who advocates functionalism. David Chalmers who advocates Dualism, also known for articulating the hard problem of consciousness, Douglas Hofstadter, famous for writing Gödel, Escher, Bach, which questions the nature of words and thought. In the realm of linguistics, Noam Chomsky and George Lakoff have been influential (both have also become notable as political commentators). In artificial intelligence, Marvin Minsky, Herbert A. Simon, Allen Newell, and Kevin Warwick are prominent. Popular names in the discipline of psychology include George A. Miller, James McClelland, Philip Johnson-Laird, John O'Keefe, and Steven Pinker. Anthropologists Dan Sperber, Edwin Hutchins, Scott Atran, Pascal Boyer, Michael Posner, and Joseph Henrich have been involved in collaborative projects with cognitive and social psychologists, political scientists and evolutionary biologists in attempts to develop general theories of culture formation, religion, and political association. Affective science Cognitive anthropology Cognitive biology Cognitive linguistics Cognitive neuropsychology Cognitive neuroscience Cognitive psychology Cognitive science of religion Computational neuroscience Computational-representational understanding of mind Concept Mining Decision field theory Decision theory Dynamicism Educational neuroscience Educational psychology Embodied cognition Embodied cognitive science Enactivism Epistemology Heterophenomenology Human Cognome Project Human-Computer Interaction Indiana Archives of Cognitive Science Informatics (academic field) List of cognitive scientists List of institutions granting degrees in cognitive science Malleable intelligence Neural Darwinism Personal information management (PIM) Quantum Cognition Simulated consciousness Situated cognition Society of Mind theory Spatial Cognition Speech-Language Pathology Outline of human intelligence - topic tree presenting the traits, capacities, models, and research fields of human intelligence, and more. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_human_intelligence Outline of thought - topic tree that identifies many types of thoughts, types of thinking, aspects of thought, related fields, and more. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_thought 8 After this journey through different concepts, conceptual sets and fields concerning cognition, thought/thinking, intelligence, consciousness etc – we might have a more subtle and complex idea of these things that originally formed part of philosophical subject-matter and the discourse of philosophy. As we have noticed many disciplines, sub-disciplines and endless topics of research and specialization have been and are differentiated. Have we learned anything from these things concerning the subject-matter of philosophy? What are the implications of this diversity and complexity of research topics and disciplines for philosophy? Are there anything, any phenomena, any topics, any ideas, concepts, sets of concepts and fields that can be explored by philosophy alone? That are unique to philosophizing? Are there anything that can be explore by philosophy, anything that must form the subject-matter of philosophizing? Anything that may form part of philosophical investigation? If so, what are these things? Perhaps branches in philosophy, other than metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, should be explored to find uniquely and still existing philosophical subject-matter? I present the categories of Philosophical Papers and other resources to show other sub-branches, specializations and areas of interest in contemporary philosophy. I also include articles about questions concerning the nature and the future of philosophy. This is perhaps a bizarre way to end explorations of the subject-matter, or lack of it, of the philosophical discourse? A systematic diagram or a few logical propositions or mathematical formulae would have suited the expectations of some individuals better? Or reporting news concerning new discoveries in Cognitive Sciences that confirm theoretical conjectures about the cognitive order as the single, absolute transcendental of sociology and other social sciences, if not all sciences, humanities, arts and socio-cultural practices? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.oswego.edu/~delancey/100_DIR/100_LECTURES/0.Branches.pdf http://www.nti-nigeria.org/nti-pgde/PGDE-9.pdf http://www.slideshare.net/RightJungle/the-branches-of-philosophy-pdf https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Introduction_to_Philosophy/The_Branches_of_Philosophy  1.1 Epistemology  1.2 Metaphysics  1.3 Logic  1.4 Ethics Philosophy of Education: Fairly self-explanatory. A minor branch, mainly concerned with what is the correct way to educate a person. Classic works include Plato's Republic, Locke's Thoughts Concerning Education, and Rousseau's Emile. Philosophy of History: Fairly minor branch (not as minor as education), although highly important to Hegel and those who followed him, most notably Marx. It is the philosophical study of history, particularly concerned with the question whether history (i.e. the universe and/or humankind) is progressing towards a specific end? Hegel argued that it was, as did Marx. Classic works include Vico's New Science, and Hegel and Marx's works. Philosophy of Language: Ancient branch of philosophy which gained prominence in the last century under Wittgenstein. Basically concerned with how our languages affect our thought. Wittgenstein famously asserted that the limits of our languages mark the limits of our thought. Classic works include Plato's Cratylus, Locke's Essay, and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Philosophy of Law: Also called Jurisprudence. Study of law attempting to discern what the best laws might be, how laws came into being in the first place, attempting to delimit human laws from natural laws, whether we should always obey the law, and so on. Law isn't often directly dealt with by philosophers, but much of political philosophy obviously has a bearing on it. Philosophy of Mathematics: Concerned with issues such as, the nature of the axioms and symbols (numbers, triangle, operands) of mathematics that we use to understand the world, do perfect mathematical forms exist in the real world, and so on. Principia Mathematica is almost certainly the most important work in this field. Philosophy of Mind: Study of the mind, attempting to ascertain exactly what the mind is, how it interacts with our body, do other minds exist, how does it work, and so on. Probably the most popular branch of philosophy right now, it has expanded to include issues of AI. Classic works include Plato's Republic and Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, although every major philosopher has had some opinion at least on what the mind is and how it works. Philosophy of Politics: Closely related to ethics, this is a study of government and nations, particularly how they came about, what makes good governments, what obligations citizens have towards their government, and so on. Classic works include Plato's Republic, Hobbes' Leviathan, Locke's Two Treatises, and J.S. Mill's On Liberty. Philosophy of Religion: Theology is concerned with the study of God, recommending the best religious practices, how our religion should shape our life, and so on. Philosophy of religion is concerned with much the same issues, but where Theology uses religious works, like the Bible, as it's authority, philosophy likes to use reason as the ultimate authority. Philosophy of Science: It is the Study of science concerned with whether scientific knowledge can be said to be certain, how we obtain it, can science really explain everything, does causation really exist, can every event in the universe be described in terms of physics and so on. Also popular in recent times, classic works include Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, Kripke's Naming and Necessity, Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. http://philosophy.atmhs.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/LO1.1-The-Branches-of-Philosophy.pdf http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/FiveBranchesMain.html https://philgcg11chd.wordpress.com/category/main-branches-of-philosophy/ https://s3.amazonaws.com/booklibrartytom2/8%20branches%20of%20philosophy.pdf http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch.html Only the traditional, major branches are mentioned by the above resources. http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html Working through the Stanford above more specialized areas will be revealed. http://www.iep.utm.edu/ http://philpapers.org/ http://philpapers.org/browse/all Areas and Area Editors Metaphysics and Epistemology Epistemology (Matthew McGrath) Metaphilosophy (Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa) Metaphysics (Jonathan Schaffer) Philosophy of Action (Constantine Sandis) Philosophy of Language (Berit Brogaard) Philosophy of Mind (David Chalmers, David Bourget) Philosophy of Religion (Thomas Senor) Value Theory (Daniel Star) Aesthetics (Rafael De Clercq) Applied Ethics (Ezio Di Nucci) Meta-Ethics (Daniel Star) Normative Ethics (Jussi Suikkanen) Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality (Lynne Tirrell) Philosophy of Law (Aness Webster) Social and Political Philosophy Value Theory, Miscellaneous (Gwen Bradford) Science, Logic, and Mathematics Logic and Philosophy of Logic (Aleksandra Samonek) Philosophy of Biology (Manolo Martínez) Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Gualtiero Piccinini) Philosophy of Computing and Information (Giuseppe Primiero) Philosophy of Mathematics (Øystein Linnebo) Philosophy of Physical Science (Hans Halvorson) Philosophy of Social Science (Michiru Nagatsu) Philosophy of Probability (Darrell Rowbottom) General Philosophy of Science (Howard Sankey) Philosophy of Science, Misc History of Western Philosophy Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy (Robin Smith) Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (Margaret Cameron) 17th/18th Century Philosophy (Brandon Look) 19th Century Philosophy (Michelle Kosch) 20th Century Philosophy (Jack Alan Reynolds, James Chase) Philosophical Traditions African/Africana Philosophy (Barry Hallen) Asian Philosophy (JeeLoo Liu) Continental Philosophy (Paul Livingston) European Philosophy Philosophy of the Americas (Susana Nuccetelli) Philosophical Traditions, Miscellaneous Metaphysics and Epistemology (247,231) 1 Epistemology (28,119) Epistemology of Specific Domains (365 | 192)Ted Poston Aesthetic Knowledge* (44) Epistemology of Mathematics* (774 | 127)Alan Baker Epistemology of Logic* (101)Joshua Schechter Epistemology of Philosophy* (220 | 2)Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa Epistemology of Religion* (2,064 | 126)Matthew A. Benton Epistemology of Specific Domains, Misc (173) Evidence and Proof in Law* (94) Knowledge of Consciousness* (135) Knowledge of Language* (502)Guy Longworth Modal Epistemology* (426 | 1)Anand Vaidya Moral Epistemology* (1,360 | 2)Christopher Michael Cloos The Problem of Other Minds* (448 | 186) Self-Knowledge* (1,082 | 258) 2 I list the entire section with all sub-sections for metaphilosophy as 1) it is of special interest to me and 2) it still contains uniquely philosophical subject-matter. Metaphilosophy (4,229) Epistemology of Philosophy (220 | 2)Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa Epistemology of Philosophy, Misc (76)Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa Metaphilosophical Skepticism (142)Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa Modal Epistemology* (426 | 1)Anand Vaidya Philosophical Methods* (1,017 | 49)Joachim Horvath Metaphilosophical Views (1,188 | 306) Empiricism* (197 | 151) Naturalism (268 | 223) Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism* (783 | 17)Cristian Constantinescu Arguments from Naturalism against Theism* (37) Normativity and Naturalism* (97) Naturalism and Intentionality* (94) Naturalism in Economics* (29) Naturalism in Jurisprudence* (6) Mathematical Naturalism* (48) Metaphysical Naturalism* (94) Naturalism, Misc (45) Pragmatism (222 | 175) Pragmatism, Misc (47) Pragmatism about Truth* (82)Patrick Greenough Feminist Pragmatism* (154) American Pragmatism* (2,051 | 1,722) Rationalism* (123 | 94)Magdalena Balcerak Jackson Metaphilosophical Views, Misc (72) Philosophical Methods (1,017 | 49)Joachim Horvath Argument* (454)Steven W. Patterson Conceptual Analysis (261)Joachim Horvath Computational Philosophy (22) Experimental Philosophy* (1,146 | 1)Wesley Buckwalter Formal Philosophy (12) Intuition* (555 | 168) Methodology in Metaphysics* (197)Frederique Janssen-Lauret Linguistic Analysis in Philosophy (60) Philosophical Methods, Misc (190) Thought Experiments (358)Magdalena Balcerak Jackson Transcendental Arguments (65) Experimental Philosophy (1,146 | 1)Wesley Buckwalter Experimental Philosophy of Action (233 | 2)Jonathan Phillips Experimental Philosophy: Free Will (91)Jonathan Phillips Experimental Philosophy: Intentional Action (120)Jonathan Phillips Experimental Philosophy of Action, Misc (20)Jonathan Phillips Experimental Philosophy of Language (101 | 1)Justin Sytsma Experimental Philosophy: Reference (29)Justin Sytsma Experimental Philosophy: Semantics (44)Shen-yi Liao Experimental Philosophy of Language, Misc (27)Justin Sytsma Experimental Philosophy of Mind (118)Adam Arico Experimental Philosophy: Consciousness (46)Adam Arico Experimental Philosophy of Mind, Misc (72)Adam Arico Experimental Philosophy: Ethics (273 | 5)Jennifer Zamzow Experimental Philosophy: Folk Morality (170) Experimental Philosophy: Ethics, Misc (98) Experimental Philosophy: Epistemology (109)Jennifer Nado Experimental Philosophy: Contextualism and Invariantism (33)Nat Hansen Experimental Philosophy: Epistemology, Misc (82)David Rose Experimental Philosophy: Metaphysics (74)David Rose Experimental Philosophy: Causation (31)David Rose Experimental Philosophy: Persons (19)Vilius Dranseika Experimental Philosophy: Metaphysics, Misc (24)David Rose Foundations of Experimental Philosophy (161 | 32)John Philip Waterman Critiques of Experimental Philosophy (60) Foundations of Experimental Philosophy, Misc (69) Experimental Philosophy, Miscellaneous (99 | 30) Experimental Philosophy: Crosscultural Research (9) * (2) Experimental Philosophy, Misc (60) Metaphilosophy, Miscellaneous (502 | 43) Disagreement in Philosophy (63) Kinds of Philosophy (8) Metaontology* (1,002 | 114)Frederique Janssen-Lauret Metaphilosophy, Misc (87) The Nature of Philosophy (82) The Nature of Analytic Philosophy (53) Philosophical Language (14) Philosophical Progress (34) The Role of Philosophy (55) The Value of Philosophy (32) Traditions in Philosophy (32) Verbal Disputes* (12) Women in Philosophy* (55) 3 Metaphysics (32,551) Metaontology (1,002 | 114)Frederique Janssen-Lauret Metaontology, Misc (119) Ontological Commitment (174)Henry Laycock Ontological Conventionalism and Relativism (62) Ontological Disagreement (54)Nurbay Irmak Ontological Fictionalism (86) Ontological Pluralism (49)Nurbay Irmak Ontological Realism (148)Penelope Rush Quantification and Ontology* (156) Methodology in Metaphysics* (197) 4 Ontology (3,772 | 1,421 5 Philosophy of Action 6 Philosophy of Language (34,767 7 Philosophy of Mind (62,786) 8 Philosophy of Religion (56,298 9 M&E, Misc (159) Value Theory (385,427)Daniel Star 10 I list 2 sections as they are of special interest to me - Aesthetics Aesthetic Cognition (3,628 | 1,192) Aesthetic Cognition, Misc (42) Aesthetic Attitudes (40) Aesthetic Concepts (100) Aesthetics and Emotions (373) Aesthetic Experience (404) Aesthetic Judgment (385) Aesthetic Perception (201)Dustin Stokes Aesthetic Interpretation (25) Aesthetic Imagination (274) Aesthetic Pleasure (174) Aesthetic Taste (122) Aesthetic Knowledge* (44) Aesthetic Understanding (127) Aesthetics and Cognitive Science (124)Dustin Stokes Aesthetics and Psychoanalysis (1) Aesthetic Realism and Anti-Realism (152 | 18)Fabian Dorsch Aesthetic Realism (13) Aesthetic Relativism (38) Aesthetic Subjectivism (24) Aesthetic Universality (23) Aesthetic Realism and Anti-Realism, Misc (36) Aesthetic Qualities (412 | 191) Aesthetic Qualities, Misc (35) Beauty (42) Humour* (516) Style (29) The Sublime (85)Robert R. Clewis The Tragic (30) Aesthetic Representation (102 | 17) Aesthetic Symbol Systems (22) Depiction* (613)Ben Blumson Intention and Interpretation (28) Aesthetic Representation and Meaning, Misc (35) Aesthetic Value (484 | 115) Aesthetic Criticism (37) Aesthetic Evaluation (54) Aesthetic Normativity (32) Aesthetics and Ethics (213)Aaron Smuts The Value of Art* (131) Aesthetic Value, Misc (34) Aesthetics and Culture (184 | 46) Aesthetic Universals (9) Crosscultural Aesthetics (22) Pop Culture (28) Aesthetics and Culture, Misc (79) Topics in Aesthetics (284 | 112) Aesthetic Education (28) Aesthetics of Nature (144) Aesthetics and Race (0)Shen-yi Liao Art and Artworks (534 | 24)Nicholas Riggle Artworks (134) The Artworld (46) The Definition of Art (104) The Value of Art* (131) Art and Artworks, Misc (95) Philosophy of Visual Art (1,772 | 41)Nicholas Riggle Depiction* (613)Ben Blumson Painting and Drawing (366) Photography (592)Dan Cavedon-Taylor Sculpture (66) Philosophy of Visual Art, Misc 11 Applied Ethics (117,068) Meta-Ethics (9,471) Normative Ethics (25,627) 12 Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality (20,671 13 Philosophy of Law (12,440) 14 Social and Political Philosophy (81,453) 15 Philosophy of Social Science* (42,969) 16 Political Theory (7,630) Political Views (7,493 | 442 Rights 17 Value Theory, Miscellaneous (43,201 18 Science, Logic, and Mathematics (290,352) Logic and Philosophy of Logic 19 Philosophy of Biology (24,269) 20 Philosophy of Cognitive Science (64,474 21 Philosophy of Psychology (3,864 | 1,299) 22 Philosophy of Neuroscience (4,866 | 3,285 23 Philosophy of Consciousness (17,368 | 5,603) Theories of Consciousness Representationalism* (340)David Bourget Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness (472 | 15)Richard Brown Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness (243)Richard Brown Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness (10)Richard Brown Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness (179)Uriah Kriegel Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc (24)Richard Brown Functionalist Theories of Consciousness (175 | 53) Dennett's Functionalism (117) Functionalism and Qualia* (156)Andrew Bailey Absent Qualia* (50)Andrew Bailey Cognitive Models of Consciousness* (166) Functionalist Theories of Consciousness, Misc (5) Biological Theories of Consciousness (99 | 46) Searle's Biological Naturalism (44) Consciousness and Biology* (600 | 135) Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness* (177) Mind-Brain Identity Theory* (333)István Aranyosi Biological Theories of Consciousness, Misc (9) Panpsychism (259 | 208)Sam Coleman The Combination Problem for Panpsychism (25) Neutral Monism* (55) Russellian Monism* (138)Tom McClelland History: Panpsychism (5) Panpsychism, Misc (21) Theories of Consciousness, Misc (379 | 32) Dualism about Consciousness (88) Eliminativism about Consciousness (26) Idealism* (168)A. P. Taylor Phenomenalism* (77)Michael Pelczar Neutral Monism* (55) Russellian Monism* (138)Tom McClelland Theories of Consciousness, Miscellaneous (40) 24 Philosophy of Linguistics (5,977 | 915) 25 Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology (4,904 | 961) 26 Science of Consciousness (17,681 | 2,455) 27 Philosophy of Computing and Information (2,906 28 Philosophy of Mathematics (11,889) 29 Philosophy of Physical Science (19,608) 30 Philosophy of Social Science (42,969) Philosophy of Anthropology (810)Terence Rajivan Edward Philosophy of Archaeology (383)Adrian Currie Philosophy of Economics (6,856 31 Philosophy of Education (20,859 | 32 Philosophy of Geography (596) Philosophy of History (6,062)Jonathan Lamb Gorman Philosophy of Law* (12,440)Aness Webster Philosophy of Political Science ( 33 Philosophy of Sociology (1,286 Sociology of Science* (1,083)Markus Seidel Sociology of Knowledge* (130)Markus Seidel Philosophy of Sociology, Misc (36) Philosophy of Social Science, Miscellaneous (2,898 | 772) Functional Explanation in Social Science (58) Holism and Individualism in Social Science (91) Objectivity and Value in Social Science (86) Rational Choice Theory (321) Reduction in Social Science (28) Social Ontology (260)Robert Keith Shaw Philosophy of Social Science, General Works (879) Philosophy of Social Science, Misc (403 34 Philosophy of Probability (5,567) 35 General Philosophy of Science (36,843) Philosophy of Science, Misc ( 36 History of Western Philosophy (248,967) Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (24,091 17th/18th Century Philosophy (71,249) 17th/18th Century French Philosophy 17th/18th Century German Philosophy (28,957 | 234)Corey W. 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Some general comments about the nature of philosophy can be summarized from the previous tutorial. Etymologically, "philosophy" can be broken into the following roots and examples. philo—fond of, affinity for; e.g., the name "Philip" means "lover of horses." sophia—wisdom; e.g., the name "Sophie" means "wisdom." Hazarding a beginning definition and some general characteristics of philosophy might be of help. Philosophy is the systematic inquiry into the principles and presuppositions of any endeavor. Almost any area of interest has philosophical aspects. For example, name an area and place the phrase “philosophy of” in front of it as in philosophy of science, philosophy of art, and philosophy of science. Or name the area and place the word “philosophy” after it as in political philosophy and ethical philosophy. Recently, philosophy of sport, medical ethics, and ethics of genetics have generated much interest. Some restaurants have printed on the back of the customer's bill their philosophy of restaurant management. In general, philosophy questions often are a series of "why-questions," whereas science is often said to ask "how-questions." E.g., asking "Why did you come to class today?" is the beginning of a series of why-questions which ultimately lead to the answer of the principles or presuppositions by which you lead your life. I.e., Answer: "To pass the course." Question: "Why do you want to pass the course?" Answer: "To graduate from college." Question: "Why do you want to graduate?" Answer: "To get a good job." Question: "Why do you want a good job?" Answer: "To make lots of money." Question: "Why do you want to make money?" Answer: "To be happy." Hence, one comes to class in order to increase the chances for happiness. As I remember Avrum Stroll and Richard H. Popkin, in their highly readable book, Introduction to Philosophy, isolate seven characteristics of a philosophical problem. These characteristics serve as a good introduction to mark some of the perplexing kinds of problems which can arise in philosophy. Philosophical Thought-Experiments from Metaphysics and Epistemology Characteristics Typical Examples 1. A reflection about the world and the things in it. If I take a book off my hand, what's left on my hand? If I take away the air, then what's left? If I take away the space? With the space gone, nothing is left. Does everything exist in nothing? 2. A conceptual rather than a practical activity. According to Newton's gravitation theory, as the ballerina on a New York stage moves, my balance is imperceptibly affected. Since the earth's circumference is about 25,000 miles, and the earth spins around once every 24 hours, as I sit at my desk, I am in reality looping through space in giant arcs at over 25,000 miles per hour. 3. The use of reason and argumentation to establish a point. Does a tree falling in a forest with no one around to hear it, make a sound? To solve, we distinguish two senses of "sound": (1) hearing—a phenomenological perception and (2) vibration—a longitudinal wave in matter. So if no one is there to hear, there is no sound of type 1, but there is sound of type 2, as can be determined by the prior leaving a recording device on the scene. 4. An explanation of the puzzling features of things. Does a mirror reverse left and right? If I move my right hand, the image's left hand moves. But why then doesn't the mirror reverse up and down? Why aren't the feet in the mirror image at the top of the mirror? Why doesn't it change the situation if I lie down or I rotate the mirror 90 degrees? 5. Digging beyond the obvious. What is a fact? In science, facts are collected. Is a book a fact? Is it a big or little fact? Is the book a smaller fact than the earth which is a larger fact. If the book is brown, is that a brown fact? If facts don't have size, shape, and color, then in what manner do they exist in the world? And how can they be found? 6. The search for principles which underlie phenomena. Is a geranium one flower or is it a combination of many small flowers bunched together? If I turn on a computer, does one event occur or do many events occur? 7. Theory building from these principles. Is nature discrete or continuous? E.g., Consider Zeno's paradoxes of motion. If you are to leave the classroom today, isn't it true that you will have to walk at least half-way to the door? And then when you get half-way, you will have to at least walk another half? How many "halves" are there? How will you ever get out? In practice, philosophy is an attitude, an approach, or even a calling to answer, to ask, or to comment upon certain peculiar kinds of questions. As we saw previously, the problems are often relegated to the main divisions of philosophy: Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Axiology (Ethics and Æsthetics). Attitude—a curiosity arising from questions such as the following. Under the assumption that time is a dimension just like any other, the case of the problem of the surprise examination can arise: Suppose students obtain the promise from their teacher that a surprise quiz scheduled be given next week will not be given, if the students demonstrate how they can know, in advance, the day the teacher will give the exam. Thus, the students can argue as follows: Assuming the class meets only on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, the students know the surprise exam cannot be given on Friday because everyone would know Thursday night that the following day is the only period left in which to give the exam. One would think that the teacher could give the exam Wednesday, but since Friday has been eliminated as a possibility, on Tuesday night, the students would know that the only period left in the week would be Wednesday (since Friday has already been eliminated; hence, the exam could not be given Wednesday either. Monday, then, is the only possible period left to offer the exam. But, of course, the teacher could not give the exam Monday because the students would expect the exam that day. Consequently, the teacher cannot give a surprise examination next week. In his Nobel Prize Lecture, Richard Feynman explained that from the perspective of quantum electrodynamics, if an electron is seen as going forward in time, a positron is the same particle moving backwards in time. Is time- reversal really possible? Is a positron, or even the earlier tachyon, discussed above, associated with backward causation a possible event? Consider this paradoxical result. Suppose a "positron gun" or a "tachyon gun" would fire a particle going backward in time—it could "trigger" an off-switch to turn off the gun before it could be fired. This example is, of course, a thought-experiment. As Feynman noted in his Lectures on Physics, "Philosophers say a great deal about what is absolutely necessary for science, and it is always, so far as one can see, rather naive, and probably wrong. Approach—to devise a methodology to answer such puzzles. Very often, all that is needed is to invoke old maxim, "When there is a difficulty, make a distinction." E.g., for the problem of the sound of a tree falling in a forest with no one around to hear, all we need do is distinguish two different senses of "sound." If by "sound" is meant a "phenomenological perception by a subject," then no sound ("hearing") would occur. If by "sound" is meant "a longitudinal wave in matter," then a sound is discoverable. Calling— if a person has had experiences of curiosity, discovery, and invention at an early age, these experiences could leave an imprint on mind and character to last a lifetime. Further Reading: Ask a Philosopher Archive. Submitted philosophical questions are answered in some detail by philosophers, a project maintained by the International Society for Philosophers. You may submit your questions on the Ask a Philosopher page. Backward Causation. Jan Fey's entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy examines several paradoxes based on the notion where an effect temporally, but not causally, precedes its cause. Paradox. An extensive reference list of paradoxes in Wikipedia is summarized by topic in mathematics, logic, practice, philosophy, psychology, physics and economics with links to more extensive discussion. Unexpected Hanging Paradox. Eric W. Weisstein at the site Wolfram MathWorld provides another version of the Surprise Examination Paradox with a list of further references. “203. Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd. ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company), 1958), 82e. http://www.isfp.co.uk/index.html The International Society for Philosophers was formed in 2002 in association with the Pathways School of Philosophy to bring together amateur and professional philosophers from all over the world. The mission of the ISFP is to "teach the world to philosophize... We believe in freedom of thought and expression but also in the responsibility that goes with that freedom." (ISFP Mission Statement). The Board of the ISFP is responsible for examining essay portfolios and dissertations submitted for the ISFP Associate and Fellowship Awards. The ISFP publishes the electronic journals, Philosophy Pathways and Philosophy for Business, and runs online conferences for Pathways students and ISFP members. On 16th November 2016, there were 2010 ISFP members in 92 countries. http://www.philosophypathways.com/questions/index.html https://www.amazon.co.uk/Philosophy-Made-Simple-Richard-Popkin/dp/0385425333 https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Made-Simple-Complete-Important/dp/0385425333 Download book here for free http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781135139537_sample_900187.pdf Philosophy - eBooks samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781135139537_sample_900187.pdf Third edition. Richard H. Popkin, Ph.D. and. A vrum Stroll, Ph.D. MADE SIMPLE. BOOKS ... Stroll, Avrum. 190.904 ... Introduction. Xl. 1 Ethics. 1 .... Their titles could easily be read: The first was ...... isolation from the social conditions of the time. Download book 840 pages here for free http://183.91.33.12/cache/eresource.lcu.edu.cn/resource/E_Course/ouzhzhxsh/链接文件/外文文献/The Columbia History The Columbia History of Western Philosophy eresource.lcu.edu.cn/.../The%20Columbia%20History%20of%20Western%20Philoso... Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on ... I hope that this volume is worthy of all of her help. .... Donald Davidson and John Searle Avrum Stroll 655 ... Philosophy and the History of Philosophy Richard H. Popkin ... Western Philosophy, are eminently readable, but cover only the high spots of ... http://historyofmodernphilosophy.blogspot.co.za/2008/07/benedict-de-spinoza.html From Descartes to Derrida Table of Contents . * Preface 1. Introduction 2. Early Modern Philosophers 3. Descartes 4. Spinoza 5. Leibniz 6. Locke 7. Berkeley 8. Hume 9. French Enlightenment 10. Kant 11. Hegel 12. Schopenhauer 13. Nietzsche 14. Positivism and Utilitarianism 15. Marx 16. Pragmatism and James 17. Bergson 18. Logical Analysis and Russell 19. Wittgenstein 20. Logical Positivism 21. Existentialism and Sartre 22. Camus and Absurdism 23. Popper 24. Postmodernism 25. Appendix * The Existentialist Couple * Suggestions for further study http://historyofmodernphilosophy.blogspot.co.za/2008/07/suggestions-for-further-study.html Suggestions for further study . Books: History of Western Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, Routledge, London Story of Philosophy by Will Durrant, Pocket Books Sophie’s World by Jostein Gaarder, Berkeley Books, New York Philosophy Made Simple, by Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll, Doubleday & Company, Inc. USA Fifty Major Philosophers, by Diane Collinson, Routledge, London One Hundred Twentieth- Century Philosophers, Routledge New York An Outline of Western Philosophy, by C B Armstrong Online Resources: Philosophy Pages by Garth Kemerling http://www.philosophypages.com Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/ Squashed Philosophers by Glyn Hughes http://www.btinternet.com/~glynhughes/squashed/index.htm Galilean Library http://www.galilean-library.org Spark Notes http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/ http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/philosophie-und-wirtschaft/index.html http://www.philosophypathways.com/newsletter/ http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/ http://www.philosophical-investigations.org/2015/05/what-is-philosophical-problem.html If we ban speculation about metahypotheses, does philosophical debate simply evaporate?  What is a philosophical problem? The irrefutable metahypothesis Taking this further, if we cannot hypothesise about hypotheses, then does science evaporate too? Labels: Karl Popper, Matthew Blakeway, Richard Dawkins, scientific method, Sraffa philosophy of language It is our language, said Francis Bacon, which bedevils everything. It is simply incapable of dealing with being: “Yet even definitions cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and material things; since the definitions themselves consist of words, and those words beget others." I myself have seen bans on areas of philosophical debate as philosophical short circuits, where philosophers most needed escape clauses. Notably Wittgenstein's: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." http://www.philosophical-investigations.org/search/label/Matthew%20Blakeway We Need Animal Cognition, Not Neuroscience http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/philosophicalanarchism.htm I distinguish Political Anarchism from Philosophical Anarchism, on the other hand, which concentrates on the critique of political authority and does not necessarily require the abolition of the state. This latter characteristic is reflected in the fact that negative philosophical anarchism is compatible with many alternative political outlooks. A subspecies of Political Anarchism might be identified as the idea that individuals have each an inviolable sphere of action under their total control. This form of anarchism views social relationships as contractual interactions between independent beings, beings seen as able to lead their lives abstracted from their social environment and its impacts.  I should like to focus however here on the philosophical side of anarchism and outline its contribution to the debate on political authority. For this, I will need to concentrate on what I call 'critical philosophical anarchism'. This I define as the view which examines the best candidates for moral theories of political obligation and derives from their failure the result: * there is no general political obligation, and that in this respect,  * political institutions remain without justification.  Incorporated in this approach is a prior standard of theoretical criticism merged with some idea of what an ideal legitimate society should be like. Philosophical Anarchism considers all existing states to be illegitimate insofar as they fail to meet this ideal.  This anarchist position, as it figures within the debate on political obligation, offers something valuable to the perspective we have towards political institutions and our relation to them. I think that it is important to stress both its critical perspective and its ideal of legitimacy. I see these aspects as defining features of the approach and furthermore as incorporating crucial elements of the arguments of Philosophical Anarchism against political obligation. These are also compatible with certain features of Communal Anarchism. http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/genomic.htm Thus rationalism can never complete its task of obtaining knowledge of the whole of existence. The immediate and unique present always escapes the petrification of process which is its method. Its own continuous extension in specialisation takes it ever further from completeness but perhaps the most problematic issue for the logic of the total system is the content of the system. The most consistent philosophical expression of this problem is found in Kant's absolute adherence to the impossibility of having any knowledge of the world independently of our perception of it. Our understanding can only be of 'things which may be objects of possible experience', that 'outside the field of possible experience there can be no synthetic a priori principles'. We cannot know anything independently of our own perceptions. There can be no privileged transcendental view of the objective. We can know nothing as it is, but only as it seems. Despite its meaning being endlessly debated, the thing-in-itself simply conceptualises the fact that any experience of the objective can only ever be through the perspective of a subject. Its meaning is that ultimately knowledge is only ever personal. Its irrationality denies entirely the possibility of the total system. Kant makes the impossibility of closure and completion even more explicit in his analysis of the antinomies of rational cosmology. In reason's inescapable desire to view the whole be free of the chains of causality of the objective. The Kantian moral actor is a poor thing, impotent within the natural world, stripped of every desire, inclination and self-interest, of that which defines the individual. Only by active intervention in content, through creativity and the effecting of change can be we loosen the grip that contemplation places us in. Limits to thought can only be overcome by action: 'the essence of praxis consists in annulling that indifference of form towards content that we found in the problem of the thing-in-itself. Thus praxis can only be really established as a philosophical principle if, at the same time, a conception of form can be found whose basis and validity no longer rest on that pure rationality and that freedom from every definition of content. In so far as the principle of praxis is the prescription for changing reality, it must be tailored to the concrete material substratum of action if it is to impinge upon it to any effect'.  The goal of the Enlightenment Project is nothing less than the fundamental understanding of the organic and inorganic, of life and death. And its paradigmatic procedure is the scientific method, the practical application of the intellectual process, which precedes by progressive abstraction and decomposition of the whole into its parts and the re-arrangement of them to form laws which explain the whole. After all, biological complexity and sophistication is achieved by the atomisation of life, the decomposition of the unitary, the dissolution of the organic into the inorganic. Reality is mathematised, geometrised in our desire to grasp it. When we theorise on the trajectory of a body in space, we resolve the continuous nature of indivisible motion into static parts in order to integrate them. Scientific analysis demands petrification of process and division of that produced without division. Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution describes these procedures in detail, summarising them thus: 'All the operations of our intellect tend to geometry, as to the goal where they find their perfect fulfilment'. He describes the conceptualisation of the action of a hand passing into some iron filings in a single movement and leaving it's imprint;    Some will account for the position of each filing by the action exerted upon it by the neighbouring filings: these are the mechanists. Others will prefer to think that a plan of the whole has presided over the detail of these elementary actions, they are the finalists. But the truth is that there has been merely one indivisible act, that of the hand passing through the filings. The effects of the application of enlightenment methodology on the labour process underpins much Marxist thought. Lukacs, in his seminal essay Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, puts it thus: 'the mathematical analysis of work-processes denotes a break with the organic, irrational and qualitatively determined unity of the product. Rationalisation in the sense of being able to predict with ever greater precision all the results to be achieved is only to be acquired by the exact breakdown of every complex into its elements and by the study of the special laws governing production - this destroys the organic necessity with which inter-related special operations are unified in the end-product. The unity of a product as a commodity no longer coincides with its unity as a use-value.' Rationalisation transforms time from quality to quantity.  Time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable 'things' (the reified, mechanically objectified 'performance' of the worker, wholly separated from his total human personality): in short, it becomes space. Yet Enlightenment time does not endure. It is a static-time which in calculation and analysis fixates. It is the t of mathematics and physics which functions by a stopping-up and a segmenting-of the indivisible flow of duration. Real time, swollen with all of the past, irrupts into the present as the absolutely novel. Life thus is a continuous process, an ever-preceding movement which our biology holds fast and gazes at. Our intellect can only grasp the Bergsonian vital impetus, which in its contact with matter constantly creates the unique, by a permanent interruption, an interruption which allow for infinite analysis after the event of that which before the event is totally beyond analysis.  The total system cannot permit the unforeseen, the unpredictable, the novel. These deny finality, stability and closure, are antithetical to control, manipulation and prediction. Yet the progress of life is not one of recognition and familiarity but one of strangeness, mystery and magic. The unique present moment happening always and everywhere in real time, constantly and permanently prevents all attempts at total systematisation. It cannot be caught fast until it is gone. The totalising urge is an eternal game of catch-up with the unknowable and unforeseeable present. The very progress of knowledge moves it ever further from totality. Any connection between a myriad of intricate sub-specialisms occurs by chance. In specialisation, we repudiate any interest in the possibility of the total system. Intellectual endeavour takes place in innumerable arenas, each 'a formally closed system of partial laws', in Lukacs' words. For any system, anything outside it is conceptually and practically beyond it's comprehension. Even a systematisation, a supra-ordination, of them all seems an insurmountable task. The rationalisation of work and the 'structure-creation' of economic processes moves in the same direction. Lukacs discussing periods of economic crisis puts it thus; 'The true structure of society appears rather in the independent, rationalised and formal partial laws whose links with each other are of necessity purely formal (i.e. their formal interdependence can be formally systematised), while as far as concrete realities are concerned they can only establish fortuitous connections - the whole structure of capitalist production rests on the interaction between a necessity subject to strict laws in all isolated phenomena and the relative irrationality of the total process.' Thus rationalism can never complete its task of obtaining knowledge of the whole of existence. The immediate and unique present always escapes the petrification of process which is its method. Its own continuous extension in specialisation takes it ever further from completeness but perhaps the most problematic issue for the logic of the total system is the content of the system. The most consistent philosophical expression of this problem is found in Kant's absolute adherence to the impossibility of having any knowledge of the world independently of our perception of it. Our understanding can only be of 'things which may be objects of possible experience', that 'outside the field of possible experience there can be no synthetic a priori principles'. We cannot know anything independently of our own perceptions. There can be no privileged transcendental view of the objective. We can know nothing as it is, but only as it seems. Despite its meaning being endlessly debated, the thing-in-itself simply conceptualises the fact that any experience of the objective can only ever be through the perspective of a subject. Its meaning is that ultimately knowledge is only ever personal. Its irrationality denies entirely the possibility of the total system. Kant makes the impossibility of closure and completion even more explicit in his analysis of the antinomies of rational cosmology. In reason's inescapable desire to view the whole be free of the chains of causality of the objective. The Kantian moral actor is a poor thing, impotent within the natural world, stripped of every desire, inclination and self-interest, of that which defines the individual. Only by active intervention in content, through creativity and the effecting of change can be we loosen the grip that contemplation places us in. Limits to thought can only be overcome by action: 'the essence of praxis consists in annulling that indifference of form towards content that we found in the problem of the thing-in-itself. Thus praxis can only be really established as a philosophical principle if, at the same time, a conception of form can be found whose basis and validity no longer rest on that pure rationality and that freedom from every definition of content. In so far as the principle of praxis is the prescription for changing reality, it must be tailored to the concrete material substratum of action if it is to impinge upon it to any effect'.  For Lukacs it was the proletariat who was to liberate mankind from the reified structure of its existence but 80 years of world history have fulfilled his prophecy completely. 'Only when the consciousness of the proletariat is able to point out the road along which the dialectics of history is objectively impelled, but which it cannot travel unaided, will the consciousness of the proletariat awaken to a consciousness of the process, and only then will the proletariat become the identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality. If the proletariat fails to take this step the contradiction will remain unresolved and will be reproduced by the dialectical mechanics of history at a higher level, in an altered form and with increased intensity. It is in this that the objective necessity of history consists'. The Bergsonian flight into intuition, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Lukacs' vision of the 'salvific' role of the proletariat all fail to solve in any meaningful way the riddle of content, genesis and totality that Enlightenment thought creates and sustains. These philosophies all issue in a demand for practice to break the petrification of rationalisation and the contemplation of rationalism and whilst the form that this practice should take varies, all thinkers radically exclude from their premises, since this would completely contradict the philosophy itself, the possibility that Enlightenment practice could ever be the answer to the riddle of Enlightenment thought. However, the unlimited explosion of scientific knowledge since the appearance of these works requires a re-evaluation of this possibility:   Can our knowledge of a thing ever reach such a fundamental depth that it allows us to know that thing, finally as it is and not forever to know it just as it seems?  Can science as practice give us the objective world which Kant ultimately failed to do in thought, in the Transcendental Deductions?  Does our knowledge of things ever become so utterly extensive, reach such a comprehensive breadth that it becomes total knowledge? Does the incessant scientific transformation of quality to quantity provide us with such a totality of content that the generation of the truly novel, the qualitatively unique, becomes possible? Can the science of time, t, allow us to reclaim Real Time? Let us speak of Life, the organic, the mirror that Bergson constantly holds up to the sterile formalism of scientific reductionism. The living cell is totally dependent upon the proteins that 'subserve' the functions of metabolism and repair, the production and maintenance of a membrane, of replication and reproduction, and without the transcription and translation of DNA these proteins do not exist. There is nothing more fundamental to the life of the cell than the bases that constitute DNA, guanine, adenine, thymine and cytosine; without these there is no life, beyond these lies the inorganic. On the 14th April 2003 the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium announced the completion of the Human Genome Project. The finished sequence covers approximately 99% of the Human Genome and contains less than 1 error per 10,000 bases. In 50 years we have gone from the discovery of the double helix to the near contiguous text of three billion DNA letters.  It is the same biological reductionism that gives us the anatomists dissection that has led us to the Human Genome, but the end - points are radically different. The former is the aestheticisation of death, the latter the total alphabetisation of life. Pushing down through layer upon layer of the phenomena of what it is to be human we reach the lowest common denominator which is not life itself but the essential content of that life. Available in public databases, for use without restriction, we are the co-owners of our fundamental script, named and created by ourselves, in its totality. The search for the minimal gene set, the least amount of DNA required to initiate and maintain life, is an attempt to exclude all the massive redundancy of this script.  This is Enlightenment rationalisation at its extreme but precedes in the diametrically opposite direction to that of the decomposition of the unitary and interruption of process. The aim is the creation, albeit a reproduction, of life, a restitution of process in real time from the atomised, segmented and fixed. Genetic engineering is prediction and calculation, again at its most extreme, but it is productive of the novel. The search for longer lasting tomatoes and for designer babies, albeit banal and reprehensible respectively, is manipulation of content in a creation of the unique. Perhaps most audacious are the attempts to create entirely new genomes, ones that obey the dictates of human logic rather than those handed to us by natural selection. Researchers are attempting to engineer cells that build proteins from completely novel amino acids, one which do not form any part of the repertory of the 20 used in nearly all living cells on earth. Bergson's philosophy is a constant attempt to situate understanding in the ever - present of unique happening, to reverse the direction in which matter inclines, in which mechanism takes us, but it provides no point of departure. The genome is the ultimate point of departure for this reversal. Derived mechanistically but from practice, not from thought, it imbues the vital impetus with human vision and consciousness. The question of the possible closure of the system of Life itself is no longer an issue of the adequacy of philosophical method but one of technological advance, of praxis not of intuition. The Bergsonian flight into intuition, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Lukacs' vision of the 'salvific' role of the proletariat all fail to solve in any meaningful way the riddle of content, genesis and totality that Enlightenment thought creates and sustains. These philosophies all issue in a demand for practice to break the petrification of rationalisation and the contemplation of rationalism and whilst the form that this practice should take varies, all thinkers radically exclude from their premises, since this would completely contradict the philosophy itself, the possibility that Enlightenment practice could ever be the answer to the riddle of Enlightenment thought. However, the unlimited explosion of scientific knowledge since the appearance of these works requires a re-evaluation of this possibility:   Can our knowledge of a thing ever reach such a fundamental depth that it allows us to know that thing, finally as it is and not forever to know it just as it seems?  Can science as practice give us the objective world which Kant ultimately failed to do in thought, in the Transcendental Deductions?  Does our knowledge of things ever become so utterly extensive, reach such a comprehensive breadth that it becomes total knowledge? Does the incessant scientific transformation of quality to quantity provide us with such a totality of content that the generation of the truly novel, the qualitatively unique, becomes possible? Can the science of time, t, allow us to reclaim Real Time? It is in genetic manipulation, and in particular manipulation of the human genome, that the solution that Lukacs proposed to resolve the antinomies of classical thought is to be found - here in the practical creation of content and concrete totality by the identical subject-object. If the completed genome of any organism is the thing-in-itself of that organism, if the manipulation of this content generates the indivisible and constantly unique movement of life and if the minimal gene set describes the essential conditions for that life in its totality then it becomes a key task for Philosophy to reflect on the implications that Biology has for the way we now philosophise. http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/socsci.htm The danger of fragmentation in the social sciences, including the futile infatuation with myopic 'newness' and postmodern 'agenda', is this: if we disperse too much into smaller and smaller areas of inquiry, discourse becomes flat and almost impossible. We no longer know what linking ideas and principles of thinking to communicate, and to whom. The more we become intelligent specialists, the less are we intellectually taken seriously. Piling higher the heap of facts can never produce a better theory, let alone a philosophy of reflection. The warning: 'publish or perish', is another debilitating development in academia. Such threats halt the growth and freedom of thinking. They not only push social scientists into the privatisation and commercial exploitation of research. Worse still, in that they lower academic expectations to instruction in functional skills and their practical usefulness, they also change substantially the satisfaction of educational ideals. And similarly, there are the hordes of publicists, all-rounders, prolific volunteers, pronouncing on everything fashionable. In academic journalism little or no time and care are taken to fathom the ideas on offer, if any are offered at all. We have forgotten what the social sciences inescapably demand of us. To examine the claim of an academic discipline to be science, is to go to the heart of its philosophical values. This means going beyond the rigid methods of analytic rationality, confined within a discipline, which is always removed and remote from the reality of human concerns. Education is the path out of narrow maxims of teaching and into clearings of freer and more flexible thinking. The purpose of this article is to discuss the pedagogical role of philosophy for a humanistic way to understand the world in which we live. A good example is the social science called International Relations, which deals with the global totality of the self-created relations between human beings. In its existential implications international politics raises the most far reaching philosophical questions about the social and historical condition of humankind. Without conceptual rootedness and the philosophical perspective of historical consciousness, the shaky scientific status of the social sciences will not be overcome. It is not that we pose questions; they come to us, and we have to respond. We therefore must be clearer where and how we have to anchor our thinking. The Need for Philosophy ndifference to philosophical reasoning in the social sciences tragically undermines their study. This is a matter of first priority. It urges us to pursue our intellectual endeavours with a strengthened philosophical orientation in mind. Our standards should not be idle talk or what is ephemerally interesting, what meets the taste of everyday opinions. No, the search for the highest good in education should guide our aspirations.Philosophy is a caring and healing praxis. If it has a role to play in education, it is to enrich our moral vocabulary and so our moral lives. This challenges the technical claims of those experts and that expertise that demean political and social questions to short-term problem-solving and efficient management. In the end, the role of philosophy is to recapture the sense of wonderment and intellectual sensibility about the calamity of the human condition. I would challenge the reader to find more tragic examples of this than in the history of international politics.  Some may find the educational requirement of philosophy either too high or not needed at all. For cultural reasons this is indefensible and professionally insufficient. It is also discourteous towards those philosophers whose thinking one can, without refined knowledge of linguistic nuances, only pretend to study. Furthermore, the criterion of a good translation is not just its philological exactness, but the rendering of philosophical meaning.  International Relations is the most complex of the social sciences. Yet despite its immense importance, its tradition or history of ideas is philosophically shallow. It has no compelling school of thought. It is devoid of paradigmatic depth and insight into the nature of humanity's past and destiny. And running commentaries and day-to-day consultancy about what is happening in the world can be no substitute for the task of demonstrating the conceptual structure of international relations and their global consequences.  We have to concentrate on integrating philosophical approaches into our understanding of international affairs which are now all about the very condition that affects and can destroy our earthly source of existence. This is our fundamental challenge. The enormous sufferings of so much of humanity pose a profound problem for us. And related to this is a further daunting philosophical question: how is it possible for a part to say something of validity about the whole of which it is just a part? When the social sciences deal with particular issues, they fail to recognise the universal links between their themes. But social life and its historical development can be understood only in a holistic and not in a piecemeal fashion. In the light of such growing pedagogical anomalies, we need to have the courage to inquire into the scientific, conceptual underpinnings of International Relations. We need to return to the humanities, especially philosophy.  Principles of Dialectic and Phenomenology Thinking philosophically in social science means sharpening the logically necessary categorial prerequisites for the comprehension of our relationship to the world we live in. This, for instance, means rejecting the all too popular insistence on psychologism with its empirical and relativistic tendencies. Fundamental for a critique of this approach to knowledge acquisition is that we do not enquire into the psychological sources of cognition, but into its logical underpinnings. To say that psychologism is senseless is to make the difference between psychic acts of thinking and their logical content. It is to make the distinction between what is and what is valid. Asking for adequate conceptual conditions of the possibility of reflection is likewise dismissing as one-sided those viewpoints which reduce an understanding of our life-world to mechanistic and causal explanations, analogous to the mathematical and positivist physical sciences. Instead of a formal logic, we require for educational purposes a logic of reflection. Such a logic is to establish the correct scientific cognition of human consciousness and the way it manifests itself in socio-historical actuality.  This logic would also study the premises of the individual sciences, their construction and methodologies. Empirical sciences, after all, are practised according to the conceptually unifying operations and intentions of a reflecting human consciousness. The modes of pre-suppositional thinking, which most closely fulfil the quest for such unity in the social sciences, are dialectic and phenomenology.  In order to make sense of these disciplines, we must turn to their most influential expositors: Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, and examine as the tensions within them. These continental traditions cannot be ignored. For without them our understanding of modern societies is likely to become ahistorical, conceptually muddled, and thus defective, as is so often the case with the quantitative and classificatory approaches of Anglo-American scholars. With their usual claim only to local and analytical knowledge they deny at the same time any legitimacy to comprehensive thinking in social science.  The discussion of Kant and Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, however, does not entail dependency on them. Thinking itself, especially in times of social crises and historical transitions, is vitally dependent on the subject matter of part-whole relations towards which thinking is ultimately directed. Thinking is a predicative and, hence, relational activity. And relation is the quintessential category of philosophical science at all levels of socio-historical perspectives, from interpersonal to international relations.  But why should we inquire specifically into the dictions of dialectic and phenomenology? It is because ethics, politics, justice and progress are themes which in a most crucial way call for criteria of judging the theoretical and practical connections between individuals and their communities and history. In addition, the epistemological and methodological question of how an open science of the global structure of social reality as a project for the future is possible at all is framable primarily within dialectic and phenomenology. And these Western languages, in turn, have their beginnings in ancient Greek thought. What is more, it is through the Greek tragedians that the tragedy of modernity can be appreciated and non-Western holistic ideas of the world mediated. The ancient vision of the world invoked the entire environment - human, divine, and inanimate. It was a world intact, a world whose parts, spiritual and material, were interdependent. This world has collapsed and long been lost. Only slowly are we now beginning to relearn the pressing question of how this happened and whether we can ever again regain a sense of unity. For understanding the relationship between human beings and the world is the first condition of human survival. All thinking about socio-historical formations takes its cue from starting-points of reflection, which must be assumed as conditions for comprehending these developments. The following are merely sketches of some educational aspects and objectives of dialectic and phenomenology. These may serve as an impetus for the reader to explore them further. Kant's theoretical philosophy, for instance, is a sharp conceptual critique of empiricism, but also a denial of all metaphysical knowledge as an illusion. It describes with dialectic the contradictory relationship between the understanding and reason. By means of the Copernican revolution, which establishes the subjective and transcendental categories of the understanding, one cognises objects of sense-perception in space and time. Reason, however, allows only for the belief in transcendent ideas such as God, freedom, and immortality. Reason 'out there' cannot be reflectively known. But, as a logical presupposition, it is said to prescribe to the understanding the task to seek the unity of its conceptual knowledge - the ultimate goal of every individual science.  This dualism cannot be bridged. It leads Kant to ask the famous questions: 'What can I know?', 'What ought I to do?', and 'What may I hope'? As a first orientation for working towards a coherent social science, these most humanistic of questions are today as appropriate as they ever were. Hegel's approach is to resolve the Kantian dichotomy by placing dialectic in socio-historical relations. The dialectic of reason is no longer a transcendent condition for understanding a presumed objective world external to us. It is now the truth itself of human self-consciousness. Reason creates and educates itself within and through the totality of social and historical actuality.  This process of production results in the unity of theory and praxis. History is the immanent object in which the social subject reflects itself. Dialectic is the conceptual mediation of present subjective and holistic identity out of differing and in this sense contradictory and particular moments of the past. Hegel's statement that the ''I' is the 'We', and 'We' is the 'I'' formulates most succinctly the organic structure of interdependence that constitutes the part-whole relations between the individual, society, and history. Husserl's phenomenology is a passionate argument against modern science and the impact of its history on the human life-world. Unlike Kant, Husserl does not study the world as it appears conceptually. Rather, he describes the logical structures of the manners of how it shows itself to consciousness.  Phenomenology is a rigorous attempt to probe the essence of the cognising subject itself. Subjective consciousness always intends the unity of all the horizons of the world. Phenomena are therefore not essentially physical entities; they are experiences inter-subjectively lived and articulated. Husserl's humanism is the search for new constitutions of humanity's self-responsibility. These conditions cannot be material facts, for 'merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people'. Their legitimacy, instead, is grounded in the transcendental origin of a logic of reflection. Phenomenological thinking for Heidegger is a path that penetrates the transcendentalism of Kant's concept and Husserl's consciousness and leads towards the unconcealment of Being. Being is for the subject the meaning-giving ground of its experiences. Phenomenological research opens up those rigid traditions which seemingly established philosophical and religious certainties. ' All these historical epochs show how Being appeared in time but in distorted forms. Its expressions in the praxis of science and technology today are seen as particularly dangerous. Unlike Hegel, who constructs dialectically the reflection of the present out of its past, Heidegger destroys phenomenologically all metaphysical manifestations and re-discovers the authentic source of Being in the pre-Socratic visions of the unity of the world.  To regain a binding sense of origin, in order to find a truer social and historical direction into the future, one needs to question the development of the past. This is the educational task of philosophy, for 'questioning is the piety of thought'.This synopsis indicates that dialectic and phenomenology provide us with an initial access into conceptual languages of relation. They also reveal the manner in which the inescapable tension within and between them reflects the need for calm and change in humanity's self-image.  Concepts connect facts and theories about society and history into contextual, and philosophical meaning. More than any other heuristic entry into social science they offer the possibility to make our spiritual and material reality transparent and hence intelligible. But we cannot grasp these concepts - and their further appropriation by later French and German writers - without recourse to our quartet: Kant and Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. Structuralism and post-structuralism, hermeneutics and critical theory, for instance, have their bearings in the dialectical and phenomenological practices of our philosophers. These sages illuminate our awareness of the internal relations of socio-historical life. Observation alone and simplistic common-sense thinking cannot accomplish this. Questions which underlie the evidence of relational unity have their final justification in dialectic and phenomenology. It is in dialectic that we find the immanent principle of all human activity and movement, while in phenomenology the philosophy of subjectivity grounds this principle in a framework of consciousness and world, history and Being. The works of Kant and Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger are at once distant and contemporaneous. Their thinking can help us to overcome the conceptual chaos in the increasingly atomised social sciences. These philosophers subject slippery assumptions about social and historical appearances to critical judgments. In their daring questions and answers they teach us to think thinking, and not merely to record and report on ready-made theories, to seek safety in uncontroversial facts, or to escape into relativistic pluralism and its twin, dogmatic scepticism. Humans are the only beings who are concerned about what they ought to be, about their future, their possibilities of being I said earlier that among the social sciences the study of International Relations is the most far reaching. War and peace and the danger of a nuclear holocaust, environmental and ecological threats, and the impact of capitalist economies on world poverty are issues of truly planetary magnitude. Everything else is derivative. These developments affect the whole of humankind. But how do we relate to them? They cannot be made sense of merely with catchy sound-bites like 'new world order', 'the end of history', or 'the clash of civilisations'. Their understanding, instead, is intrinsically philosophical.  In dialectical and phenomenological reflection we are dealing with ourselves as subjects, and with the questions 'what is it to be human?' and 'how ought we to live?'. Humans are the only beings who are concerned about what they ought to be, about their future, their possibilities of being. Their end and thus their future is always only a question for them.  This is in stark contrast with factual studies and predictions based on the pretensions of statistics. There we treat the political world as if it self-evidently existed as an object outside and independent of us. To prove this wrong, philosophical teaching has to become the pedagogical agent through which knowledge becomes, not only the conscious possession of human beings, but also the guiding principle of their action - now with the view of a future that is to be secured for all humanity. One example must suffice to illustrate my point. Carl von Clausewitz begins his great book On War like this: 'I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject, next its various parts or sections, and finally the whole in its internal structure. In other words, I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought together..It is for reason of this part-whole relationship and the most radical paradigmatic shift it necessitates that Raymond Aron called Clausewitz a 'philosopher' of war.  Little in Clausewitz is ever understood unless we see the timeless truth of his premise embodying a unity and are prepared to think it through and ponder its consequences for action. Clausewitz is not a theoretician of particular types of war. And by the same token, Marx is not a market economist, just as the philosophers of nature, from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger, are not short-term policy-makers. They are not specialists in the pursuit of narrow interests. They are thinkers who conceive of human beings not as distinct entities, but as subjects who produce themselves spiritually and materially in the whole of society, history, and nature. Their work needs to be carefully studied and not misused in mindless collages of quotations and for ambiguous motives. It is not that we are disturbed by a problem for which we must fix a solution. We are faced with a condition of humanity that requires first a transformation of our thinking. We think correctly when we learn that socio-historical phenomena and their relation to nature are both woven together into a web of life. If we do not care to wonder about the significance of our own standpoint, our scholarly products remain unconvincing and hopelessly entangled in the finitude of facts and myriads of theories. They will remain built on quicksand and not be accepted as valid reasoning. But the effort to legitimate what we are doing is our foremost educational responsibility. While our pronouncements may not be the truth, the search for truth remains nonetheless inalienable. If we fail in this imperative, our need for philosophical conceptions of what we are engaged in when we think about the world is unfulfilled, and all sense of intellectual purpose lost.  Philosophising is not an exercise which we impose on others. It is a form of praxis; it guides us towards the integrity of our own thinking, its origin and unfolding. The experience of nihilism in the 20th century should be the strongest justification for adopting the questioning thinking of dialectic and phenomenology. This century calls for the contemplation of the necessary though complicated and often tragic relationship between philosophy and politics, between our actions and the great ideas which we acknowledge. This century supports much pessimism about what is domestically, internationally, and globally possible, despite the attempt by some to retrieve and preserve the Enlightenment promise. But the premise of that promise, that is, man's inevitable emergence from his own self-imposed immaturity, has clearly lost credibility, both theoretically and in practical terms.  Many people today doubt our wisdom and see no reason to be sure of ourselves. The politics of thinking must therefore be to determine, again and again, who we are and what we are doing to ourselves and to others, even though this quest is never fully complete. It is only a possibility. But we must try to get a grip on the question. To choose a philosophy is like choosing a self. Not to choose one is not knowing who one is and what one thinks. The social sciences are about factual knowledge and theory acquisition and the informative and policy-oriented analysis of historical, contemporary, and current affairs. But the study of socio-historical phenomena also demands the scrutiny of these theories, the understanding of that knowledge and the justification of the very presuppositions which are claimed to validate this analysis. All knowledge is ultimately grounded in principles of philosophical comprehension. What theory is to fact, philosophy is to theory, and all three moments of cognition are inextricably linked to one another. Only when we raise our human concerns to the level of philosophical consciousness are these concerns opened up to understanding. Upholding philosophical values presupposes a noble vision of educational purpose. This purpose is the imaginative teaching of serious thinking. It may well be that in the world today we act too much and think too little. Address for correspondence: Dr Hayo Krombach, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. The Columbia History of Western Philosophy | Books | Columbia ... https://cup.columbia.edu/...columbia-history-of-western-philosophy/9780231101295 Richard Popkin has assembled 63 leading scholars to forge a highly approachable chronological account of the development of Western philosophical ... The three chapters in this appendix deal with matters that do not really fit in the chronologically ordered structure of the rest of this volume. Nonetheless, each deals with a matter of much relevance. Constance Blackwell* has been working on the history of the history of philosophy, making us realize that what we call ‘‘the history of philosophy’’ is an enterprise that itself has a history that goes back to the Renais- sance; and in the form we usually meet it, it only goes back to the mid-eighteenth century. The development of histories of philosophy, as she shows, has greatly influ- enced what people think philosophy is about and established what we accept as the canon of important philosophical authors, going back to antiquity. Many new approaches and theories have been put forth and developed in various ways. At this point, it is hard to assess where we are and where we may be going in future philosophizing. There has been a tremendous divergence between the concerns and approaches of philosophers in the English-speaking world and those of the French and German worlds. Over the last half century, there has been fairly little contact between these philosophical worlds. In the United States, a kind of mixing is beginning to occur that might lead to new possible ways of carrying of the philosophical quest. Up to World War II, the American philosophical scene was dominated by prag- matic philosophy and British idealism. In the 1930s, many European intellectual ref- ugees came to America and found havens in colleges and universities. The logical positivists from Vienna seem to have had the first major impact and to have gener- ated an American form of positivism. More slowly, people trained in phenomology and existentialism in Germany and France came here. Both movements had to trans- late their texts, explain them to the American audience, and show their relevance to thinkers here. Also in the 1930s, some American scholars came in contact with Lud- wig Wittgenstein and his teachings and brought his way of philosophizing to the American scene. After the war, many more went to study at Oxford and Cambridge to imbibe the new kinds of analytic philosophies, and some of the leaders came to the United States to teach. For a few decades, there was little communication among the new kinds of Euro- pean philosophies that were becoming the vital part of the American philosophical scene. Battles were fought for control of college and university departments. New journals appeared in order to foster research in different kinds of philosophizing. The American Philosophical Association, the umbrella organization of the people teaching in the field, was dominated for a while by the logical positivists and analytic philos- ophers. Gradually, a kind of balance has been reached, and almost every group is able to take part in the programs of the association. A broader view of philosophy has been emerging in many departments: a feeling and conviction that students should be exposed to the different kinds of philosophies and ways of doing philosophy. This has led to the coexistence in many colleges and universities of philosophers of different interests, styles, and convictions. This inter- mingling is starting to show some fruit and might presage new combined ways philosophers could approach problems in the twenty-first century. What movements, what figures, will emerge retrospectively as the central ones of twentieth-century thought is beyond our present ability to judge. As new issues be- come the important foci of philosophers, the newer thinkers find their antecedents in previous philosophizing. So the history of philosophy is always being rewritten in terms of newer developments. It looks to me, as the editor of this volume, that quite forceful kinds of scepticism are being generated out of the analytic and Continental movements. What John Dewey called ‘‘the quest for certainty’’ may be over, replaced by other forms of understanding. To guess what these might be like is to attempt prophecy. The study of the history of philosophy should bring the realization that the human drive to come to terms with the world we live in has led to a vast number of different kinds of theorizing and understanding. Many philosophies that were believed or found most plausible or certain in the past have subsequently been written off as erroneous, immature, or uninteresting. The same may happen with the most plausible or con- vincing theories being offered currently. But the urge for philosophic understanding shows no sign of abating, and so the philosophical journey will probably go on and on, each stage building on and rewriting its past. —RICHARD H. POPKIN * HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RECONSTRUCTING PHILOSOPHY Between 1430 and 1833, when Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy were first published, philosophers used the history of philosophy to define philosophy and to better philosophize themselves. The history of philosophy as a subject has been studied with renewed vigor since 1926. At this time, Emile Bre´hier, in a seminal study introducing his Histoire de la philosophie, stated that he had developed a new methodology that rejected Hegelian constructs, as well as those inspired by Auguste Comte. In 1979, Giovanni Santinello wrote that he would not impose an ‘‘idea’’ on historical texts as post-Kantian philosophers have done in his five-volume survey of works on the history of philosophy written between the Renaissance and the twentieth century in his Models of the History of Philosophy. The material the Santinello volumes have amassed is extraordinary, studying around 160 historians of philosophy up to G. W. F. Hegel. This new historical approach has liberated us. We can now witness how the retelling of philosophy’s history created philosophy as we now know it and how the history of philosophy raised philosophical questions that philosophers found they had to answer. A generation ago, it was thought that neuroscience held the promise of solving many philosophical problems. Looking back now over those lost decades, we are able to see that it failed to solve a single one, and arguably created a new one or two. http://www.philosophypages.com/ 153