Abstract
The purpose of this note is to tidy up some matters concerning ascriptions of intention and the employment of the doctrine of double effect (henceforth DDE). I first argue that Jonathan Bennett’s efforts to show that DDE is a foolish doctrine are unsatisfactory. I then consider a puzzle of Mark Johnston’s that seems to pose a problem for the defender of DDE. I turn to possible solutions to the puzzle, criticize one, and then offer the one I find most appealing. I then show how my proposal for employing DDE enables it to make some distinctions between courses of conduct without issuing foolish pronouncements about moral permissibility.
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Thanks to Robert George, Michael Bratman, Gilbert Harman and Mark Johnston for useful discussion and written comments. For a more extended somewhat different treatment of these issues see my “To Double Business Bound: Reflections on the Doctrine of Double Effect," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75, 4, pp. 561–583.
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Delaney, N.F. A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philos Stud 134, 103–110 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9086-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9086-z