Skip to main content
Log in

The toiling lily: narrative life, responsibility, and the ontological ground of self-deception

  • Published:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture what it is to be who we are. Irrespective of whatever worldly projects and identities we press into, something about our subjectivity always remains unchanged. Narrative identity, which trades merely on practical identity, thus obscures this ontological dimension of life wherein human action, decision, choice, and responsibility truly originate. By way of conclusion, in §4, I briefly examine depictions of the narrative life found within the authorships of Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, and Voltaire, illustrating how self-narrative at times invites self-deception and annuls responsibility. A life of genuine responsibility demands more than what the most candid and best intentioned of self-narratives can supply us. Living the good life, I shall intimate, is thus not something that involves mere narrative. It depends, rather, on inwardness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. An anonymous referee has brought to my attention that narrative identity, at least by Ricoeur’s lights, is arguably not equivalent to the portrayal of practical, social identity I highlight. It is, rather, a matter of “reconstruction” or “retrospection.” I agree with all this. It seems to me, however, that this still poses a problem for narrative theorists: what, after all, besides practical identities could supply the material for such a reconstructive, retrospective enterprise?

  2. One might object that not all narrativists claim that such a construal of one’s life is imperative for authenticity. Nevertheless, it seems to me that many do. Among others, notable instances include Carr (1991), Davenport (2012), Guignon (1993), Ricoeur (1980), and Rudd (2009, 2013).

  3. An anonymous referee has noted that it is one thing to argue that narrative mightn’t be sufficient for authenticity, but something else to fill-in what it must then instead involve. I admit that the “negative” half of my argument is fuller than its “positive” half. Due to space considerations, however, I shall not be able to develop the positive aspect in great detail. I can, though, say at least this. On Kierkegaard’s view, and one I share, “inwardness” amounts to what he repeatedly calls a “God-relationship.” For a further explanation of why such so-called “existential faith” is irreducible to a form of narrative self-understanding, and what it thus otherwise essentially involves, see DeLay (forthcoming).

  4. Reasonably, one might argue that life exhibits narrative structure even prior to any explicit articulation of such form. As both Davenport and Rudd have noted, the view that narrative self-regard turns solely on reflective articulation, schematizing, and reconstruction is guilty of the “logos-fallacy.” More on all this in §4.

  5. Much of what I say in the next two pages, especially the material concerning the “logos-fallacy,” is taken from DeLay (forthcoming).

  6. This is, admittedly, a very loose paraphrase of Matthew 6:28. It remains justified, I hope, if only because it accentuates the absolute distinction between one’s ontological subjectivity and practical identity, respectively.

References

  • Carr, D. (1991). Time, history, and narrative. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crowell, S. (2004). Authentic historicality. In D. Carr & C.-F. Cheung (Eds.), Space, time, and culture. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davenport, J. (2012). Narrative identity, autonomy, and mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeLay, S. (forthcoming). A Review of John J. Davenport’s narrative identity, autonomy, and mortality: from Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard. European Journal of Philosophy.

  • Derrida, J. (1995). The gift of death (trans: Willis, D.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  • Dostoevsky, F. (1992). Crime and punishment (trans: Pevear, R., & Volokhonsky, L.). New York: Vintage Classics.

  • Fisher, T. (2010). Heidegger and the narrativity debate. Continental Philosophy Review, 43, 241–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frank, J. (2010). Dostoevsky: A writer in his time. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guignon, C. (1993). Authenticity, moral values, and psychotherapy. In C. Guignon (Ed.), Cambridge companion to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1982). The basic problems of phenomenology (trans: Hofstadter, A.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

  • Heidegger, M. (1993). What is metaphysics? In D. Krell (Ed.), Basic writings. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, M. (2005). Dostoevsky and the dynamics of religious experience. London: Anthem Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kierkegaard, S. (1983). Fear and trembling (trans: Hong, E., & Hong, H.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Ricoeur, P. (1980). Narrative time. In W. J. T. Mitchell (Ed.), On narrative (pp. 69–190). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudd, A. (2009). In defence of narrative. European Journal of Philosophy, 17, 60–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rudd, A. (2013). Self, value, and narrative: A Kierkegaardian approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartre, J. (1956). Being and nothingness: A phenomenological essay in ontology (trans: Barnes, H.). New York: Washington Square Press.

  • Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio, 16, 428–452.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Voltaire. (2003). Candide (trans: Morley H.). New York: Barnes & Nobles Books.

Download references

Acknowledgments

I owe thanks to Steve Crowell, Mike Griffiths, two anonymous referees, my dad, and the participants at the “Narrativity: Interpretation, Embodiment and Responsibility” workshop. Their feedback helped me think through all the issues at stake. Also, thanks Barns.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Steven DeLay.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

DeLay, S. The toiling lily: narrative life, responsibility, and the ontological ground of self-deception. Phenom Cogn Sci 15, 103–116 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9348-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9348-0

Keywords

Navigation