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On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism

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Abstract

The following paper presents a characterization of three distinctions fundamental to computationalism, viz., the distinction between analog and digital machines, representation and nonrepresentation-using systems, and direct and indirect perceptual processes. Each distinction is shown to rest on nothing more than the methodological principles which justify the explanatory framework of the special sciences.

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Demopoulos, W. On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism. Synthese 70, 79–96 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414027

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414027

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