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Technology and the Myth of ‘Natural Man’

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Abstract

The main suggestions and objections raised by Don Ihde and Charles Lenay to my ‘Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment’ are summarized and discussed. On the one hand, I agree that we should pay more attention to whole body experience and to further resisting Cartesian assumptions in the field of cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of cognition. On the other hand, I explain that my account in no way presupposes the myth of ‘natural man’ or of a natural, delineated body from before the fall into technology.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Fine Arts, University College Ghent, Ghent, Belgium

    Helena De Preester

  2. Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

    Helena De Preester

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  1. Helena De Preester
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Correspondence to Helena De Preester.

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De Preester, H. Technology and the Myth of ‘Natural Man’. Found Sci 17, 385–390 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9246-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9246-7

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