It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations-in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions-leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has been supposed. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
CITATION STYLE
Donnelly, M. (2009). Mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. Synthese, 168(1), 53–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9312-z
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