Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation is a purely qualitative account of confirmation; it allows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms the theory to a certain degree. The present paper extends Glymour’s theory to a quantitative account and investigates the resulting theory in some detail. It also considers the question how bootstrap confirmation relates to justification.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • L. BonJour (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Harvard University Press Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • L. Bovens S. Hartmann (2003) Bayesian Epistemology Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • N. Cartwright (1989) Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Christensen (1983) ArticleTitle‘Glymour on Evidential Relevance’ Philosophy of Science 50 471–481 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289130

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Christensen (1990) ArticleTitle‘The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping’ Philosophy of Science 57 644–662 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289584

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Christensen (1997) ArticleTitle‘What is Relative Confirmation?’ Noûs 31 370–384

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Christensen (1999) ArticleTitle‘Measuring Confirmation’ Journal of Philosophy 96 437–461

    Google Scholar 

  • I. Douven (1999) ArticleTitle‘Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent’ Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 66 S424–S435

    Google Scholar 

  • I. Douven (2002a) ArticleTitle‘A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 391–410 Occurrence Handle10.1093/bjps/53.3.391

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • I. Douven (2002b) ArticleTitle‘Testing Inference to the Best Explanation’ Synthese 130 355–377 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1014859910339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Douven, I.: 2003a, ‘Empirical Equivalence, Explanatory Force, and the Inference to the Best Theory’, in R. Festa, A. Aliseda, and J. Peijnenburg (eds.), Logics of Scientific Cognition: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, Rodopi, Atlanta GA, in press.

  • I. Douven (2003b) ‘On Bayesian Logic’ M.C. Galavotti (Eds) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences Kluwer Dordrecht 321–326

    Google Scholar 

  • Douven, I.: 2004, ‘Basic Beliefs, Coherence, and Bootstrap Support’, in S. Roeser, R. Rood, and R. van Woudenberg (eds.), The Epistemology of Basic Belief(publisher to be determined), in press.

  • I. Douven J. Uffink (2003) ArticleTitle‘The Preface Paradox Revisited’ Erkenntnis 59 389–420 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1026092226306

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Dreier (1996) ArticleTitle‘Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality’ Theory and Decision 40 249–276 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00134210

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duhem, P.: 1906/1954, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory(translated by P. Wiener), Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.

  • J. Earman (Eds) (1983) Testing Scientific Theories University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Earman (1992) Bayes or Bust? MIT Press Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Earman C. Glymour (1988) ArticleTitle‘What Revisions Does Bootstrap Testing Need?’ Philosophy of Science 55 260–264 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289431

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Earman W. Salmon (1992) ‘The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses’ M. Salmon (Eds) Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River NJ 42–103

    Google Scholar 

  • Edidin, A.: 1983, ‘Bootstrapping Without Bootstraps’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 43–54.

  • E. Eells (1985) ArticleTitle‘Problems of Old Evidence’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 283–302

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Eells B. Fitelson (2000) ArticleTitle‘Measuring Confirmation and Evidence’ Journal of Philosophy 97 663–672

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Eells B. Fitelson (2002) ArticleTitle‘Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support’ Philosophical Studies 107 129–142 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1014712013453

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fitelson, B.: 2001, Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory, PhD. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison.

  • B. Fitelson (2003) ArticleTitle‘A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence’ Analysis 63 194–199 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8284.00420

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • H. Gaifman (1985) ArticleTitle‘On Inductive Support and Some Recent Tricks’ Erkenntnis 22 5–21 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00269957

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garber, D.: 1983, ‘Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 99–131.

  • K. Gemes (1993) ArticleTitle‘Hypothetico-Deductivism, Content, and the Natural Axiomatization of Theories’ Philosophy of Science 60 477–487 Occurrence Handle10.1086/289748

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • K. Gemes (1994) ArticleTitle‘A New Theory of Content I: Basic Content’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 596–620 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF01052779

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • K. Gemes (1997) ArticleTitle‘A New Theory of Content II: Model Theory and Some Alternatives’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 449–476 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1004291217792

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Gillies (2000) Philosophical Theories of Probability Routledge London

    Google Scholar 

  • C. Glymour (1980a) Theory and Evidence Princeton University Press Princeton NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • C. Glymour (1980b) ArticleTitle‘Bootstraps and Probabilities’ Journal of Philosophy 67 691–699

    Google Scholar 

  • W. Goosens (1976) ‘A Critique of Epistemic Utilities’ R. Bogdan (Eds) Local Induction Reidel Dordrecht 93–113

    Google Scholar 

  • I. Hacking (2001) An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic Cambridge University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Halpern (2003) Reasoning about Uncertainty MIT Press Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Hampton (1994) ArticleTitle‘The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason’ Economics and Philosophy 10 195–242

    Google Scholar 

  • B. Hansson (1988) ‘Risk Aversion as a Problem of Conjoint Measurement’ P. Gärdenfors N.-E. Sahlin (Eds) Decision, Probability, and Utility Cambridge University Press Cambridge 136–158

    Google Scholar 

  • C. Howson (2000) Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • C. Howson (2003) ‘Bayesian Evidence’ M.C. Galavotti (Eds) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences Kluwer Dordrecht 301–320

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Jeffrey (1983) The Logic of Decision EditionNumber2 University of Chicago Press Chicago IL

    Google Scholar 

  • Joyce, J.: 2004, ‘On the Plurality of Probabilist Measures of Evidential Relevance’, manuscript.

  • M. Kaplan (1981a) ArticleTitle‘Rational Acceptance’ Philosophical Studies 40 129–145 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00353786

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • M. Kaplan (1981b) ArticleTitle‘A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance’ Journal of Philosophy 78 305–330

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Kemeny P. Oppenheim (1952) ArticleTitle‘Degrees of Factual Support’ Philosophy of Science 19 307–324 Occurrence Handle10.1086/287214

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • P. Klein T. Warfield (1994) ArticleTitle‘What Price Coherence?’ Analysis 54 129–132

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Kuipers (2000) From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism Kluwer Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • A. Kukla (1998) Studies in Scientific Realism Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • K. Lehrer (1990) Theory of Knowledge EditionNumber2 Routledge London

    Google Scholar 

  • I. Levi (1967) Gambling with Truth MIT Press Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Maher (1993) Betting on Theories Cambridge University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Merricks (1995) ArticleTitle‘On Behalf of the Coherentist’ Analysis 55 306–309

    Google Scholar 

  • I. Niiniluoto (1983) ArticleTitle‘Novel Facts and Bayesianism’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 375–379

    Google Scholar 

  • I. Niiniluoto (1998) ArticleTitle‘Verisimilitude: The Third Period’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 1–29 Occurrence Handle10.1093/bjps/49.1.1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • I. Niiniluoto (1999) Critical Scientific Realism Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Nozick (1981) Philosophical Explanations Harvard University Press Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • E.J. Olsson (1999) ArticleTitle‘ “Cohering With” ’ Erkenntnis 50 273–291 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005530006938

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • S. Psillos (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Routledge London

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine W.V. (1953). ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in his From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 20–46.

  • M. Rabin (2000) ArticleTitle‘Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem’ Econometrica 68 1281–1292 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1468-0262.00158

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ramsey F.P. (1926). ‘Truth and Probability’, in his The Foundations of Mathematics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931, London, pp. 156–198.

  • M. Resnik (1987) Choices University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Satz J. Ferejohn (1994) ArticleTitle‘Rational Choice and Social Theory’ Journal of Philosophy 91 71–87

    Google Scholar 

  • L. Savage (1954) The Foundations of Statistics Wiley New York

    Google Scholar 

  • G. Schurz (1991) ArticleTitle‘Relevant Deduction: From Solving Paradoxes Towards a General Theory’ Erkenntnis 35 391–437

    Google Scholar 

  • G. Shafer (1976) A Mathematical Theory of Evidence Princeton University Press Princeton NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Shogenji (1999) ArticleTitle‘Is Coherence Truth Conducive?’ Analysis 59 338–345 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8284.00191

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • W. Spohn (1988) ‘Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States’ W. Harper B. Skyrms (Eds) Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics NumberInSeries(Vol 2) Reidel Dordrecht 105–134

    Google Scholar 

  • W. Spohn (1991) ‘A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons’ W. Spohn B.C. Fraassen Particlevan B. Skyrms (Eds) Existence and Explanation Kluwer Dordrecht 165–196

    Google Scholar 

  • W. Spohn (1999) ArticleTitle‘Two Principles of Coherence’ Erkenntnis 50 155–175

    Google Scholar 

  • B.C. Fraassen Particlevan (1980) The Scientific Image Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • van Fraassen, B. C.: 1983a, ‘Theory Comparison and Relevant Evidence’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 27–42.

  • van Fraassen, B. C.: 1983b, ‘Glymour on Evidence and Explanation’, in Earman (ed.), pp. 165–176.

  • B.C. Fraassen Particlevan (1988) ‘The Problem of Old Evidence’ D. Austin (Eds) Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Dordrecht 153–165

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Weirich (1986) ArticleTitle‘Expected Utility and Risk’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 419–442

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Weirich (2001) ArticleTitle‘Risk’s Place in Decision Rules’ Synthese 126 427–441 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005240226961

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L.A. Zadeh (1978) ArticleTitle‘Fuzzy Sets as a Basis for a Theory of Possibility’ Fuzzy Sets and Systems 1 3–28 Occurrence Handle10.1016/0165-0114(78)90029-5

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University, Rotterdam

    Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs

Authors
  1. Igor Douven
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Wouter Meijs
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Igor Douven.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Douven, I., Meijs, W. Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative. Synthese 149, 97–132 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6250-2

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6250-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation