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Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism

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Abstract

Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Igor Douven

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  1. Igor Douven
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Correspondence to Igor Douven.

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Douven, I. Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism. Stud Logica 86, 149–182 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9058-5

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