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The Preface Paradox Revisited

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Abstract

The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it isassumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principleaccording to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP)must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausibleassumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead tocontradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version of CP canthus be maintained.

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  1. Institute for History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80000, 3508 TA, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Igor Douven

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  1. Igor Douven
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Douven, I. The Preface Paradox Revisited. Erkenntnis 59, 389–420 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026092226306

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