Abstract
Voyeurism seems creepy. This paper considers whether these feelings are well-founded. It identifies a variety of ethically troubling features, including harmful consequences, deceit, and the violation of various religious, legal, and conventional norms. Voyeurism is something of a moral misdemeanor that seems worrisome when associated with these other failings. However, because voyeurism remains troubling even in the absence of harm or deceit, we must pay special attention to the ways complex social conventions can be used to show disrespect for others. The discussion centers on the famous case of Lady Godiva and Peeping Tom, but much of the analysis applies to voyeurism more generally.
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Notes
For further discussion, see Warren and Brandeis (1890).
Reputation is one, but not the only reason violations of privacy are objectionable. See Prosser (1960).
There might also be indirect harms that stem from a pattern of looking. If, for example, looking leads to the fear that violence may result, then the fear is a harm to be counted. Even if no physical harm is actually done, the threat of violence can be just as pernicious. Still, there is no reason to suppose that harm is done.
Godiva’s husband probably suggested that she take her ride because he never believed that she’d actually go through with it. If so, then he never really intended for her to be naked in public. King Candaules makes a different mistake (Herodotus 2008). He contrives to show off his queen’s beauty by giving Gyges secret access to his bedchamber. Candaules can be faulted for regarding his wife as a sexual trophy to be displayed. As such, he exhibits disrespect for her and their relationship.
For related issues, see Scanlon (1975).
Property rights and respect for autonomy may converge here. If Godiva has ownership over her body, then she ought to be able to decide who has access to her body. Looking may constitute a form of trespassing, but Tom’s actions may be disrespectful even if she has no such right to her body. See Thomson (1975).
For a related discussion, see Nathan (1990).
Tom could have decided that being seen by strange men would not be in Godiva’s interests and thus concern for her welfare could have led him to keep the shades drawn. Even so, it would have been her welfare and not her explicit choice that was doing the argumentative work.
For a related discussion, see Nathan (1990).
This is something of a timeless theme. The Roman poet Ovid (1994), for example, writes of a man who, while hunting with his dogs, comes upon the goddess Diana bathing in the river. Seeing that she’s been viewed naked, Diana turns the poor guy into a game animal and his own dogs promptly devour him. We could pause to ask what the young hunter did wrong and observe that his punishment does not seem to fit the crime. Perhaps the severity of the punishment speaks to the gravity of gazing upon a woman above one’s station.
For further discussion, see Barcan (2004).
McDowell (1979) makes a similar point about how we learn to participate in normative communities.
Stocker (1979) makes the case for the latter possibility.
Tom’s willingness to secure consent signals that he is not trying to deceive Godiva, but he shows a willingness to see her as an equal participant (or at least a fellow participant) in the exchange. Furthermore, it would seem to meet Nagel’s test (1969) for un-perverted sex acts, namely reciprocal communication.
For a helpful discussion of this point with regards to race, see Blum (1999).
Nussbaum (1995) considers a similar form of objectification.
This view is defended by Donoghue (2003).
There is an analogy here with the near universal importance of privacy. According to Westin (1984), most cultures value their privacy, though each differs in the details that they hope will remain hidden. Similarly, most cultures have attitudes about the naked body, though each differs in how the body is to be covered.
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Draeger, J. What Peeping Tom Did Wrong. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 41–49 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9225-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9225-z