Abstract
Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an information-based account of knowledge an effective tool in answering the skeptic.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dretske, F. Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64, 409–413 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-5815-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-5815-x