Abstract
This paper explores a problem for Michael McKenna’s conversation model of moral responsibility that views blame as characteristically part of a conversational exchange. The problem for this model on which this paper focuses is the problem of private blame. Sometimes when we blame we do so without any intention to engage in a communicative exchange. It is argued that McKenna’s model cannot adequately account for private blame.
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Notes
Paul Bloom discusses disapproval in pre-verbal children in Just Babies.
References
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Driver, J. Private Blame. Criminal Law, Philosophy 10, 215–220 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-015-9368-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-015-9368-z