Abstract
I had first thought of entitling this paper—after the model of Jonathan Swift—“A Modest Proposal For Preventing the Noema From Becoming an Entity and thereby a Burden to Philosophical Reflection.” The rhetorical purpose of such a title would be to encourage participants in this conference on Husserl’s notion of the noema never to use the term “noema” again. The reason for such encouragement is that a technical term used by Husserl within a non-ordinary, philosophical attitude to denote an ordinary object abstractly considered has come to be used instead to denote a non-ordinary object. This mistaking of an ordinary thing specially considered for a special thing does in fact prove to be a burden to philosophical reflection, and to eliminate the term would contribute to eliminating the burden. Now while I knew in fact that this probably should not and certainly would not happen, I hoped at least to dispel the view that noemata are entities present (but hidden) in our ordinary experiences, awaiting only to be disclosed through the methodological technique of the phenomenological reduction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Reference
Cf. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band Erster Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis,ed. U. Panzer, Husserliana XIX/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 219ff. [Logical Investigations,trans. J. N. Findlay, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press, 1970), I: 427ff.i.
It is only after the formulation of the notion of the reduction that Husserl includes the intentional contents within the phenomenological contents of the act and, therefore, only after the formulation of the notion of the reduction that Husserl can include the intentional object, the intended object as intended, i.e. the noema, within the phenomenological contents of the act. Cf. LU II/1, 411n. [II: 576n.]); cf. also Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie,ed. K. Schuhmann, Husserliana III/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 2025, 295–97 [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology,trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 213–16, 307–8]. Cf. also John J. Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object,Contributions to Phenomenology 4 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 34ff.
Dagfinn F011esdal, “Noema and Meaning in Husserl,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement, 1990): 271.
Dagfmn Follesdal, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 68087.
Follesdal, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” 684, and “Noema and Meaning in Husserl,” 270–71.
Follesdal, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,’’ 681, and ”Noema and Meaning in Husserl,“ 268–69.
F011esdal, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” 682, 684; and “Noema and Meaning in Husserl,” 266–67, 269–70.
Follesdal, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” 682, and “Noema and Meaning in Husserl,” 266.
Cf. Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism, chaps. 4–8.
F011esdal, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” 683.
David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mù4 Meaning and Language (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984); cf., e.g., 93 and 117.
Ibid., 121–24.
Husserl’s distinction between morphological and exact (ideal) concepts and between “abstraction” (in the sense of generalizing abstraction) and “ideation” (the idealizing abstraction) can be found in Ideen I,§74. A later account of empirical generalization can be found in Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik (hereafter EU),ed. L. Landgrebe with Afterword by L. Eley (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1972) [Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic,trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973)], §§81ff., and the connection of idealization to geometry and the exact mathematical sciences of nature can also be seen in EU; cf. 41–44 [43–46]. For accounts of idealizing, cf. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Philosophie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie,ed. W. Biemel, Husserliana VI (2nd ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), §9a and Appendix III [The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §9a and Appendix VI)], and Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1886–1901),ed. I. Strohmeyer, Husserliana XXI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 285–95, 308–10.
For the definition of formalizing abstractions, cf. Ideen I,§13 and Formale und transzendentale Logik Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft,ed. P. Janssen, Husserliana XVII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) [Formal and Transcendental Logic,trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969)], §24.
Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality,123–24.
Aron Gurwitsch, “Husserl’s Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Historical Perspective,” Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, ed. L. Embree ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974 ), 236–37.
John J. Drummond, “A Critique of Gutwitsch’s `Phenomenological Phenomenalism’,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1980): 10–12; and Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism,63–73.
Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism,73–74.
I am grateful to William McKenna for pointing out this possibility to me in conversation; of course, I do not mean to suggest that he would accept anything I say in my response to this argument.
Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness ( Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964 ), 227.
Ibid.
Cf. Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism,§§16–17.
I have elsewhere used the expression “phenomenological phenomenalism;” cf. “A Critique…”, and Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism,§18.
Robert Sokolowski has pointed to the gerundial character of “mind;” cf. Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 157.
Cf. John J. Drummond, “On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of Kinaesthesis in Visual Perception,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (1979): 19–32.
Husserl gives us a good example of this kind of teleological fulfillment in his discussions of optimal givenness in perception; cf. Ding and Raum: Vorlesungen 1907,ed. U. Claesges, Husserliana XVI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), §36.
I have given some indications of how I would answer this question in “Modernism and Postmodernism: Bernstein or Husserl,” The Review of Metaphysics 42 (1988): 275–300; Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism,chap. 9; and “Phenomenology and the Foundationalism Debate,’ Reason Papers 16 (1991): 45–71.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Drummond, J.J. (1992). An Abstract Consideration: De-Ontologizing the Noema. In: Drummond, J.J., Embree, L. (eds) The Phenomenology of the Noema. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3425-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3425-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4207-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3425-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive