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A Thomistic appraisal of human enhancement technologies

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Abstract

Debate concerning human enhancement often revolves around the question of whether there is a common “nature” that all human beings share and which is unwarrantedly violated by enhancing one’s capabilities beyond the “species-typical” norm. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’s influential theory of human nature, noting certain key traits commonly shared among human beings that define each as a “person” who possesses inviolable moral status. Understanding the specific qualities that define the nature of human persons, which includes self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective thought, and volitional autonomy, informs the ethical assessment of various forms of enhancement. Some forms of cognitive and physical enhancement may be desirable from the perspective of what constitutes the “flourishing” of human persons in our fundamental nature; while other forms of enhancement, such as emotive or so-called “moral” enhancement, run the risk of detracting from human flourishing when evaluated from the virtue-theoretic perspective Aquinas promotes.

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Notes

  1. Relatedly, I will not entertain any theological premises in my analysis that may support or weaken the principled case for human enhancement. Rather, acknowledging that what I will describe is one aspect in which human beings can be understood as created in the “image and likeness of God” (Genesis 1:27), I will focus only upon Aquinas’s philosophical account of human nature and flourishing.

  2. An excellent fictional presentation of such a bifurcated society due to genetic engineering is Andrew Niccols’s film Gattaca (Columbia Pictures, 1997).

  3. An example of a group who generally approves of any form of enhancement is the World Transhumanist Association, also known as “Humanity+” [6]. General critical assessments of enhancement technologies are developed by Michael Sandel [5] and Jürgen Habermas [7]; Frances Kamm [8] and Elizabeth Fenton [9] offer critical responses to Sandel and Habermas, respectively. The President’s Council on Bioethics [10] provides a comprehensive evaluation of various forms of human enhancement.

  4. Descriptions of various present and potential near-future means by which forms of enhancement may be brought about can be found among the contributions to [12].

  5. The primary historical proponent of the libertarian concept of autonomy is John Stuart Mill [14]. Robert Nozick [15] articulates an influential contemporary defense of libertarianism.

  6. Gerald McKenny [27] and Sandel [5, ch. 5] critique human enhancement on the basis of the value of appreciating our vulnerability and the attendant virtues we may cultivate in response.

  7. Discussion, both pro and con, of these objections can be found in [7, 28–32].

  8. This general definition captures the essence of being a person, but omits many distinct nuances that are often contested. For example, it is debated whether having a capacity for self-conscious rational thought and autonomous volition requires having a biological cerebrum, or whether a functionally equivalent silicon information-processing system would suffice. Also debated is what is required to be a member of the moral community. For example, a severely mentally disabled human being may not be a contributing member of the moral community—in that she does not have the mental capacity to fulfill duties to others—but may be a recipient member—in that she has rights which entail others fulfilling duties toward her.

  9. As Thomistic thought has been a primary influence upon the moral theology of the Roman Catholic magisterium, which in turn has been a significant conservative voice in many bioethical debates, it is worth noting what Catholic authorities have had to say on the subject of genetic enhancement. The Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith wholly rejects any form of non-therapeutic genetic intervention [43]. Pope John Paul II, however, offers a more open-ended assessment in which he defines four basic criteria that, if satisfied, would allow for the moral possibility of genetic enhancements [44]. While it may be the case that no human enhancement project could avoid violating one or more of those criteria, perhaps some forms of enhancement may be appropriately carried out that both fulfill the criteria while also avoiding the concerns raised by the Congregation.

  10. The purpose of phantasms is to be available for the intellect to use in abstracting the intelligible form—that is, the universal essential concept—of perceived things. Hence, phantasms are between the immediate mental impression of an object perceived by sensation and the intellectual understanding of that object’s nature as abstracted from any individuating characteristics.

  11. The fundamental good of promoting pleasure and avoiding pain for both oneself and others is also affirmed by non-natural law moral theorists, most notably utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill [52, 53].

  12. Nussbaum and Aquinas also agree that such actualization is achievable through just interpersonal and social relationships defined in terms of our moral obligations to each other, which in turn is the foundation for rights and duties. It is not surprising that Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s views cohere insofar as Aquinas was significantly influenced by reading and commenting upon Aristotle, quoting him at length as “The Philosopher” [55, ch. 12].

  13. Nussbaum likens her approach to Rawls’s notion of “primary goods”; although she also criticizes Rawls’s approach as inadequate for responding to the diversity of human needs.

  14. Among the authors cited in this paper, Anderson and Tollefsen, James Delaney, and James Keenan address the topic of human enhancement from a Thomistic perspective as well [58–60]. Each of their analyses differs from the present analysis, however, in various ways. Anderson and Tollefsen adopt a Thomistic anthropological and ethical framework, but they do not relate their analysis explicitly to Aquinas’s texts; furthermore, they arrive at a more pessimistic conclusion regarding some forms of cognitive enhancement that, according to my analysis, can serve as an aid to the “self-constituted philosopher’s” search for wisdom [58, p. 96]. Delaney conducts his analysis in light of magisterial documents of the Roman Catholic Church, which, although informed by Thomistic philosophy, are also based upon fundamentally theological premises not referenced in the present analysis; furthermore, Delaney discusses genetic enhancement only in general terms without specifically analyzing distinctive forms of enhancement. Finally, similar to Delaney, Keenan approaches the topic from an explicitly theological perspective and focuses narrowly on the question of whether enhancement involves a misguided striving toward perfectionism.

  15. The authors have in mind here a list of basic goods quite similar to Finnis’s list cited above.

  16. Fictional depictions of cyborgs include the Terminator, the Cylons of the re-imagined Battlestar Galactica television series, and the Borg of Star Trek: The Next Generation and Star Trek: Voyager.

  17. I am grateful to John Boyer for raising this criticism.

  18. Aquinas argues that intellective cognition can occur post-mortem without one’s body; but such is not the natural mode of human cognition [45, Ia, q. 89].

  19. Discussion of the various pros and cons of performance enhancement can be found in [12, pt. IV]

  20. I will not discuss here the potential benefits and problems associated with expansively increased longevity, asymptotically approaching immortality.

  21. Consider the fictional depiction of a human being with technologically enhanced eyesight in the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation. The character Geordi LaForge, congenitally blind, is capable of seeing well beyond the visible spectrum thanks to his VISOR. In the feature film, Star Trek: Insurrection (Paramount Pictures, 1998), Geordi’s natural eyesight is temporarily restored and, in a moving scene, he sees a sunrise naturally for the first time, telling his captain, “You know, I’ve never seen a sunrise—at least not the way you see them.”

  22. To be sure, there is some debate whether SSRIs are an effective means of effecting long-term emotive enhancement [66].

  23. Maartje Shermer, also employing a MacIntyrean virtue-theoretical framework, defends a contrary view [80].

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Acknowledgments

A version of this paper was presented at the 2013 Oxford Symposium on Religious Studies, the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics 9th World Conference, the 3rd Annual Conference on Medicine and Religion, the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, the 2013 meeting of the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, and the first U.S. meeting of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas at the University of St. Thomas in Houston. I am grateful for comments provided by audience members at each of these conferences as well as to two anonymous reviewers for this journal.

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  1. Semler Endowed Chair for Medical Ethics, College of Osteopathic Medicine, Marian University, 3200 Cold Spring Road, Indianapolis, IN, 46222-1997, USA

    Jason T. Eberl

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Eberl, J.T. A Thomistic appraisal of human enhancement technologies. Theor Med Bioeth 35, 289–310 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-014-9300-x

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