Skip to main content
Log in

Possible knowledge of unknown truth

Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Church, A. (1945). Referee reports on Fitch’s “A Definition of Value”. In J. Salerno (Ed.), 2009a [Published for the first time].

  • Edgington D. (1985) The paradox of knowability. Mind 94: 557–568

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fitch F. (1963) A logical analysis of some value concepts. Journal of Symbolic Logic 28: 135–142

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart W. D. (1979) The epistemology of abstract objects. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 53: 152–165

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart W. D., McGinn C. (1976) Knowledge and necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5: 205–208

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humberstone L. (1981) From worlds to possibilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10: 313–339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke S. (1980) Naming and necessity. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D. (1986) On the plurality of worlds. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H. (1978) Meaning and the moral sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Salerno, J. (Ed.). (2009a). New essays on the knowability paradox (pp. 13–20). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salerno, J. (2009b) ‘Knowability Noir: 1945–1963’. In Salerno (2009a, pp. 29–48).

  • Schlessinger G. (1985) The range of epistemic logic. Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen

    Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker R. (1999) Context and content. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Williams B. (1973) ‘Imagination and the self’ in his Problems of the Self (pp. 26–45). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 26–45

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson T. (1987a) On knowledge of the unknowable. Analysis 47: 154–158

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson T. (1987b) On the paradox of knowability. Mind 96: 256–261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson T. (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Dorothy Edgington.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Edgington, D. Possible knowledge of unknown truth. Synthese 173, 41–52 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9675-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9675-9

Keywords

Navigation