Abstract
Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.
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Edgington, D. Possible knowledge of unknown truth. Synthese 173, 41–52 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9675-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9675-9