Abstract
Gödel's Theorem is often used in arguments against machine intelligence, suggesting humans are not bound by the rules of any formal system. However, Gödelian arguments can be used to support AI, provided we extend our notion of computation to include devices incorporating random number generators. A complete description scheme can be given for integer functions, by which nonalgorithmic functions are shown to be partly random. Not being restricted to algorithms can be accounted for by the availability of an arbitrary random function. Humans, then, might not be rule-bound, but Gödelian arguments also suggest how the relevant sort of nonalgorithmicity may be trivially made available to machines.
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Edis, T. How Gödel's Theorem Supports the Possibility of Machine Intelligence. Minds and Machines 8, 251–262 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008233720449
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008233720449