Simplifying Alethic Pluralism Dr Douglas Edwards Penultimate draft. Final version to be published in The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 1 Introduction What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or ‘alethic pluralists’) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief - or any chosen truth-bearer - to be true.1 This view is developed in relation to the idea that natural language is composed of various ‘domains of discourse’2 , such as moral discourse, mathematical discourse, and discourse about the nature - or state - of the material world. Given the differences between these domains, it is thought that truth may require different treatments accordingly. This paper is mainly concerned with the proper formulation of alethic pluralism. After briefly examining the general motivations for the view, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I go on to outline a new approach for alethic pluralism that does not suffer from these problems, what I call ‘simple determination pluralism’. This approach offers a new framework for pluralist theories which has the potential to have applications beyond the theory of truth. 2 The Motivations for Alethic Pluralism Equipped with the traditional notion of truth as correspondence to the facts, acknowledging that statements within a domain are apt to be described as true or false carries with it significant metaphysical baggage: in other words, it can be thought of as implying realism about that domain, or that there are facts of the matter which our statements, thoughts or beliefs map onto. This has posed particular problems about employing the 1 I prefer to talk of propositions as the truth-bearers in a language, but will sometimes, for ease of phrasing, speak of sentences as truth-bearers. In these cases take talk of sentences as being truth-apt as being shorthand for sentences expressing propositions, which are then truth-apt. 2 This phrasing of the notion is due to Wright (1992). 1 notion of truth in the moral domain, for example, where the idea of there being facts of the matter causes a degree of uneasiness.3 It also causes problems in the mathematical domain, where we might be more comfortable thinking that there are mind-independent facts of the matter, but, due to the abstract nature of the facts involved, the notion of ‘mapping onto’ these facts seems misguided. Some respond to this uneasiness by giving up on the applicability of truth in these problematic domains.4 But pulling in the other direction is the attractive view of minimal truth-aptness. That is, that a domain can sustain a truth predicate in virtue of meeting very basic standards of syntactic discipline. Briefly, a domain will qualify as being syntactically disciplined if its component sentences can be used as the antecedents of conditionals, be negated, and feature as the targets of propositional attitude statements. In addition, there ought to be a distinction between seeming to be right and being right, along with the intelligibility of speakers saying ‘I used to think that p but now I realise I was mistaken’. Moral discourse, for example, plausibly meets these standards. We often say things like ‘I used to think that eating meat was morally wrong, but now I realise I was mistaken’, or ‘I wonder whether abortion is morally wrong’. Furthermore, moral sentences such as ‘murder is wrong’ can feature as the antecedents of conditionals, such as ‘if murder is wrong, then those that murder will be punished’, or be negated, as in ‘it is not the case that murder is right’. It is this feature in particular that pushes us towards the truth-aptness of these sentences. As Geach (1960, 1965) argues, only truth-apt sentences can feature as the antecedents of conditionals, so, given that moral sentences are able to do so, they must be apt for truth.5 2.1 Deflationism Of course, one may well point out that this is not such a problem: there is already a plausible, and popular, theory of truth which explains how these kinds of claims are truth-apt, and without any unwanted metaphysical baggage: deflationism.6 Deflationist 3 Particularly if these facts are considered to be mind-independent in origin - the classic concerns are found in Mackie 1977. 4 Such as expressivists (e.g. Ayer 1936, Blackburn 1998) about the moral domain, and fictionalists about mathematics (e.g. Field 1980, 1989). 5 There are, of course, a lot of contentious issues surrounding this claim. Expressivists, for example, who think that moral sentences express attitudes, and not beliefs, maintain that although such sentences appear truth-apt, they are not. There is much debate about whether they can maintain this claim in the face of the intuitive discipline exhibited by the moral domain, and, indeed, whether or not there is anything more to a domain’s dealing in truth-apt contents over and above it’s appearing to do so. For a small sample, see Wright 1992, Smith 1994 and 1994a, Divers and Miller 1994 and 1995, Boghossian 1990 and Jackson, Oppy and Smith 1994. 6 One type of deflationism is Horwich’s (1998) ‘minimalist’ view. See Field 1994 for an alternative type of deflationism, and O’Leary-Hawthorne and Oppy 1997 for an overview of deflationist theories. It is also worth noting that another deflationary option here, which will not be discussed, is to take a deflationary view of facts, as opposed to an explicitly deflationary view of truth. See, for example, Horwich 2006. 2 theories of truth typically hold that the concept of truth is entirely captured by all known instances of the following (E) schema: (E) hpi is true iff p.78 Moreover, deflationists think that there is nothing more to be said about truth. That is, that there is no ‘robust’9 truth property, such as the property of corresponding to the facts, or of representing reality. At most, a deflationist will allow that all true propositions share an honorific, ‘lightweight’ property of falling under the concept of truth. Deflationists about truth thus reject that the intuitive thoughts about truth amount to anything substantial about truth. They do not think the nature of truth consists in some relation between linguistic and non-linguistic entities, or between language and the world. The deflationist instead insists that the truth predicate exists just to perform certain logical functions, such as the endorsement of a proposition, or generalisation over a potentially infinite number of propositions. One common deflationist claim is that the truth predicate serves an expressive function: to say ‘the proposition, p, is true’ is just another way to assert that p, or to express one’s endorsement of the proposition that p. Moreover, deflationism is often paired with the minimal notion of truth-aptness, a natural companion given its deflated view of truth.10 Consequently, sentences about morals will be apt for truth just as sentences about mathematics, or sentences about the material world will be: there is no deep problem here at all. However, deflationism may be able to give us the resources to explain how all of the classes of sentences we are considering can be true, but it does so at the expense of being unable to say anything interesting about truth. It also does so at the cost of being unable to account for the idea that truth is valuable, and being unable to use truth as an explanatory resource when attempting to understand other concepts.11 There are also concerns that deflationism is an internally unstable view, expressed in Wright’s (1992) ‘inflationary argument’.12 I will not go into these problems in depth here, but suffice to 7 In these and following schemas I use hpi as shorthand for ‘the proposition that p’ (thus in line with Horwich 2010). 8 (E) is the form of Tarski’s (1944) T-schema adopted if we take propositions to be the primary truth bearers in a language. I use (E) as much of the discussion has Horwich’s view in mind, which does take propositions to be the primary truth bearers, but this should not be taken to be distinctive of deflationary views in general. 9 One way of understanding ‘robust’ properties is to hold that a robust property of F is a property which is not simply transparent on the concept of F. That is, there may be more to grasping the nature of the property than simply understanding the concept. This is opposed to a ‘lightweight’ property of F, which is a property whose nature is grasped simply by understanding the concept of F. For more on this distinction see Alston 2002, Wright 2003 and Lynch 2009. 10 Though whether deflationism entails minimal truth-aptness this is controversial - see, for example, Jackson, Oppy and Smith 1994. 11 See, for example, Lynch 2004a, Davidson 1999, Field 1986. 12 Also discussed in Horwich 1996 and 1998, Rumfitt 1995, van Cleve 1996, Kölbel 1997 and Miller 2001. 3 say that, for the sake of the dialectic here, it is fair to say that deflationism does not offer a free solution to the problem under discussion. 3 Alethic Pluralism The alethic pluralist agrees with the deflationist that all of the sentence classes we have considered are capable of being true. However, the alethic pluralist does not think, like the deflationist, that this is the end of the matter. There is a story to tell about the nature of truth, the pluralist thinks, but this story will not always be the same. According to the alethic pluralist, there will be a robust property in virtue of which the propositions expressed by sentences in a particular domain of discourse will be true, but this property will change depending on the domain we are considering. In other words, although the notion of truth as correspondence to the facts might fit our domain of discourse about the material world, a different notion of truth - perhaps one with less metaphysical baggage, constructed out of coherence, or justification or warrant - may fit the domains in which the correspondence notion looks problematic.13 Consequently, alethic pluralism offers a treatment of truth which allows for a wide range of beliefs, sentences and the like to be true, whilst holding onto the idea that there are interesting things to say about truth. Before putting forward my view of how alethic pluralism should be formulated, I wish to explain why we ought not to be satisfied with two of the main proposals on the table, those of Wright (1992, 2003a), and Lynch (2009).14 3.1 Wright’s Minimalist Theory The original statement of alethic pluralism is Crispin Wright’s (1992) ‘minimalist’15 theory of truth. According to Wright, any domain of discourse that meets certain basic standards of syntactic discipline is able to sustain a truth property; that is, sentences belonging to that domain will be capable of expressing propositions, and will be capable of being true in a ‘robust’, i.e. not simply deflationary, way. 13 These alternative notions of truth ought not to be too surprising, given that many have sponsored full-blown versions of these views in the past. Coherence theory, for instance, is often set up as the traditional competitor to correspondence theory - see, for example, Walker 1989. We also have theories that identify truth with what would be justified under ideal epistemic circumstances (e.g. Putnam 1981). It is not my purpose in this paper to argue for any particular notions of truth for each domain, rather to set up the general structure a pluralist view ought to take. Consequently, I shall not go into the nature of these properties in too much detail. 14 There is also a previous version of the view put forward by Lynch in Lynch 2001, 2004, and discussed in detail in C.D. Wright (2010). But as Lynch rejects this view in Lynch 2009, for reasons with which I am sympathetic, I will not discuss this view here. 15 Note that Horwich also uses the term ‘minimalism’ for his brand of deflationism, which is different from the type of view Wright advocates. I will reserve the term for Wright’s view in this paper. 4 Wright holds that the concept of truth is exhausted by a number of a priori principles, or ‘platitudes’16 about truth, such as:17 Transparency. That to assert a proposition is to present it as true and, more generally, that any attitude to a proposition is an attitude to its truth - that to believe, doubt, or fear, for example, that p is to believe, doubt, or fear that p is true. (E). hpi is true iff p.18 Embedding. A proposition’s aptitude for truth is preserved under a variety of operations - in particular, truth-apt propositions have negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, etc., which are likewise truth-apt. Straight-talking. A true proposition ‘tells it like it is’, in some way.19 Contrast. A proposition may be true but not justified, and vice versa. Stability. If a proposition is ever true, then it always is, so that whatever may, at any particular time, be truly asserted may - perhaps by appropriate transformations of mood, or tense - be truly asserted at any time. Absoluteness. Truth is absolute - there is, strictly, no such thing as a proposition’s being more or less true; propositions are completely true if true at all. Wright holds that this concept remains fixed across domains of discourse, but states that the property that satisfies the concept will change depending on the nature of the syntactically disciplined domain we are considering. The thought is that, if a property is to count as a legitimate truth property, it must exhibit the features set out in these platitudes. In other words, a property must behave a certain way if it is to count as a truth property. Descriptions of the property must thus be such that they include descriptions analogous to those of truth in the platitudes. For instance, if correspondence is to count as a truth property, then it must hold of the property of corresponding to the facts that a proposition, p, corresponds to the facts iff p. Likewise, it must hold that propositions that correspond to the facts can be justified yet not correspond to the facts, and vice versa. The same must hold of all the platitudes in the above list (or at least 16 For more on the use of platitudes in philosophical methodology, see Nolan 2006. Broadly speaking, platitudes are designed to reflect highly intuitive, pre-theoretical, and perhaps even theory-neutral thoughts about a concept. 17 This list is adapted from Wright 2003a: 271-272. 18 Whilst Wright does not include (E) in his list of platitudes referenced here, he (and Lynch (2009: 9)) takes it to be derivable other platitudes given some uncontroversial assumptions (see Wright: 1992, 2003a). I include it (E) here as (E) is a significant constraint as any: a failure to satisfy (E) would perhaps be problematic for any theory of truth, not just a pluralist one. 19 Wright’s original platitudes in this area are phrased directly in terms of true propositions ‘corresponding to the facts’. Wright, however, claims that this seemingly loaded terminology is in fact equivalent to a more neutral phrasing like that which I use here. See, e.g. Wright 1992: 24-27. 5 the set of platitudes that are eventually agreed upon). Note also that these descriptions are not descriptions that must hold at the level of concept, rather they are descriptions that must hold at the level of property. It is the behaviour of the properties in question that we are interested in here, not their corresponding concepts.20 Wright’s thought thus allows one to hold that, in our talk about the nature or state of the material world, the property that satisfies the truth concept may well be the property of corresponding to the facts, but that, in the moral domain, the truth property may be a property constructed out of justification or warrant. Wright argues that a good candidate for the truth property in such a domain is what he calls ‘superassertibility’.21 Wright also (in Wright 2003a) offers a demonstration of how coherence may be identified with truth in pure arithmetical discourse. According to the minimalist view, then, we have different truth properties, each tied to a specific domain of discourse.22 3.1.1 A Problem for Wright However, there are significant problems with Wright’s proposal. To see them, what we need to do first is distinguish between the global satisfaction of platitudes, and local satisfaction of platitudes. In other words, we require a distinction between unrestricted and restricted interpretations of the truth platitudes. The unrestricted interpretations of the truth platitudes make no reference to notions of truth that just apply in particular domains. Accordingly, the truth platitudes are taken at face value; no indexing to particular domains is required to identify the property that satisfies them. The restricted interpretation of the truth platitudes, on the other hand, requires that the platitudes be indexed to a particular domain in order to identify the property that satisfies them. The platitudes thus require a revisionary phrasing: instead of an unrestricted platitude like ‘hpi is true iff p’, we get ‘In domain D1 hpi is true iff p’, or - better - hpi is true (in D1) iff p. It is interesting to note that Wright’s minimalism is required to interpret the platitudes restrictedly, for the unrestricted readings would come out as false on his account. Here is why. Suppose, with Wright, that we are to identify truth with the relevant domain-specific property, and take the properties of corresponding to the facts (as the 20 In other words, we are not looking for identity of concepts - the concept of corresponding to facts or superassertibility need not be identical to the concept of truth - rather looking for a property (or properties) that exhibit the features set out in the truth concept. These descriptions must thus hold at the level of property. See Alston 2002, Wright 2003a and Lynch 2009 for more on the concept/property distinction in this context. 21 Roughly, a proposition is superassertible when it is warrantedly assertible at a stage of inquiry, and would remain warrantedly assertible at any future stages of inquiry. See Wright 1993. 22 It is worth pointing out that some theories of truth along pluralist lines take it that there is not such a radical difference in the nature of the truth property across domains. For instance, Horgan 2001 and Sher 2004 take it that truth always consists in correspondence to the facts, but that the nature of the correspondence relation changes according to the conception of the subject matter. I will not discuss this type of view here. 6 truth property for the material world domain) and superassertibility (as the truth property for the moral domain), for example. On the unrestricted reading, it seems as though neither of these properties will actually be able to be considered truth properties, as none will be able to satisfy the platitudes unrestrictedly, for all propositions. Take a version of the (E) schema platitude and its interpretation on a view of truth as corresponding to the facts in the domain of discourse about the material world:23 (E) hpi is true iff p. (EC) hpi corresponds to the facts iff p.24 The key difference between (E) and (EC) is that (E) holds true for all propositions, whereas (EC) only holds true for propositions in the domain of discourse concerning the state of the material world. If, for instance, we were to plug a moral proposition into (EC), it would come out as false, as moral propositions are subject instead to the following principle: (EM) hpi is superassertible iff p. (EC), then, cannot globally satisfy (E), as some propositions will be subject instead to (EM). But, of course, (EM) cannot globally satisfy (E) either, as some propositions will be subject to (EC). It thus follows that neither correspondence nor superassertibility can satisfy the unrestricted reading of (E). As, by the lights of Wright’s theory, the truth platitudes are supposed to specify features that it is necessary that any candidate truth property must satisfy, the failure of these properties to satisfy this platitude means that they are not worthy of being regarded as truth properties. It thus seems as though we must then read the claim restrictedly, and say that truth properties only apply within domains of discourse, and that a truth property for a domain can be identified by its ability to satisfy the platitudes in that domain. In order to do this, we must first restrict all of the truth platitudes, which can no longer be understood in their original unrestricted forms. Accordingly, (E) becomes: (Ed) hpi is true (in D) iff p. The satisfaction of this platitude now requires more than just the substitution of the name of the property for ‘true’: prior to this, we must plug the domain in question into D position. Working still with the properties of correspondence and superassertibility for domains of material world and moral discourse respectively, consider material world discourse as domain D1, and moral discourse as domain D2. What we will get are the following two models of (Ed): 23 See Wright 1992 and 2003a for more details on the process of modelling the platitudes in this way. One way to derive (EC) is to use (E) along with the claim (C) hpi is true iff hpi corresponds to the facts. Transitivity of the biconditional would yield (EC) from (E) and (C). Note that (C) would presumably have to hold if corresponding to the facts is to be identified with truth. 24 7 (Ed1) hpi corresponds to the facts (in D1) iff p. (Ed2) hpi is superassertible (in D2) iff p. Unlike (EC) and (EM), (Ed1) and (Ed2) both come out as true, thus rescuing the prospects for correspondence and superassertibility being considered truth properties. It will hold for all propositions in domain D1 that hpi corresponds to the facts in D1 iff p, just as it will hold for all propositions in domain D2 that hpi is superassertible in D2 iff p. Provided we restrict the platitudes in question, it looks as though the properties Wright considered do have the pedigree to be considered truth properties. This restriction, however, brings with it two rather serious problems. The first is that minimalism is in danger of becoming a far more revisionary and controversial view about truth than it originally cast itself to be. One of the main points of the methodological strategy adopted by minimalism is to construct an analysis of the concept in question - here truth - by reference to a set of uncontroversial, highly intuitive platitudes. However, by restricting the truth platitudes to specific domains, minimalism loses most, if not all, of this methodological strategy. Firstly, the original platitudes identified by Wright were, of course, unrestricted: they make no reference to domains, and aim to characterise truth from a theory neutral, and pre-theoretical perspective. Once restricted, however, they certainly do not characterise truth from a theory-neutral, and pre-theoretical, perspective. Even if the theory that truth consists in different properties in different domains is correct, it is certainly not platitudinous: it is a substantial theoretical claim, which is highly contentious, and far from being theory-neutral. Consequently, as soon as domain-specificity is built into the very truth platitudes, these platitudes cease to be platitudes, at least in the sense originally intended. What we have are revisionary, theory-laden interpretations of the original truth platitudes: we do not have the truth platitudes themselves. The second problem is that the restriction of the platitudes to specific domains has serious implications for the structure of Wright’s view as he presents it. His thought is that we have a single truth concept, exhausted by the unrestricted platitudes, which is satisfied by different properties in different domains. However, with the restriction of the platitudes in each domain, what we end up with is a number of distinct truth concepts as well as distinct truth properties. This is because - in this case at least the content of concepts is given by platitudes, so if the platitudes are restricted, so will the concept be. What we end up with, then, is not a general truth concept satisfied by different properties in different domains, but rather different truth concepts in different domains (e.g. truth-in-ethics, truth-in-mathematics, etc.) which pick out different truth properties. It is important for Wright that, even if the truth properties vary from domain to domain, the general truth concept remains constant across domains.25 However, if 25 This is to stop the view from slipping into the view that ‘true’ has a number of distinct meanings, 8 these considerations are correct, it does not seem that it does. I propose that these considerations leave us with is the idea that the global, unrestricted platitudes are expressive of the concept of truth itself, and the restricted, local platitudes are expressive of a concept which, whilst not worthy of being truth itself, is certainly worthy of being considered a closely related notion. Later on, I will suggest that this notion is best captured as a truth-determining property, but, for now, let us consider the second view on the table: Michael Lynch’s ‘functionalist’ proposal.26 3.2 Lynch’s Functionalist Theory Lynch’s functionalist theory, as proposed in Lynch 2009, differs from Wright’s view in that it does not identify truth with the domain-specific properties that are taken to satisfy the truth platitudes, or realise the truth role. Lynch holds that we ought to conceive of truth as a single property, that is held distinct from all the domain-specific properties. On the functionalist view, whilst there may be a different story to tell about how, say, mathematical propositions get to be true from the story told about how moral propositions get to be true, these propositions, if they are true, are all in possession of the very same truth property. Lynch does share with Wright the important view that the concept of truth is captured by a set of platitudes about truth, although Lynch prefers a slightly different list composed of: Objectivity: The belief that p is true if, and only if, with respect to the belief that p, things are as they are believed to be. Warrant Independence: Some beliefs can be true but not warranted and some can be warranted without being true. Norm of Belief : It is prima facie correct to believe that p if and only if the proposition that p is true. End of Inquiry: Other things being equal, true beliefs are a worthy goal of inquiry. (Lynch 2009: 8-12) However, according to Lynch, we ought to take the truth platitudes (or the ‘truish features’ in his words) to specify the nature of the truth property, as well as the nature of the truth concept: the functionalist...can claim that there is a single property and concept of truth. The property being true (or the property of truth) is the property that has the truish features essentially or which plays the truth-role as such. (Lynch 2009: 74) a view which neither Wright nor Lynch think is promising. See, e.g. Lynch 2009: Ch. 3. 26 There are other problems noted for Wright’s view in the literature, some more serious than others. For objections see Tappolet 1997, 2000 and Lynch 2006. For rejoinders and discussion see Beall 2000, Pedersen 2006, Edwards 2008 and 2009 and Cotnoir 2009. 9 Lynch does not want to disregard the ‘domain-specific’ properties, such as correspondence and superassertibility, that we saw Wright identify truth with. But Lynch does not want to identify truth with these properties, rather he wants to say that truth is manifested in these properties: this approach allows the functionalist to claim that truth is, as it were, immanent in ontologically distinct properties. Let us say that where property F is immanent in or manifested by property M, it is a priori that F’s essential features are a subset of M’s features. (Lynch 2009: 74) Lynch’s view thus requires that the truth features - as expressed in the characterisation of the truth property - are a subset of the features of the particular domain-specific properties. That is, each of the properties that, in Lynch’s terms, ‘manifest’ truth in a domain, must contain the truth property as a proper part. So, for example, for superassertibility27 to manifest truth, it would have to be part of the features of superassertibility that the belief that p is superassertible if, and only if, things are as they are believed to be; that some beliefs can be superassertible but not warranted and some can be warranted without being superassertible; that it is prima facie correct to believe that p if and only if the proposition that p is superassertible; and that, other things being equal, superassertible beliefs are a worthy goal of inquiry. If the above considerations concerning the restricted and unrestricted interpretations of the truth platitudes are correct, it seems as though Lynch also has a problem. This is because the specification of the truth property requires that the truth platitudes that compose it are read unrestrictedly; that is, it is a crucial part of Lynch’s view that the truth property itself is not annexed to any specific domain. But, in line with what was said above, if the domain-specific truth-manifesting properties exhibit the truth features, they cannot exhibit them unrestrictedly, because none of the properties manifest truth in all domains. Consequently, as they only manifest truth in specific domains, they can only be said to exhibit the truth features for those domains in which they manifest truth. For example, suppose that superassertibility manifests truth just in the moral domain, and consider the ‘Norm of Belief’ platitude. It is not part of the features of superassertibility that it is prima facie correct to believe that p iff the proposition that p is superassertible. On the view we are supposing, this is only part of the features of superassertibility in the moral domain; in other domains, different properties will ground the norm of belief. What we should say instead is that it is part of the features of superassertibility that, in the moral domain, it is prima facie correct to believe that p iff the proposition that p is superassertible. But, of course, this is to restrict this feature of superassertibility to a specific domain, which is to restrict the feature of truth 27 Note that Lynch prefers the term ‘superwarrant’ to ‘superassertibility’, but, for ease of use, I will continue to use ‘superassertibility’. 10 in question to a specific domain. At the very most, then, the ‘truth’ features which superassertibility, in this case, can manifest must be restricted to a specific domain. Consequently, at most, the property of superassertibility can manifest a restricted truth property (perhaps moral truth, in this case). But this is not the result Lynch needs; he needs superassertibility - and all the domain-specific properties - to manifest the generic truth property. That is, he needs them to contain the features of the domainfree truth property as a proper part. The generic truth property, however, is composed of the unrestricted readings of the truth platitudes, and, thus, to manifest truth, a property must contain these features as a proper part. But, it seems, this cannot be done: at most they can manifest a property composed of restricted readings of these platitudes which, as we saw above, may constitute a notion closely related to truth, but, unfortunately, not truth itself.28 The problem for Lynch’s view, then, is that the claim that truth is manifested in the domain-specific properties ends up in tension with the claim that truth is a property independent of any domain-specific annexing. The problem for Lynch’s view, then, is that the claim that truth is manifested in the domain-specific properties ends up in tension with the claim that truth is a property independent of any domain-specific annexing. Both Wright’s and Lynch’s views suffer because they either try to identify truth with the domain-specific properties (Wright), or maintain that truth is to be considered a part of those properties (Lynch). I will now move on to outline a view - ‘simple determination pluralism’ - which aims to avoid these problems.29 4 The Structure of Simple Determination Pluralism 4.1 Simple Determination Pluralism’s Truth Property The first issue to address is what account simple determination pluralism gives of the truth property. Simple determination pluralism occupies the same ground as Lynch’s functionalism on this point, in that it states that the nature of the truth property is captured by the truth platitudes. When questioned about the nature of truth, the simple determination pluralist will thus be able to say things like: Truth is the property that is the goal of inquiry. 28 One could, of course, reject the platitudes altogether - a strategy hinted at by Pedersen (2010: 100), particularly in response to the debate between C.D. Wright (2005) and Lynch (2005). But this leaves the pluralist with the hard problem of how to identify the domain-specific properties without the platitudes - the platitude strategy being a strategy prominent in a number of cases, see, e.g. Lynch 2001a and 2004, Jackson 1998, Lewis 1979. 29 I should note that the view I will present is not the only other option on the table. For example, Pedersen (2010) explores taking the truth property to be a disjunction of all the domain-specific properties - i.e. a proposition is true iff it corresponds, or is superassertible, or coheres, etc. For discussion of proposals of this sort see Lynch 2009: Ch.3. 11 Truth is a property that is distinct from justication. Truth is a property that is distinct from warranted assertibility. The proposition that p has the property of being true if and only if p. To have the property of being true is to tell it like it is. To assert p is to present p as possessing the property of truth. 30 These features, and others like them, will tell us all that there is to know about the essential features of the truth property. In response to the question of what the truth property is, the simple determination pluralist will be able to give an elucidation of the property by reference to the list of features given by the platitudes about truth, but will have no response to any further questions about what the nature of truth is. Accordingly, we can think of the truth property as a ‘simple’, non-reducible property. It is just the property that necessarily has the truth features.31 The truth property thus should not be identified with any of the domain-specific properties (like correspondence, coherence or superassertibility): there is only one property that has the pedigree to be the truth property, and that is just the simple property that necessarily has the truth features. However, as we will see, these domain-specific properties will have an important role in explaining why it is that propositions are true.32 4.2 The Truth Property and Domains of Discourse According to simple determination pluralism, then, the truth property is just the property that necessarily has the truth features. Now we must address the question of how it is that propositions get to have this property. The first thing to note is that simple determination pluralism aims to maintain the basic pluralist thought that natural language contains different domains of discourse, but to reconcile this thought with the idea that there is a single truth property that all true propositions share. The thought 30 These are all taken to be consistent with Wright’s truth platitudes cited above. We may also want to include claims like ‘truth is the property that is the goal of inquiry’, and ‘truth is the property that is preserved by valid inference’, though these may be more contentious. 31 As the truth features are expressive of the unique aspects of truth, it is part of the view that there is just one property that necessarily has the truth features - at least as they are phrased in the truth platitudes (i.e. unrestrictedly). In other words, any property which has these features is necessarily the very same property as the simple determination theorist’s truth property. 32 One might worry that this property is dangerously close to the lightweight property proposed by deflationism. It is worth noting that Lynch’s functionalism faces this concern too. Lynch claims that the robustness of the truth property, on his view, lies in the fact that it is manifested in other properties - a fact that is not simply read off from the truth platitudes (Lynch 2009: 83-4). If this approach is satisfactory, presumably the simple determination pluralist can offer a similar response by holding (as we will see) that, according to simple determination pluralism, the truth property is determined by other properties - also a fact that cannot be read off from the truth platitudes. Note also that the fact that truth is determined by other properties gives us a substantial explanatory story to tell about the properties in virtue of which propositions are true, something which is not offered on a deflationary account, and which ought to assist the simple determination pluralist in avoiding the pitfalls of deflationism briefly noted above. Of course, these issues require fuller consideration in a separate study. 12 is that propositions - insofar as they are true - are held to by a pluralist to always be true in some way, so there must be an explanation of what way it is - or in virtue of which property it is - that the proposition or belief is true. An analogy to help explain this is winning.33 Winning, or the property of being a winner, seems to be a fairly non-reducible property. It is a property that is highly desirable in itself and it is a property that one can get in a variety of different ways, depending on the game being played. What it takes to be a winner in a game of pool (e.g. potting the black before your opponent) is very different from what it takes to be a winner in a race (crossing the finish line first). The property of being a winner plausibly remains the same, though, despite the fact that is determined by the possession of different properties in different games. It is important to note that, despite the relationship between winning and the ‘win-making’ properties in each game, the property of winning ought not to be identified with those properties, nor considered to be manifested in those properties. We can minimally define winning as the property that players of all games aim to possess in playing their respective games. We can also say that, for each particular game, there will be a ‘win-making’ property such that the possessor of that property will automatically possess the property of being the winner in that game. In the case of pool, for example, the ‘win-making’ property could be defined as potting the black before your opponent (after potting all of your own balls, of course). This property is considered a distinct property from the property of being a winner, and it is not supposed that this property contains the property of being a winner as a proper part. This is how we ought to think about truth on the simple determination pluralist view. We hold that the achievement of being true is always the same, regardless of the domain of discourse we are considering: it always consists in the possession of the same single truth property. However, what will change from one domain to another will be the property which gets the proposition the truth property, just as the property which gets a player to be the winner changes from game to game.34 33 An analogy between truth and winning was originally emphasized by Dummett (1978). The analogy is useful given the similarity between the normativity of the property of winning (in that the aim of a game is (usually) to win), and the normativity of truth (in that the aim of belief or assertion is (usually) truth). 34 It is important to note that simple determination pluralism is not second-order functionalism (the view of truth of which is expressed by Lynch 2001a, 2004, 2005, 2006). For one thing, the simple truth property is not a second-order property: it is the property that exhibits the truth features, not the property of having a property that exhibits the truth features. Accordingly, simple determination pluralism is not open to the main objections to second-order functionalism. Lynch (2009) demonstrates that the main problem for the view is that the second-order truth property (the property of having a property that realises truth) does not itself satisfy the truth platitudes, thus leaving it unfit to be considered a truth property. As, according to simple determination pluralism, the truth property is defined as the property that necessarily has the truth features, this problem is avoided. 13 4.3 Determining Truth We must now address the question of how it is that propositions get to have the truth property, and how this changes from domain of discourse to domain of discourse. We can return to our analogy with games to find one way of explaining this. We can hold that, for a particular domain that passes basic tests of syntactic discipline, there will be a ‘truth-making’ property, the possession of which will bring with it the possession of the property of being true. This ought to maintain the separation between the truth property and the domain-specific properties, whilst staying true to the idea that our analysis of the truth of propositions ought to be different from one domain of discourse to the next. This is the basic idea, but - in order to avoid confusion with other theories,35 and for reasons to be discussed below - I propose to call the domain-specific properties ‘truth determining’ properties, as opposed to ‘truth-making’ properties. Possession of the truth-determining property in a domain must be both necessary and sufficient for the possession of the truth property in a domain. In other words, in, say, the material world domain, we want possession of the correspondence property to be both necessary and sufficient for the possession of the truth property.36 We can demonstrate this as follows. Take the (E) platitude once more: (E) hpi is true iff p. We then take its restricted version: (Ed1) hpi is true (in D1) iff p. Supposing that D1 is a correspondence domain, we get the following model: (Ed1C) hpi corresponds to the facts (in D1) iff p. Then, using transitivity of the biconditional, from (Ed1) and (Ed1C) we can get the following: (TC) hpi is true (in D1) iff hpi corresponds to the facts (in D1). 35 I refer here to the independent discussion of truthmakers, see, e.g. Beebee and Dodd 2005. In truthmaker theory, every true proposition is taken to have a truthmaker (usually construed as a fact) which grounds the truth of that proposition. Simple determination pluralism is not incompatible with such a view - at least in certain domains - but it would hold that the truthmaker for a proposition (as a fact) would be the ground of the proposition possessing the truth-making property (or, in my terms, the truth-determining property) for its domain, and hence the truth property. 36 If the possession of correspondence is only necessary for truth in the material world domain, we might get propositions which correspond to the facts, but that are not true. If it is only sufficient, we might get propositions that are true but that do not correspond to the facts. Neither of these situations looks favourable, as the role of the correspondence property in accounting for the truth of propositions looks decidedly confused. 14 (TC) gives us the desired result: a property the possession of which is both necessary and sufficient for the possession of the truth property in domain D1. We can note that (TC) should not be taken as a statement of identity. We should read it in much the same way as we would read the following biconditional: (WR) In a race: x is the winner (in that race) iff x crosses the finish line first (in that race). In other words, we ought to think of the right-hand side of the biconditional as specifying the conditions under which the left-hand side is satisfied. In the case of (WR), the right-hand side specifies the property an individual, x, must have in order to have the property of being the winner. Likewise, in the case of (TC), the right-hand side specifies the property a proposition, p, must have in order to have the property of being true. We can say, then, that there is an order of determination in the biconditionals in question. A plausible case of a biconditional with an order of determination is the following: (C) hp & qi is true iff hpi is true and hqi is true.37 (C) specifies the truth conditions for conjunction, in the form of a biconditional. There is an order of determination in the biconditional, as what explains the truth of hp & qi is the truth of the components, hpi and hqi. To put the point slightly differently, the truth of the right-hand side determines the truth of the left-hand side, but not vice-versa: the fact that hp & qi is true does not explain why hpi is true, and why hqi is true. We should read biconditionals like (TC) in a similar fashion. What (TC) essentially says is that the truth of a proposition in domain D1 is dependent on that proposition’s having the property of corresponding to the facts: a proposition will be true in domain D1 just in case it has the property of corresponding to the facts. In addition, possession of the property of corresponding to the facts determines the truth of a proposition, and also plays a significant role in explaining why that proposition is true. With this account in hand, we can see why we should refer to these domain-specific properties as truth-determining properties; the properties that determine the possession of the truth property. 4.4 Identifying the Truth-Determining Properties We have a distinction, then, between the truth property (captured by the unrestricted truth platitudes) and the truth-determining properties (the properties that are responsible for establishing the propositions in a domain which possess the truth property). We must now address the question of how we identify the truth-determining properties within each of the domains. 37 The order of determination in biconditionals like (C) is also discussed in Edwards 2008. 15 We can get some guidance by looking at what was said earlier in relation to Wright and Lynch’s views. If we are operating within the framework of alethic pluralism, we are comfortable with the idea that properties like correspondence and superassertibility have important roles to play when it comes to accounting for the truth of propositions in certain domains. The problem - as we have seen with Wright and Lynch - is to explain just how they are able to do so. Using notions like identity and manifestation did not not seem to work, as those notions required satisfaction of the unrestricted truth platitudes, whereas properties like correspondence and superassertibility could only satisfy the restricted versions. However, it is interesting to note that - in both those cases - there was taken to be no problem establishing that properties like correspondence and superassertibility were able to satisfy the restricted versions of the truth platitudes. What simple determination pluralism does is embrace this fact already established - that these properties satisfy the restricted platitudes - and say that they need do nothing more. The thought thus is that the domain-specific truth-determining properties are identified by their ability to satisfy the restricted interpretations of the truth platitudes, and thus, whilst they do not count as properties of truth, globally conceived, they still have the status of being the properties in virtue of which propositions in those domains get to be true. In other words, they explain how propositions in the domains in question get to be true - they are true because they possess the relevant truth-determining property for their domain. These properties have this status due to their ability to satisfy the localized truth platitudes, which essentially give the job description for the property that any proposition in the domain in question must have in order to be true. However, as we have noted, these properties should not be identified as truth properties, as they only satisfy the restricted platitudes, not the unrestricted platitudes. Whilst, according to simple determination pluralism, these properties are essential in the story told about why a proposition is true, they are not identical to the truth property itself, and nor do they manifest the truth property. Here, then, is the picture. The truth-determining property in a domain is identified by its ability to satisfy the restricted truth platitudes (restricted to that domain). Possession of this property will bring with it possession of the truth property (just as possessing the property of crossing the finish line first in a race brings with it the property of being the winner in that race). The truth-determining properties, which must satisfy the restricted, localized versions of the truth platitudes, are contrasted with the truth property itself, which is identified by its ability to satisfy the unrestricted, global interpretations of the truth platitudes. As has been proposed above, according to simple determination pluralism, the only property that has the pedigree to be considered a truth property, so conceived, is the simple property that necessarily has the truth features. 16 This property - truth - is not tied to any story about domains of discourse, and requires no revision of the folk platitudes about truth. Consequently, it should be worthy of the title of a truth property on any theory of truth, whether pluralist or not, and thus fits the bill of satisfying the truth platitudes which are designed to reflect pre-theoretical thoughts about truth. 4.5 Simple Determination Pluralism, Minimalism, and Functionalism By maintaining the distinction between the truth property and the truth-determining properties, simple determination pluralism is able to avoid the problems we noted for Wright and Lynch’s views. In fact, it uses the criticism of those views - that the domainspecific properties are only able to satisfy the restricted truth platitudes - as a strength. It takes this on board and specifies these properties as truth-determining properties, held distinct from the truth property, which does not participate in any restriction to domains. This preserves the ability of truth to be preserved as a notion characterised by the unrestricted platitudes, thus avoiding the pitfalls of minimalism and functionalism. 5 Summary Using the notion of truth-determation gives us the sketch of a pluralist theory of truth which does not suffer from the problems of Wright’s minimalism or Lynch’s functionalism. This model of determination also provides us with a new model for pluralist theories in general, one which is recognisably distinct from the standard functionalist proposals. A key concern for pluralist theories for any subject matter is the reconciliation of unity and diversity: unity in the sense that the different ways of being x must recognisably be ways of being x, and diversity in the sense that the different ways of being x must all be different ways of being x. The determination model offered by simple determination pluralism gives a clear account of both unity and diversity. Unity is given by the simple account of the property of being x - which is possessed by all things that are x - and diversity is provided by the different properties that determine x in the various circumstances (whatever they are required to be). Whether or not the benefits simple determination pluralism gives us in the truth debate can cross over to other debates is a matter for further discussion. However, the model is adaptable, and if it offers a solution to the general need to reconcile unity and diversity in the case of truth, there is perhaps reason to be optimistic about its utility elsewhere.38 38 I would like to thank Patrick Greenough, Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright for very helpful discussions and comments. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for the The Southern Journal of Philosophy for their comments. 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