Abstract
After a brief presentation and discussion of two versions of Newcomb's problem, I examine the analyses proposed by Levi (1975). Horgan (1981), and Kyburg (1980). I argue that the first two are not genuine solutions to the problem, but that the third, if appropriately elaborated and modified, is correct.
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This paper was written under a grant from the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School, which I gratefully acknowledge.
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Eells, E. Newcomb's many solutions. Theor Decis 16, 59–105 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141675
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141675