Abstract
I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequate conceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy a methodological standard – roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed.
This paper was written, in part, under a grant from the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which I gratefully acknowledge. I would also like to thank James H. Fetzer for many useful suggestions which improved an earlier draft, and Michael Byrd for useful discussions.
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Eells, E. (2010). Probabilistic Causality and Causal Generalizations. In: Eells, E., Fetzer, J. (eds) The Place of Probability in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 284. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_1
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