Abstract
The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider’s argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley’s argument rests on the same premise as Sider’s argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibility of simples. Once you stick it all together, you get an absurd consequence. I then survey the possible lessons we could draw from this, arguing that whichever one you take yields an interesting result.
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Notes
This assumption is uncontroversial. Only ontological nihilists (O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens 1995) will dissent, but they are a rare breed. Moreover, they would have little interest in VA in any case, for it would be odd to worry about the vague existence of things, and how it bears on when those things compose, given that no things exist.
Also an uncontroversial assumption. Only ontological nihilists and those who endorse the necessity of existential monism (that the universe is just one big mereological simple (Schaffer 2007)) will deny it. Again, monists are a rare breed. And, again, they will have little interest in vague existence (for by necessity there is only ever definitely one thing) and the answer to the special composition question (as monism is compatible with any answer to that question, including universalism or whatever you care to mention (see Schaffer 2007, p. 178n11)).
Unless you endorse ontological nihilism (see n1). So you might take this argument just to indicate that there can’t be anything whatsoever, although that would be a radical conclusion.
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Effingham, N. Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument. Philos Stud 154, 241–250 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9523-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9523-2