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Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality

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Abstract

The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of the view that no individual ought to be worse off other than because of a fault or choice of his or her own. I argue that these two characterizations of luck egalitarianism are not equivalent and that, properly understood, luck egalitarianism is compatible with widespread, potentially radical, inequalities in brute luck.

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Notes

  1. That is to say, if someone is better off than another there is injustice or unfairness in the case that others lacked an equal opportunity to be as well off as they are (the absolute level of which is not important). By ‘opportunity’ I mean, as luck egalitarians do, the possibility of something being obtained through choice rather than the fallout of risk unconnected with choice. Of course, an individual may lack the opportunity to be as well off as the best off because of past choices they have made. Luck egalitarianism does not, obviously, imply that individuals ought to enjoy equal opportunities in such cases, only that, at some prior point, individuals enjoyed that opportunity and that they can justly lose it only through their own responsible choices.

  2. Note, also, that the egalitarian mantra entails equality on two levels – an equal opportunity to be equal with others. It is not sufficient for the egalitarian mantra, therefore, that an individual has merely some opportunity to avoid being worse off than others; this opportunity must itself be no worse than the opportunity the better off have/had to be as well off as they are.

  3. In later work Cohen explains that the substance of his view is inadequately expressed by this earlier statement. He explains that, as an egalitarian, he objects to “inequalities that are caused by (brute) luck,” as opposed to the influence of brute luck per se (Cohen 2006, p. 439, my emphasis). Insofar as Cohen’s revised statement of egalitarian concern still expresses the thought that egalitarianism requires equality in brute luck it is a relevant target of the discussion. Because extinguishing/eliminating brute luck is a way in which brute luck is equalized, the conclusions of the paper apply in the same measure to either view. For discussion of the difference between the elimination and the equalization of brute luck see Hurley (2003), Chapter 6.

  4. Elizabeth Anderson, for instance, whose work prompted the introduction of very label ‘luck egalitarian’, groups Rakowski together with the set of views she identifies under the luck egalitarian umbrella. See Anderson (1999)

  5. Rakowski follows this statement with a series of conditionals; however none of those conditionals reconciles brute luck equalisation with the egalitarian mantra.

  6. Of course, whilst it is unfair for Oscar to be better off than others, neither brute luck equalization nor the egalitarian mantra maintain that it is unfair for Shane to be worse off than others. For a luck egalitarian view that suggests it is unfair for Shane to be worse off than others in virtue of his gift see Eyal (2007) p 12–13. Eyal argues that although we might have reasons not to compensate individuals for making philanthropic gifts, reasons of egalitarian fairness are not among them.

  7. It is worth briefly clarifying option luck as it is apt to be misunderstood. Option luck, on Dworkin’s original construal, is a matter of calculated gambles. One important dimension of option luck is, therefore, that there is some uncertainty with respect to what a given payoff will be. Not all of our choices are like this, however. We sometimes make choices in which there is no uncertainty with respect to the consequences that will result. For ease of explication, I will understand ‘option luck’ to cover both gambles to which there are risks attached and choices in which there is no uncertainty of risk with the respect to the expected payoff.

  8. One might offer a further objection that runs as follows. The fact that Shane alone chooses to give to others does, in fact, represent an unfair advantage that is condemned by the egalitarian mantra, in virtue of the fact that Shane has a greater disposition to give than others. If Shane is disposed to give and others are not (or less so), then Shane is disadvantaged relative to others because of his lower probability of receiving gifts. Shane’s worse brute luck (explained by Shane not receiving a gift where others do) is therefore explained by his lacking an opportunity to be as well off as others (others’ lower dispositions to give relative to Shane). As such, in this case, inequalities in brute luck and the failure of the egalitarian mantra do not come apart in the way that I have argued. Let us stipulate, then, that Shane in fact has precisely the same disposition to give as the others; the difference between them is only that Shane chooses to give and the others do not. This still might not satisfy the objector here, however. It might be pressed that the very fact that Shane chooses to give and others do not entails a greater disposition to give on Shane’s part. I do not believe this is plausible. The very fact that people can choose in opposition to their dispositions demonstrates this. However, notice that even if we grant the view that Shane’s choosing to give reflects his greater disposition to give this will not in fact contest the argument of the paper. To explain, if Shane’s giving when others don’t give is to some extent explained by his greater disposition to give then this represents both unequal brute luck and unfairness according to the egalitarian mantra (Shane has lesser opportunities to be as well off as the better off). But Shane’s choice itself also creates brute luck. This brute luck is consistent with the egalitarian mantra precisely because Shane has the opportunity to avoid the comparative disadvantage created by that choice. So the objection, if successful, shows only that some unfair opportunity (judged by the egalitarian mantra) always accompanies unequal brute luck, even when that brute luck is of the sort found in cases like Shane’s. It does not succeed in showing that all unequal brute luck is also condemned by the egalitarian mantra. The objection therefore does not undermine the argument of the paper.

  9. A fact to which Lazenby’s paper is explicitly sensitive.

  10. Vallentyne (1997), p. 329.

  11. What’s more, this opportunity is relevantly identical to (and hence equal with) the opportunity Leonard had to nudge Floyd’s cupcake into the water. Issues concerning the fact that Floyd’s opportunity to level down comes after Leonard’s opportunity (that he takes) to ‘get ahead’ in the cupcake stakes are dealt with below.

  12. The argument here is that is no distributive injustice in the distribution between Floyd and Leonard. This is independent of whether there is any non-distributive injustice. Whenever one individual affects another in negative ways there is a question regarding whether the other-affecting act in question is just or unjust. In the example of Leonard and Floyd, it might be thought that Leonard’s knocking Floyd’s cupcake into the sea is an unjust act. If Floyd acts to knock Leonard’s cupcake into the sea it might be thought that this is an act that restores justice. This would seem to be in contradiction with my claim that the distribution between Floyd and Leonard is not unjust (because Floyd has an equal opportunity to affect Leonard’s cupcake holdings). But there is no contradiction here, strictly. Leonard may well act unjustly but he does not thereby create distributive unfairness (or, more precisely, distributive unfairness arises only if Floyd’s knocking Leonard’s cupcake into the sea is not a reasonable option for him. If that is not a reasonable option for Floyd, he should not be held justly liable for any comparative disadvantage that results from his refraining from taking it.)

  13. Of course, it would be possible to redefine brute luck in terms of comparative advantage rather than non-comparative advantage. So defined, there is no inconsistency between equal brute luck and the egalitarian mantra. However, redefining brute luck in this way would not contest the argument of the paper: namely that there is a distinction between equality of brute luck (understood non-comparatively, as Dworkin specifies it) and equal opportunity for comparative advantage and that the latter is a more favourable way of expressing egalitarian concern. It’s worth noting, additionally, that redefining brute luck in terms of comparative advantage would deprive us of a conceptual resource for capturing unchosen non-comparative advantage/disadvantage. Indeed, if we did revise the label ‘brute luck’ to refer to comparative rather than non-comparative advantage, do we execute the same revision with respect to option luck? If we keep a non-comparative reading of option luck (as given by Dworkin) whilst using brute luck to refer to comparative advantage then option luck and brute luck cease to remain the counterparts, defined in opposition to one another as they are in the Dworkin’s original specification of those terms. If, alternatively, we also redefine option luck in terms of comparative advantage (in the case of option luck, the comparative advantage that is the fallout of deliberate and calculated gambles) then we are forced into propositions that certainly look odd in relation to how luck egalitarianism is ordinarily conceived. Under the comparative reading of option luck, if an individual takes a gamble that leads to not only good consequences for his/herself but also, in equal measure, for all others, then that individual does not experience good option luck. After all, the individual in question enjoys no comparative advantage. Nor, even, could we say that the other individuals who gain from the fallout of this individual’s risk enjoy any good brute luck. For none among them enjoy any comparative advantage. Any ‘luck’ here is neither option luck nor brute luck but what one might call ‘non-comparative’ luck (which in the case of the individual taking the gamble is choice-related and in everyone else’s case is choice-independent). None of this is incoherent, though there are legitimate questions with respect to whether it is conceptually helpful.

  14. Taking account of other-affecting choice presents a further, and interesting, question for the luck egalitarian view. Option luck, as luck egalitarians deploy it, is concerned with the self-affecting consequences of individual choice. It is a matter of the self-affecting consequences of choice that it is reasonable to expect an individual to anticipate and avoid. The demand that such consequences be reasonably anticipatable reflects an epistemic constraint on the inequality justifying power of individual choice. Under this view it must be reasonable to expect an individual to anticipate the self-affecting consequences of their choice in order for those consequences to represent option luck for that individual. Once the significance of other-affecting choice is drawn into focus, however, the set of epistemic constraints is potentially expanded. If it is the egalitarian mantra that ought to be of fundamental egalitarian concern, rather than brute luck equality, then it is worth enquiring whether the set of such epistemic constraints also ought to include the anticipation of the other-affecting consequences of an individual’s choice.

  15. The former holds that it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own; the latter holds that it is not unjust if some are worse off because of a fault or choice of their own.

  16. This reflects the demand that the opportunities to avoid being worse off than any other are equal opportunities.

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Elford, G. Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16, 139–149 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9331-6

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