Abstract
Some philosophers argue that the thesis of content externalism, according to which the contents of a subject’s thoughts are in part individuated by environmental factors, threatens the standard idea that a subject can know the contents of her thoughts without empirical investigation. It is typically assumed, however, that this thesis does not threaten another common idea about privileged access: that a subject can know the phenomenal character of her experience–its “what it’s like” aspect–without empirical investigation. That is, even if content externalism is true and does imply that a subject cannot know without empirical investigation the contents of some of her thoughts (e.g., her thoughts about water), surely she can know without empirical investigation what it’s like for her to be having whatever experience she is having. I argue that if content externalism threatens privileged access to content (I do not discuss whether it does), then it also threatens privileged access to phenomenal character. My argument does not involve claiming that phenomenal character is itself externally individuated. Rather, it depends on two other claims: (1) that introspective access to phenomenal character is conceptual; and (2) that standard arguments for content externalism suggest that some phenomenal concepts are externally individuated.
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Ellis, J. Content externalism and phenomenal character: a new worry about privileged access. Synthese 159, 47–60 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9067-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9067-3