Abstract
A theory of morality acceptable to humanists must be one that can be accepted independently of religion. In this paper, I argue that while there is such a theory, it is a non-standard one, and its acceptance would have some far-reaching consequences. As one might expect, the theory is similar to others in various ways. But it is not the same as any of them. Indeed, it is a radically new theory. Like Hume’s ethics, it is founded on our natural sociability, and feelings of empathy for others. Like Aristotle’s theory, it incorporates an ethics of virtue. Like Kant’s theory, it regards the set of moral principles as those appropriate for a socially ideal society. But unlike Kant’s theory, it is essentially utilitarian. I call it ‘social contractual utilitarianism’.
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Notes
For definitions of the relevant social and moral concepts, see Ellis 2009: 150–54
Aristotle’s moral theory is sometimes described as a ‘virtue ethics’. For the virtues played an important role in Aristotle’s conception of the good. However, they should not be equated with the moral virtues. They include the moral virtues, of course, but, for Aristotle, the virtues of human beings are those that are characteristic of good people. They include not only the moral virtues, but also a wide range of skills and capacities that could be developed and put to various ends—good as well as bad
References
Aristotle. Nichomachean ethics. Book 1.
Ellis, B. D. (2009). The metaphysics of scientific realism. Durham: Acumen Publishing.
Gardner, H. (2009). Presentation at the Parliament of the World’s Religions. Melbourne. See also http://www.victorianhumanist.com.au/ethicaleducation/.
Mill, J. S. (1861/1971). Utilitarianism. In S. Gorovitz (Ed.), Utilitarianism with critical essays. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill
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Ellis, B. Humanism and Morality. SOPHIA 50, 135–139 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0164-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0164-x