Skip to main content
Log in

Stag Hunts and Committee Work: Cooperation and the Mutualistic Paradigm

  • Joint Action: What is Shared?
  • Published:
Review of Philosophy and Psychology Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Contemporary philosophers and psychologists seek the roots of ethically sound forms of behavior, including altruism and a sense of fairness, in the basic structure of cooperative action. I argue that recent work on cooperation in both philosophy and psychology has been hampered by what I call “the mutualistic paradigm.” The mutualistic paradigm treats one kind of cooperative situation—what I call a “mutualistic situation”—as paradigmatic of cooperation in general. In mutualistic situations, such as the primeval stag hunt described by Brian Skyrms, every partner in a cooperative action has to do his part in order for the action as a whole to succeed. But many familiar cooperative situations—for example, serving on an academic committee—do not have this structure. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists are right that thinking about cooperation can shed light on how and why ethically sound behavior happens in human beings. But the deep connections between ethics and cooperation only come into view once we have a richer conception of our capacities for cooperation than the mutualistic paradigm provides.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Warneken and Tomasello 2006; Warneken and Tomasello 2007.

  2. Tomasello et al. 2009: 65–6.

  3. Warneken et al. 2006.

  4. There is an ongoing debate in the psychological literature about how best to describe the results of these studies and what they show. I don’t mean to take sides on that issue here. In describing the studies and their implications, I have followed the interpretations given by Tomasello, Warneken, and their co-authors.

  5. Tomasello et al. 2009: 40–41.

  6. Skyrms 2004.

  7. Tomasello et al. 2009: 98–9. The idea that rights and obligations are generated by mutualistic cooperative situations has been defended by Margaret Gilbert. See, e.g., Gilbert 2000.

  8. Bratman 1999b: 143.

  9. See Velleman 1999 and Bratman’s response in his 1999b.

  10. Bratman 1999a: 121.

  11. My use of this example is indebted to Joan Silk’s reply to Tomasello in Tomasello et al. 2009: 111–122.

  12. See Silk’s reply in Tomasello et al. 2009: 113.

  13. Silk’s reply to Tomasello in Why We Cooperate 120.

  14. The locus classicus of this response on behalf of practice-based accounts is, of course, Rawls 1999. Michael Thompson argues that Rawls’ attempt to isolate considerations “within the practice of promising” from those “outside” it threatens to assimilate the practice too much to a mere game. Thompson 2008: 174–9.

References

  • Bratman, Michael. 1999a. Shared intention. In Faces of intention: selected essays on intention and agency, 109–129. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Bratman, Michael. 1999b. I intend that we J. In faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and agency, 142–161. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Gilbert, Margaret. 2000. What is it for us to intend?. In Sociality and responsibility: New essays in plural subject theory, 14–36. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield

  • Rawls, J. 1999. Two concepts of rules. In John Rawls: Collected papers, ed. S. Freeman, 20–46. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms, B. 2004. The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, M. 2008. Life and action: Elementary structures of practice and practical thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomasello, M., C. Dweck, J. Silk, B. Skyrms, and E. Spelke. 2009. Why we cooperate. Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, David. 1999. How to share an intention. In The possibility of practical reason, 200–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press

  • Warneken, F., and M. Tomasello. 2006. Altruistic helping in young infants and chimpanzees. Science 311: 1301–1303.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Warneken, F., and M. Tomasello. 2007. Helping and cooperation at 14 months of age. Infancy 11(3): 271–294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Warneken, F., F. Chen, and M. Tomasello. 2006. Cooperative activities in young children and chimpanzees. Child Development 77(3): 640–663.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgment

For many helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am indebted to Facundo Alonso, Anton Ford, Nat Hansen, Rafeeq Hasan, Erica Holberg, Candace Vogler, and two anonymous referees for The Review of Philosophy and Psychology.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jay R. Elliott.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Elliott, J.R. Stag Hunts and Committee Work: Cooperation and the Mutualistic Paradigm. Rev.Phil.Psych. 2, 245–260 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0053-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0053-4

Keywords

Navigation