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Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning

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Abstract

In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of analysis. Moreover, we propose that, within the new paradigm, these levels of analysis reflect on each other. Bayesianism suggests a specific theoretical understanding of dual processing. Just as importantly, the duality in processing carries over to duality in function; although both types of processes compute degrees of belief, they generate different functions.

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Notes

  1. Chomsky, in contrast, proposed that competence theory strongly binds performance theory: ‘investigation of performance will proceed only so far as understanding of underlying competence permits’ (1965, p. 10). Our own views in this coincide more with Marr’s.

  2. Confidence is again a different matter. As Thompson’s latest work (Thompson 2009; Thompson et al. 2011) shows, confidence is more a matter of meta-cognitive judgment.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Jonathan Evans, Laura Macchi, and Maria Bagassi for a critical reading of a previous draft of this paper, Valerie Thompson and the University of Plymouth Thinking and Reasoning group for useful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixth London Reasoning Workshop, Birkbeck College, London, July 2011.

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Correspondence to Shira Elqayam.

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Elqayam, S., Over, D. Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning. Mind Soc 11, 27–40 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0102-4

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